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Research question: 
 
This thesis explores the reasons for the lack of democratic progress in Iraq since the 
US invasion in 2003. It seeks to address the research question why has 
Democratization in Iraq faltered?  
In doing so it explores the impediments to democracy and analyses the impact of 
these impediments in the form of: 
1.        Sectarianism and the deployment of religion as an aspect of political activity, 
asking how much sectarianism impeded democratisation in the context of Iraq? 
2.          Adjacent to this there is the lack of a democratic tradition and the weakness 
of state and civil institutions , examining how these institutions  are historically rooted 
in a rentier state tradition and how they have been attacked by a powerful insurgency 
aligned to outside influences. Many of these influences are malign, leading to the 
need to address the question about the extent to which the problem is one of the 
lack or weakness of the state; in other words is this a "stateness" problem and how 
does it impact on the process of democratisation? 
3.         Finally there is a list of other powerful impediments such as corruption, 
tribalism and a low expectation of state protection and nurturing for personal security 
and overall economic development. The thesis seeks to address the question, does 
this collection of impediments amount to an insurmountable obstacle to the evolution 
of democracy in Iraq? 
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Abstract 
The basic contention of this study is that democratization in post-2003 Iraq has 
faltered due to a multiplicity of reasons that include the role of religion in politics, lack 
of democratic tradition, weak sponsor commitment, the legacy of the dictatorial 
regime, exclusionary policies, stateness problem, interference by regional powers, 
rentier economy and sectarianism among others. Long years after toppling the 
Ba’athist dictatorial regime, the establishment of stable democratic institutions 
continues to elude Iraq. I argue that post-2003 Iraq could not completely eradicate 
the long historical tradition of despotic governance due to both deep-seated religious 
beliefs and tribal values, along with widening societal ethno-sectarian rifts which 
precluded the negotiation of firm and stable elite settlements and pacts across 
communal lines. 
 After exploring the different definitions of democracy, I discuss the adverse effects 
of these endogenous impediments to democratization; arguing that they were 
compounded by a hostile regional environment and the rise of sectarian 
fundamentalism and armed groups and militias which have mushroomed later due to 
terrorist threats and outside support. I will examine how the fear by neighbouring 
countries of a region-wide domino effect of the Iraq democratisation process caused 
them to adopt interventionist policies towards post-2003 Iraq that helped to stunt the 
growth of democracy.  
The lack of resolve and commitment by the sponsor and initiator of the post-2003 
democratic process, the United States, undermined the prospects of democratic 
consolidation. This is compounded by serious administrative mistakes such as the 
Deba’athification policy and disbanding the Iraqi army which caused a security 
vacuum that the US forces were not able to fill. This is in addition to the absence of 
strong competent leaders which the Iraqi society failed to produce. The contribution 
of this study is to identify clearly the main impediments to democratization in Iraq, 
providing the evidence for each of them. Identification of the problem is crucial for 
finding solutions which are not impossible if the right leaders, who are ready to make 
difficult decisions, emerge.   
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Prologue   
This study explores the democratization process in Iraq since the removal of 
Saddam Hussein’s regime by US forces in April 2003. The US had created an 
organization called the Organization of Human Relief and Assistance (ORHA) 
headed by a retired US general, Jay Garner, to prevent any humanitarian crisis and 
oversee the transition to Iraqi civilian rule within three months.1 But soon after the 
end of the war in May 2003, the US administration changed its mind and appointed a 
‘Civilian Administrator’ who headed what was called ‘The Coalition Provisional 
Authority’ (CPA) which administered Iraq for a year in order to lay the basis for 
democracy.2 
The civilian administrator, Paul Bremer, after consultations with Iraqi political leaders, 
appointed a 25-member Governing Council (GC) in July 2003.3 It was officially 
declared in the presence of UN envoy, Sergio de Mello. UN General Secretary, Kofi 
Anan, called the establishment of the GC ‘an important first step towards a full 
restoration of sovereignty’.4 The GC was intended to represent all political, religious, 
ethnic and regional trends, but it couldn’t in the absence of elections to legitimize its 
existence. Many important political forces remained outside the GC, such as the 
Sadrist Trend (ST), several Sunni groups, and the Ba’ath Party-(BP) or its 
successors.5 There were suggestions to expand the GC representation to include all 
                                                            
1
  Larry Diamond-Squandered Victory-Henry Halt & Company-(2005)-pp30-36 
2
  CPA regulation to rule Iraq was issued on 16/6 /2003 on the basis of UN Resolution 1483: 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/  
3
  More on Governing Council members on: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iraq/igc.htm  
4
  UN statement on 22/7/2003: http://www.un.org/sg/STATEMENTS/index.asp?nid=424  
5
  Hamid Alkifaey-Iraqi Governing Council: Pros and Cons-Alsharq Alawsat-26/7/2004: 
https://goo.gl/z8LgXh  
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groups as a prelude to elections, but Iraqi political groups represented in GC, 
together with the UN and US, decided to form an interim government to oversee 
elections for the national assembly and permanent constitution, as demanded by 
Shia religious leader, Ayatullah Sistani who insisted on elections to the national 
assembly.6 
The Governing Council served for just under a year as the country’s unelected 
legislature. It appointed a government that worked alongside the CPA. It received 
UN recognition through the UN Security Council resolutions 1483, 1500 1511.7 It 
also took Iraq’s seat at the UN. Many countries recognised it as the representative of 
the Iraqi state. Real power, however, remained in the hands of the American CPA. 
The GC tried hard to assert its authority. It entered into battles with the CPA, which 
tried, with marked success, to bypass it. Bremer didn’t implement many GC 
decisions and sometimes imposed his will on the GC as happened in the 15th of 
November Agreement.8 Another organization that played an important role then was 
the Iraqi Reconstruction Council (IRDC). IRDC was made up of Iraqi exiles who 
manned different Iraqi institutions but it reported to CPA.9 The core of IRDC was an 
organization in exile called the Iraqi Forum for Democracy (IFD)10 which aimed to 
promote liberal democracy in Iraq.11 
Working closely with CPA, the GC managed to write and adopt the Transitional 
Administrative Law (TAL)12 that called for elections on 30th of January 2005 to elect 
a national assembly tasked with writing a permanent constitution, getting it approved 
through a popular referendum on 15th of October 2005, and then calling for another 
election based on the new constitution on 15th of December 2005. The aim was to 
                                                            
6
  Paul Bremer-‘My Year in Iraq-Simon& Schuster’-(2006)-p242. Also Diamond-(2005)-op.cit.p44 
7
  UN Resolutions 1483,1500&1511. Texts can be accessed from the following links: 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1483(2003) 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1500(2003) 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1511(2003)  
8
  Diamond-(2005)-op.cit.p51. Also, the writer was present at the meeting the agreement was presented to 
the Governing Council on 15
th
 November 2003 in the house of Kurdish leader, Jalal Talabani. 
9
  Bremer-(2006)-op.cit.p32 
10
  The author was a member of both IFD & IRDC and spokesman of GC 
11
  Ali Allawi-‘The Occupation of Iraq-Yale University-(2007)-p99-100 
12
  Text of the TAL can be accessed from: https://goo.gl/7UApFd  
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put Iraq on the road to legitimate democratic politics as the UN statement of 22nd of 
July called for.13  
The UN was involved in the process in order to give it an international legality but the 
bombing of its Baghdad headquarter in August 2004, resulting in the death of 22 of 
its staff, including UN envoy Sergio de Mello, led to distancing the UN from the 
process after it closed its bureau in Baghdad. After the formation of the GC, the UN 
was sidelined by Paul Bremer who rejected all UN proposals to give more power to 
Iraqis. This US attitude angered the UN envoy, Mr de Mello, and made him bitter as 
he felt he was used to legitimize the GC and then dropped.14 
Elections were held according to the plan set out in the TAL; a 275-member national 
assembly was elected which subsequently wrote the permanent constitution that was 
approved by a popular referendum, despite objections to some of its articles by 
various groups.15 However, most people in the provinces populated by Sunni Arabs 
rejected the constitution.16 This trend revealed a sectarian-based political divide in 
the country at that earlier stage. Elections were held again in 2005, 2010 and 2014 in 
line with the constitution, parliaments were elected and coalition governments were 
formed. The US regularly said the elections were largely free and fair with ‘no 
evidence of widespread or serious fraud’.17 The UN came back to the process and 
was involved in the preparation and observation of all elections since 2005 after both 
GC and CPA called upon it to provide assistance.18  Since 2005, Iraq saw three 
elected prime ministers; one, Noori Al-Maliki, was elected twice (although his second 
term was questionable since he was not the outright winner). 
It was a momentous period in Iraq’s history when new political forces emerged. The 
Islamist parties, previously in opposition to the regime of Saddam Hussein, joined 
forces and formed the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). They were also joined by the 
                                                            
13
  UN statement-(22/7/2003)-op.cit. 
14
  Diamond-(2005)-op.cit.pp55-60 
15
  US State Department archives: http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rpt/60857.htm  
16
  Patrick Cockburn & Kim Sengupta-‘Sunni voters fail to block Iraq's new constitution’-The 
Independent-(25/10/ 2005):  https://goo.gl/Vaj3hk  
17
  BBC-27/3/2010: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/8590417.stm    
18
  UN-Iraq factsheet; http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/iraq/iraq-elect-fact-sht.pdf  
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secular Iraqi National Congress (INC), led by Ahmed Chalabi, regarded by many as 
the architect of the ‘New Iraq’ because of his perceived influence over the 
Americans.19 The largely Islamist UIA won the first elections on the 30th of January 
2005. 
Interim PM, Ayad Allawi, who had American and British support20, did not do so well. 
He got only 40 seats in the National Assembly.21 This number shrank to 25 seats in 
the following parliament.22  Since UIA became the 'biggest bloc' with 140 seats23, it 
was officially asked to nominate the PM. In April 2005, PM Allawi handed over the 
premiership to PM-elect, Ibrahim Al-Jaafari of the Islamic Da’awa Party-(IDP), who 
was chosen by UIA through an internal vote.24  
 
Elections and Fatwas 
The second elections produced a parliament and government also dominated by 
Islamist Shia parties, mainly because Iraqis voted on sectarian and ethnic lines.25 
The Shia overwhelmingly voted for UIA, which was originally formed by a committee 
of six appointed by the Ayatullah Sistani.26 Voters followed the advice of their 
religious leaders. This was widely reported at the time and documented by official 
statements, media reports and books.27  Sheikh Ja’afar Al-Ibrahimi, a popular Shia 
preacher, acknowledged in a sermon in the city of Samawa that he engaged in 
publicizing UIA and introducing its members to people who didn’t know them, even 
                                                            
19
  BBC report/Iraqi National Congress List-20/1/2006: https://goo.gl/m12DcL  
 See Also: Aram Reston-‘The Man Who Pushed America to War’-Nations Books-(2008)-p.xi 
20
  Antony Shadid-NY Times-4/2/2011: https://goo.gl/hKTdFS  
21
  Inter Parliamentary Union: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2151_05.htm  
22
  Ibid & BBC-Iraqi National List, 20/1/2006: https://goo.gl/625E7S  
23
  Inter Parliamentary Union: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2151_05.htm  
24
  Al-Jazeera-7/4/2005: http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2005/04/200849145149814789.html  
25
  Appendix-1,  
pp13,14,16,19,22,28,29,31,33,35,45,46,47,50,53,57,57,64,67,71,78,87,92,94,99,101,105,107119 
26
  Allawi-(2007)-p343 
27
  Ibid.p342. Also, Fareed Ayar, appendix-1,  p79 
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though he himself didn’t know them either, but he did that on behalf of the religious 
establishment in Najaf. ‘It’s Najaf that has gotten them into power’ he declared.28 
People thought there was a fatwa in favour of UIA. The author was a candidate in 
both the 1st and 2nd elections and he reported it to the press.29 People were told 
participation in the election had religious sanctity and voting for lists other than UIA 
would ‘bring down God’s wrath’. Even an abstention from voting would ‘throw the 
transgressor in hellfire’.30 This call was made by one of Sistani’s closest aid, Sayyid 
Ahmed al-Safi on 22nd October 2004. Al-Safi was himself a candidate within UIA, 
then Member of the National Assembly.  UIA was regarded by Ayatullah Sistani as 
an ‘electoral vehicle for the Shia and should continue in any post-election 
government as a unified grouping that would govern the country’.31  
In many areas of the south, people didn’t know the candidates, nor had they even 
seen their photos or election posters, yet they voted for any candidate standing with 
the UIA because they were told these were the wishes of Ayatullah Sistani. UIA 
election posters featured huge photos of Sistani together with the list numbers (169 
and 555) emblazoned on them.32  
The religious leadership maintained publicly that it didn’t recommend any list, but 
four of Sistani’s official representatives were candidates on the UIA ticket.33 This was 
used in the UIA election campaign to argue that this list was the one Sistani 
                                                            
28
  Videotext translation-Appendix-2:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eDSDc_L8ZF8  
29
  Bloomberg’s full text: ‘In the January vote `the religious parties issued a fatwa,'' or religious edict, 
calling on Shiites to back the United Iraqi Alliance, Hamid al-Kifai, head of the Movement for Democratic 
Society, an independent secular party, said in a Dec.1 telephone interview from Baghdad. ``There isn't one this 
time, and so we have a better chance of succeeding.’ Accessed on1st Nov 2014:   
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a9VYgcHobTcA&refer=us  
30
  Allawi-(2007)-op.cit.p342 
31
  Ibid.p343 
32
  Appendices-5,6&7 
33
  Among them were Ali As-Safi and Ahmed As-Safi  as verified by Sistani’s website-(Arabic): 
http://www.sistani.org/arabic/in-news/973/  
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favoured. Sheikh Najih Al-Abboodi, Ayatullah Sistani’s representative, said in a 
statement published by Al-khaleej newspaper and still appears on Sistani’s website, 
that the religious leader supports UIA list stating its number, 169, for more clarity to 
his followers.34  In a statement issued by the office of the ‘Scientific Seminary in 
Najaf’, the schools under Sistani’s guidance, that was published by some 
newspapers and websites, the position was very clear: ‘Ayatullah Sistani supports 
UIA’.35 The list swept the country and the four of Sistani’s representatives were 
elected to the assembly, including Ahmed As-Safi, whose sermons were broadcast 
live every Friday by many TV stations. 
The Sunni Arabs boycotted the first elections, protesting the American invasion, 
which changed the power dynamics in Iraq and treated them as a minority.36 Only 
one Sunni party, the Iraqi Islamic Party-IIP, decided to participate, although it 
demanded a delay in the elections to get organized, arguing a delay would enable it 
to compete with the more organized Shia and Kurdish parties. No delay was granted 
as the interim constitution, TAL, fixed election and referendum dates. 37   
However, Sunnis participated massively in the second elections held on 15th 
December 2005, represented by two blocs. An Islamic-leaning list, the Accordance 
Front-AF, dominated by IIP, and a secular pan-Arab bloc, the National Dialogue 
Front-NDF whose support came from those loyal to the former regime. Together, 
they got 55 seats (AF-44, NDF-11), while the Shia UIA bloc got 128 seats.38 The 
Kurds participated in full force in both elections and got 58 seats (53 for Kurdish 
Alliance and 5 for Kurdish Islamic Union).39 
Democracy or Shura? 
Politicians and electorate have been talking all along about democracy and the 
democratic experience, but it looked that every group had its own version of 
democracy which may not necessarily accord with real democracy. Islamists for 
                                                            
34
  Najih Al-Abboodi-Sistani.org: https://goo.gl/srcjAC  
35
  Statement of the ‘Scientific Seminary’-Elaph-19/1/2005: https://goo.gl/d9UvzL  
36
  Jeffrey White and Brooke Neuman-Washington Institute-13/12/2005: https://goo.gl/lWw55S  
37
 Article-2(B-2)-TAL-Refworld-: http://www.refworld.org/docid/45263d612.html  
38
  Inter Parliamentary Union: http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/reports/arc/2151bis_05.htm  
39
  Ibid  
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example talked of ‘democratic mechanisms’ as opposed to democracy.40  Some 
compared democracy to ‘shura,’41 which simply means consulting “knowledgeable” 
people.42 The political process might have looked democratic, but when it’s closely 
examined, one would have some doubts in view of the basic principles laid down in 
text books or  applied in established democracies. 
In real democracies, people choose their representatives free of pressures after a 
free and transparent election campaign. Religion and politics are separated, or in the 
words of John Stuart Mill ‘placing the direction of men’s consciences in other hands 
than those which controlled their worldly affairs’.43 Candidates must not use religious 
symbols or places of worship for political purposes. This is not exactly what has 
happened in Iraq over the last four general elections and three local elections. All the 
above criteria for democracy have been violated, including the use of religious 
symbols and places of worship which is against Iraqi law and election regulations.44  
UIA splintered into two lists prior to the elections of March 7th 2010, ‘State of Law’-
(SoL), led by PM Noori Al-Maliki, which got 89 seats, and the National Iraqi Coalition-
(NIC), which brought together the Reform Trend (RT), Sadrists Trend (ST), Supreme 
Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC), and the Fadhila Islamic Party-IFP, got 70 seats in 
2010.45 The list also included Ahmed Chalabi’s INC, who won only one seat. 
Chalabi, dubbed widely as the architect of the new Iraq, was unable to win when he 
ran alone in Dec 2005 and could only win one seat in his birth place of Kadhimiyya 
when he joined a religious list of UIA and then NIC.  
Sunni electorates were also subjected to campaigns that made them scared of the 
Shia alliance, and they voted for the tribal-religious list-Accordance Front. They fast 
developed a feeling of victimhood vis-à-vi the Shia.46 
                                                            
40
 Sami Al-Askari, Walid Al-Hilli & Adil Abdur-Rahim, Appendix-1, p19/24, p34/35/37and  p64/69-
(respectively) 
41
  Walid Al-Hilli, Ibid-p34 
42
  Akeel Abbas-appendix-1, p86.  
43
  John Stewart Mill-On Liberty-Dover Publications-(2002)-p11. 
44
 Sharwan Al-Waeli & Fareed Ayar, Appendix-1, P73 & p81 
45
  Seat distribution of 2010 parliament: https://goo.gl/IgvS1q  
46
  Fanar Hadad-Hudson Institute-4/8/2014: https://goo.gl/EVs1kw  
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The Kurds have their own fears of an Arab rule as well as an ambition of a Kurdish 
state, thus, the electorate had to vote for the two main parties: the Kurdistan 
Democratic Party-KDP- led by Masud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan-
PUK- led by Jalal Talabani and Islamist Group.  
PUK splintered into two parties prior to the elections of 2010.47 The new party, Goran 
(Change), led by Nawshirwan Mustafa, got 8 seats in the Baghdad parliament and 
25 seats in the Kurdish parliament.48 It increased its seats to 9 in Baghdad in the 
following national elections.49 Goran MP, Aram Sheikh Muhammed, has become 
deputy parliamentary speaker in Baghdad, while another Goran member, Yusuf 
Muhammed, become the speaker of the Kurdish Parliament in Erbil. KRG president, 
Masud Barzani, banned Muhammed from entering Irbil to perform his job in Oct 
2015.50 According to KRG law, Muhammed would have succeeded Barzani in the 
presidency of KRG after his term expired. Kurdish politics have become family-
based, where the Talabani and Barzani families are dominant. Talabani’s youngest 
son, Qubad, has been groomed to succeed his father as a leader of the PUK.51 He 
has become deputy PM in the Kurdistan Regional Government headed by Barzani’s 
nephew and son-in-law, Nichervan. 
 
Voters’ Motivation 
What motivated Iraqi voters was not political programmes, which hardly existed, nor 
a desire for change, since most of them didn’t have an idea what sort of change was 
ahead. Rather, it was religious, sectarian and ethnic passions and fears of the other. 
There were other pressures put on people to elect certain individuals or parties. 
These included tribal, familial and regional loyalties, in addition to international 
pressures. Religious pressures, be they personal or collective, were the most 
influential in deciding how voters voted in the Arab west, middle and south. In the 
                                                            
47
  The Majalla-The Leading Arab Magazine-16/6/2010: https://goo.gl/nZnKPU  
48
  IWPR-August-2009: https://goo.gl/NVRPUH  
49
  Assyrian International News Agency: http://www.aina.org/news/20140520151010.htm  
50
  Ekurd Daily-24/5/ 2016: http://ekurd.net/barzani-kdp-coup-iraqi-kurdistan-2016-05-24  
51
  Michael Rubin-Ekurd Daily-19/12/2012: http://ekurd.net/mismas/articles/misc2012/12/state6722.htm  
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Kurdish north, the main motive was, and still is, ethnic and irredentist.  Fear of the 
other was the main factor in people’s voting decisions.52  
The constitution was also flawed in many ways according to experts.53 It impedes 
democracy, says Dr Faleh Abdul-Jabbar, a prominent sociologist and director of the 
Beirut-based Institute for Strategic Studies. One obvious example he points to is 
Article 2. Clause A bars enacting laws that ‘contravene the established provisions of 
Islam’.54 This was demanded by Islamist parties to block any legislation that loosens 
their grip on power. Dia Shakarchi, former Islamist MP, charges that Islamists 
attempted ‘to add as much as they could of religious and sectarian colour to the 
constitution’.55 Clause-B56, which bars laws that ‘contradict the principles of 
democracy’ is not a deterrent as some secularists thought. Clause A is stronger than 
Clause-B since the former refers to a defined religious text, while the latter is a 
vague floating idea that has no well-defined reference point.57    
Islamists in parliament used Article (2A) to introduce Sharia with regards to personal 
status law and the ban of alcohol and clause (B) did not deter them as there is no 
text to refer to.58  In addition, no one can dispute what prominent clerics say because 
their opinions are obligatory on all believers.59 On the other hand, democratic 
principles are not well-defined, nor are they agreed upon among democracy-leaning 
people, let alone those who are opposed to democracy.60 Unlike Islamic principles, 
they are not sacred, so no one will enforce them outside the law. They can vary from 
one country or culture to another. Islamists always argue that each country has its 
own version of democracy and we can have our version too. Human rights 
conventions are not obligatory either. Countries can opt not to sign them if they wish 
to, so they cannot be made obligatory in Iraq. Article 2 maybe contradictory but 
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Clause ‘A’ gives more weight to clerics to interpret the religious text and when they 
form the majority, they will prevail.61    
Although there are many schools within Islam and religious texts can be interpreted 
in many ways, the fact remains that there are fixed Islamic principles agreed upon 
among Muslims, Sunni and Shia alike, since they are clearly defined in the Qura’an 
and the Sunnah. Among these are the controversial penal code, the prohibition of 
alcohol, fighting the ‘infidels’ and non-believers in Islam, negative attitude towards 
women and inheritance law. These codes pose a problem for modern democracy 
and political thought and contravene human rights conventions. Individuals may opt 
to apply some of these laws voluntarily, but a democratic state must not adopt laws 
that clearly violate human rights conventions or the principles of democracy.  
 
Dr Akeel Abbas rightly argues that ‘Democracy and religion belong to diametrically 
opposed orders of reality. The former is based on debate and questioning that leads 
to following the opinion of the majority, while protecting the rights of the minority, 
whereas latter is based on holy texts that accept no debate or questioning and pay 
no attention to the opinions of the majority or minority’.62 
Religious symbols were widely used. PM Al-Ja’afari, for instance distributed a prayer 
book, with his photograph showing him praying emblazoned on it.63 Many candidates 
were giving political speeches in mosques and religious centres.64 Preachers were 
telling people ‘if they did not vote they would be punished by God and go to hell and 
the list endorsed by the religious authority was UIA, number 169’.65 The latter story 
was widely circulated prior to the elections of 30th January and 15th December 2005 
and believed by ordinary people.  
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The Independent High Election Commission-(IHEC)-was too weak to do anything 
about such violations.66 According to its first president, Hussein Al-Hindawi, when 
IHEC fell under the control of parties, this ‘distances the democratic process from 
propriety and integrity’. Sami Al-Askari, MP, charges that IHEC ‘has never been 
independent. Once it got out of the control of UNAMI and US embassy, it entered 
into partisan quotas. Members of the former and current IHEC were candidates of 
political blocs and they represented the interests of their blocs when taking 
decisions’.67 
Secularists were too frightened to object to any violation and when they protested, 
IHEC rejected their complaints. The most prominent Iraqi secular leader, Ayad 
Allawi, protested to IHEC that UIA had violated the law, but his complaint was 
rejected.68 Allawi was portrayed in a hostile poster as looking like Saddam Hussein 
with a military uniform, marked (Ba’athist).69  
After years of “democratization” democracy has not taken roots in Iraq. On the 
contrary, democratic principles are being violated and the country is increasingly 
heading to toward a religious state. Some democratically-elected leaders have left 
the process or fled the country fearing for their freedom or lives after having been 
accused of terrorism. Former Vice President, Tarik Al-Hashimi, fled to Turkey in 
2011, and former finance minister, Rafi Al-Isawi, fled to Jordan in 2012. US 
mediation efforts to facilitate their return to Iraq to repair the political process haven’t 
succeeded.70 MP Muhammed Al-Dayni fled Iraq after being accused of planning a 
parliament explosion and MP Abdul-Nassir Al-Janabi fled to Jordan in 2007 after PM 
accused him in a parliamentary questioning of kidnapping 150 people.71 
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Others have been implicated in high-level corruption that made it impossible for them 
to stay in politics such as former defence minister, Hazim Ash-Sha’alan,72 and former 
electricity minister Ayham As-Samerraei, who escaped from prison, allegedly with 
the help of Americans.73 Some politicians resigned in silent protest at the political 
process itself such as Ja’afar As-Sadr.74  
 This shows there is a serious problem with Iraqi democracy. If those officials were 
innocent and were framed with these crimes, it’s a huge problem. If they did actually 
commit these crimes, it’s even more serious. In both cases, democratically-elected 
officials break the law and in such a flagrant way when they should be upholding it 
and setting examples for others. It means Iraq lacks nation-builders and inspiring 
leaders with the stature of the Spanish transitional leader, Adolfo Suarez, who led 
the Spanish transition to democracy successfully.  Political scientist, professor 
Kanan Makiya describes the new leaders as ‘small men with no vision. They treated 
Iraq as booty’.75 Iraq lacks visionary leaders with a firm commitment to building a true 
modern democracy. Writer and a former trade, defence and finance minister, Ali 
Allawi, says there is no national leader. ‘They are only Sunni, Shia and Kurdish 
politicians, a smattering of self-styled liberals and secularists, each determined to 
push their particular agenda forward’.76    
For the first ten years of democratization, there was no law to organize and regulate 
political parties. The law was passed in 2015 and will take effect in 2018.77 The 
democratic process runs through agreements among the leaders of political blocs 
and these agreements are subject to other factors such as having an armed wing or 
a strong foreign backer. It served the established political parties well not to have a 
law for political parties in place because it would restrict their activities, especially 
funding. MP Alia Nassif charges that some politicians use public money to fund their 
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election campaigns and ‘there are mafias run by political parties’.78 Corruption 
among politicians and government officials is common and this constitutes a problem 
for democracy. 
Some parties are strong because they have militias to protect their activities and 
personnel and perhaps impose their policies. Militias were formed or came to Iraq 
from neighbouring countries after the regime’s fall in 2003, but they have 
mushroomed after the fall of Musil in 2014 when the Shia spiritual leader, Ayatullah 
Sistani issued a fatwa of jihad against ISIS, after which militia leaders have gained a 
lot of political weight in the country.79  With so many armed militias connected to 
political parties, Iraqi democracy is in real danger. 
In 2010, Iraqia list, led by Dr Ayad Allawi, was the biggest bloc in parliament. But the 
incumbent PM, Noori Al-Maliki, rejected the outcome, requesting a recount of votes, 
claiming there was vote-rigging in favour of his opponents, although he was in 
government, not his opponents. When the recount didn’t change the results, he went 
to the Federal Court and obtained a ruling allowing the formation of parliamentary 
lists after elections, basically changing the meaning of an electoral win to his 
favour.80  Many doubted the soundness of the ruling. Experts warned that this ruling 
could create a potential for ‘endless negotiations after every election’, which means 
that elections results cannot indicate who should form the government.81 After 9 
months of wrangling, Allawi gave up his right to form the government, paving the way 
for Al-Maliki’s second term. That government didn’t achieve much because of its own 
failures and the fierce opposition it faced.   
In August 2014, Al-Maliki increased his parliamentary seats but he was forced to 
relinquish the premiership after Ayatullah Sistani intervened.82 He advised the Shia 
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National Alliance to choose a new leader after Al-Maliki looked divisive. Although his 
replacement by Haider Al-Abadi caused a rift within SoL, it eased sectarian and 
political tensions threatening to tear the country apart.83  
Aims of the Study 
Doubts began to surface about the viability of Iraqi democracy since people’s 
primary allegiance has been to the pre-modern affiliations of religions, sect and tribe, 
not to ideas. These affiliations dictated voting decisions. Worse still, there was the 
fear of the others spread by politicians eager to be elected at any cost. I began to 
feel that those who were elected to office may not actually represent the real interest 
of the people because they came to political prominence by availing themselves of 
fortuitous and expedient circumstances; in other words, through a process that 
violates the basic tenets of democracy in the name of democracy!  
This was happening under the eyes of the American sponsors who made it possible 
for all these mainly undemocratic forces to reach power through a process that may 
not have been fully democratic. Even the current modicum of democracy may not be 
maintained for long since those in power are not prepared to relinquish it under any 
circumstances.  The only power that was able to make a prime minister leave office, 
was not that of the ballot box, but the clout of the religious leader Ayatullah Sistani. 
This study has sought to find answers for many questions, the most important of 
which is whether this current state of things can develop into a true democracy.  Can 
pluralism actually exist when most of the parties are religious and undemocratic, 
ready to unite to exclude others? What are the conditions that are necessary to help 
a true democracy develop in Iraq over time? Iraqi parties in general deepened social 
and religious rifts, polarizing society so sharply to the point of triggering a civil war. 
What kind of parties does Iraq need to make democracy a viable option? 
Political parties are essential for any democracy, and their ideological differences are 
vital to energize democratic debates since these differences represent different 
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socio-political orientations in society. But this has not been the case in Iraq, reflecting 
a common trend in many developing countries. Haggard and Kaufman-(1995)-don’t 
place parties in developing countries on the same left-right dimension as is the case 
in the party system in advanced industrial countries. The authors define political 
polarization ‘by the ideological distance between parties’.84 Hussein Al-Hindawi 
contends there are no ideological differences between Islamist parties; they are one 
group.85 In other words, there are no genuine legitimate differences among religious 
parties in Iraq, failing to reflect modern socio-political orientations in the Iraqi society, 
opting instead for pre-modern allegiances and fears. 
Democracy assumes freedom. Personal, associational or political, freedom is an 
integral part of democracy, guaranteed under democratic systems.86 Under the Iraqi 
Islamists, it’s restricted. Armed masked men keep raiding nightclubs and 
professional clubs, such as that of the Literary Union, and terrorise people, beat 
them up and break furniture frequently. The last time the Literary Union, a famous 
association for Iraqi literary writers and poets, was attacked was in 2015.87 Women 
are no longer free and most of them have to dress in hijab to avoid harassment. Ms 
Hana’a Edward, head of Al-Amal Charity says "Iraqi women suffer marginalization 
and all kinds of violence, including forced marriages, divorces and harassment, as 
well as restrictions on their liberty, their education, their choice of clothing, and their 
social life".88   
Al-Fadheela Islamic Party sought to enact Sharia law on personal status and got it 
approved by the Council of Ministers.89 Some personal freedoms are non-existent 
such as changing one’s faith from Islam to another faith. Under a democratic rule, 
freedoms are guaranteed by the government. Although many Islamic scholars 
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support democracy, most Islamist parties are critical of democracy, believing only in 
its mechanisms as a way to hold power.90  
Democracy is not just about elections. It’s about electing those who can protect 
people’s rights and freedoms. They may fail in their endeavour to serve the people 
but they abide by democracy’s basic tenets. A democratic system doesn’t 
necessarily perform better than a non-democratic one. In fact democratizations 
coincided with acute economic crisis in Eastern Europe and Latin America except in 
Czechoslovakia and Chile.91  
In an environment where religion and tradition play a central role in shaping people’s 
minds and decisions, is there a place for real democracy? Can democracy work in a 
society where a high percentage is uneducated or even illiterate?92 Finally, can 
democracy actually survive without secularism that can protect it from religious 
domination?  
There has been a noticeable shift recently in people’s thinking, but it has not been 
electorally reflected. There is a new political movement, ‘the Civic Democratic 
Alliance’-(CDA)-that entered the process in 2014 election. It got thousands of votes 
nation-wide, but its share in Baghdad was only three seats, because the electoral 
system worked in favour of established parties.93 Some of its candidates got 
thousands of votes but failed to win seats in parliament, while candidates with fewer 
votes who belonged to big lists were elected.94  
In the 2010 elections, many politicians moved away from the Sunni AF to the secular 
‘Iraqiyya’. But they soon left Iraqiyya, forming another sect-based group, the Union of 
Iraqi Forces-(UIF).  Ayad Allawi has maintained his political base, albeit his 
parliamentary seats shrank from 40 in 2005 to 21 in 2014.95 
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A movement toward secularism is happening but slowly. Still, religious blocs have 
tried to appeal to voters nationally but religious rhetoric remains strong.96 They have 
adopted patriotic or civic names for their lists, abandoning their old religious names.  
Mahmoud Al-Mashhadni, a Sunni Islamist and former speaker of parliament, 
predicted that Islamist parties will ‘change their names; they will carry modern names 
and formulate political programs, thus they will overcome their failure’.97  Whether 
this perceived trend towards civic politics is permanent or even real is questionable. 
Dia Shakarchi, former MP for IDP, moved away from political Islam in 2006 but he 
didn’t win as a secular politician. Sharwan Al-Waeli left IDP-IO and formed an 
independent list in the 2014 election. He, too, didn’t win.  
Islamist parties may have changed their tactics and rhetoric, but not necessarily their 
ideologies. The electorate may have changed their perception of Islamist politicians. 
But they are still voting for them. Islamists have been in power since early 2005 and 
they made sure that the electoral arrangements, enshrined in the election law and 
IHEC, do not make room for secular or small parties to challenge their dominance 
through the ballot box. According to Przeworski-(1996) ‘democratic institutions must 
be 'fair': they must give all the relevant political forces a chance to win...they must be 
effective: They must make even losing under democracy more attractive'.98 
Election turnout has been falling, from 78% in 2005 elections, to 63% in 2010 to 52% 
in 2014.99 Is it apathy? Or disillusionment with Islamists? It’s too early to tell. I have 
been following events in Iraq closely for over three decades and written about it.100 I 
rushed to Iraq in 2003 to participate in building new institutions in pursuit of a truly 
democratic Iraq.101 But with so many hurdles in the way of democracy, I thought the 
best contribution I could make to democracy is to conduct a serious study on 
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democratization to find out the real reasons why democracy has faltered despite all 
the available opportunities, the most important of which was international support.   
If democracy is ‘not the “default mode” of humanity, but a rare occurrence 
proceeding from specific and unique historical sequences’ using the words of John 
Dunn, can this ‘rare occurrence’ succeed in Iraq?102 I have undertaken to find out 
whether democracy can co-exist with theocracy, tribalism, militarism, illiteracy and 
closed cultures. The findings are listed at the end of the thesis. As Dr Akeel Abbas 
said earlier ‘democracy and religion belong to diametrically opposed orders of 
reality’.103 They do not go hand in hand. 
Islamist MP Sami Al-Askari contends tribal values ‘don’t accord with the spirit of 
democracy and personal freedom’. He also warns that ‘religious despotism’ is the 
worst and most dangerous of all types of despotisms that humanity has ever 
witnessed over all times because ‘it simultaneously dominates the brains and 
bodies’.104 
I am also arguing that the democratic process has fared poorly in Iraq, especially 
with the threat posed by armed groups and secret militias within the political process 
itself, both of which undermine the rule of law necessary to protect any democratic 
experience. One report by the US War College estimates that the number of Shia 
militias in Iraq to be over 50.105  I have provided the evidence, from political theories, 
religious texts and political realities of Iraq to support my argument. Democratization 
can succeed in Iraq if the impediments are removed but this requires leaders strong 
enough to tackle the real problems impeding political progress in Iraq. Many 
countries have managed to overcome their problems by taking tough decisions. This 
has to happen in Iraq. 
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Chapter 2 
Methodology 
 
I have chosen the method of ‘case study’ for my research on democratization in Iraq 
for several reasons, easiness is certainly not among them since using case studies 
for research purposes, remains one of the most challenging of all social science 
endeavours.106 The method is used by many researchers, academics and institutions 
alike in order to ‘contribute to our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, 
social, political, and related phenomena’.107 Case Study research is used in all fields 
of life, and it has been a common strategy in philosophy, sociology, political science 
and social work.108   
 
It arises out of a desire to understand complex social phenomena and allows the 
investigator to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events.109 
Since the issue I am studying, the democratization process in Iraq, has many ‘why’ 
and ‘how’ questions, and since it’s a contemporary phenomenon, and because, I, the 
investigator, have no control over events, case study was the preferred strategy to 
conduct my research.110   
 
Information was gathered from many sources such as social, political and economic 
theories, experiences of other countries that democratized in the second half of the 
twentieth century, or the third wave, using Samuel Huntington’s terminology. Other 
sources included interviews with experts and current and past Iraqi politicians, both 
secular and Islamists, in government and opposition. It also compares democratic 
practices as they are developing in Iraq with the basic principles of democracy, as it 
exists in the West. 
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In social sciences, it’s essential to use a methodological framework to investigate a 
phenomenon such as democratization. Methods vary between qualitative and 
quantitative research. Some researchers mix between them to achieve their targets. 
The two may be different, but they can be used to complement each other as 
Neuman observes: 
‘Qualitative and quantitative research differ in many ways, but they complement each 
other, as well. All social researchers systematically collect and analyse empirical 
data and carefully examine the patterns in them to understand and explain social 
life’.111 
There are differences between the methods used. Neuman argues that the 
differences between qualitative and quantitative research can be noticed in the 
nature of the data, as there are different objectives between qualitative and 
quantitative, and holding different assumptions about social life.112 Social scientists 
during the last decades increased dependence on qualitative methodology in 
investigating social phenomenon.113 Qualitative research enables in-depth rather 
than general or large-scale investigation. This thesis is a qualitative study that aims 
to understand the changes, interactions and developments taking place in Iraq since 
2003.    
I have decided to regard democracy in Iraq as a 'dichotomous' variable not a 
continuous one.114 The reason is the nature of the change in 2003 which was very 
sudden; a military invasion by a superpower, and also because of the repressive 
nature of the regime that existed prior to the democratization process. No civil, 
political or economic societies existed in Iraq under the previous regime, no 
independent think tank or study centres whose information the researcher can trust. 
That’s why I needed to test every piece of information for accuracy.  
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Although some scientists believe that case studies are only appropriate for the 
exploratory phase of an investigation-(Shavelson & Townes-2002), this view is 
challenged as case studies have been used as explanatory and descriptive case 
studies-(Alison & Zilikow's Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
1999)-and descriptive case studies-(Whyte's Street Corner Society, 1943/1995).115  
Each strategy can be used for all three purposes: exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory. There can be exploratory, descriptive and explanatory case studies.116  
 
Strategies are not so distinctive since they significantly overlap and their boundaries 
are not always sharp. Three conditions distinguish strategies; hierarchy is not one of 
them. They are the type of research question posed, the extent of control an 
investigator has over actual behavioural events, and the degree of focus on 
contemporary, as opposed to historical events117. 
 
Types of Research Questions 
My research question starts with the interrogative word ‘why’ (why the democratic 
process in Iraq has faltered) and it also implies ‘what’ since I am looking for the 
reasons of this failure (what are the reasons?). Since the question focuses on 'what', 
it’s a ‘justifiable rationale for conducting an exploratory case study with the goal of 
developing pertinent hypotheses and propositions for further inquiry’.118 
 
I embarked on trying to find out whether the Iraqi democratic experiment has 
faltered. If yes, why has it, and what are the reasons or circumstances that led to its 
failure. The way ahead is to look at documentary evidence and conduct interviews. 
Yin states ‘If you wanted to know why the acts had occurred, you would have to draw 
on a wider array of documentary information, in addition to conducting interviews. If 
you focus on the 'why' question in more than one terrorist act, you would probably be 
doing multiple case studies. If you need to know how or why a governmental 
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programme had worked (or not), you would lean towards a case study or field 
experiment’.119  
 
Although a research question is a small part of the study, defining this question is 
perhaps the most important step in a research study and it requires patience and 
sufficient time to accomplish. The form of the question can provide an important clue 
to the appropriate research strategy, not forgetting the large areas of overlap among 
strategies, so that for some questions, a choice among strategies might actually 
exist.120   
 
My research extends into history, even though it’s about a contemporary issue. I 
needed to know if certain historical events have actually influenced current ones. 
Some historical events are distant and there are no living people to ask about them. 
So, when dealing with the distant ‘dead past,’ I needed to consult memoirs and 
books by former politicians or academics, newspapers and journal articles. At one 
point, I wanted to interview a living minister from the monarchy era, Abdul-Kareem 
Al-Uzri. He was in his nineties but his family said he was not in a position to be 
interviewed. Instead they have given me his book, which I’ve used in my research.121 
Histories can overlap with case studies if they are done about a contemporary event 
as my research is.122 
 
In social sciences, data collection methods are dependent on the methodological 
framework. In a qualitative enquiry, primary and secondary sources are the two main 
methods of data collection, where Primary sources are generated by means of 
asking questions and observation.123  Michael Wilson and Roger Sapsford refer to 
interviews and questionnaires as commonly used techniques to generate data by 
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asking questions.124  Glenn A. Bowen refers to ‘documents’ as an important primary 
source.125   
Bowen details the types of documents that can be used as supportive primary 
sources; ‘advertisements; agendas, attendance registers, and minutes of meetings; 
manuals; background papers; books and brochures; diaries and journals; event 
programs (i.e. printed outlines); letters and memoranda; maps and charts; 
newspapers (clippings/articles); press releases; program proposals, application 
forms, and summaries; radio and television program scripts; organisational or 
institutional reports; survey data; and various public records. Scrapbooks and photo 
albums can also furnish documentary material for research purposes’.126  I have 
used many of the above including photos and election posters, as supporting 
evidence.  
Catherine Dawson refers to information already published such as ‘research books, 
research reports, journal articles, articles reproduced online, scientific debates, and 
analyses of historical events’ as secondary sources.127      
Interviews 
Qualitative research emphasizes the need for primary or naturally occurring data, in 
which interviews and documents are major primary sources of gathered data.  
Jennifer Mason argues that interviews are among ‘the most commonly recognized 
forms of qualitative research’.128  It has a strong claim to being probably ‘the most 
widely used method in qualitative research’.129  For Catherine Dawson, there are 
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three types of Interviews: ‘unstructured, semi-structured and structured 
interviews’.130  Carolyn Mears explains that in-depth interviews are: 
‘conversations with a purpose, namely, to sit with another and learn what that 
particular individual can share about a topic, to discover and record what that person 
has experienced and what he or she thinks and feels about it’.131 
In this study, most interviews were in-depth because it would be much easier to 
analyse and interpret the discourse of interviewees’ answers. In-depth interviews 
focus on open-ended questions, which provide opportunities for both the interviewer 
and interviewee to discuss certain topics in detail. Different people make different 
observations regarding the same event while some notice things that others don’t.  I 
have conducted fifty interviews; some were face-to-face where conversations were 
open-ended, while others were via emails; where further questions were asked 
through the same method.  
Ruth Wodak states that: ‘All actors display their individuality, their self –otherwise, 
every professional in a specific field would have to act in the same way due to their 
position in the field and their acquired symbolic capital. Hence, the identity of the 
actor influences the performance as well’.132 
In the interviews for this study, some important views or observations were 
expressed or made only by one or two interviewees. Some people surprised me with 
their observations, while others have noticed other events and reached different 
conclusions. For example, MP Wahda Al-Jumaili, was perhaps the only one among 
the interviewees who raised the issue of Kurdish ambitions which she believes 
constitute a challenge to democratization in Iraq. It does, since democracy cannot be 
consolidated if there is a stateness problem and the Kurds do wish to establish an 
independent state over parts of northern Iraq.  
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Why Case Study? 
Since I was examining contemporary events where the relevant behaviour cannot be 
manipulated, the preferred method would be case study.133 ‘It uses many of the 
same techniques as history but it adds two sources of evidence, not usually included 
in the history repertoire: direct observation of the events being studied and interviews 
of the persons involved in the events’.134 I have indeed used both and interviewed 
the people who I thought were relevant to the process of democratization in Iraq for 
various reasons. Many of them were senior politicians, others were experts, clerics, 
writers or informed observers. Furthermore, a case study is even stronger than other 
methods in dealing with a full variety of evidence such as documents, artefacts, 
interviews and observation. It’s also done when the 'how' or 'why' questions are 
asked about a contemporary set of events over which the investigator has little or no 
control135, and this applies to my research.  
  
Determining the questions that are most significant for a topic and gaining precision 
in formulating these questions, require much preparations and one way is to review 
the literature on the topic (Cooper 1984).136 Literature review is a means to an end. 
Researchers and investigators review previous research in order to develop sharper 
and more insightful questions about the topic. This is what I have done throughout 
this research. As I read more literature on the subject, I needed to conduct more 
interviews and ask different and better-targeted questions.  
 
I am aware of the concerns raised about case studies and these included for 
example the lack of rigour where investigators are sloppy, failing to follow systematic 
procedures, or allowing equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction 
of the finding and conclusions. It’s said that such lack of rigour is less likely to be 
present using other strategies because of the existence of numerous methodological 
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texts with specific procedures to follow.137 I have regularly checked my information 
and used triangulation in order to guarantee accuracy. I have tried not to allow 
unattributed biased views into my research.  
 
Answers which have no basis or defy established facts are not accepted and 
interviewees are challenged about them until they provide evidence or their replies 
are not used in the research. Dr Fareed Ayar gave answers which my evidence 
stands against, so I didn’t accept them.138 Dr Al-Hindawi said ‘Gen. Franco was a 
strong believer in democracy’ and this was also rejected.139 
 
There is some confusion between case study teaching and case study research. In 
teaching materials are deliberately altered to demonstrate a particular point 
effectively (Stein 1952).140 While in research any such step is strictly forbidden. 
Every case study investigator must work hard to report all relevant evidence fairly. 
Those who accuse case study of bias may forget that bias can also enter into the 
conduct of experiment (Rosenthal, 1966) and the use of other research strategies 
such as designing questionnaire for survey (Sudman and Bradburn, 1982) or 
conducting historical research (Gottschalk 1968).141    
 
Some criticise case study because it ‘provides little basis for scientific 
generalization’, i.e. how can you generalise from a single case? But the same can be 
asked about experiment. The answer is that case studies, like experiments, are 
generalisable to theoretical propositions, not to populations or universes. When 
doing a case study, the goal is to expand and generalize theories, not enumerate 
frequencies (statistical generalization).142  The goal is to generalize and not 
particularise analysis (Lapset, Trow and Coleman-1956, pp.419-420).143  
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Although this study is about Iraq, the same findings can be found in other countries 
where circumstances are similar. i.e. some findings can be generalized. But even if 
the findings of this study apply only to Iraq, it will still be a useful contribution. I have 
found many similarities between the Ceausescu regime in Romania and Saddam 
Hussein’s in Iraq. The Romanian democratization was the least consolidated among 
eastern Europeans.144 There is a lesson here for Iraq. There are also similarities with 
Spain regarding irredentist movements and extremist groups hostile to democracy, 
such as Fuerza Nueva, which Spain dealt with through inclusion and letting the 
people decide its fate.  
 
Others criticise case studies for taking too long and resulting in massive unreadable 
documents. But this is not necessarily the way case studies must be done, nor need 
case studies take a long time. My research, however, did take a long time due to 
exceptional circumstances in Iraq, mainly the security situation and having to 
examine and analyse so much material and review so much literature. It would have 
taken less time if circumstances were different or if I chose to depend solely on 
secondary material. 
 
It’s possible to do a valid and high-quality case study without leaving the library and 
the telephone or Internet, depending on the topic being discussed.145 Still good case 
studies are difficult to do and their success very much depends on the ability of the 
investigator. However, the skills for doing good case studies have not yet been 
defined and agreed upon. 
 
Definition 
Yin defines case study as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between 
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phenomenon and context are not clearly defined’.146 
 
This means a case study is used when an investigator deliberately wants to cover 
contextual conditions believing they might be highly pertinent to the phenomenon of 
study. For example, the British occupied Iraq during WW1 and established a sort of 
parliamentary democracy which lasted for 37 years but failed in the end. This is 
relevant to the current democratic process which came about through almost similar 
circumstances. In fact the Washington Institute for Near Eastern Studies produced a 
book about the British experience in Iraq with the subtitle ‘Lessons from the British 
Experience’.147 That’s why I went through the recent history of Iraq, exploring the 
interaction of sectarian politics, and also the background of Islamic doctrines of 
Islamist parties in order to put their policies in context.148 The context helps to 
explain the conduct of politicians and their future moves.  
 
Because phenomenon and contexts are not always distinguishable in real life 
situations, a set of other characteristics becomes the second part of case study 
definition: 
The case study inquiry copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there 
will be many more variables of interests than data points as one result, it relies on 
multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to converge in a triangulating 
fashion, and as another result, benefits from the prior development of theoretical 
propositions to guide data collection and analysis.149  
 
Case study research can be based on any mix of qualitative and quantitative 
evidence.150 The source of evidence in case studies doesn’t have to always be 
based on direct detailed observation. It can be based on any mix of qualitative and 
quantitative evidence. ‘There is a strong and essential common ground between 
                                                            
146
  Ibid.p13 
147
  US Policy in Post Saddam Iraq-(ed. Michael Eisenstadt and Eric Mathewson)-The Washington Institute    
for Near Eastern Policy-(2003) 
148
 Yin-(2003)-op.cit.p13 
149
  Ibid.pp13/14 
150
  Ibid  
37 
 
 
qualitative and quantitative research…Case studies have a distinctive place in 
evaluation research’.151 
 
It’s a way of investigating an empirical topic by following a set of pre-specified 
procedures. It’s remarkably hard, even though it has been traditionally branded as 
'soft' possibly because investigators have not followed systematic procedures.152 But 
this criticism does not stand if systematic procedures are followed and rigorous 
checks are made and enough participant views were taken as was the case in this 
research.  
 
In addition to being an insider, I made sure I have taken all the information and views 
relevant to my area of research, checking their accuracy and authenticity in the 
process. I have conducted 47 interviews with prominent politicians, scholars, 
sociologists, authors, academics and activists with informed opinion and wide 
knowledge as well as political experience since some of them were ministers, deputy 
minister, directors and members of parliament. One, Dr Ayad Allawi, was interim 
Prime Minister between 2004-2005 and currently Vice President.  
 
Case Study Design 
 Although it might be difficult to have a clear near-perfect research design at the 
early stages of the research, but it’s important to have one which can be adjusted at 
a later stage if it runs into difficulties or if a better design is found. It’s the logic that 
links the data to be collected (and the conclusion to be drawn) to the initial question 
of study. The development of case study design needs to maximize four conditions 
related to design quality. They are: construct validity, internal validity (for explanatory 
or causal case studies only), external validity and reliability. 153 
 
Development of research design is a difficult part of doing case studies. But, a 
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comprehensive catalogue for case study has not been developed.154 It’s a separate 
research method that has its own designs, but it has not been codified.155 The design 
is the logical sequence that connects the empirical data to a study’s initial research 
question and ultimately to its conclusions. i.e. a research design is a logical plan for 
getting from here (research question) to there (conclusion).156 
 
Nachmias & Nachmias (1992, pp77-78) defines research design as a plan that 
guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analysing and interpreting 
observations.  It’s a logical model of proof that allows the researcher to draw 
inferences concerning causal relations among the variables under investigation.157 
Philiper, Schwab and Samsloss-(1980), calls research design a ‘blueprint of 
research dealing with at least four problems: What questions to study, what data are 
relevant, what data to collect and how to analyse the data.  
 
The case study strategy is most likely to be appropriate for ‘how’ and ‘why’ 
questions158. But the questions alone do not point to what should be studied, so we 
need to suggest some propositions in order to move in the right directions, but some 
studies have legitimate reasons for not having propositions when the whole topic is 
subject for exploration. But this needs to be clear in the design and the criteria needs 
to be identified on how to judge the success of the exploration.      
 
In addition to the proposition, a case study also needs a unit of analysis and this is 
related to defining what the case is. Without a proposition, the investigator is tempted 
to look at everything.159 This is important for narrowing the data. The more a study 
contains specific propositions the more it will stay within feasible limits. 
Yin warns of case studies in political science, among others, that they are not easily 
defined in terms of the beginning or end points of the case. The solution he suggests 
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is ‘delineating the unit of analysis’ which he says needs a different research design 
and data collection.160   
 
The unit of analysis of a case study can be a country’s economy, an industry in the 
marketplace, an economic policy or the trade or capital flow between two 
countries161.  In my case study, the unit of analysis is Iraq's democratization post-
2003. By engaging the cultural impediments to democratization, my  analysis will 
focus on how the Islamist political players, the most potent and influential force in the 
country, radically reshaped the democratization process to reflect their socio-
religious bias, compounded by their intellectual misunderstanding of democracy as 
well as their lack of a meaningful nation-building vision.  As I was studying the 
cultural impediments, other related impediments came to the surface and they have 
all been noted, studied thoroughly and listed. 
 
Because there is a need for ‘time boundaries to define the beginning and end of the 
case’162, the time boundaries for my case study would be 2003-2014 in which four 
parliamentary elections took place and three full term parliaments. Three local 
elections to elect provincial councils and governments were held. These are also 
important for democratic consolidation, since local governments remits include 
allocating resources, banning or allowing activities and deciding on holidays.  
 
However, I have looked beyond those dates since I needed to go back to explore 
sectarian practices and irredentist tendencies since the establishment of the Iraqi 
state and also examine the characteristics of the regime of Saddam Hussein. I also 
explored the policies of Islamists parties in the last two years regarding freedom and 
their treatment of women and how they acted after consolidating their power.  
 
I needed to look at events at the beginning of the last century since they have some 
impact on events that happened later. For example, the Shia are conscious of the 
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fact that in 1921, they lost out because their leaders were intransigent and did not 
cooperate with the British. Their leaders were determined this time round not to 
repeat the same mistake. Therefore, I needed to study these events whenever they 
happened and have them within the design of my research. I studied them in many 
sources in order to have a view that’s close to the truth. 
 
Since there are no academic studies dealing with the Iraqi democratization process 
in this period, my findings can be regarded as idiosyncratic, although I have drawn 
on the literature written about democratization elsewhere in the world. There are 
several books written about the post-Saddam Iraq, the most important of which were 
Ali Allawi’s ‘The Occupation of Iraq’, Paul Bremer’s ‘My Year in Iraq’, Larry 
Diamond’s ‘Squandered Victory’, Toby Dodge’s ‘Iraq: From War to New 
Authoritarianism’ and Ahmed Hashim’s ‘Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Iraq’ 
among others. I have referred to them in my research.  
  
The study has looked at the problems faced by countries in southern Europe, Latin 
America and Eastern Europe as they transited into democratic systems. The study 
design will embody democratic and liberal theories, looking at the common 
institutions of democracy, economic, civil and political societies which are necessary 
to democracy, the role of religion in politics, especially political Islam and the 
religious basis it stands on. As the study develops, more impediments to 
democratization in Iraq emerged. Many of these difficulties are similar to what other 
countries have gone through, so there will be some parallels. The study has also 
incorporated relevant views of political and intellectual elites expressed in interviews 
books, reports and news stories.  
 
I have avoided giving myself the role of ‘theoretician’.163 I didn’t think it’s useful, given 
the restrictions of time and space, to elaborate on democratic theory beyond stating 
the basics. In my analysis of the reviewed literature and the collected data, it’s 
inevitable to compare Iraqi democratization to what is prevalent in the world. I have 
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reviewed several works which are relevant to the study of democratization and 
referred to them throughout the study. They have enriched the information I have 
gathered through field work and elite interviews.  
 
I have avoided falling in statistical generalization of the results of my case study 
since it’s not a sampling unit but a particular case that refers to Iraq given its 
diversified population makeup and political and religious background. However, 
some textbooks recommend ‘analytic generalization’ in case studies.164 I have 
developed my own theoretical framework, using the information I have collected from 
various sources, including elite interviews, field work and reviews of relevant 
literature, videos, posters, newspapers and websites. 
  
For the evidence to be credible, it must come from multiple sources that encourage 
convergent lines of inquiry. Also a chain of evidence must be established.  To 
establish validity, there is a need to develop a set of operational measures and avoid 
subjective judgments when collecting the data.165  
 
Certain interviewees linked certain events to previous events or decisions taken by 
Americans or Iraqis. This was repeated in some interviews but I had to check 
whether this information could be relied upon through the available facts that I have 
looked at from various sources. This is done through three analytic tactics: 
explanation building, addressing rival explanations and using logic models.166   
 
For external validity to be established, case studies must rely on analytical 
generalization, i.e. generalizing a set of results to some broader theory.167   
A single case study can represent a significant contribution to knowledge and theory 
building and may meet all of the conditions for testing the theory. It can also 
represent a unique or extreme case. A single case also represents the critical test for 
a significant theory. Another rationale for a single case is the representative or 
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typical case. The objective is to capture an everyday or commonplace situation. A 
fourth rationale for a single case study is the revelatory case, and this exists when an 
investigator has the opportunity to observe and analyse a phenomenon previously 
inaccessible to scientific investigation.168    
 
Perhaps my case study is something similar to this, particularly because I observed 
and participated in the Iraqi democratic process since in 2003 and I argue I have a 
unique advantage not available to other researchers. I could uncover previously 
inaccessible phenomenon, which is the reasons for the failure/faltering/non-
consolidation of democratization in Iraq, or perhaps any other Arab or Muslim 
country for that matter, as they could have similar characteristics. i.e., the Iraqi case 
can, in some way, be generalised to other countries in the region.  
 
Because the ‘Arab Spring’ brought demands for democracy in these countries, the 
Iraqi case could prove to be a sample of what might happen in the region if 
democratization is to take place there. In fact, when one listens to discussions in 
Arab countries such as Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen and Syria, people always refer 
to Iraq and warn that this should not be repeated there. In both Tunisia and Libya, 
there was a law similar to ‘Deba’athification’. They called it ‘political isolation’. In 
Tunisia, they dropped it.169 In Libya it’s still there. Tunisian Islamist leader, Rached 
El-Ghannouchi, said that his party voted against political exclusion because of what 
happened in Iraq.170 
 
Although some may believe that conducting a case study is easy and many have 
been drawn to this strategy for this belief.171 I contend it’s the most difficult and 
complicated among all other research methods since it needs special skills. At the 
same time, the rules are not rigid, and this means it offers researchers more freedom 
of maneuver but this is not always an easy option. If there are strict rules, one could 
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follow them to the letter. But if they are free, they have a lot of room for discretion 
and this requires more hard work, analysis and comparisons.   
 
In addition, I benefited from being a participant in the Iraqi political process, as a 
spokesman for the Governing Council, and as a head of an election list in the first 
two elections (the Movement for Democratic Society). I knew most of the political 
leaders and many of the candidates and observers, be they election observers, 
journalists or academics. I saw the transformation of some politicians from being 
members of religious parties to secular.  
 
Only an experienced investigator can take advantage of the unexpected 
opportunities rather than being trapped by them and also exercising sufficient care 
against potentially biased procedures.172 A ‘good’ investigator requires the following 
skills: 
-ask good questions and interpret the answers 
-be a good listener and not trapped by his own ideologies or preconceptions 
-be adaptive and flexible and treats newly found situations as opportunities not 
threats 
-has a firm grasp of the issues being studied 
-be unbiased by preconceived notions, including those derived from theory, thus 
should be sensitive and responsive to contradictory evidence.173 
 
I was careful regarding potential bias although I was never partisan. But, I am 
secular liberal, normally critical of Islamist or conservative politicians. But as a 
researcher, I was looking for the truth regardless of what is favourable to me. I 
needed credible and new information, so I had to be a good listener, adaptive, 
flexible, and responsive to contradictory evidence. I also asked relevant questions as 
this was a prerequisite for case study investigators.174 I was never trapped in any 
ideology or preconceived ideas, so I had a clear inquiring mind when I collected 
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data.175  
 
Collecting information is never easy and specific information that may become 
relevant to a case study is not readily predictable, so the data collection and analysis 
are likely to be exhausting. Research is about questions not necessarily about 
answers.176 Rigid formula cannot be relied upon to guide the research. I used my 
discretion with regards to the difficulties I faced, and I was helped by the fact that I 
knew the field well, be it the country, culture, language, people, religion, or politics 
and politicians.  
 
Listening means receiving information and a good listener can assimilate a large 
amount of new information without bias. Any new information has to be corroborated 
with other sources of information. Good listeners can find information between the 
lines. As Yin stated, very few case studies end up as they started.177 You might start 
up looking for one thing but you end up finding another. I was not shocked to find 
new information. As the research progressed, new questions presented themselves, 
this prompted me to go back to searching for information and conducting new 
interviews which can be found in appendix; 1  with a total of 50 interviews.  
 
I was aware of the religious and cultural impediments, but there were other 
information that also proved vital, such as family, tribal, regional and sectarian 
loyalties which were outlined or alluded to by some of the interviewees. There were 
also claims of intervention by outside powers such as the US, Iran, Turkey and UN 
as well as claims of vote-rigging. Regardless of how credible these allegations were, 
the fact that many participants believe them, and backed their claims with evidence 
means they must also add something to the research. I may have changed direction 
without even knowing it. Indeed, when I began, I had in mind two or three reasons 
for the non-consolidation of Iraqi democracy (mainly culture, religion, sectarianism 
and weak sponsor commitment). But I ended up with 20.  
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In collecting data, I used several means, among which are tape recorder, taking 
notes and using emails or the three together in order to make sure I get the right 
information.  An investigator is like a detective. He/she arrives after the crime has 
occurred and has to make inferences about what has actually happened.178   In my 
case I was ‘at the scene of the crime’! 
 
Democratization is vast and multidimensional. There are cultural, religious, social 
and economic elements to it; that’s why I had to interview more people than I 
planned originally and this required more time and effort. This is the reason why this 
study lasted longer than originally planned. Since there were many countries 
democratised in the third wave, I needed to review more literature to find out about 
impediments that other countries had faced. I have found the cases of Spain, 
Argentina, Hungary and Romania very useful.   
 
Protocol 
 A case study protocol is an effective way of increasing the reliability of case studies 
and is intended to guide the investigator in carrying out the data collection from a 
single case study.179 But it was not easy to follow the planned protocol as there are 
many developments on the ground that forced me to change it. The security situation 
was unhelpful even for my interviewees. Some people were not very comfortable 
talking to an academic investigator; others do not use emails to write their answers if 
you cannot meet up with them. One intended interviewee, Haider Al-Abadi, suddenly 
became prime minister and became out of bounds.  
 
One section of the protocol is to have study questions ready.180 As the research 
progressed and I completed my interviews and got the answers, I discovered there 
were more questions to be asked, so I conducted more interviews on article 2 of the 
constitution, Deba’athification, Kurds and stateness, Islamists’ hostility to democracy 
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and whether Saddam’s regime’s grip on power loosened after sanctions were 
imposed.  
 
Throughout the research, I made sure that my interviewees came from different 
backgrounds, politically, ethnically, culturally, and educationally. This was important 
in order to have full and accurate picture of the situation. I also had experts on 
economics, oil, sociology, elections, the Kurdish issue, law, religion and the 
constitution. I chose 28 distinguished people, and some of them were interviewed 
several times on different issues.  
 
Since a case study is a study of real life events within their life contexts,181 I had to 
adjust to interviewees’ schedules and availability. The nature of the interview is 
open-ended and interviewees may not answer all the questions. Circumstances are 
not always helpful, and you always find people who are not willing to tell you 
everything they know. In some cases I had to invite people to secured restaurants or 
hotels in Baghdad, Beirut and London in order to interview them.   
 
There are five levels of questions to be asked. Level 1 is the questions asked to 
specific interviewees. Level 2 are the questions asked of the individual case. Level 3 
are asked of the pattern of the findings. Level 4 are questions asked beyond the 
case study evidence, including other literature or published data and level 5 are 
normative questions about policy recommendations and conclusions.182 
 
I had no problem sustaining an interview with new relevant questions until I get good 
and relevant answers to my research. I was trained on interviewing by BBC, in 
addition to the valuable instructions from my supervisor. The questions do not have 
to be asked literally to the interviewee but they are there in order to structure the 
inquiry.183 
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Selecting the candidates for the research was not easy, although I had a wide range 
of choices of politicians, writers, academics and journalists. But that choice added to 
the problem as I needed to decide which of the people I had in mind were more 
relevant. I chose those who have played an important part or who really knew what 
had happened and they had an informed opinion that may add to my information. A 
few would have probably been enough but I wanted to be sure that the information 
and opinions I have collected about individuals, parties, groups and the process of 
democratization are accurate, impartial and not one-sided.  
 
There are six sources of evidence: documents, archival records, interviews, direct 
observation, participant observation and physical artefacts.184 In my research I used 
multiple sources of evidence, and almost all the above, even though any source can 
and have been the sole basis for entire studies.185  
  
The multiple sources of evidence in case studies allow an investigator to have a 
broad range of historical, attitudinal and behavioural issues. Any finding or 
conclusion is likely to be more convincing when multiple sources are used, rather 
than a single source.186 I may have relied more on interviews, documents and direct 
observations. But I used other forms and added to the six sources the use of videos, 
films, election posters, audios and photographs.  
 
Evidence has to be checked for authenticity and accuracy. ‘Every document was 
written for a specific purpose and specific audience other than the case study 
investigator’.187 But if documentary evidence is contradictory, rather than 
corroboratory there is a need for further investigation. Inferences are clues, not 
findings as they can be false.188  
 
Although some studies depended on a single source, such as participant-
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observation, others on archival records alone, this is not recommended. A major 
strength of case study data collection is the use of multiple sources of evidence to 
corroborate different facts.189  
 
Reports have to be checked for accuracy since inaccuracy is not so uncommon. 
Relying on information provided by the media or even think tanks is not always wise. 
One report by US Army War College quoted Iraqi VP, Ayad Allawi, as saying there 
were 250,000 volunteers in the Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU).190 The quoted 
source was the Kuwaiti newspaper; Al-Siyasa. When I checked the source in Arabic, 
I found out the newspaper never quoted VP Ayad Allawi, but an unknown person in 
his party!191 If an organization such as the US Army War College could make such 
an inaccuracy, other media outlets could easily do it. 
 
Even foreign media could not distinguish accurate from inaccurate information. On 
17th July 2004, an Australian TV report and the Herald newspaper claimed that the 
interim PM, Ayad Allawi, executed insurgents personally just days after he took office 
and the Interior Minister ‘congratulated’ him!192 This was not believable even in an 
Iraqi context that’s rife with rumours; yet an Australian TV programme broadcast it 
believing it to be true. With such an environment of widespread rumours, claims and 
counterclaims, there was a need for a focused and knowledgeable investigator 
attentive to details and committed to producing accurate information and sound 
evidence. 
 
There is a tendency to exaggerate or even make up stories and portray opinions as 
facts. Therefore, I needed to look for convincing evidence to support the information I 
gathered.  
Gathering the evidence is important but analysing it is more important and difficult. 
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The best preparation for conducting case study analysis is to have a ‘general 
analytic strategy’.193 Yin states analysing case study evidence is ‘one of the least 
developed and most difficult aspects of case studies’.194 However, the preferred 
strategy is to follow the theoretical propositions that led to the launch of the case 
study in the first place. The original objectives and design of the case study were 
based on propositions, which are examples of a theoretical orientation guiding the 
case study analysis.195  
 
Original theoretical prepositions could include rival explanations or hypotheses, i.e. 
examining democratic processes in other countries under similar circumstances, or 
looking at other reasons that might have caused this failure and eliminating them. 
For example, the Ceausescu regime in Romania didn’t allow the development of 
civil, political and economic societies in the country, which are necessary for 
democratization, and this, among other reasons, has led to problems in 
democratising the country after the fall of the regime. This is similar to the situation in 
Iraq since the Saddam regime has many similar characteristics to Ceausescu’s.    
 
There is a need to understand the conditions under which new research findings can 
benefit society. Research must meet practical needs, not just serve itself.196 Since 
the welfare of the Iraqi people depends on the success of the political system in 
managing their affairs and impeding the emergence of new dictatorship, the findings 
of this study will be relevant to the effort of building a true democracy in Iraq.  
 
I have arranged some events chronologically to examine the changes that happened 
in the intervening time between the events in question and what might have actually 
brought these changes about. Compiling chronological events is a common 
technique in case studies and may be considered a special form of time-series 
analysis. Arraying events into chronology can have an important analytical purpose 
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to investigate presumed causal events.197 
 
Evidence should address the most significant aspect of the case study. Digressions 
must be avoided in order to strengthen the analysis against any criticism that the 
main issue was avoided because of possible negative findings. Prior expert 
knowledge should be used in the case study. It must demonstrate the awareness of 
current thinking and discourse about the case study topic.198  
 
Theory Building  
Case studies generally cover events over time; one approach is to present the case 
study evidence in a chronological order. This approach serves an important purpose 
in explanatory case studies.199   
I chose a structure for the thesis that builds up the argument so that at conclusion, I 
would have gone through all the collected data and evidence.   
‘The sequence of chapters will follow some theory building logic which will depend 
on the specific topic and theory but each chapter should reveal a new part of the 
theoretical argument made. If structured well, the entire sequence can produce a 
compelling argument. It’s relevant to both explanatory and exploratory case 
studies’.200 For example, the next chapter is dedicated to liberty then democracy. 
Liberty is the basis of democracy and it’s most important to explain it before moving 
to democracy, democratization, religion and politics, political Islam only to pave the 
way for an informed discussion about impediments to democracy in chapters 7-12. 
 
Anonymity can be justified ‘when dealing with a controversial case in order to protect 
the real case and/or the individuals/participants’. Individuals can sometimes be 
named but without attributing any point of view to a single individual’.201 I didn’t need 
to rely on anonymous witnesses due to having a wider choice of people who were 
prepared to talk openly about their real views and experiences.   
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In consulting political memoirs, both written and recorded, I have found that 
politician-authors, in Iraq and the larger Arab world, aspire not only to record facts 
and provide personal accounts but also to vindicate their political positions and 
stances during their political careers. This may not be peculiar to Iraq but admissions 
of error or guilt and self-critical writings are still rare.  
I have also explored the literature produced by research centres and websites. While 
almost every fine detail is available, sifting through the massive amount of 
information requires special filtering efforts to reduce information overload to make 
sure that the information I incorporate is accurate. 
Sourcing online information might be complex and challenging. However, any 
information obtained through this way has been evaluated in terms of quality and 
screened for reliability and accuracy. The credibility of the material has also been 
checked through techniques such as verifying the authors’ credentials, the exercise 
of rigorous quality control by the publishers (such as in the case of websites of 
established and credible institutions and media outlets), and cross-checking 
information with other sources. 
Weighing up the Evidence 
The case study method had given me the freedom to gather the information I needed 
without the rigidity associated with other methods. This has allowed me to employ 
qualitative and quantitative research techniques. But with all the freedom associated 
with it, it wasn’t easy since I needed to apply rigorous checks on the information I 
gathered and carry out many interviews to arrive at sound conclusions. Originally I 
was planning to interview 20 people who were directly involved in one way or 
another in the political process. Once I have interviewed those twenty and analysed 
their input, I discovered I needed to interview others who can provide more 
information on certain aspects of the process. While the questions I prepared 
originally were relevant and pertinent to the democratic process, they opened up 
more subjects and raised more questions in my mind.  
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By asking questions about the effect of wearing religious cloth on the electorate and 
the sectarian motives of the parties and electorate, I was able to gauge how far 
religion and sectarianism were used in Iraqi politics and how far they have influenced 
people’s votes. Nearly all my interviewees acknowledged that people voted on 
sectarian basis and most of them acknowledged the negative role played by the use 
of religion in politics, including some Islamists. I also found out that since people 
were moved by the religious discourse, they neglected to ask politicians about their 
economic programmes or their intentions of how to improve essential services such 
as electricity, education and health. All major issues were neglected by both 
candidates and voters in the midst of election fever and religious frenzy.  
When I asked whether the religious discourse helped candidates get votes, then I 
asked whether this has brought unqualified people to power, I was able to get 
answers about the reasons for the difficulties the democratization process was facing 
and this is linked to the employment of religion and sectarianism in politics. This has 
led me to conclude that the use of religion in politics was harmful to the interest of 
the people, the democratic process and consequently the country at large and 
perhaps the region and the world since the ensuing weakness and instability of Iraq 
led to the spread of terrorism and instability of the area. This is because using 
religion or sectarianism enables candidates to hide their personal inabilities and get 
elected without having a political or economic programme. This idea of religion and 
politics is also connected well with the literature I had already studied, especially 
John Rawls’ liberalism and Ali Abdur-Razik’s ‘Islam and the Fundamentals of 
Governance’ on the necessity of leaving religion out of politics.    
In the light of new evidence and the increasing number of reasons for the difficulties 
facing democracy in Iraq, I needed to interview more people who were not 
necessarily politicians, who usually hold strong views and are naturally biased, but 
intellectuals, economists, sociologists, poets, experts on certain issues and other 
professionals. I also needed to interview people who endured life under Saddam 
Hussein, be they politicians or apolitical, to tell me about whether the regime 
changed its tactics after the weakening of its hold on the country after its invasion of 
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Kuwait 1990 which led to the imposition of UN sanctions on Iraq, or managed to 
maintain its iron fist on the people nevertheless. 
This was important to determine the type of non-democratic regime existed in Iraq 
prior to the change since it’s relevant to democratization which depends on the 
existence of civil, political and economic societies as well as state bureaucracy and 
rule of law in order to succeed. I needed to interview sociologists in particular who 
could analyse the cultural and psychological status of Iraqi society and what they 
think is needed for democratization to succeed in Iraq and what should be 
implemented for it to succeed.  
The prominent sociologist I interviewed, Dr Ibrahim Al-Haidari, was also an expert on 
German issues since he lived and studied in Germany for a long time and translated 
important works of German writers and thinkers such as those of Habermas. This 
enticed me to ask him about the process of Deba’athification and whether it was 
comparable with de-nazification. This has helped me understand that the 
Deba’athification was not really necessary in Iraq and there was no need to emulate 
the German experience as circumstances, culture and geopolitics were totally 
different.   
When former PM Dr Ayad Allawi said the existence of many Islamists parties made 
them not sectarian, I began to doubt whether sectarianism was a cause for the 
failure of democracy in Iraq because there were many Islamists parties in politics, 
not just one party, so I needed to interview Dr Khalil Osman, an expert on 
sectarianism in Iraq, who had recently published a book on the matter. Dr Osman 
told me that Dr Allawi was wrong on this issue as his findings on the ground proved 
otherwise.   
When I interviewed Islamist politicians such as Dr Walid Al-Hilli, Sami Al-Askari and 
Dr Adil Abur-Raheem Muhammed, they kept talking about ‘democratic mechanisms’ 
which indicated to me via ethnographic evidence that they did not really believe in 
democracy but in its mechanisms. I needed to confirm it, so I went back to interview 
the former Islamist MP and senior member of the Islamic Da’awa Party, Mr Dia 
Shakarchi on the reasons behind Islamists’ rejection of democracy. He was in a 
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position to tell me more than anyone else for a number of reasons, among which is 
the fact that he was a cleric, so he knew Islamic theology well, and he was an 
Islamist MP and senior member of the Islamic Da’awa Party, so he knew their way of 
thinking well. This new information would not have been available if I had not asked 
the original questions which made the Islamists reveal their true intentions about 
democracy.   
When Dr Adil Abdur-Raheem Muhammed suggested that Islamists could be 
interested in economic and political issues while secular parties could turn sectarian, 
I had to make sure from different sources that Islamists are more prone to be 
sectarian because of their ideology which is naturally divisive in a society that is not 
well-ordered and deeply divided as per the classification introduced by John Rawls. 
Islamists’ tendency towards sectarianism was also confirmed by Mr Dia Shakarchi 
among others.      
Dr Faleh Abdul-Jabbar made clear the contradiction in the constitution, and in 
particular Article 2 which had two paragraphs, A and B, that contradict each other. 
This information, though was clear to me in advance, made me investigate the issue 
further, so I conducted more interviews on it with MP Maysoon Aldamluji, Dr Akeel 
Abbas, Dr Kadom Shubber among others until the issue was thoroughly investigated 
and the evidence was clear that the constitution was an impediment to 
democratization since it allowed Islamists to introduce anti-democratic laws such as 
the personal status and alcohol ban laws where article 2A was used by Islamists to 
justify them as Miss Aldamluji clearly said.   
Dr Hussein Al-Hindawi made clear to me in his interview that those Islamists who 
wrote the constitution were not even expert on Islamic law. But Dr Hindawi also 
mentioned something about Gen. Franco believing in democracy. Although he was 
clearly inaccurate, it made me investigate the Spanish experience and find parallels 
with the Iraqi one. This has opened up my mind to another impediment to democracy 
which the Spanish were able to avoid, and that was political inclusion. Another 
evidence that came out of the Spanish experience was the leadership factor and 
how the lack of capable leaders in Iraq was a cause for the failure in the Iraqi 
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experience while it was cause for success in the Spanish one due to the ‘innovative 
leadership of Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez’ as Linz & Stepan put it.    
Dr Abdulkhaliq Hussein said he was ‘confident’ that politicians who have given a 
false impression that their parties were favoured by the religious leader 'will fail' and 
'their attempts will be counterproductive'. This issue required further investigation, so 
I had to look back at the electoral records of such parties and individuals over three 
general elections and three provincial elections. I have found out that those 
individuals and parties have not really suffered as a result of claiming falsely the 
backing of the religious establishment. In fact they have won elections after elections 
and have become prominent, rich and powerful through these false claims. People’s 
memory is very short while religion is a potent force in the words of Mr Samir 
Sumaidaie and ‘deep-rooted in Iraq as Dr Abdul-Khaliq Hussein said.  
What is worse is that since pretending to be religious brought more votes, even the 
non-religious and previously irreligious Marxists claimed to be religious in order to 
get elected. This false spirit of ‘political religiosity’ as Dr Akeel Abbas called it, will 
deepen sectarian identities and undermine Iraq's national identity which is important 
for the consolidation of democracy,  and it’s ‘not a condition for integrity or efficiency’ 
as Mr Sharwan Al-Waeli said.   
Dr Wahda Al-Jumaili talked about the role of the Kurds, and how their policies were a 
threat to democracy in Iraq. This has opened up the whole issue of irredenta, and it’s 
adverse effect on democratization.  Although I had explored irredenta as part of the 
literature review and it was established that it’s a destabilising factor for democracy, I 
now have a view from an Iraqi Arab MP who is also a legal expert, that irredenta in 
Iraq is a problem for democracy. This has made it imperative to take an expert view 
on Kurdish affairs from a Kurdish intellectual who is close to the political 
establishment. I approached the prominent Kurdish writer and journalist, Kamran 
Qaradaghi, who was also the presidential chief of staff of the former Iraqi Kurdish 
President Jalal Talabani. Qaradaghi’s contribution to the research was valuable 
because he confirmed the irredentist aspirations of the Kurds and said the Kurds 
have actually made up their minds that independence was the solution to their 
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problem. With this view, the problem of irredenta in Iraq has been established in 
practice as it was established in theory.  
American errors were apparent to all, but it was important to take the view of experts 
on whether they constituted an impediment to democratization. Most of my 
interviewees made it clear that they constituted an impediment including the election 
commission president, Hussein Hindawi, and interim PM Ayad Allawi who was an 
ally of America. MP Shirouq Al-Abayachi went as far as saying it was intentional as 
the Americans wanted to bring terrorists to Iraq to fight them on its soil. The 
American advisor for democracy, Larry Diamond, made it clear in his book 
‘Squandered Victory’ that democracy in Iraq needed a long-term American 
commitment and billions of dollars to succeed.    
The extent of regional interference in Iraqi affairs to block the development of 
democracy was also made clear by interviewees, but there was an area that needed 
deeper investigation and that is Shia reliance on Iran for protection and support and 
how this could compromise democracy in Iraq since Iran is not a democracy but a 
theocracy. I carried out more interviews on this issue with informed people from 
Sunni and Shia backgrounds, and I established that discrimination against Shia in 
the Islamic Sunni world does exist and this is one reason why the Iraqi Shia feel they 
need Iranian protection and support even if it comes at the expense of democracy 
which Islamists do not believe in anyway.   
Although interviews provided me with important information, I didn’t rely on them on 
their own. It was corroborated by information available in text books and evidence 
from the experience of other countries as well as my own observations and 
ethnographic evidence I arrived at via interviews. Anything that wasn’t supported by 
evidence was not accepted. 
As Yin stated, a major strength of case study data collection is the use of multiple 
sources of evidence to corroborate different facts.202 I have used multiple sources, 
rather than a single source, and also used triangulation; therefore my conclusions 
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are safe and reliable. When documentary evidence is contradictory, rather than 
corroboratory, there is a need for further investigation. Whenever I was in doubt 
about any issue, throughout this study, I investigated further until I established the 
evidence.  
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Chapter 3 
Liberty and Democracy 
 
Liberty 
Liberty is one of the important bases for democracy. The work of John Stuart Mill in 
this regard is emphasised here because he set out the basic tenets of 
modern liberalism, building on the work of his father, James Mill, and the 
philosopher, Jeremy Bentham, to explore the building of a modern liberal democratic 
state. This is something to which parts of Iraq aspire and others clearly do not. Mill is 
famous in the Arab world and highly regarded by intellectuals and learned individuals 
in Iraq. Although his ideas were expressed in the early 19th century, they are still as 
relevant in the early 21st century for the purpose of this thesis. Indeed they supply 
something of a benchmark against which Iraq may be measured.  
John Stuart Mill defines liberty as the protection against the tyranny of political rulers, 
where he puts the rulers in ‘a necessarily antagonistic position to the people whom 
they ruled’. 203 He expressed liberty in terms of the limitation of the power of the 
rulers. ‘The aim of the patriots was to set limits to the power which the ruler should 
be suffered to exercise over the community and this limitation is what they called 
liberty’.204 Limiting the ruler’s power is done in two ways. First via ‘a recognition of 
certain immunities called political liberties or rights’. If the ruler infringed on these 
rights, specific resistance or general rebellion was held to be justifiable. Second, 
through ‘the establishment of constitutional checks’ by consent of the community or 
those who represent its interests.205  
The implication here runs against a dominant view that the interests of the rulers are 
‘habitually opposed to those of the people’.  But under democracy, the dynamic has 
changed. The rulers should now be ‘identified with the people and their interests and 
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will should be the interests and will of the people’.206 This is so because rulers are 
now elected by the people to represent the popular will rather than imposed through 
coercion.  
Mill defines ‘the will of the people as meaning ‘the will of the most numerous of the 
most active part of the people; the majority or those who succeeded in making 
themselves accepted as the majority’. This majority may desire to ‘oppress a part of 
their number’ which necessitates precautions against this trend to prevent the abuse 
of majoritarian power.207 This is what Mill calls ‘the tyranny of the majority’; 
something he regarded as an ‘evil’ which society needs to guard against.208  
 One of the least understood tenets of democracy in Iraq is nature of rights in a 
democratic system. The dominant understanding, promoted by the political class, 
emphasizes group rights rather than individual rights. In this context, groups are 
understood as primordial and fixed identities into whose membership all Iraqis have 
to belong in order to be represented and “enjoy” their rights as part of the group.  
Women for example are treated as a group not individuals. Muslims are also treated 
as a group with no variations among them. Politicians always talk about Muslim or 
Shia majority, dismissing individuality altogether. Islamic Fadheela Party-(IFP), 
sought in 2014 to legislate for Shia personal status law whereby 9-year-old girls 
would be eligible to marry.209 The bill was passed by the council of ministers and it 
could become law if parliament approved it, something that didn’t happen. On 24th 
October 2016, parliament passed a law to ban alcohol in the whole of Iraq on the 
basis of the ‘Muslims majority’.210 Mahmoud Al-Hassan, the head of the 
parliamentary legal committee, announced after the adoption of the law that ‘anyone 
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who objects to this law is indirectly objecting to God’s law and he will be 
prosecuted’.211 Islamist rule is basically the tyranny of the majority.   
 
Tolerance with ‘Tacit Reserves’ 
Liberty, as a socio-political right in any functioning democracy, is often challenged by 
religious beliefs asserting absolutist, universalist messages. This challenge 
commonly translates into intolerance toward non-religious lifestyles or ideas. Mill 
correctly argues that intolerance about the things that people care about is ‘so 
natural’ to mankind and thus, religious freedom has hardly existed anywhere. He 
argues that tolerance in the minds of religious persons always comes with ‘tacit 
reserves’ even in the most tolerant of countries.212  
Intolerance is widespread in Iraqi religious society, with some zealots taking the law 
into their hands at times of weak state control.213 What fuels this religious zeal is the 
moralist, truth-possessing nature of both political Islam and mainstream religious 
beliefs in Iraq, both Sunni and Shia.  The public expressions of those beliefs are also 
partially contradictory because of the Shia-Sunni doctrinal differences, something 
that causes violence and discord among people. Indeed, the emergence of Sunni 
and Shia doctrines in Islam is associated with the disputes dating back 1400 years 
ago, and any expression of such beliefs invokes those old differences between the 
two sects.  This is not conducive to public peace or order.  
One example of those differences is the Husseini rituals, commemorating the tragic 
death of Hussein, the third Shia Imam, in Karbala in 680. Although these rituals have 
been part of the Iraqi culture for a long time, practiced by Shia, but also accepted by 
Sunnis, they come to acquire a divisive political meaning post-2003, away from the 
agreed-upon, communal socio-religious meaning of sorrow and solidarity in the past. 
In the new Iraq, these rituals point to the political dominance of the Shia as 
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previously oppressed majority (by the Sunni minority) who come now to assert their 
“rightful control” over the state and the society.  
 
One manifestation of this control is the official mainstreaming of these rituals as a 
sign of Iraqism whereby the state officially promotes them, expecting its Sunni 
citizens to do the same. This removes these rituals from the realm of society and 
faith, as they have been historically, bringing them into that of politics and the state in 
post-2003 Iraq. This problematic approach has sown division and distrust among 
Iraqis based on their sectarian affiliation. Any criticism of these politicized rituals 
nowadays is seen as a criticism of Shiaism as a religious creed, a deliberate offense 
to the entire group of Shia, and an encroachment on the liberty of a group. 
 
In the founding literature on democracy the state or society is only warranted to 
interfere with individuals’ liberty when there is a need for self protection. This is the 
position that Mill asserts ‘That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of the civilized community against his will is to prevent 
harm to others’.214  Additionally, the individual is ‘sovereign’ over himself, his own 
body and mind’ except those who are ‘in a waste to require being taken care of by 
others (who) must be protected against their own actions as well as against external 
injury’.215 Constraining the individual by the interest of others entails other benefits to 
society, as it will entice him/her to do other services to society which he/she can 
benefit from such as contributing to a common good like defence or any other 
common interest of society.  
 
Human liberty must consist of liberty of consciousness in all its manifestations 
(liberty of thought and feeling and absolute freedom of opinion and sentiment on all 
subjects). As for the liberty of expressing and publishing opinion, it falls under 
another principle since it’s connected to others, but it’s no less important than the 
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freedom of thought. It also consists of liberty of taste and pursuit, planning our life to 
suit our own character, doing what we like without impediment from others provided 
we are not causing any harm to them.  
 
Then comes the collective freedoms which include the freedom to unite for any 
purpose not involving harm to others and the persons uniting are of full age and not 
forced or deceived. These liberties are so important to society that ‘no society, in 
which these liberties are not, on the whole, respected, is free…and none is 
completely free in which they do not exist absolute and unqualified’. Mill continues 
stating that ‘the only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own 
good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or 
impede their efforts to obtain it’.216 ‘Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each 
other to live as seems good to themselves, than by compelling each other as seems 
good to the rest’ Mill contends.  
Unfortunately, many Muslim believers disagree with this principle. They believe it’s 
their heavenly duty to stop others from doing what they call as ‘vice’ under the 
principle of ‘Promotion of virtue and Prevention of Vice’. In some Muslim countries, 
there is religious police whose duty is to compel people to behave in a certain 
way.217 Sharia law limits individuals’ freedoms in many ways. This unitary and truth-
possessing mentality fuels always the desire to interfere with people’s personal lives 
in order “to correct” them, by making them virtuous, standard practices in Saudi 
Arabia and Iran. These practices are now on the rise in Iraq after 2003. Although 
there are no laws to support this interference in Iraq, unlike the cases of Iran and 
Saudi Arabia where this interference is mandated by law, the emerging religious 
piety among many Iraqis made such interferences culturally acceptable, if not tacitly 
encouraged by Islamist parties at the helm of power. This only highlights the 
importance of separating the state from religion in the troubled nascent Iraqi 
democracy.    
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Mill interprets the separation of religion and politics as ‘placing the direction of men’s 
consciences in other hands than those which controlled their worldly affairs’.218 But 
‘the disposition of mankind, whether rulers or fellow citizens, to impose their own 
opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others, is so energetically supported 
by some of the best and some of the worst feelings incident to human nature, that it 
is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power’. 219   
 
Since Islamists came to power, women have been under increasing pressures to 
wear Islamic head scarf (hijab) and there are hardly any women not wearing it 
outside Baghdad. Even in Baghdad, the number of women who are not wearing hijab 
is decreasing. Some ministries which are managed by Islamists have issued 
guidelines for women how to dress up.220 Signs have been placed in road junctions 
and on front walls of institutions to tell women to be wear hijab. Some signs have 
even asked Christian women to wear hijab!221  
Freedom of Expression 
Not many doubt the importance of the freedom of the press to expose corruption and 
prevent despotism. In fact Mill contends ‘the time… is gone by when any defence 
would be necessary of ‘the liberty of the press’ as one of the securities against 
corrupt and tyrannical government’.222  Any government that attempts to control the 
expression of opinion ‘will make itself the organ of general intolerance of the 
public’.223   
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Mill regards the freedom of expression as sacrosanct. ‘If all mankind minus one were 
of one opinion, and only one person were of the contrary opinion, mankind would be 
no more justified in silencing that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be 
justified in silencing mankind’. 224  
Silencing the expression of an opinion is ‘robbing the human race, posterity as well 
as the existing generation, those who dissent from the opinion more than those who 
hold it’ because ‘if the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of 
exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose what is almost as a great benefit, the 
clearer perception and livelier impression of truth produced by its collision with 
error’.225 He continues; ‘we can never be sure that the opinion we are endeavouring 
to stifle is a false opinion, and if we were sure, stifling it would be an evil still’.226 This 
is because those who try to suppress the opinion have no authority to decide the 
question for mankind while excluding all others from the means of judging it. By 
opting to decide the idea was wrong, they are assuming they are infallible.  
In theory, Mill argues, we all agree we are fallible. In practice, we do not take the 
necessary precautions against our fallibility. Absolute princes or rulers are 
accustomed to unlimited deference. They feel so confident in their opinions on nearly 
all subjects.227 - ‘One devolves upon his world the responsibility of being in the right 
against the dissentient worlds of other people and it never bothers him that mere 
accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is the object of his reliance 
and that the same causes which made him a churchman in London would have 
made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in Peking’. 228   
This is a fact that is so absent from the thinking of religious people with missionary 
zeal in general. In Iraq, members of a family who were brought up in Anbar or Tikrit 
are Sunnis, while their cousins who live in Karbala or Samawa are Shia. Shia tribes 
in southern Iraq are members of the great Sunni clans and confederations in the 
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Arabian Peninsula.229 But they follow different religious doctrines due to living under 
different circumstances.  
Mill acknowledges opinions do change over ages and the ones that one age regards 
as valid, other ages consider absurd. This will go on and our ideas now won’t be 
suitable for future generations. That’s why if we do not act on our opinions just 
because they might be wrong, we will never be able to perform our duties or care for 
our interests. 230  
Governments and individuals must, therefore, ‘form the truest opinion they can, form 
them carefully and never impose them upon others unless they are quite sure of 
being right’. But once they are sure, it would be cowardice, not conscientiousness to 
shrink from acting on their opinion. ‘Men and governments must act to the best of 
their ability. There is no such thing as absolute certainty but there is assurance 
sufficient for the purposes of human life’.231   
The main point here is that opinions must not be imposed on others unless they 
there is a high degree of certainty about their correctness and this is not always 
possible. Also, opinions do change over time, and what was correct in the past may 
not be correct now. But Islamic fundamentalists treat all opinions of imams and 
caliphs as sacred that you cannot discuss or argue against and this is a real problem 
for modern Muslim states in general and for democracy in particular.  
 
The Shia faithful believe in the principle of the infallibility of the Prophet and the 
Twelve Imams and their sayings and traditions are taken without any discussion or 
objection because the imams are infallible.232  Devout Shia travel to holy places on 
foot, instead of using cars or other modern means of transport.233 This causes 
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disruption across the country from road closures, government and other businesses 
stoppages, to the loss of many work days several times every year. They visit 
shrines on foot because they are emulating imams and other revered leaders and 
pious persons who did it in the past. They are also following a religious principle 
which says ‘the greater the hardship’ the greater the reward’!234 This means, the 
more hardship they endure during their pilgrimage, the more reward they will get in 
Heaven.    
What is noteworthy here is the widespread promotion of these rituals through 
religious propaganda in an attempt to make them a regular norm of Iraq’s national 
life. It is quite dangerous to engage in any kind of public discussion in Iraq where one 
can criticize the continuous promotion of these rituals. An opinion like this falls 
outside legitimate difference in Iraq; it can cost a person his/her life. Practically 
speaking, discussing these rituals in a critical way does not fall within a person’s 
democratic rights.              
According to Mill ‘we must assume that our opinions to be true for the guidance of 
our conduct and it is assuming no more when we forbid bad men to pervert society 
by the propagation of opinion which we regard as false and pernicious’. 235  
Persecution of opinion is deemed harmful to society. Some believe persecution 
cannot harm the truth since it will serve to promote it. But this is not always the case. 
In his attempt to refute such a claim, Mill catalogues the number of ideas and people 
who disappeared due to persecution. ‘History teems with instances of truths put 
down by persecution. If not suppressed forever, it may be thrown back for 
centuries’.236 The Reformation broke out at least twenty times and put down before 
the triumph of Martin Luther. Mill’s conclusion is that persecution has always 
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succeeded, and the survival of the heretics is because they were too strong a party 
to defeat.  
This actually explains why secularism has not succeeded in the Muslim world so far. 
It’s the persecution of all new ideas that lack religious backing. There are many 
examples of successful persecution of ideas and groups in Islamic history where 
reform movements were put down or eradicated completely. One such movement 
was ‘Akhwan-al-safa’ (the Brothers of Tranquility) which appeared in Basra around 
the end of the tenth century AD and remained secret until it disappeared due to 
persecution.237 In modern times many irreligious ideas or groups appeared but didn’t 
last due to persecution.  
A Marxist study group by the name of Mutadarisi al-Afkār al-Ḥurrah or ‘Free Ideas 
Contemplators’, began publishing a paper called al-Ṣaḥifah but it was quickly closed 
down by the authorities because it contained attacks on religion. A political party by 
the name ‘Free Non-religious Party’ (al-Ḥizb al-Ḥurr al-Lādīnī) also disappeared 
because it was vociferous in criticizing religion.238 Communism, which is perceived to 
be hostile to religion, only prospered at times when religious forces were weak 
during the fifties and sixties.239  
 
In the sixties, Shia religious leader, Ayatullah Muhsin Al-Hakim, issued a fatwa 
attacking communism and saying it’s ‘incompatible with Islam’.240  This fatwa had 
adversely affected the communists in Iraq where previously their ideas were 
embraced by the Shia youth. Islamic Party (mainly Sunni) also issued a 
memorandum blaming PM Abdulkarim Qassim for ‘patronizing’ communism.241 
‘Islam began to attract lay Shia in great numbers encroaching on communist 
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influence’.242 When religion was revived after the establishment of Islamist parties, all 
secular ideas and groups were suppressed or marginalized.   
 
Resuscitating Past Evils  
Mill acknowledges that people with different opinions are not put to death anymore. 
‘We are not like our fathers who slew the prophets’.243 Although this maybe the case 
in some countries in Europe or North America, in various parts of the world, including 
Iraq, people are still punished by death if they express ideas critical of the prevalent 
religious beliefs. If they don’t get executed, they get assassinated. Many people were 
assassinated in Iraq simply because they expressed opinions regarded as 
dangerous by others.244  This is even worse than executing opponents since 
assassination is done secretly and no one knows the reasons for it or who is behind 
it. People can only guess. While execution follows a trial during which people get to 
know the reasons leading to the case and this would serve to highlight their cause. In 
Sudan, scholar Mahmoud Muhammad Taha was tried and executed in 1985 for 
demanding an end to Sharia law. Although his trial lasted two hours but his name 
and cause have remained on people’s minds.245 Those assassinated in Iraq, 
intellectuals and scholars though they were, have been forgotten. 
 
The death penalty still exists in Iraq, and although there have been no overtly 
political executions since 2003, there is no guarantee that this wouldn’t become 
common in the future when Islamists power is entrenched and more laws are 
enacted to criminalize certain practices such as trading in alcohol. Judicial 
proceedings also lack transparency and information is sometimes extracted under 
duress.246  
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Mill warns of attempts to ‘resuscitate past evils’ which raffle the ‘quiet surface of 
routine’.247  He warns of the revival of religion and compares it with bigotry in the 
uncultivated mind that could ‘provoke (people) into actively persecuting those whom 
they have never ceased to think proper objects of persecution’. 248 This, he contends, 
‘makes this country not a place for mental freedom’.  
The revival of religion has proven a huge impediment to democracy and indeed to 
the progress and stability of the country as a whole since it caused civil and 
sectarian wars between different sections of society and increased tension between 
Sunnis, Shia and Christians, many of whom had to immigrate within the country or 
abroad. This is in addition to the restrictions imposed on general freedom and civil 
life in the country which is discussed in details in chapter 7.   
Contesting received opinion should be welcomed by any society because those who 
contest them are doing something that the believers themselves should be doing. As 
Mill argues, ‘if there are any persons who contest received opinion…. let us thank 
them for it, open our minds to listen to them and rejoice that there is someone to do 
for us what we otherwise ought, if we have any regard for either the certainty or the 
vitality of our convictions, to do with much greater labour ourselves’.249  
 
Diversity of opinion can only be advantageous for all times, ‘until mankind shall have 
entered a stage of intellectual advancement which at present seems at an 
incalculable distance’250. Opinions do not have to be true or false. Conflicting 
doctrines could share the truth among them and ‘non-conforming opinion is needed 
to supply the remainder of the truth of which the received doctrine embodies only a 
part’.251   
Different arguments are needed for a healthy state of political life, but they must be 
political arguments which can be debated and criticized, not sacred views that must 
be accepted as they are as is the case with religious views. Debate is important for 
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political issues, where compromises and adjustments can be made, but you cannot 
compromise on religious or doctrinal principles or issues. When politics and religion 
are intermingled, as they are in Iraq now, this is what happens.  
According to Mill, there are usually two parties, one of order or stability and another 
of progress or reform.252 The two parties will compete ‘until one or the other enlarges 
it’s grasp as to be the party of stability or progress, knowing and distinguishing what 
is fit to be preserved from what ought to be swept away’.253  
Collision of Opinions 
Mill argues that fair play of all sides to the truth can only exist through diversity of 
opinion.254  Through debate people can arrive at the truth. Although an advocate of 
freedom, Mill doesn’t hesitate to announce that ‘unlimited use of freedom’ would not 
necessarily put an end to the ‘the evils of religious or philosophical sectarianism’ 
because ‘men of narrow capacity’ will always act as their truth is the only one. 255 Mill 
describes religious sectarianism as ‘evil’.  
I argue that sectarianism is deleterious to the interest of any state or society and it 
has impeded democracy and progress in Iraq while it protected corruption, 
inefficiency, nepotism and inefficacy. In one instance, the Integrity Commission 
announced that the head of the Hajj and Umra Commission, a prominent Shia cleric, 
had committed many legal violations and financial irregularities, including obtaining 
degrees through irregular means for himself and his two sons whom he appointed in 
the commission, yet he remained in his position after a short period of suspension. 
He was protected by the sectarian quota system. The standing of his party (SIIC) 
was enhanced in the subsequent elections in 2014 and increased its seats by 14.256  
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The tendency of all opinions to become sectarian, Mill contends, is not cured by the 
freest of discussion. On the contrary this could often heighten and exacerbate it. In 
spite of this, the collision of opinion still has a salutary effect, ‘not on the impassioned 
partisan, but on the calmer and more disinterested bystander’.257 Mill recognises that 
freedom of opinion and discussion as necessary to the mental well-being of mankind 
on four grounds; they are:  
1-if an opinion is compelled to silence, it may be true, and to deny it, we assume our 
own infallibility. 
 2-The silenced opinion maybe an error, but it may contain a portion of truth and it’s 
only by collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance 
of being supplied.  
3-If the received opinion is the whole truth, but if doesn’t suffer any vigorous contest, 
it will be held as a prejudice.   
4-The meaning of the doctrine itself will be in danger of being lost or enfeebled and 
deprived of its vital effect on the character and conduct: the dogma becomes a mere 
formal profession, inefficacious for good but cumbering the ground and preventing 
the growth of real heart-felt conviction, from reason or personal experience.258 
 
Individuality is linked to freedom of people to express their opinions as they wish. But 
Mill distinguishes between freedom of action and freedom of thought. But opinions 
lose their immunity when they are expressed in certain circumstances which may 
lead to mischief. Mill explains how the same opinion could be received differently 
under different circumstances. For example, an opinion that ‘-corn-dealers are 
starvers of the poor or private property is robbery- ought to be unmolested when 
circulated in through the press, but may justly incur punishment when delivered 
orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer’.259  
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Hence, liberty of the individual can be limited when his words may reasonably pose 
danger to other people’s lives as in the cases of potential incitement to violence or 
molestation that Mill correctly alludes to. Freedom must be associated with respect 
for the law of the land, even if the law is not acceptable to certain sections of society.  
Lesson for Iraq 
The progressively gradual adoption of democratic principles that emphasize peaceful 
coexistence among European nations was due to their cultural diversity. ‘Individual, 
classes, nations, have been extremely unlike one another; they have struck out a 
great variety of paths, each leading to something valuable’. 260 There is a lesson for 
Iraqis there. Iraq is made up of diverse communities and cultures but it has suffered 
over the years from waves of Bedouin immigrants whose despotic, violence-
glorifying values came to dominate its diverse society.261  
 
The Iraqi state has often been captured by ‘distinct groups of Iraqis’ who have not 
been able to ‘ensure that the multiple histories of the Iraqi people are subsumed into 
single narrative of state power’.262 This inability to accommodate the multiple Iraqi 
histories into a larger national narrative has translated into the coercive dominance 
of one history over other histories, henceforth paving the way for conflict, many times 
violent, between defenders of different histories.  As a result the Iraqi state has been 
characterized by violence.263 The era of Saddam Hussein was perhaps the most 
repressive and violent Iraq has ever seen in recent times.  His 24 years in power 
were characterised by ‘murder, plunder and terror’.264   
Wilhelm von Humboldt contends there are two necessary conditions for human 
development; ‘freedom and variety of situations. These render people unlike one 
another’. 265  Iraq is diverse, not only socially, racially and religiously, but also 
geographically; therefore people are bound to be different in their cultures and 
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attitudes. Not only is diversity given, but it’s also beneficial and comes as a result of 
social and economic development where people go through a ‘variety of situations’.     
Since society affords individuals protection, they owe it a return for this benefit. Part 
of it is to abide by certain rules and observe a certain line of conduct towards the 
rest.266 An individual who doesn’t conform to society’s norms doesn’t have to be 
punished by law, but by opinion. As soon as a person’s conduct begins to negatively 
affect the legitimate interests of others, society has the jurisdiction to stop him. For 
example, drinking alcohol in Iraq is not socially approved, but has never been legally 
banned. People who drink know there is a social cost to be incurred. Alcohol has 
been banned by an act of parliament passed on 22nd Oct 2016. The ban has caused 
a public outcry, but Islamists’ position on the ban didn’t move an inch.267  
 
Alcohol-drinking by others has not affected the lives of the religious since drinking is 
usually in exclusive clubs or in the confines of people’s homes. So, it’s not the type 
of activity that causes any inconvenience to society, but rather it is the ideological 
difference that the Islamists have with the whole idea of drinking as immoral and 
anti-religion. There is no public-interest issue involved here, but only a legitimate 
difference in life-style that has been criminalized by an intolerant political elite. Mill 
suggests that even when there are types of conduct by the individuals that cause 
injury to society, ‘society can afford to bear for the sake of the greater good of human 
freedom’. 268 Such conduct must not violate specific duty to the public nor occasion 
perceptible hurt to any particular person except the individual himself. Society must 
not interfere with purely personal conduct, since when it does, ‘the odds are that it 
interferes wrongly and in the wrong place’. 269  
On matters of social morality, the majority must not impose a law on the minority on 
the question of self-regarding conducts because ‘this is quite as likely to be wrong as 
right’. 270  Therefore, moral conduct should be left to individuals to determine and the 
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state must not interfere there, but the laws that Islamists have introduced or wish to, 
restrict individual liberties and assume negative judgments about certain types of 
personal conduct to the point of judicial criminalization such as the alcohol ban that 
was legislated recently by the Iraqi Parliament with an overwhelming support by 
Islamist MPs. 
The individual is not accountable to society for his/her actions insofar as these 
concern the interests of no other person but him/herself. ‘Advice, instruction, 
persuasion, and avoidance by other people if thought necessary by them for their 
own good, are the only measures by which society can justifiably express its dislike 
or disapprobation of his conduct’.  If the actions of the individual are ‘prejudicial to 
the interests of others, the individual is accountable and maybe subjected to wither 
social or legal punishments if society is of the opinion that one or the other is 
requisite for its protection’. 271  
Liberty may be legitimately “infringed upon” for the prevention of crime or accident 
through the interference of the police. Although the function of the government in 
taking precautions against crime before it has been committed is undisputed, this 
function is ‘far more liable to be abused to the prejudice of liberty than the punitory 
function’.272   
Public education is another contentious issue. One function of public education in 
established democracies is to promote and consolidate a common national identity 
that represents the agreed-upon values among the population. It is one way to help 
construct citizenship and promote a “patriotic” affiliation with the land through a 
certain inclusive and representative understanding of its history. This is about 
building some consensus about national meaning. In Iraq, public education does 
exactly the opposite as it fractures any possibility of consensus in this regard. This is 
especially so because history is linked to religion, both of which are divisive in Iraq.  
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The Shia for example regard the Umayyads as ‘usurpers responsible for the killing of 
Shia imams’ while Sunnis have a favourite view of them.273 The Shia also believe the 
first three caliphs had no right to succeed the Prophet and the rightful caliph was Ali, 
while Sunnis revere them, hold them in high esteem and believe they were the 
rightful successors.274 The two sects have recorded Islamic history in two completely 
different ways and one of their main differences is how the political leadership was 
chosen after the Prophet’s death. Teaching religion would also be a problem since 
there are different interpretations and applications of the Qura’an and Sunna. 
 
Therefore, all contentious issues of history and religion need to be avoided, not only 
in school syllabi, but also in public debate since they are likely to cause discord and 
violence. Liberal democracy needs to be the basis for the democratic system in Iraq 
so that it can be inclusive and unifying. Civil liberties have got to be sacrosanct. As 
we will see in chapter 5, the conception of justice has to be ‘free standing’ and also 
not in conflict with any major doctrine as per John Rawls theory. It must be 
recognised and shared by all the citizens.  
Liberalization 
Liberalization is the removal, fully or partially, of restrictions on general freedoms 
accompanied by strengthening the rule of law and the emergence of civil, political 
and economic societies. This usually precedes democratization, especially in 
authoritarian regimes and it usually facilitates the process of democratization and 
reduces the time required for its consolidation. But it has different effects in different 
countries. According to Samuel Huntington, liberalization in Islamic countries 
‘enhanced the power of social and political movements whose commitment to 
democracy is questionable’.275 This has actually happened in Iraq and elections 
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brought Islamist parties to power who treat democracy with contempt and only want 
to use ‘democratic mechanism’ and confuse democracy with shura.   
Dictatorships cannot tolerate independent organizations because they fear any 
collective action, but not all dictatorships are the same. Adam Przeworski states 
'What is threatening to authoritarian regimes is not the breakdown of legitimacy, but 
the organization of counter hegemony, collective projects for the future'.276 Political 
choice becomes available only when there are collective alternatives.  Despite this, 
authoritarian regimes do lessen the restriction at some point as happened in Spain, 
Chile and Poland. Such a moment signals the loosening of the power of the 
authoritarian power bloc and suggests to civil society that there is a room for 
autonomous organisation.  
This loosening is two types: from above and from below.  The first one happened in 
Hungary as a result of division in the leadership. Communist leader, Karoly Grosz, 
said 'the party was shattered not by its opponents, but – paradoxically – by the 
leadership'.277 The other type happened in East Germany. There was no division in 
the leadership until hundreds of thousands of people occupied the streets of Leipzig. 
Przeworski sums this up in the phrase: 'top-down and bottom-up models often 
compete to explain liberalization'.278 But he agrees that decisions to liberalise 
combine elements from both types.  Liberalization is a 'result of an interaction 
between splits in the authoritarian regime and autonomous organization of the civil 
society'.279 It’s either a popular mobilization signaling to liberalizers in the regime that 
they have allies among the people that could change the power bloc to their 
advantage, or visible splits in the power bloc indicate to civil society that there is a 
space for autonomous organisations. But the logic of liberalization is the same.280 
Przeworski asserts it’s 'unstable'. He borrows a term coined by Ilya Ehrenburg who 
called it in 1954 a 'thaw' or a 'melting of the iceberg of civil society that overflows the 
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dams of the authoritarian regime'.281 The first reaction of civil society to the loosening 
of the repressive apparatus is an outburst of autonomous organisations such as 
students' associations, trade unions and 'proto-parties'.  
 
After the advent of Gorbachev's Perestroika in 1985, many were encouraged to 
establish independent organisations, and by 1989, around 60,000 autonomous 
groups, associations, circles and federations were established 'probing the limits of 
the political space' as the newspaper Pravda (10/12/1989) called it. The pace of 
mobilization of civil society varies in different countries 'depending on whether the 
authoritarian equilibrium rests mainly on lies, fear, or economic prosperity'. 'Once the 
king is announced naked, the equilibrium is destroyed instantaneously'.282   
 
Przeworski explains that 'the crucial factor in breaking individual's isolation is the 
safety of numbers'.283 When the Pope visited Poland in 1979, the Poles discovered 
the strength of the opposition when two million people poured into the streets. In 
Bulgaria and Romania, first opposition demonstration grew out of organised 
demonstrations of support for the two regimes.  Regimes that are based on 'tacit 
exchange of material prosperity for passive acquiescence' are vulnerable to 
economic crises. Przeworski argues the eruption of mass movements, unrest and 
disorder, constitutes evidence that the policy of liberalization has failed.  'Since 
liberalization is always intended as a process controlled from above, the emergence 
of autonomous movements constitutes the proof that liberalization is not, or at least 
is no longer, a viable project'.284  In China, student demonstrations forced the 
liberalizers to retreat and repression increased again. The opposite happened in 
South Korea where demonstrations strengthened the liberalizers who later became 
the democratizers.285  
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Finally, liberalizations are either reversed, taking the country back to the old order or 
succeed in which case they lead to democratization. In Iraq, liberalization measures 
had taken place at the same time as democratization and this has made it very 
difficult since there was a political price to pay. Some reforms were not easy to 
implement such as subsidies for food given through the ration system. The 
government had to go back on its decision to abolish the ration system in 2012 
because there was a public outcry. The system is inefficient with wide-spread 
corruption and distorts private sector activity.286  
 
Although Iraq has adopted the free market economic system officially, it’s still 
struggling with old system where the state is the biggest employer with at least 7 
million people drawing salaries from the state. Democracy requires a vibrant 
economy where the private sector plays an important role. This has not yet 
happened as we shall see later.    
Zeitgeist  
As an ancient idea, democracy began in Athens at the 5th century B.C.; it has 
become so relevant to our modern world and come to represent a symbol of 
modernity. Democracy is never overdetermined, but by the 1970s, it has become the 
zeitgeist in most of the world.287 No one argues against the legitimacy of democracy 
anymore and people across the world tend to accept the discourse and ideas of 
democracy. Explicit arguments against democracy as a concept have almost 
disappeared from public debate in most countries.288  A UNESCO report noted in 
1951 that ‘for the first time in the history of the world, no doctrines are advanced as 
antidemocratic. The accusation of anti-democratic action or attitude is frequently 
directed against others, but practical politicians and political theorists agree in 
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stressing the democratic element in the institutions they defend and the theories they 
advocate’.289   
Although the first democratic government was established by the Athenians, its 
modern usage dates to the revolutionary upheavals in Western societies at the end 
of the 18th century.290 The first wave of democratizations began after the American 
and French revolutions. However, the emergence of democratic institutions is a 
nineteenth century phenomenon.291 Switzerland, France, Great Britain and several 
other European countries made the transition to democracy before of the turn of the 
19th century.292  
The Athenians introduced the concept of a popular government in 507 BC, where the 
demos (people) rule (kratia) themselves.293 But the Roman republics, established in 
Rome and other cities in ancient Italy, are no less contributors to the current idea of 
democracy than the Greek city states.294  
Power to the People  
What does democracy mean? It’s the ideal of people governing themselves, of giving 
power to ordinary people to rule themselves rather than being ruled by a tyrant who 
gives them little or no say in running their affairs.  
Democracy, or demokratia, the government of people, the many, polyarchy, rather 
than the few, oligarchy, or one ruler, monarchy, has become the aspiration of people 
around the world because it’s thought of as a system characterized by continuous 
responsiveness to all its citizens who are considered to be political equals.295 It may 
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have been first found in Greece, but it could have been invented in other times and 
places whenever appropriate conditions existed.296 
But why has this system of popular government been regarded as ideal for countries 
and nations with different cultures, when it was devised by the Greek noble, 
Kleisthenes, when he attempted to reform the Athenian constitution over 2500 years 
ago? It now entails so many things for people aspiring to have a democratic rule. 
John Dunn puts it eloquently: ‘as it travels through time and space, democracy never 
travels on its own. Increasingly, as the last two centuries have gone by, it has 
travelled in fine company, alongside freedom, human rights and perhaps now even, 
at least in pretension, material prosperity’.297 
All reforming political movements in the last two hundred years at least claimed to be 
democratic or sought to establish a ‘democratic’ system of government. In fact, even 
communist governments established in the second half of the twentieth century 
called themselves democratic when they weren’t really. There are no more 
ideological contestants to democracy as a political system in most of the world, 
although Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan-(1996) make an exception for the 
‘reinvigorated fundamentalism in Islamic cultural community’ who opposes 
democracy on ideological basis.298 This is perhaps why democracy has not 
prospered in Muslim countries and this is actually what former Iraqi PM, Ayad Allawi, 
has indicated to this study.299 Many Iraqi Islamists do not hesitate to declare their 
rejection of democracy, although they stress their adherence to ‘democratic 
mechanisms’.300 
 
Obviously, the democracy designed by Kleisthenes, and established by the Greek 
leader, Pericles, 2500 years ago, is not the same as the system established when 
the Americans adopted their constitution in 1776, nor is it the same system the 
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French adopted after their successful revolution in 1789, and it’s certainly not the 
system that Britain is governed by today nor the one that Iraqis aspired to establish 
after 2003. There has been a long process of ‘democratization’ from ancient Greece 
and Rome till today. But all these developments have centered around one idea: 
people’s wishes expressed through elections on how to rule themselves.  
 
After this long process; democracy is not only accepted, but demanded by political 
societies across the world. To reject democracy today is to ‘write yourself out of 
politics’ sooner or later.301 Iraqi Islamists for instance have accepted democracy, 
albeit reluctantly, merely for the fact they know they would otherwise write 
themselves out of politics. But they have not given up on the hope of establishing an 
Islamic system that’s not fully democratic. 
Democracy and Elections 
With all the talk of democracy being the rule of the people, we still need to define 
democracy in today’s terms. Joseph Schumpeter provides the 18th century ‘classical 
definition for the democratic method which is ‘institutional arrangement for arriving at 
political decisions which realises the common good by making the people itself 
decide issues through the election of individuals who are to assemble in order to 
carry out its will’.302 But Schumpeter goes on to criticise this definition as being 
inaccurate since ‘both the will and the good of the people may be, and in many 
historical examples have been, served just as well or better by governments that 
cannot be described as democratic according to any accepted usage of the term’.303  
 
Schumpeter continued to describe in details the shortcomings of this definition in 
neglecting how to choose the leadership, incorporate group-wise volitions, or clarify 
individual freedoms which subsist with democracy.  The classical definition makes 
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producing a government a prime function of democracy but there is no clear method 
of evicting it. While the definition talks about the will of the people, while democracy 
operates by simple majorities and this is not the will of all the people. Also, electing 
individuals to produce a government, but for a national government ‘this practically 
amounts to deciding who the leading man should be’.304 He argues that this is only 
done in the US democracy.  
 
Schumpeter then reduces democracy to mean ‘the people have the opportunity of 
accepting or refusing the men who rule them’, not what was originally intended which 
was ‘the rule of the people’.305 But could people choose or refuse their leaders in 
undemocratic ways? This fact required another criterion to be added to the definition 
and this is ‘through free competition among the would-be leaders for the vote of the 
electorates’.306  
Samuel Huntington regards the definition of democracy in terms of elections as 
minimal. He states that democracy, to some, must have ‘sweeping and idealistic 
connotations’.307 To them, he argues, ‘true democracy’ means  ‘liberté, egalité, 
fraternité, effective citizen control over policy, responsible government, honesty and 
openness in politics, informed and rational deliberation, equal participation and 
power and various other civic values’.308   Although these are ‘good things’, as 
Huntingdon acknowledged, but defining democracy in those terms, he argues, 
‘raises all the problems that come up with the definitions of democracy by source or 
purpose’. He concludes that ‘elections open, free and fair are the essence of 
democracy, the inescapable sine qua non’.309  
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Requirements for Democracy 
But how do we define democracy in today’s terms? Or can a definition actually sum 
up everything about democracy? There are necessary political institutions for 
modern representative democratic governments and these must exist in any 
democratic country. Robert Dahl provides six political institutions that need to exist 
for a modern democracy to function.310 Although different political thinkers have 
provided different definitions and descriptions, but Dahl’s description sums up what 
modern democracy is all about. 
1- Elected officials 
All decisions and policies in a democratic government have to be taken by officials 
elected directly by the people, thus modern democratic governments are 
representative of their people and decisions are taken on people’s behalf.  
2- Free, fair and frequent elections 
Elected officials are chosen in frequent and freely-conducted elections in which 
coercion is comparatively uncommon. So, when a government is elected, it really 
represents the true wishes of the people. The term of the government must be 
limited in time so that people can pass their judgments on the performance of their 
elected representatives after a specific period has passed. If people are happy with 
them, they will vote for them again so that they continue their good work for the 
benefit of the country and its people. If not, they will elect others who they think are 
better placed to serve them and the country at large. Therefore, there is a need for 
frequent elections in order to keep the rulers in check and punish those who do not 
do well by replacing them with others. 
 
3- Freedom of expression 
Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe 
punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials, the 
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government, the regime, the socio-economic order and the prevailing ideology. 
Debating important issues without fear of any repercussions will encourage people to 
express their views freely and tell the truth about what is happening to them and in 
the country at large.  
4- Access to alternative sources of information 
Citizens have a right to seek out alternative and independent sources of information 
from other citizens, experts, newspapers, magazines, books, telecommunications 
and the like. Alternative sources of information that are not under the control of the 
government and political parties must exist in a democracy, and must be protected 
by law. This way, the people will have a choice to hear information from all sides and 
also it will put pressure on government and partisan media to tell the truth or at least 
be fairer and more reasonable in covering events since they will be competing with 
other independent media that will be covering events in a fair and transparent way. 
 
5- Associational autonomy 
Citizens have the right to form independent organizations and associations in order 
to achieve their various rights and demands, including those related to the effective 
operation of democratic institutions. These associations help democratic institutions 
achieve their goals and help people pursue aims without having to belong to political 
parties. The organizations also monitor political parties and put a check on their 
activities. 
6- Inclusive Citizenship 
All citizens are equal before the law and have equal rights and duties. No one should 
be denied the rights available to other citizens in the land and are necessary for the 
implementation of the other five political institutions. They include: voting in regular, 
free and fair elections to elect officials, running for elective office, free expression, 
forming and participating in independent political parties and organizations, having 
access to independent sources of information, the rights to civil liberties and 
opportunities that may be necessary to the effective operation of the political 
institutions of large-scale democracy. 
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Why is Democracy Necessary?  
One interesting definition of democracy is a system in which parties 'lose elections', 
explaining that the presence of a party that wins elections does not define a system 
as democratic.311 
Linz (1984) characterizes democracy as a system with temporary government or 
'government pro tempore', where conflicts are regularly terminated under established 
rules. But Coser (1959) contends that conflicts are terminated temporarily, not 
resolved definitely under democracy because losers do not give up their right to 
compete again in future elections, and even rules 'can be changed according to 
rules'. 312 
Participants in a democratic competition dispose unequal economic, organisational 
and ideological resources, since some groups have more resources and are better 
organized than others. Others are superior ideologically or have 'arguments that 
persuade'.313 Those with greater resources are better placed to win in a democracy. 
But the presence of recognized unions and federations of employers is important in a 
democracy because they act as a ‘counterbalance’ for strong political parties.314  
According to Pizzorno (1978) 'protagonists are collectively organized... have the 
capacity to formulate collective interests and act strategically to further them'.315 The 
nature of democratic institutions imposes a relation of representation on society and 
individuals do not defend their interests directly, they delegate this responsibility to 
their representatives (Luxemburg-1970-p.202).316 This also extends to associations 
and unions which act on behalf of their members. Thus, democratic societies are 
populated 'not by freely acting individuals but by collective organizations that are 
capable of coercing whose interests they represent'.317 But no single force can 
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control outcomes in a democracy although they depend on what participants do, 
believing it to be in their best interest. 
Although it has often been said that dictators are unpredictable, and this is true about 
Saddam Hussein who invaded two independent states, Iran and Kuwait, within 10 
years, according to Adam Przeworski, 'uncertainty is inherent in a democracy, 
although this doesn't mean everything is possible or nothing is predictable... 
democracy is neither chaos nor anarchy'.318  But democracy’s unpredictability 
happens with defined rules that participants are aware of. Actors do know what is 
possible and what is likely to happen because 'the probability of particular outcomes 
is determined by institutional framework and the resources that different political 
forces bring to the competition'. What is not known is 'which particular outcome will 
occur’. 319 Actors in a democracy can attach probabilities to the consequences of 
their actions and hence they can calculate what is best for them to do. Thus, 
democracy constitutes an opportunity for all to pursue their respective interests.   
Przeworski asserts that despite the majoritarian foundation of representative 
democracy, the system generates outcomes that are predominantly a product of 
negotiations among leaders of political forces, not a universal deliberative process. 
'Democratization is an act of subjecting all interests to competition, of 
institutionalizing uncertainty. The decisive step towards democracy is the devolution 
of power from a group of people to a set of rules'.320  
Democracy is collectively rational exercise if: 1-A unique maximum exists, 2-the 
democratic process converges towards this maximum, where democracy is superior 
to all its alternatives, 3-the democratic process is the unique mechanism, that 
converges towards this maximum – no benevolent dictator could know what is in the 
general interest.321   
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Rousseau believed that the general interest is given a priori and that the democratic 
process converges towards it, while Marx argued that no such general interest can 
be found in societies divided into classes. Arrow (1951) argued that even if such a 
maximum existed, no process of aggregating individual preferences will reveal it.322  
Przeworski regards the assumption that preferences are exogenous to the 
democratic process as unreasonable and he quotes Schumpeter (1950:263) that 'the 
will of the people is the product, not the motive power of the political process'.323  
Habermas and Joshua Cohen (1989) think deliberations lead to convergence on a 
unique maximum. Przeworski doesn't agree and regards their views as 'too strong to 
be realistic'.  He agrees with Manin-(1987)-who believed that deliberation stops short 
of convergence on a unique maximum, but it educates preferences and makes them 
more general.324 He accepts that not all conflicts can be resolved by deliberation, 
quoting Schmitt (1988), who argues this is the case since reasons and facts get 
exhausted at some point while conflicts remain; therefore, democracy generates 
winners and losers. ‘Democratic institutions render an intertemporal character to 
political conflicts and offer a 'long time horizon to political actors' allowing them to 
'think about the future rather than being concerned exclusively with present 
outcomes'.325 But outcomes under democracy ‘hold only if they are mutually 
enforced in self-interest or enforced externally by some third party’.326 Democracy 
can minimize arbitrary violence as Przeworski argues.327  
In Iraq, the US was the guarantor of democracy, but not anymore. Iran has emerged 
as the most influential power. Since democratic culture is not yet entrenched in Iraq, 
political, ethnic and sectarian rivalry is very intense. As some groups have militias to 
impose undemocratic solutions, and the guarantor is no longer interested in 
performing its previous role, democracy in Iraq could be under threat.  Democracy 
needs unequivocal international support, political and financially, for a long period for 
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it to survive.  A study by Rand Corporation found that nation-building enterprises 
(democracy in Iraq is one such enterprise) ‘have succeeded only with enormous 
investments of labour, money and time-five years at minimum’328.   
American expert on democracy, Larry Diamond, who was sent to Iraq by the US 
administration to help build democracy, wrote in 2003 ‘it’s possible that Iraq could 
grow into a democracy, but the task is huge and the odds are long against it...It will 
require a prolonged and internationalized engagement with Iraq, costing billions of 
dollars over a number of years’.329  
Samuel Huntington believes that the obstacle to democracy in the Muslim World are 
mainly cultural, in Africa they are economic while in China (at least in 1990) they are 
political, economic and cultural.330 This view is largely accurate regarding Iraq as a 
Muslim country, although impediments to democracy are not limited to culture. There 
are others such as religion, stateness, rentier economy, armed groups and militias, 
hostile environment among others. Impediments will be discussed in details in Part 2 
of this study. 
In his evaluation of the Indian democracy, Barrington Moore (1967) argues that the 
Indian democracy is ‘not a mere sham’ and India ‘belongs to the modern world’ 
politically. He lists six positive features of the Indian democracy:  
1-a working parliamentary system since independence, 2-independent judiciary, 3-
standard liberal freedoms, 4-free general elections in which the ruling party accepts 
defeat, 5-civilian control over the military and 6-a head of state who made very 
limited use of his formal extensive powers.331  
But Moore lists two important negative factors of the Indian democracy. They are: 
Asian settings and lack of industrial revolution. He attributes India’s ‘appalling 
problems’ to these two factors. Iraq shares with India the two negative factors and 
both apply to it, the Asian setting and having a rentier economy (non-industrial).   
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The Middle East still has no democracy with the exception of Lebanon which has a 
limping democratic system that is based on sectarian divide (consociational 
democracy).332  
The other two regional democracies, Turkey and Israel, cannot act as a model for 
Iraqi democratization because they are distrusted by most Iraqis.333 Iraq had the 
worst dictatorship in recent times, and now has a democratic system that is weak 
and under threat from many quarters, including terrorist groups believed to be helped 
by regional powers, and Islamist politicians whose belief in democracy is 
questionable.  
 
Currently large parts of Iraq are controlled by ISIS terrorists, including Iraq’s second 
largest city, Musil. The Kurds in the North keep threatening to declare independence; 
it is likely that they will ‘at the right time’. This clearly means there is a stateness 
problem since there is a large minority that doesn’t believe in the current Iraqi 
state.334 The Iraqi state has broken down entirely and rebuilding it is a slow process 
that requires extensive support from the international community.335 
Benefits of Democracy 
So, what are the benefits of democracy and why do prosperous nations living under 
other regime types want to be democratic? Since I have quoted Dahl for the 
necessary institutions of democracy, and in order to be consistent, I would like to 
quote him again about the benefits of democracy: 336  
1- Avoiding tyranny and autocratic rule. The most pressing problem in politics is the 
development of dictatorships which results in oppression and repression as well as 
loss of freedom and dignity for citizens. Under Stalin’s tyranny, millions of people 
were imprisoned, tortured of killed for political reasons. Under democracy, people 
can choose their leaders carefully and keep an eye on their performance. Once they 
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do not fulfill their obligations, people can ‘evict’ them, using Schumpeter’s term. Any 
non-democratic rule, be it authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian or sultanistic, will 
be oppressive in various degrees.  
 
2- Guaranteeing essential rights. One of the basic tenets of democracy is that essential 
human rights are guaranteed because elected officials cannot violate the law and are 
constantly checked by the law of the country as well as by opposition parties and 
free press. Democracy is inherently a system of citizen rights while a non-democratic 
rule, especially authoritarian, may give certain freedoms, but they are not guaranteed 
and can be withdrawn at any time as is the case in many benign monarchies, 
republics or sheikhdoms in various parts of the world.337  
 
3- Ensuring general freedom. When there is a law that is made by a representative 
body, the democratic government will be under duty to respect such a law. Laws 
produced by a democracy usually guarantee citizen’s basic freedoms such as 
freedom of speech, association, assembly and so on. 
 
4- Self-determination. People can determine how they want to live with no compulsion 
from individuals who happen to be their rulers. They can choose their constitution 
and laws and they can change them if and when they so wish. 
 
5- Moral autonomy. Only democratic governments can provide a maximum of 
opportunity for persons to exercise freedom of self-determination and live under laws 
of their own choosing.  
 
6- Human development. Democracy fosters human development more fully than any 
feasible alternative. Although this is controversial, but evidence suggests that human 
development in democratic countries is highly plausible.  
 
7- Protection of essential personal interests. Under a democratic system, legitimate 
interests are protected by the state. 
                                                            
337
  Linz& Stepan-(1996)-op.cit.pp44-45 
91 
 
 
 
8- Political equality. Democratic systems treat citizens equally. However, this needs to 
be regularly checked by civil society in order to make sure equality is realised. In 
certain cultures, such as the Iraqi one, preferential treatments are given to friends 
and relatives of high officials.338 This has continued under democracy and siblings of 
holders of high posts are appointed in senior positions without any challenge from 
civil society or the law.339 Ministers look up to their leaders, rather than the public, for 
instruction. They brought their party followers and relatives to their ministries with no 
fear of breaking the law.340   
 
9- Conducive to Prosperity. Countries with democratic governments, with regular 
checks and balances in place, tend to be more prosperous than countries with non-
democratic countries. Although this may be accurate in theory, but in practice, it’s not 
always the case as some democracies remain poor such as India, and non-
democratic governments have delivered economic prosperity, while others served 
people better.341  
 
There is no evidence that democratic governments perform better than non-
democratic. In fact some studies have indicated that democratic governments 
perform less well.342  The Spanish economy deteriorated sharply during the transition 
while unemployment under Franco (in 1970) was around 3%. It went p to 20%, in the 
1980s. Economic growth was over 7% from 1960-1975, it went down to 1.7% 
between 1975-85.343 Huntington points out that governments produced by elections 
can be ‘inefficient, corrupt, short-sighted, irresponsible, dominated by special 
interests and incapable of adopting policies by the public good’.344  
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Prosperity under democracy in Iraq has not materialized and Iraqi economy is 
weaker than ever due to falling oil prices, wide-spread corruption and extra military 
spending to fight terrorist groups controlling Iraqi cities.345 As a sign of the wide-
spread corruption in the country, one Iraqi politician admitted, in a rare moment of 
truth, that ‘everyone is corrupt, including me’.346  
 
10- Conducive to Peace. Modern representative democracies do not fight wars with one 
another. No war has been fought in recent history between two democratic countries. 
Many regard this as one of the most important attributes of democracy.  
 
The final idea of “democratic peace” was first formulated by Immanuel Kant and 
Thomas Paine. Bruce Russet wrote a book on this in the 1990s.347 In recent times 
there has been no war between two democratic nations. From the 19th century down 
to 1990, democracies didn’t fight other democracies, with trivial exceptions.348 But 
Jack Snyder (2000) argues that democratization is a double-edged sword that can 
provide impetuses for heightening nationalist violence, conflict and aggression.349  
 
While acknowledging that established democracies often have peaceful interactions 
in their foreign policies toward each other, Snyder demonstrates that the early 
phases of democratic transitions are often fraught with the potential for conflict, 
“which not only raises the costs of transition but may also redirect popular political 
participation into a lengthy antidemocratic detour”.350 But even Snyder acknowledges 
that mature democracies have not fought wars against each other.  
 
John Stuart Mill also argues ‘unlimited use of freedom’ would not necessarily put an 
end to the ‘the evils of religious or philosophical sectarianism’ because ‘men of 
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narrow capacity’ will always act as their truth is the only one. 351 He also 
acknowledged that the tendency of all opinions to become sectarian is not cured by 
the freest discussion. On the contrary, he argues this could often heighten and 
exacerbate it. 
 
There are two opposing points of view about democracy; Static and dynamic. From a 
static point of view, democratic institutions must be 'fair': they must give all the 
relevant political forces a chance to win. From a dynamic point of view, they must be 
effective: They must make even losing under democracy more attractive.352 One of 
the dilemmas for the Left that Adam Przeworski (1991) highlights is that 'even 
procedurally perfect democracy may remain an oligarchy: the rule of the rich over the 
poor', while the traditional dilemma for the Right is 'democracy may turn out to be the 
rule of the many, who are poor, over the few rich'.353  
A glimpse at the personalities ruling Iraq today reveals that they are a few families 
who inherit political positions or dominance. Leaders of political parties or blocs, 
presidents, ministers and prime ministers are sons or siblings of past political leaders 
or their associates and followers. The Barzani, Talabani, Hakeem and Sadr families 
bequeath leadership positions in a systematic manner and appoint their associates 
and their heirs to leadership positions. In the 2014 elections, 5 of PM Noori Al-
Maliki’s family were candidates, including his two sons-in-law and two nephews, who 
were elected.354 
As we will see in the next chapter, the establishment of democracy requires a state, 
without which there can be no secure democracy.355 When there is a ‘lack of 
identification with the state by large groups or individuals in the territory, fundamental 
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and often unsolvable problems are at hands for democracy. Iraqi Kurds didn’t think 
of themselves as Iraqis and prefer to have their own independent state.356 
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Chapter 4 
Democratization 
 
Introduction 
Democratization is the process whereby countries become democratic, and this 
takes time, depending on several factors related to society’s readiness for 
democracy. Countries go through a period of transition before they become 
consolidated democracies. But what is a consolidated democracy? Juan Linz and 
Alfred Stepan (1996) gives a very simple but eloquent definition: it’s a political 
situation when democracy becomes the only game in town.357  
 
Przeworski (1991) offers similar explanation but he adds ‘it’s a system in which 
parties 'lose elections', explaining that the presence of a party that wins elections 
does not define a system as democratic.358 Przeworski regards democracy as 
consolidated 'when a particular system of institutions becomes the only game in 
town, when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic institutions, when all 
losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have 
lost'.359  
 
Philippe Schmitter sees consolidation as ‘the transformation of the institutional 
arrangements and understandings that emerged at the time of the transition into 
relations of cooperation and competition that are reliably known and regularly 
practiced and voluntarily accepted by those persons or collectivities...that participate 
in democratic governance’. 360 
 
So, democracy becomes established and entrenched within a society when it is 'self-
enforcing' and when all the participants feel they find it best for their interests to use 
the existing system and have hope to get improvement sometime in the future; and 
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when democracy becomes a benefit to all and it’s harmful for any political force to try 
and subvert it. Coleman’s (1989) view on this is 'minority doesn't consist of losers 
and the majority winners. Instead minority members have false beliefs about the 
general will; members of the majority have true beliefs'.361 This means that losing 
and winning under democracy is temporary and those who lose have a hope of 
winning in the future. 
 
Democracy becomes the only game in town in a territory when: 
 
1-Behaviourally, there is no significant national, social, economic, political or 
institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives 
by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to 
secede from the state.  
 
2-Attitudinally, there is a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that 
democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern 
collective life in a society such as theirs and when the support for the anti-system 
alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces. 
  
3-Constitutionally, when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout 
the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of 
conflict within the specific laws, procedures and institutions sanctions by the new 
democratic process.362  
 
State and Nation 
Democracy is governance system for a state, so the first requirement for the 
consolidation of this system is the existence of a state. Without a sovereign state 
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there can be no secure democracy.363 When there is a ‘lack of identification with the 
state that large groups or individuals in the territory want to join a different state or 
create an independent state, it raises fundamental and often unsolvable 
problems’.364  In Iraq there is at least one irredentist tendency represented by a large 
Kurdish minority which has been demanding self-determination since the creation of 
the state.  
 
There are now more irredentist tendencies such as Turcoman, Assyrian, Yazidis and 
even Sunni groups who either demand a separate federal entity or autonomous 
region.365  
 
Although the terms nation and state are now used interchangeably, there is a 
distinction between the two. A nation may have a ‘nation-state’. According to Max 
Weber, a nation belongs to the sphere of values, i.e. the expected sentiment of 
solidarity among some groups. A nation is not necessarily identical with the people of 
a state or a membership of a given polity.366   
 
A nation can be divided in more than one state as was the case in Germany prior to 
unification in 1990 and perhaps now in Korea which is one nation divided between 
two states. The Arab nation is divided into 22 states; all are members of the Arab 
League.367 
  
A nation doesn’t have officials, and there are no clear rules of membership nor 
defined rights and duties that can be legitimately enforced. National leaders don’t 
have coercive powers or taxes.  
 
In contrast, a state has resources and coercive powers and controls over its 
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citizens.368  Some national movements could exercise power, use violence or exact 
contributions without or before gaining statehood, but this always happens when 
‘that movement is taking the function of another state, subverting its order so that a 
state is breaking down in the process.’369 Sometimes, nationalists have private 
armies to enforce their aspirations and challenge the authority of a state, which can 
lose control of some of its territory, but this signals the beginning of a civil war or 
national liberation struggle which could end in the creation of another state.370  
 
The emergence of a state dates back to the 15th century, before the emergence of 
modern ideas about nationalism in the late 18th century, and the idea of a nation-
state becoming a major force in the second half of the 19th century.371 Most of the 
nation states that were created in the twentieth century were not actually nation-
states. Most of them such as Czechoslovakia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, 
were made up of different ethnicities. The disintegration of empires and redrawing of 
boundaries between states were not directly the result of nation-building 
movements.372  Since very few states are ethnically pure, nationalism can be a 
counter-democratic because it’s divisive since it focuses on a primordial identity that 
is not shared by all the people of the state.  
 
Belgium for example became independent of the Netherland in 1830, but when it 
was confronted by Flemish nationalism, it created political institutions and practices 
that made it a democratic multinational state.373 In some nation-states, national 
leaders pursue policies that aim to increase ‘cultural homogeneity’. They send 
messages that the state should be ‘of and for the nation’.374 So, the language of the 
nation becomes the ‘official language’ and the religion and culture of the dominant 
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nation become privileged if not ‘official’.375 This flies in the face of democratic 
principles and practices which emphasize inclusive citizenship and equal rights. 
Under democracy, all citizens identify with one subjective idea of the nation and the 
nation is congruent with the state.  
 
Irredenta  
Other factors are also important for democratization. If there is a significant irredenta 
outside the state boundaries, or there are diverse cultures and more than one nation 
existing, pursuing democratization would be difficult. ‘Congruence between polity 
and demos would facilitate the creation of democratic nation-state’.376  This 
congruence is supportive of democratic consolidation because it reduces or even 
eliminates stateness problems. But in the real world there are a few nondemocratic 
states that are homogeneous enough to start democratic transition. Polis/demos 
incongruence creates problems for democratic consolidation unless carefully 
addressed.377  
 
State legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens is important for the consolidation of 
democracy and when this legitimacy is questioned by one group or more within the 
state it creates complication for democracy. Further problems arise if a large minority 
is considered an irredenta by another state and this could jeopardize peace. On the 
other hand, if nationalist extremists among the majority group, the titular nation as 
they are called in the former Soviet Union, pursue nationalist policies that alienate 
other groups, this may push them to turn to neighbouring countries for support and 
protection. When irredentist policies become dominant, they become a serious strain 
on democracy in both the external ‘homeland’ of the minority and the neighbouring 
nation-building state.378  It is a problem for democracy in particular since it requires 
agreements by the citizens of the territory, while a non-democratic regime can 
suppress irredentist aspirations imposing acquiescence over a large group of people 
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for a long period of time without threatening the coherence of the state.379  
 
In Iraq, irredentist aspirations are particularly manifested in the Kurdish large minority 
whose members feel they do not belong to the state of Iraq but should have a state 
of their own. This is partly due to the harsh treatment they received from the central 
government and partly because they have a different racial and cultural identity. 
They also feel they are part of a larger ‘Kurdish nation’ that is dispersed over four 
countries, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria. Kurdish nationalist leaders, such as Masud 
Barzani, feed into this challenge often by threatening to declare the independence of 
Kurdistan from Iraq.380  The American diplomat and writer, Peter Galbraith, had two 
descriptions for the current Kurdish sense of belonging to Iraq. ‘For the older 
generation, Iraq was a bad memory, while the new generation has no feeling of 
being Iraqi’.381    
 
Sunni Arabs also feel part of the bigger Arab world. According to Dr Abbas Kelidar, a 
prominent writer and expert on Iraq, the ideology of Arab nationalism, imbued by 
King Faysal and his Sharifian officers, was seen by Shia and Kurds as a ‘means to 
ensure Sharifian (Sunni) hegemony over the Iraqi political process’. ‘Pan-Arabism 
took for granted that language, religion and historical experience shared by the 
Arabic-speaking peoples constituted the essential qualities of nationhood’.382 Kelidar 
argues that ‘the pan-Arabist reading of religion has alienated Shia heartland by 
emphasizing that the Umayyad dynasty (661-750) as the epitome of Arab genius. 
The Shia viewed the Umayyads as usurpers responsible for the killing of Shia 
imams. Hence they strongly objected to the government invocation of the dynasty 
seeing it as a means of validating the Sunni political hegemony’.383  
 
Arab emphasis on the nation’s political discourse has also alienated the Kurds. 
Kelidar affirms Arab nationalism has ‘ill-served the new Iraq since it failed in its drive 
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to remake Arabs via a process of individual immersion in Arab political culture’.384 He 
concludes that the nationalist ideology imposed by the British on Iraqis was 
‘externally irredentist and internally divisive’.385  
 
Judith Yaphe has a slightly different view regarding the divisiveness of Arab 
nationalism. She states that ‘Arab nationalism was particularly strong in the Shia 
cities of Karbala and Najaf where students and scholars encouraged the teachings of 
Arab civilization and culture’. She attributes this to the fact that ‘southern tribes had a 
common sense of Arab identity, shared traditions and customs and links to the great 
clans and confederations that originated in Arabia and spread throughout the 
region’.386  The question remains whether these cross-country links between Arab 
people contribute to irredentist feelings or cause others in different territories to 
interfere in territories they do not live in, or they can be considered as normal cultural 
links that exist between all peoples of the world.  
 
As we saw above, the Iraqi state was built on shaky grounds from the beginning 
since the brand of Arab nationalism brought by the state’s founding fathers alienated 
the non-Arabs who nearly form a fifth of the population and also divided Arabs since 
they embrace two faiths which have different readings of history. Arab nationalism 
ideology suited only the Sunnis and some Shia Arab nationalists.    
 
Citizens not subjects  
Democracy is characterised by citizens not subjects, and a democratic transition 
often puts the polis/demos at the centre of politics. But the more linguistic, cultural 
and national diversity, the more difficult politics becomes, because it would be 
difficult to reach an agreement on the fundamentals of a democracy. Still, democracy 
can still be consolidated in a multilingual, multicultural and multi-religious societies 
but it needs considerable political crafting of democratic norms, practices and 
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institutions.387  
 
Many of the existing states are multi-national multi-cultural, multi-lingual, and it is 
difficult to make them homogeneous (nation states) and the only democratic 
possibilities to make them homogeneous are through voluntary assimilation.388 But 
there are political elites, especially among minorities who emphasize primordial 
values and characteristics for emotional and self interest reasons. Those elites didn’t 
exist in preindustrial societies, but they do exist now even in agrarian societies.389  
With so many ethnicities, cultures and languages (around 8000 in the world), and 
people living in multinational settings, a nation-state will be difficult to achieve by 
democratic means.390  
 
In a multinational settings, the chances to consolidate democracy are increased by 
state policies that grant inclusive and equal citizenship and that give all citizens a 
common ‘roof’ of state-mandated and enforced individual rights. Such states have a 
greater need than other polities to explore a variety of non-majoritarian and non-
plebiscitarian formulas.391 Federalism is an option but only if there are spatial 
differences between the different groups. In Iraq, the spatial differences between 
groups are not always well-defined.  
 
Although the Kurds live in the northern/north-eastern region, but there are many of 
them who live with other Iraqi communities in Kirkuk, Musil, Dyala and Baghdad. The 
current Kurdish Federal Region encompasses only three provinces which are largely 
inhabited by Kurds. But it will be difficult to have all the Kurds in one federal region. 
The same goes for the Sunnis and Turcoman who are dispersed in many provinces 
although there are areas where they constitute the majority. 
 
Both the state and society might allow a variety of publicly-supported institutions 
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such as media and schools in different languages, symbolic recognition of cultural 
diversity, a variety of legally accepted marriage codes, legal and practical tolerance 
for parties representing different communities and a whole array of political 
procedures and devices that Arend Lijphart has described as ‘consociational 
democracy’.392  
 
The choice of electoral systems is also important. Proportional representation can 
facilitate representation of spatially dispersed minorities.393  But this system, 
according to which the first elections of Jan 2005 were conducted, was abolished by 
Islamists when they controlled the National Assembly in 2005. The current system 
(Modified Saint Lague) allows candidates with a few hundreds of votes to become 
MPs, while it bars others with thousands of votes. Many complain about its 
unfairness. Due to this unfairness, there have been calls to change the system 
recently by the Sadrist Trend and the Civil Democratic Alliance.394 
  
Democratic consolidation 
It’s now established that modern democratic governance is inevitably linked to 
stateness. Without state there can be no citizenship and without citizenship there 
can be no democracy.395 Citizenship can be acquired in three different ways. These 
are by descent, birth, or naturalization (voluntaristic act of asking for and being 
granted citizenship).396 In all three cases, citizenship is linked to the state, especially 
in the third type since the state has to grant the citizenship to the individual 
requesting it.   
 
But the absence of effective institutional structures in the state “to attach the citizenry 
to the state” prompts political elites to “attempt to create loyalty through cultural 
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attachments,” such as culture, ethnicity, language and religion.397 This may have 
happened in Iraq. Citizens and politicians were influenced by the tide of sectarian 
media.398  
 
After stateness, there must exist five conditions in order for democracy to be 
consolidated. These are free and lively civil society, autonomous and valued political 
society, rule of law to ensure that citizens’ freedoms and independent associational 
life are guaranteed, usable state bureaucracy and institutionalised economic 
society.399  
 
Civil society can destroy a non-democratic regime and then generates political 
alternatives to monitor government and state. A full democratic transition and 
consolidation must involve political society which consists of political parties, 
elections, electoral rules, political leadership, interparty alliances and legislature. 
Both civil and political societies need to be protected by the rule of law that is 
embodied in a spirit of constitutionalism and this requires strong consensus over the 
constitution and a commitment to ‘self-binding’ procedures of governance that 
require exceptional majorities to change as well as a hierarchy of laws interpreted by 
an independent judicial system and supported by strong legal culture in civil society. 
The state also needs a functioning bureaucracy, usable by the democratic 
government in order to have the capacity to command, regulate and extract. 
Unfortunately, the last condition was not to be found in Iraq after the fall of the 
regime. Ali Allawi affirms “when the Coalition arrived in Baghdad on 9 April 2003, it 
found a fractured and brutalized society, presided over by a fearful, heavily armed 
minority. The post 9/11 jihadi culture, that was subsequently to plague Iraq, was just 
beginning to take root. The institutions of the state were moribund; the state 
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exhausted. The ideology that had held Ba’athist rule together had decayed beyond 
repair.400” In other words, the state had to be recreated almost from scratch.  
There must also be an institutionalised economic society. Modern democracies 
neither exist in a pure market economy nor in a command economy. People must 
have the freedom to conduct business profitably, and at the same time a government 
that intervenes to remedy market failures. The very working of a modern democracy 
would lead to the transformation of a market economy into a mixed economy.401 The 
Iraqi economy was rentier with 98% of the budget coming from oil revenue.402  
 
The consolidation of democracy is closely linked to the consolidation of economic 
reforms which are necessary for any country undergoing democratization. 
Democracies are ‘unlikely to become institutionalised if broad assumptions 
underlying the management of the economy lack widespread support or are subject 
to continuous challenge’.403 Iraq is a divided society and political and sectarian 
groups undermine each other. The management of the economy does lack 
widespread support and is continuously challenged.  
 
Paths to democracy 
Different polities may vary in the paths available for transition to democracy, 
depending on the type of the nondemocratic regime they have been ruled by. There 
are four types of nondemocratic regimes and two subtypes of democracy, since 
democracy has ‘sufficient value to be retained as one regime’.404 Still, there are two 
subtypes of democracy: consociational and majoritarian.  
 
Democracy has the following characteristics:   
-Responsible political pluralism reinforced by extensive areas of pluralist autonomy 
in economy, society and internal life of organization.  
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-Legally protected pluralism consistent with ‘societal corporatism’ but not ‘state 
corporatism’.  
-Extensive intellectual commitment to citizenship and procedural rules of 
contestation.  
-Not teleological.  
-Respect for the rights of minorities, state of law and value for individualism. -
Participation via autonomously generated organizations of civil society, guaranteed 
by a system of law.  
-Value is on low regime mobilization but high citizen participation.  
-Diffuse effort by regime to induce good citizenship and patriotism.  
-Toleration of peaceful and orderly opposition.  
-Top leaders are produced by free elections and power must be exercised within 
constitutional limits and state of law.  
-Leadership must be periodically subjected to, and produced by, free elections.405  
     
Types of Nondemocratic regimes  
 
1-Totalitarian is characterized by the following characteristics: 
- Absence of pluralism.  
-Official party has de jure and de facto power.  
-Party has eliminated almost all pre-totalitarian pluralism.  
-No space for second economy or parallel society 
-Elaborate and guiding ideology that articulates a reachable utopia.   
-Leaders, individuals and groups derive most of their sense of mission, legitimation 
and often specific policies from their commitment to some holistic conception of 
humanity and society.  
-Extensive mobilization into a vast array of regime-created obligatory organizations.  
-Emphasis on activism of cadres and militants.  
-Efforts at mobilization of enthusiasm, private life is decried.  
-Leadership rules with undefined limits.  
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Great unpredictability for members 
-Often charismatic.  
-Recruitment to top leadership highly dependent on success and commitment in 
party organization.  
_Adherence to utopian ideology.  
Undefined limits and great unpredictability, vulnerability for elites and non-elites 
alike.  
 
2-Post-totalitarian is characterised by the following characteristics: the regime has 
almost all the other control mechanisms of the party-state in place, but there is 
limited but not responsible social, institutional and economic pluralism, almost no 
political pluralism because the party still formally has monopoly of power, may have 
a second economy but state still has the overwhelming presence, most 
manifestations of pluralism in ‘flattened polity’ grew out of tolerated state structures 
of dissident groups consciously formed in opposition to totalitarian regime, opposition 
creates second culture or parallel society in mature totalitarianism, guiding ideology 
still officially exists and is part of the social reality, but weakened commitment to, or 
faith in, utopia, shift of emphasis from ideology to programmatic consensus that is 
presumably based on national decision-making, limited debate without too much 
reference to ideology, progressive loss of interest by leaders and non-leaders 
involved in organizing mobilization, routine mobilization of population within the state 
sponsored organizations to achieve a minimum degree of conformity and 
compliance, many cadres and militants are mere careerists and opportunists, 
boredom, withdrawal and ultimately privatization of populations values become an 
accepted fact, growing emphasis on personal security, checks on top leadership via 
party structures, procedures and internal democracy, top leaders are seldom 
charismatic, recruitment to top leadership is restricted to official party, but less 
dependent on building a career within the party’s organization, top leaders can come 
from party technocrats in state apparatus.  
 
3-Authoritarian is characterized by the following characteristics:  limited but not 
responsible political pluralism, often quite extensive social and economic pluralism, 
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most of pluralism has been in place before the establishment of the regime, often 
some space for semi opposition. No elaborate ideology but distinctive mentalities, no 
extensive or intensive political mobilization except at some points in their 
development.  The leader or small group of leaders operates within formally ill-
defined but quite predictable norms. Effort at cooperation of old elite groups. Some 
autonomy in state careers and in the military.  
 
4-Sultanistic regime is the most bizarre in all of the nondemocratic regimes. It is 
characterized by the following characteristics: unpredictability, social and economic 
pluralism doesn’t disappear but it is subject to unpredictable and despotic 
intervention. No individual or group in civil society, or political society or the state free 
from the sultan’s exercise of despotic power, no rule of law, no low 
institutionalization, and high fusion between private and public. High manipulation of 
symbols, extreme glorification of the ruler, no elaborate or guiding ideology, or even 
distinctive mentalities outside the despotic personalism. No attempt to justify major 
initiatives on the basis of ideology, pseudo ideology not believed by staff, subjects or 
staff, low but occasional and manipulative mobilization of a ceremonial type by 
clientelistic methods without permanent organization, periodic mobilization of Para-
state groups who use violence against groups targeted by the sultan. The leadership 
is highly personalistic and arbitrary. No rational legal constraints, strong dynastic 
tendency, no autonomy in state careers, leader unencumbered by ideology, 
compliance to leaders is based on intense fear and personal rewards, staff of the 
leader are drawn from members of his family, friends and business associates, or 
men directly involved in the use of violence to sustain the regime, and staff’s position 
derives from their purely personal submission to the ruler.   
 
What Type is Saddam’s Regime? 
It will be inaccurate to assign any of the above types to the regime of Saddam 
Hussein since it had all the characteristics of totalitarian regime, plus most of the 
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Sultanistic features, from assigning top posts to family members406, unpredictability, 
no one in civil society, or political society or the state free from his exercise of 
despotic power and so on. In fact the Ba’ath regime destroyed the remaining civil 
society institutions when it came to power in 1968 under Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakir 
and Saddam Hussein and Iraq became a one party state.407 I argue the closest to 
Saddam’s regime was the Ceausescu regime in Romania since there were so many 
similarities between them. Ceausescu’s regime was regarded as Sultanistic by Linz& 
Stepan (1996).408  
 
However, Saddam regime changed after the defeat of 1991 after his invasion of 
Kuwait, not because it evolved and was willing to reform, but because it was 
weakened by wars, sanctions and defections of supporters to the opposition. Even 
the dictator’s sons-in-law defected with his two daughters in 1995.409 The definition 
of sultanism as given by Weber, applies to the regime of Saddam Hussein: 
Patrimonialism, in extreme case, sultanism, tend to arise whenever traditional 
domination develops an administration and a military force which are purely 
instruments of the master… where domination… operates on the basis of discretion, 
it will be called sultanism.410  
 
Sultanism looks similar to Saddamism: ‘Under sultanism, there is no rule of law, no 
space for semi-opposition, no space for regime moderates who might negotiate with 
the democratic moderates and no sphere of the economy or civil society that is not 
subject to the despotic exercise of the sultan’s will’.411 Although a sultanistic ruler has 
no elaborate ideology, Saddam Hussein claimed to believe in the Ba’ath ideology 
which embraces Arab unity, freedom and socialism, although there were no 
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instances where he actually applied these principles. He failed to achieve any unity 
with an Arab country, including Syria that’s governed by a ‘Ba’ath’ party.  
 
Tahir Al-Ani, a senior member of BP leadership bureau and Saddam loyalist till the 
end, stated that Saddam was opposed to the unification efforts with Syria which 
Presidents Ahmed Al-Bakir and Hafidh Al-Assad were pursuing.412  Freedom hardly 
existed under his regime, while socialism was in name only, even though there were 
some attempts during the early years of his rule to implement some socialist 
principles, such as nationalization and the establishment of farm cooperatives, but 
they were to placate BP leftist members. It was more ‘symbolic politics being 
conducted at a senior level of the regime, than a policy adopted out of ideological 
convictions’.413  
 
After Saddam assumed the presidency, the party broke away with socialism. ‘In the 
1980s, the socialist ideology of the (Ba’ath) party accommodated itself to capitalism. 
Nationalised industries were privatised. Iraqi businessmen trying to take advantage 
of the country's oil wealth often pursued their ambitions through the party’.414 Loyalty 
to Saddam personally became the only criterion by which any Iraqi is judged. As 
Charles Trip stated ‘Obedience to Saddam Hussain and proximity to him were now 
to be the criteria for promotion and indeed for political-and sometimes actual-
survival’.415 There is also the element of personal grandeur in Saddam’s behavior 
that is close to Sultanism. During the UN-imposed sanctions on Iraq after its invasion 
of Kuwait in 1990, which was regarded as ‘the most comprehensive and severe ever 
imposed against one nation’416, Saddam built 50 palaces across Iraq using money 
ear-marked for the Iraqi people in the famous Oil-for-Food programme-(OFF). 
General Tommy Franks called it the ‘Oil-for-Palaces’ programme.417  
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There was also an obvious streak of Machiavellianism in Saddam’s turn to religion. 
Ahmed Hashim notes that “despite its original allegiance to militant secularism, 
Saddam’s regime began in the early and mid-1990s to promote the re-Islamization of 
Iraqi society to buttress its legitimacy. Saddam implemented an official policy of 
religious revival so that the regime could control the rising tide of faith”.418 Hashim 
further argues that the regime of economic sanctions imposed on Iraq after 
Saddam’s invasion of Kuwait “promoted the return to religion among the Iraqi 
population”. An Iraqi sociologist had told an American journalist in 2001: “when a 
society is in crisis like the one we are in, the embargo and all, religion plays a greater 
part in soothing the psyche of the people and giving the people greater strength to 
face the crisis”.419  
 
Why does regime type matter? 
Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan (1996) state that ‘the characteristics of the previous non-
democratic regime have profound implications for the transition paths available and 
the tasks different countries face when they begin their struggles to develop 
consolidated democracies’.420 This is because the structures the previous regime 
leaves behind can facilitate democratization if the regime was authoritarian, as was 
the case in Spain in 1970s, since it would have left reasonably developed civil 
society, economic society, rule of law and a usable bureaucracy. The only item that 
needs to be created for the democratization was a political society. But if the starting 
point for the transition was a totalitarian regime, the democratic transition could entail 
crafting, not only political society and economic society, but also every single aspect 
of democracy at the same time.421  
 
As for a sultanistic regime, democracy crafters, as was the case in Haiti, have to 
begin the construction of civil society, economic society, political society, 
constitutionalism and rule of law, professional norms of state bureaucracy from a low 
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point.422 This was the case in Iraq, although there was a kind of political society 
thanks to the exile opposition parties which returned immediately after the fall of the 
regime, despite the fact that they were not fully aware of the social and political 
developments inside Iraq. Many Iraqis resented their domination and associated 
them with foreigners, even though they contributed new ideas and brought in much-
needed foreign support.423 Other sectors such as civil and economic societies, rule 
of law, usable state bureaucracy were near to non-existent.  
 
Democratization and Economic Development 
There is documented correlation between the level of economic development and 
democracy. It’s well documented that there are ‘few democracies at very low levels 
of socioeconomic development and that most polities at high levels of socioeconomic 
development are democracies’.424 Most of the major modern transition attempts take 
place in countries at medium levels of development. ‘Robust economic conditions 
would appear supportive of any type of regime’.  
 
But ‘there are good theoretical reasons why sustained economic growth could erode 
a nondemocratic regime’. ‘No theoretical reason why sustained economic growth 
would erode a democratic regime’.425  ‘Sustained prosperity alters relations of power 
in favour of democratic forces’. ‘Franco’s Spain, Pinochet’s Chile, Brazil in 1970s and 
South Korea, had some of the world’s highest economic growth’.426  This has 
contributed to the enhancement of democratic movements in these countries. Non-
democratic regimes have a problem when they do well economically and when they 
do badly. If they do well, it will encourage people to demand more rights. If they do 
badly, it will erode the basis of their legitimacy.   
 
But ‘If a regime is based on the double legitimacy of democratic procedures and 
socioeconomic efficacy, the chances of fundamental regime alternatives (given the 
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absence of stateness problem) being raised by a group in society is empirically 
negligible’. 427 However, no regime is immune to economic downturns but the effects 
will be different. ‘Severe economic problems affect democratic and nondemocratic 
regimes, especially authoritarian ones, very differently’.428 There are good theoretical 
reasons why sharp economic decline will adversely affect stability of both democratic 
and nondemocratic regimes, although it will affect the latter substantially more 
because such regimes always base their legitimacy on their performance.     
 
Economic performance of any regime is important for its survival, but ‘It’s not 
changes in the economy but changes in politics that trigger regime erosion-that is the 
effects of poor economy often have to be mediated by political change’. Linz & 
Stepan(1996) argue ‘the question of system blame is crucial for the fate of 
democracies…A country that is experiencing positive growth, other things being 
equal, has a better chance to consolidate democracy than a country that is 
experiencing negative growth. 429 
 
But it’s political perceptions of citizens that really matter to the stability of any regime. 
‘Where the citizens come to believe that the democratic system itself is compounding 
the economic problem or incapable of defining or implementing a credible strategy of 
economic reform, the system blame will aggravate the political effect of economic 
hard times. More importantly, economic crises will tend to lead to democratic 
breakdown in those cases where powerful groups outside, or-more fatally-inside the 
government increasingly argue that nondemocratic alternatives of rule are the only 
solution to the economic crisis’.430 There are powerful groups outside the Iraqi 
government (Ba’athists) and even inside it who believe in non-democratic 
alternatives.  
 
Current economic downturn in Iraq is causing a lot of problems for the regime itself 
                                                            
427
  Ibid.p79 
428
  Ibid  
429
  Ibid.p80 
430
  Ibid.p81 
114 
 
 
as many people began to question the efficacy of democracy. Mahdi Al-Hafidh, MP, 
has called for the declaration of emergency due to terrorist threats and economic 
difficulties.431  If reforms are to be successful, the ruler must have personal control 
over economic decision-making and the ability to recruit a ‘cohesive reform team and 
the political authority to override bureaucratic and political opposition to policy 
change’.432  The current PM doesn’t have such authority and he is struggling to 
maintain the cohesiveness of his government which is made up of many rival parties. 
He is unable to replace the ministers who lost the confidence of parliament. As 
Haggard& Kaufman argue ‘centralization of authority has been crucial for economic 
reform in both authoritarian and democratic regimes’. 433  This is not possible under 
the current consociational arrangement that exists in Iraq whereby all political parties 
have to share power according to their representation in parliament.  
 
Where the democratic political actors are incapable or unwilling to search for 
solutions and even compound the problem by such actions as infighting and 
corruption, key actors will search for alternatives. But alternatives might not be 
available. ‘In such circumstances, many of these actors might resign themselves to a 
poorly performing democracy. Such resignation may not prevent crises, upheavals 
and attempted local coups, but not conducive to regime change, but it certainly 
makes consolidation difficult and can even deconsolidate democracy’.434 
 
This means there is a need for continuous action to keep democratization on track. 
‘Even the easiest and most successful transition was lived as a precarious process 
constantly requiring innovative political action’.435 What is keeping the balance now is 
perhaps the inability of any of the parties to seize power and rule on its own.  
 
The Spanish economy deteriorated sharply during the transition and didn’t improve 
until 3 years after consolidation in 1982. Spanish unemployment in 1970, under 
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Franco, around 3%, was one of the lowest in Europe. In the mid 1980s, it was 20%, 
the highest in Europe. Economic growth was over 7% from 1960 to 1975; it went 
down to 1.7% between 1975-85.436  
 
This goes to prove two things. First democracy doesn’t always lead to prosperity and 
second, economic downturn under democracy doesn’t necessarily lead people to 
abandon it. The rules of democracy ‘guarantee opposition groups the right to 
challenge incumbent rulers and policies and to replace those rulers through 
competitive elections’.437 What complicates this problem is the ‘uncertainty of the 
loyalty of groups associated with the old order’.438 These groups have certainly 
played a destabilizing role, but were not able to derail the process. 
 
 
Outcomes of Democratization 
The path to democracy is mined, as Adam Przeworski explains, and 'the final 
destination depends on the path'.439 It’s fragile in most countries where it has been 
established, while in others, transitions into democracy were notsuccessful. In other 
words, transitions don’t necessarily lead to consolidated democracy. 'Democracy is 
consolidated when most conflicts are processed through democratic institutions, 
when nobody can control the outcomes ex post and the results are not 
predetermined ex ante, they matter within predictable limits and they evoke the 
compliance of the relevant political forces'.440 Przeworski reveals 'the breakup of an 
authoritarian regime may be reversed, as was the case in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in 
Brazil in 1974, and in Poland in 1981, or it may lead to a new dictatorship as in Iran 
and Romania'. Even when democracy is established, it may not be consolidated, as 
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democratic institutions may generate outcomes that cause some politically important 
forces to opt for authoritarianism.441 Przeworski predicts five outcomes: 
1-The structure of conflicts is such that no democratic institutions can last and 
political forces may end up fighting for a new dictatorship. Conflicts over the political 
role of religion, race, or language are least likely to be solvable by any set of 
institutions as in Iran. 
2- The structure of conflicts is such that no democratic institutions can last and 
political forces agree to democracy as a transitional solution as in Argentina between 
1953 and 976. 
3- The structure of conflicts is such that some democratic institutions will be durable 
if adopted, but the conflicting political forces fight to establish a dictatorship. This 
outcome may ensue when political forces have different preferences over 
institutional framework: unitary versus federalism. This may result in civil war and 
dictatorship. 
4- Political forces agree to an institutional framework that cannot last, although the 
structure of conflicts is such that some democratic institutions will be durable if 
adapted. 
5- The structure of conflicts is such that some democratic institutions will be durable 
if adopted and they are.442 
 
Prospects 
A consolidated democracy is, therefore, one option among at least five. Any of the 
first four outcomes (excluding the 5th) may apply to Iraq, depending on different 
readings of the political process. The optimists believe there is hope for Iraqi 
democratizations to develop and consolidate, while the pessimists believe the only 
hope is to start from scratch once again which will be almost impossible as the gains 
made by some parties are not going to be foregone easily by them. 
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The Iraqi democratization is neither consolidated nor failed completely.  A reversal 
can happen, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, in Brazil in 1974, and in Poland in 1981, 
or it may lead to a new dictatorship as in Iran and Romania, especially with the help 
of neighbouring countries hostile to democracy for fear of upsetting their internal 
political setup. But it’s clear no single group, political, religious or sectarian, can rule 
on its own in the foreseeable future. It’s also clear that no one country, currently, 
could really impose its will on all Iraqis. But things could change in the future with 
Iran being the most influential power in Iraq, with all the Shia groups that it supports 
or controls. 
Ali Allawi describes the emerging political map as combining ‘elements of intrigue 
and corruption’.443 Regrettably, as Allawi put it, ‘plots, as opposed to democracy-
building and democratic practice of politics, dominated the political scene, as 
politicians from various communities engaged in endless bickering over the spoils of 
power and privilege’. Not many people are working towards consolidating the 
democratic system at present.  
Yes, there has been some progress, but that was due to ‘deal-making between 
political leaders’ As Ali Allawi stated. It has failed to produce the national consensus 
necessary to bridge the widening ethnic and sectarian rifts and consequently create 
a modern democratic state. The constitution for example ‘had all the hallmarks of a 
series of deals by political operatives’. 444 Article 2A could be triggered by Islamists to 
achieve their goals. At the same time, it’s difficult to change the constitution since 
this requires consensus among the three main components (Shia, Sunni and Kurds). 
Any constitutional amendment requires the approval of the majority and must not be 
rejected by two thirds of the electorate in three provinces as per Article 142-
Fourth.445  
Ali Allawi is pessimistic about the prospects of democracy in Iraq. He contends ‘there 
was no national vision for anything, just a series of deals to push forward a political 
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process, the end state of which was indeterminate. There was also no governing 
plan. The corroded and corrupt state of Saddam was replaced by the corroded, 
inefficient, incompetent and corrupt state of the new order”.446 Despite all the doom 
and gloom, democratization in Iraq has not completely failed, but it has faltered and it 
could fail with the militarization of society, the proliferation of militias and spread of 
corruption. Islamization of society is not going to lead to democracy and unless it 
slows down, the future for democracy is bleak.  
Liberalism, which is the most important basis of democracy, has shrunk in Iraq and 
the first victims of this are civil liberties and women. This is manifested in repeated 
attacks on social clubs and shops selling alcohol. Democracy is not just about 
elections and changing political leaders, but about freedoms and civil liberties and 
these must be preserved and protected if democracy is to succeed. Samuel 
Huntington predicts ‘time is on the side of democracy’. This is true, but it also 
requires political leaders who believe it’s ‘the least worse form of government for 
their societies and for themselves’. 447 This principle perhaps is the one that governs 
the Iraqi political process at the moment, but the main political operators have 
designs for other alternatives and this could constitute a fatal danger to democracy.  
Challenges to Democracy 
Democracy becomes consolidated when it is ‘the only game in town’ according to 
Linz and Stepan. It’s not the only game in town in Iraq currently since political parties 
can have other ‘games’ to play. Most of them rely on foreign countries for support 
and the major ones have armed militias and could resort to using arms when they do 
not get their way in the democratic process. They have not done it so far on a large 
scale, although they resorted to assassinations against each other’s personnel. They 
have committed other violations such as using religious symbols, inciting sectarian, 
regional and ethnic hatred, twisting facts and giving distorted information. The 
existence of militias has deterred and will always deter the press, the judiciary and 
the people from investigating, reporting on, or exposing their mistakes and 
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corruption. In a democracy, there is no place for a militia or any kind of compulsion. 
People must vote according to their conscience.     
Democracy is also described as a ‘system where parties lose elections’. So far in 
Iraq, the Shia alliance (UIA), now called (National Alliance), has won all elections 
since the first one in Jan 2005. It’s true that governments since 2005 have been 
coalitions, where other parties have participated, but the Shia alliance chose the 
prime minister and all the ministers, even those fielded by other parties. They also 
occupied most important positions in the country. Institutional arrangements have not 
yet been transformed into ‘relations of cooperation’ between political parties and 
democracy is not yet ‘self-enforcing’.  
There is still a lack of identification with the state since there are still groups and 
individuals who wish to join or form other states. The Kurds for example have 
publically declared their intentions to establish an independent state, while the 
Sunnis are talking about a federal region or even an independent state. The 
Christians and the Yazidis have also come to the same conclusion after their areas 
were occupied by ISIS and found themselves defenceless while other communities, 
the Kurds, Sunnis and Shia, have defended their areas and left them to their fate. 
There are political groups and leaders who emphasize primordial identities for 
emotional and self interest reasons. 
Arab and Kurdish nationalisms are still strong and this is not helpful to democratic 
consolidation which is enhanced by equal citizenship and the ‘common roof’ 
provided by the state for all citizens. The imposition of Shia religious culture on the 
rest of the country, especially in areas with Shia majority, is not helpful for the 
development of an Iraqi national identity. Federalism cannot solve the ethnic, 
religious or sectarian problems since there are no spatial differences between 
communities and people have been living together for centuries. Although there are 
provinces in the north with Kurdish majorities, the Kurds live in large numbers in 
three other provinces; Nineveh, Kirkuk and Dyala as well as the capital Baghdad.   
Rules of democracy guarantee the opposition the right to challenge incumbent rulers 
and replace them in competitive elections. This didn’t happen in 2010 when Ayad 
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Allawi won the elections. The incumbent Islamist PM, Noori Al-Maliki, refused to 
vacate his position and he got the Federal Court to issue a ruling allowing him to 
form a coalition after the elections. The idea behind this was that Allawi led a list that 
was largely Sunni while the leadership of the government should remain in the hands 
of the sectarian majority group, the Shia, not the political majority led by Allawi which 
was not entirely Sunni, but cross-sectarian.   
Democracy is successful when most conflicts are resolved through democratic 
institutions but this is clearly not the case in Iraq with the Shia insisting on leading 
the government and with the existence of militias and armed groups.  
With so many ethnicities, sects and religions, the Iraqi population is certainly not 
homogeneous and this requires more efforts from democracy crafters. This is not to 
say that democracy cannot be consolidated in a multilingual, multicultural and multi-
religious society such as the Iraqi one, but it requires considerable political crafting of 
democratic norms, practices and institutions. This is not happening yet. 
In the interim constitution approved by the Iraqi Governing Council in March 2004, 
Iraq chose the PR electoral system with Iraq being one constituency. This type of PR 
system promotes a national political agenda and allows spatially-dispersed 
communities to be fairy represented in parliament. The first elections of January 
2005 were conducted according to this highly representative system.But it was 
changed by Islamists in the permanent constitution approved by the Islamist-
controlled National Assembly. Elections are now conducted according to Iraqi-
Modified Saint Lague system which favours established parties over new ones. This 
will ensure the continuation of Islamist rule for a long time to come. 
Finally, polis/demos incongruence is not helpful to democracy but it’s very clear in 
Iraq. There are at least three obvious polities in the country. Shia polity, Sunni polity 
and Kurdish polity. Within those polities, there are also secular, Arab and Islamist 
polities. This incongruence creates problems for democratic consolidation especially 
when it’s not addressed at all. In fact there are people who are working hard to 
deepen it in order to craft permanent constituencies for them.  
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Chapter 5 
Religion and Politics 
Religion has become so relevant to our modern world, especially in the Middle East 
since the advent of the Islamic awakening in the 1970s following the Arab defeat of 
1967.448 Farag Foda, the Egyptian scholar who was murdered by extremists 
because of his critical views of them, believed that the defeat of 1967 was not 
regarded as a defeat for Egypt or the Egyptian leadership, but a condemnation of the 
way that Egypt had adopted Western culture and civilization. Foda believed this idea 
gained support for the fact that Israel is a religious entity. He observed that violent 
Islamic extremism appeared in all Arab countries in the wake of the 1967 Arab 
defeat.449 Islamic fundamentalism triumphed in Feb 1979 when the Iranian Islamic 
revolution succeeded in toppling the Shah.  
Islam has been a potent force almost everywhere in the world. In Iraq, Islamist 
parties, be they Sunnis, Shia, were voted into parliament, and ever since 2005, they 
have been leading the government. This chapter explores the thoughts of John 
Rawls based on his book ‘Political Liberalism’450 which applies to the idea of 
incorporating religious believers into political debate and participation. Since it’s 
difficult in a democracy to exclude an important section of society from the political 
debate, especially in Islamic societies where this section may constitute the majority, 
it’s important to look at ways to incorporate them without compromising either the 
principles of democracy or the freedom of belief. Since the issue of religion and 
politics is not exclusive to Muslim societies, which are new to democracy, it’s 
important to find out how democratic societies have dealt with it, and Rawls ideas 
provide an insight into the issue.  
The thoughts of a prominent Muslim scholar, Sheikh Ali Abdur-Razik, regarding the 
role of religion of Islam in politics, based on his landmark study of ‘Islam and the 
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Fundamentals of Governance’, are also examined.451 Many Islamic scholars, Sunni 
and Shia, just like Razik, believe that the government should be civil since it’s a 
worldly affair and not concerned with the afterlife. The traditional Shia school (the 
quietest school) approves of this view.452 A quietist cleric doesn’t demand to 
participate in government nor presumes to exercise control over the state. He can 
remain aloof from all political matters, but he is not totally apolitical. ‘During times of 
moral decadence, political corruption, serious injustice, or foreign occupation, he can 
become more active in politics by offering advice, guidance, and even the promotion 
of sacred law in public life’.453  
Razik, an Islamic scholar at Al-Azhar Mosque and University, first published his 
ideas in 1925, but they came to prominence after the rise of Islamic fundamentalism 
in the Arab world in the 1970s and 80s following the Arab defeat of 1967 and the 
triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iran as previously stated. It has become more 
relevant now with popular uprisings going on in some countries of the Middle East, 
widely referred to as the “Arab Spring'.454 I contend that democracy cannot succeed 
unless it finds a way to reconcile religion with politics. Rawls’s thoughts dealt with 
Christian societies while Razik’s thoughts dealt with Muslim societies. A major pillar 
of democracy is that the government guarantees civil liberties and personal 
freedoms using the force of the law and the power at its disposal. On the other hand, 
the politically-religious seek to limit civil liberties and personal freedoms. This 
paradox needs to be resolved for societies to live in peace and harmony and for 
democracy to succeed. This study explores possible solutions based on Rawls’s and 
Razik’s thoughts in their different contexts.  Shia scholars such as Hani Fahs, 
Muhammed Mahdi Shamsuddeen and Muhammed Hussein Fadhlalla have similar 
thoughts.  
 
The Shia quietist school, which I have referred to in different places of this study, 
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provides the ultimate solution to this paradox by making it a religious duty not to 
interfere in politics except at times of crises. This is similar to the position of Ali 
Abdu-Razik. But Islamist political parties follow the interventionist school politically, 
even though they may follow the quietist school religiously. This may sound 
contradictory to some, but it is expedient politically for political Islam since they want 
to show ordinary people, who follow the quietist school, that their position accords 
with the teachings of this school. It’s likely the next generation of religious leaders 
may not belong to the quietist school for many reasons that are beyond the scope of 
this study.   
Political Liberalism  
John Rawls’ ‘political liberalism’ calls for the integration of all sections of society 
within a democratic system, including religious believers, who are ‘not going to go 
away’, so they must be integrated into the political debate. It is important to involve 
all sections of society in the political debate and preserve the interests of all by 
finding a common denominator among them.  
Rawls proposes a political conception of justice that all citizens, be they religious or 
not, can recognize as valid and acceptable, and be prepared to adhere to. He 
proposes a political conception that can deal with fundamental political questions 
that a democratic society usually faces. This conception includes an agreement on 
what he calls ‘constitutional essentials’.455 These are of two types: principles and 
rights. 
 
The first type deals with the political process and structure of the government while 
the second deals with the rights and freedoms of citizens that the political majorities 
must respect and not take away from them. They include liberty of conscience, 
freedom of thought and association and the protection of the rule of law. The 
conception that Rawls seeks to establish is one that all citizens, of all creeds and 
persuasions, can publicly recognize as valid so that society’s ‘main institutions and 
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how they fit together into one system of social cooperation can be assessed in the 
same way by each citizen, whatever that citizen’s social position or more particular 
interests’. He calls this political conception of justice ‘justice as fairness’. 456 
Rawls cites three traits of modern democratic society. They require that justice as 
fairness to be seen as a political conception.457 These traits are: 
1- Pluralism 
Modern society (or Post-reformation) is characterised by the presence of ‘reasonable 
pluralism’ which could constitute a ‘reasonable comprehensive doctrine’. This means 
a moral theory that includes ‘conceptions of what is of value in human life, and ideals 
of personal character as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational 
relationships, and much else that is to inform our conduct, and in the limit to our life 
as a whole’.458  He suggests that ‘reasonable disagreement is an inherent part of 
modern democratic life’ and that is why ‘no one comprehensive religion, doctrine or 
philosophical or moral doctrine is affirmed by all citizens generally and it would be 
wrong to expect in the foreseeable future one of them or some other reasonable 
doctrine will ever be affirmed by all or nearly all citizens’.459 This means that 
pluralism of thought and creed will be a permanent feature of modern society and 
pluralism means no prominence to any doctrine, creed or moral philosophy.   
2- Objection to oppression 
Post-reformation society recognises that you can only maintain the dominance of 
one religion or ideology through oppression, namely by the use of massive power by 
the state. Oppression, by nature, is anti-democratic and anti-modern; therefore, it 
would be oppressive of the modern state to impose on its citizens the pursuit of any 
way or ways of living. Since there is reasonable pluralism, oppression won’t be 
allowed by the majority of people, and this oppression-fearing majority won’t allow 
dominance by any religious or philosophical doctrine in society.460   
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3- Quest for Justice 
For the concept of justice to endure in a post-Reformation society, ‘it must be 
actively supported by all citizens, freely and willingly’.461 Given the presence of 
reasonable pluralism, a concept of justice needs to be endorsed by widely different 
and opposing, though reasonable, comprehensive doctrines, for it to be the basis of 
justification for a pluralistic constitutional regime. 
Modern democratic society is characterised by dissensus and debate since there is 
no single doctrine or philosophical or religious ideology that can form the basis of 
political regulation without oppressing or excluding some sections of society. 
Therefore, any conception of justice ‘that may be shared by citizens as a basis for a 
reasoned, informed and willing agreement’ must be one that can gain the support of 
an overlapping consensus of reasonable religious, philosophical and moral doctrines 
in a society regulated by it’.462  
A conception of justice must be ‘free standing’. That is, it must not exclusively refer 
to any particular doctrine, be it ideological, religious or philosophical.463 Justice as 
fairness must be articulated in such a way that all or most members of the 
democratic society in question feel they can relate to it. Its basic idea must be found 
in the ‘public political culture’ of that society.464 But at the same time, it must not be, 
wherever possible, in conflict with any reasonable comprehensive doctrine or 
doctrines so that the followers of these doctrines won’t find it conflicting with their 
beliefs if they adopt such a concept.   
To achieve this correlation between the political conception of justice and religious 
doctrines, the principles of toleration should be applied to the philosophy behind it 
itself, i.e., the political conception of justice must avoid any religious, philosophical 
and moral issues which are in dispute.465 These issues must be left to the believers 
themselves to settle among themselves, supposedly through civil and peaceful 
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means in accordance with the views that they freely affirm.466 This has to be done 
through removing religious issues from political agenda.467 Once they have been 
removed, they are ‘no longer regarded as appropriate subjects for political decision 
by majority or other plurality voting’.468 Removing religious questions from the 
political agenda is ‘not because they are unimportant or regarded with indifference, 
but because we think they are too important and recognise that there is no way to 
resolve them politically’.469       
This attempt to integrate religious believers into the political process may run into 
obstacles especially when all religious questions and issues should be left out of the 
political debate. But what if the religiously devout do not agree to this? Rawls 
distinguishes between the ‘public’ basis of justification that forms the public political 
culture of a democratic society, and the non-public justification’ which belongs to 
‘civil society’ or ‘the background culture’.470  
 
It is the public reason, represented by an elected government that can exercise the 
final coercive power on any section of society because the citizens are regarded as 
equal by the same public reasons and because they all share one political 
conception, a public one, irrespective of the reasonable comprehensive doctrine they 
may affirm. While a distinction between believers or followers of different doctrines 
can be made within the civil society, in a democratic society there is no distinction 
between citizens; they are all equal before the law. The reason is public because it’s 
the reason of citizens or the public. Its nature and content are public (as opposed to 
private); its subject is the good of the public and matters of fundamental justice.471 
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But public reason has limits.472 This precludes the expression of certain forms of 
conviction and argument in public debates, especially when ‘discussing constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice’.473 This limit will not extend to ‘personal 
deliberations and reflections about political questions or to the reasoning about them 
by members of associations such as churches and universities’. ‘Religious, 
philosophical and moral considerations of many kinds may here play a role’. Limits of 
public reasons also hold true for citizens as well ‘when they are engaged in public 
advocacy in the public forum and they vote in elections when constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice are at stake’.474 
Disallowing the employment or the expression of any form of religious arguments 
and beliefs in public debates is not so rigid. ‘Citizens are allowed to present what 
they regard as the basis for political values rooted in their comprehensive doctrine, 
provided they do this in ways that strengthen the ideal of public reason 
itself’.475Rawls originally allowed this only in civil society, not political society. 
But one can legitimately ask who decides which values strengthen public reason and 
which ones don’t? Is it the citizen him/herself? If yes, how far can this go and when 
and who will stop him or her if they wanted to employ all their religious values in 
public debates on the assumption that they ‘strengthen’ public reason? Religious 
believers have convictions. They firmly believe in the teachings of their doctrines and 
they follow them to the letter. How can they be persuaded to follow a different path 
that may lead them to a different set of values which they may find in conflict with 
their original beliefs?  
Muslim believers, for example, firmly believe it’s their religious duty to change others 
and bring them to their way of thinking and they may not be prepared to compromise 
on this tenet. 
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Society Types 
Rawls divides society into three types, depending on the political circumstances they 
live under.476 First, a society that is ‘well-ordered and its members recognise a firm 
overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines and it’s not stirred by deep disputes’. 
In this society, religious convictions should be excluded from public debates in what 
is called ‘exclusive approach’. Second, a society that is ‘nearly well-ordered’ but 
subject to serious dispute with respect to applying one of its principles of justice. An 
‘inclusive approach’ should be adopted, especially regarding allowing the state to 
support religious schools.477 
Third, a society that is ‘not well-ordered’ and where there are ‘profound divisions’ 
about constitutional essentials when certain religious arguments were tolerated.478 In 
this case the focus should be on whether the religious convictions of the believers 
truly contravene the ideal of public reason. ‘Longer term views must be taken 
whereby the ideal maybe best achieved in good times by following what at first sight 
may appear to be an exclusive view’, in less good times, to be the inclusive view’.479  
Allowance is given to the timing and circumstances under which the ideal of 
excluding religious convictions from political debate is implemented. This ‘time-line’ 
for the achievement of the goal, or the permitted circumstantial convenience, softens 
the impact of excluding religious convictions from political debate. It’s a pragmatic 
way of reaching the original goal of total exclusion of religious convictions form 
political debate through stages if and when it is difficult to achieve it in one go.  
Rawls wants religious issues to be taken out of the political agenda completely.480 
This is because religious issues do not serve the political aim of the majority of the 
public in a democratic society since they are controversial and should be confined to 
the civil society which nurtures all sorts of issues and arguments.481 Religious 
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questions, arguments and convictions should not even form part of the political 
vocabulary of the religious believer. The employment of religious convictions or 
arguments can be tolerated in public debate, only if they supported the ‘clear 
conclusion of public reason’.482  
Islam and Governance  
Sheikh Ali Abdur-Razik argues that the ‘Islamic government’ (caliphate) was not 
stipulated in the Qura’an nor in the Prophet’s Tradition (Sunna). He could not find 
any evidence in the religious texts to support establishing it. He affirms Muhammed 
was not a ruler as such; he was a prophet like other prophets before him.   
Razik acknowledges that people may have regarded some actions of the Prophet as 
‘governance’, but they were part of his duties as a prophet even though they may 
have looked as governmental but this was because people ‘obeyed him and followed 
his orders and advice because he was a prophet, not because he was their ruler’.483 
‘The position of the message requires an authority that is wider than that of the ruler 
and even wider than that of the father on his children’.484 
He argued that ‘If there was a near-evidence to this effect, the proponents of this 
idea would not have hesitated to use it, but they have failed to bring a shred of 
evidence to support their claim’.485 The Qura’an, according to Razik, didn’t call for 
such a government and all the legitimacy that its proponents claim stems from 
‘consensuses’ or ‘logic’ or ‘necessity’. 
Caliphate was a mistake 
Razik acknowledges that calling the government after the Prophet ‘caliphate’ was a 
mistake and the rulers who came after the Prophet should not have called 
themselves caliphs (successors) because this was misleading. ‘Only prophets can 
succeed prophets’ he avers.  
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He reveals the caliphs were not absolute rulers at the beginning, but were restricted 
by the principles and rules laid in the Qura’an and the Prophet’s tradition.486 People 
obeyed caliphs because they believed that ‘caliphs had the same status as the 
Prophet who the Muslims hold in the highest regards and also because they were 
applying Islam which was the dearest thing to Muslims in the whole universe’.487  
 
Razik states that Caliphs remained restricted by Islamic legal jurisdiction until the 
Abbasid Caliph, Haroon Ar-Rasheed, when the caliphate changed and remained in 
name only ‘due to Arab fanaticism’.488 It became an absolute rule, yet people kept 
their allegiance to it nevertheless. He calls on those who attached holiness to 
caliphate to show the evidence and the source of the caliph’s authority.489 ‘They 
neglected this as they did with all things related to the science of politics or anything 
that resembled caliphate’. 
Razik explains the existence of two views regarding caliph’s position. First, the 
caliph’s authority is bestowed on him by God. This view is ‘prevalent among most 
clerics and people. Some caliphs like Mansour claimed he was ‘the shadow of God 
on His earth’.490 
In addition, scholars and people bestowed this heavenly authority on caliphs. This 
was widespread and scholars and poets spoke of such an authority for the caliphs. 
Scholars, especially those who came after the fifth century of the Islamic calendar, 
had persistently regarded caliphs as ‘above human’ and not far from the status of 
God, Razik charges.   
Second, a caliph takes his authority from the nation.491 Razik quotes a poem recited 
before the second caliph, Omar, by the Arab poet, Al-Hutay’aa, in which he told him 
he was actually authorised and appointed by the nation (as opposed to God). 492 
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He states that scholars such as Al-Kasani likened the authority of the caliph to that of 
the judge whose authority is linked to people’s approval of him since he works in 
their interest and is appointed by them.493 He compared the authority of the caliph to 
that of European kings, which led to European development. ’The first school that 
believed that caliphs drew their authority from God is similar to the doctrine of 
Thomas Hobbes, while the other school that believed the caliph should take his 
authority from the nation was similar to the European doctrine of John Locke’.494  
The four caliphs who succeeded the Prophet, Abu-Bakir, Omar, Othman and Ali, 
were actually rulers who dealt with worldly issues. Razik challenged all those who 
believe that there was a stipulation for an Islamic government in the Qura’an to 
provide the evidence to support their claims.495  
 ‘All fair-minded scholars could not find any evidence in the Book, so they turned to 
other forms of evidence such as consensus reason and logic’.496  
Razik explains verses of the Qura’an which might be used as evidence, such as 
verses 59 and 83 of Chapter 4 which call on Muslims to refer any outstanding issues 
to the Prophet or those in charge of their affairs to sort out. ‘These verses are not 
used as evidence by the proponents of caliphate or imamate, therefore I am not 
going to spend a long time on them in order to avoid vanity and fighting with a non-
foe’.497 The most these verses say, Razik explains, ‘Muslims have other people they 
should go to regarding their affairs’ and this is a lot wider than the specific ‘Islamic 
government’. The Qura’an ‘has dealt with every aspect of religion, and it actually 
states this clearly, yet it has no specific verse about universal caliphate or imamate. 
It is a great wonder that the Qura’an, from first chapter to the last one, has described 
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everything in details regarding this religion, but you cannot find, not even a mention 
of, caliphate or imamate in it. Hence, there is a space here for an opinion’.498 
After exhausting the Qura’an, Razik turns to the Sunna, and hadeeth, both are 
regarded as legal sources for Islamic jurisprudence. ‘It is not just the Qura’an that 
has neglected caliphate and didn’t address it. The Sunna has done the same. It left it 
and never dealt with it. This shows that all religious scholars could not find one piece 
of evidence from the tradition; otherwise they would have provided it’. 499  
Arabs and politics 
‘Why did the Arabs stand perplexed before the science of politics? Why did they 
neglect to look at Plato’s book, the Republic, and Aristotle’s book, the Politics, when 
both men had impressed them so much that they called Aristotle the ‘First Teacher’? 
Why were the Muslims left in total ignorance of the principles of politics and the types 
of governments in Greece? Razik wondered.500 Muslim scholars did not leave the 
science of politics out of their own accords, it appears. ‘It was forced upon them by 
caliphs and kings’ Razik concluded. He asserted it was a direct action by their rulers 
who felt threatened by any political knowledge by their subjects.  
Razik’s view of the caliphate is damning. ‘The Caliphate, throughout its history, was 
built on defeating the other. Its throne was always erected on the heads of people 
and has always been laid on their necks and what is called crown has no life except 
what it takes of human life, has no power except the one that it takes of their power, 
no greatness or dignity except what it steals of their greatness and dignity, just like 
the night; when it is long, it always comes at the expense of the dawn; its brightness 
comes from the brightness of the sword and the flame of the wars’. 501  
But he reserved a totally different description for Islam. ‘It is a religion that, not only 
has taught its followers brotherhood and equality theoretically, mentored them that 
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‘people are as equal as the teeth of a comb’, and told them that the slaves you keep 
are your brothers in religion, but it also trained them on this practically and showed it 
to them in reality until they began to feel it. Their prophet didn’t leave them till he 
impressed their hearts with this religion and accustomed them to it and their state 
was not established before an ordinary citizen calls upon the caliph ‘If you go wrong, 
we will correct you with our swords’. 502  
He made a clear distinction between the caliphate as a system of government 
imposed by force, and the religion of Islam which preaches equality and dignity. The 
first is established and maintained through oppression and comes at the expense of 
people’s power and dignity, while the second is in people’s hearts and consciences, 
enhances their dignity and calls for equality among them.  
Razik states that Muslims were taught by their religion to be free while the caliphate 
imposes on them a ruler who will curtail their freedom and reduces their dignity and 
power. ‘Muslims are too proud to bow to anyone but God, and they communicate 
with their God 17 times a day at five specific times with this very belief in mind. 
Obviously, it is natural for these free people not to submit to one man from among 
themselves, the type of submission that kings demand of their subjects, unless they 
are forced to do so by sheer force’ Razik concludes. 503 He goes further by asserting 
that caliphate contravenes the basic principles of Islam.  
Religion doesn’t need a government 
Razik explored other evidence that the proponents of caliphate can come up with to 
prove their point.504 ‘They say that if the Muslims are to perform their Islamic rituals 
and rites, there is a need for a government to organize their affairs’. 505 
Acknowledging the need for government for any civil society, whether it had a 
religion or not, be it Muslim, Christian, Jewish or else, Razik ponders: ‘If the religious 
scholars meant by the caliphate/imamate the same as what the scholars of politics 
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meant, then they are right that the performance of the religious ritual and rites and 
interest of the nation do need a caliphate as in ‘government’ of any type, be it 
monarchic or republican, despotic, consultative or democratic, absolute or restricted, 
constitutional, Bolshevik or socialist…. But if they meant by caliphate the type of 
government that they know (religious requirement), then their evidence is shorter 
than their claim. It does not stand’. 506  
 
Razik contends Islam performed better over the years without an Islamic 
government, while it was adversely affected when there was one ruling in its name. 
‘Performing God’s rites and rituals did not depend on the government which religious 
scholars call the caliphate, nor on those who people refer to as caliphs. In reality, the 
welfare and worldly interests of Muslims didn’t depend on anything like that. We 
don’t need this caliphate for our religion, nor for our worldly welfare. I could even go 
further than this. The caliphate has been and still is a catastrophe to Islam and 
Muslims, and a source of harm and corruption. I could say even more, but it suffices 
to expose the tangible reality so that you can believe that our religion is not in need 
of this religious caliphate, nor is our worldly life’.507 
In conclusion, Rawls ideas regarding incorporating the religious within political 
debate are relevant to all societies, not just Christian or American society. As he 
stated modern society is characterized by pluralism, debate and dissensus and no 
religious or philosophical doctrine is affirmed to by all or nearly all people. If a state is 
to impose a religion or doctrine on all its citizens, it can only do that by oppression 
and this is anti-democratic and anti-modern, and there is always an oppression-
fearing majority within society which will not let it stand. A conception of justice has 
to be ‘free standing’ and recognized by all people of different religions and 
persuasions, but must not be in conflict with any of the reasonable doctrines in 
society.  
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Razik has coherently argued that there is no stipulation in the Qura’an or Sunna for a 
specific type of government. In fact he described the ‘caliphate’ or ‘imamate’ as 
catastrophe  to Islam and Muslims. The main Shia traditional school, the quietist 
tradition, believes firmly in the separation of religion and politics. Shia religious 
leaders, including the current one, Ayatullah Sistani, do not belong to the 
interventionist school of Ayatullah Khomeini. Islam in general favours a just and fair 
government and this principle is also affirmed by democracy. Therefore, democratic 
government can unite the people, achieve justice through a conception of justice 
that’s not in conflict with any religious or philosophical doctrine, yet it relates to 
political culture of all or most people at the same time.  
Since the creation of the Iraqi state in 1921, the conception of justice has never been 
‘free standing’. It always appealed to one constituency in the country. There was 
never a conception of justice that appealed to the common political culture of the 
country which is so diverse ethnically and religiously. The Iraqi state was established 
as an Arab and Sunni state. The first appealed to the Arabs who are the majority and 
the second appealed to the Sunnis (Kurds and Arabs) who are under half of the 
population. But the Sunni Arab ideology ended up alienating both Shia and Kurds 
who both form the overwhelming majority of the population. Being Arab, it alienated 
Kurds, and being Sunni, it alienated Shia. As Dr Abbas Kelidar described it ‘it was 
externally irredentist and internally divisive’.  All the state symbols were Sunni and 
Arab. The school syllabi, history and religion books, national holidays and religious 
holidays were all designed according to the Sunni doctrine.  
Shia and Sunni doctrines were founded on two different narratives of history and 
theology. When the state follows one of them, it basically abolishes the other 
automatically. In response, the Shia, by and large, boycotted the government and 
the state institutions altogether and this remained the case for a long time before the 
main stream Shia began to participate in political and other state activities. The 
Kurds took up arms against the state right from the beginning demanding their own 
nation state. Their armed resistance never stopped until 2003.  
 
The monarchy was never able to unite the diverse people of Iraq on one shared 
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conception of justice, and when the army coup brought it down, it was largely 
welcomed by the majority of Iraqis, especially the Kurds and Shia. The republic 
created by General Qssim had a national Iraqist conception of justice. It was ‘free 
standing’ since it was shared by most of the people, but it came into direct conflict 
with Arab nationalism represented at the time by Col. Nassir of Egypt.  It was 
subjected to enormous pressures from Arab nationalists in Iraq and the wider Arab 
world, agitated by Nassir’s pan-Arab rhetoric and also from the largely-Shia tribal-
religious alliance which lost out under the new regime when it had tried to be fair to 
the poor. Qassim’s republic finally fell in 1963 and the Arab nationalists came back to 
control Iraq once again with their old one-constituency discourse and ideology.     
When the Ba’athist took over in 1968, the tone of Arab nationalism was doubled 
while the state remained symbolically Sunni Arab. Although it was officially secular, 
everything in the state relates to Sunni Arabism. The announcement of the beginning 
of Ramadan, the declaration of the two religious festivals (Eid ul Adha and Eid ul Fitr) 
as well as the pilgrimage to Mekka (haj) were made by the Baghdad First Judge who 
was always Sunni. The call to prayer over the state radio and TV has always been 
performed according to the Sunni doctrine. Official school books on history and 
religion were overtly Sunni with no mention or reference to the opinion of the Shia. 
This has angered the Shia population and caused a crack in the national unity even 
among the Arabs themselves who embraced both doctrines. Continuous denial of 
Kurdish rights has alienated the Kurds further and pushed them to fight their most 
ferocious war against the state during the Ba’ath regime. The Kurdish rebellion 
weakened the Ba’athist regime and pushed it to make significant territorial 
concessions to Iran in the 1975 Algiers agreement to persuade the bellicose Shah to 
stop supporting the Kurdish guerillas in the north.   
The conception of justice was not shared by all citizens, because it was not based on 
a shared political culture and it came in conflict with the Shia doctrine and the 
Kurdish sense of nationalism and culture. The state’s discourse was never 
convincing nor acceptable to the rest of the population. It sought to overlook all sub-
identities and impose an Arab Sunni identity on all the people including non-Arabs 
such as the Kurds, Turcoman and Assyrians. On top of that, the state had also 
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imposed the Ba’athist ideology and way of thinking on everyone and those who 
didn’t assimilate were persecuted.  
When the Islamists came to power in 2005, they continued with the same single-
constituency discourse and narrow conception of justice, imposing Shia discourse, 
beliefs and practices on everyone else. Their conception of justice has been for all 
Iraqis to accept or at least tolerate the Shia narrative of history, religion and culture. 
This has caused Sunni resentment and contributed to discord, violence, at times civil 
war, and instability of the country. When there is a Shia religious occasion, the whole 
country comes to a standstill with major roads closed, work suspended and Shia 
posters and flags littering the streets of major cities, even the ones inhibited by 
Sunnis and Christians, and loudspeakers broadcast Shia religious messages and 
chants. This has continued to cause resentment among non-Shia and non-religious 
who may constitute a large component of the population.  
The Deba’athification law which was issued by the Americans and enthusiastically 
applied by the new Shia political class has divided society and caused animosity and 
discord since it targeted a large section of society and it, not only alienated them, but 
it turned them against the state. In fact Deba’athification was used as a weapon 
against all Iraqis who lived under Saddam. It was also used selectively against 
political opponents. Sunnis in particular felt it was designed to marginalise them 
since most senior Ba’athists were Sunnis. All the rhetoric against Ba’athism that Shia 
Islamists engaged in was divisive and acrimonious. It alienated a large section of 
Iraqi society.  
The political discourse was not national but Shia, Sunni or Kurdish. This has created 
at least three polities, in addition to a fourth non-religious one. There are common 
vocabularies repeated by Shia Islamist leaders which indict all Sunnis. For example, 
the expression ‘incubator environment’-(al-bee’ah al-hadhina) that refers to the Sunni 
areas from where terrorists launch their attacks on civilians. This expression in fact 
embodies a tacit accusation of all Sunnis of being terrorists or terrorist sympathisers. 
It makes them feel they lack patriotism and it encourages others to insult them 
and/or mistreat them.   
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The Iraqi political discourse is full of divisive terms and issues. Iran, Turkey and 
Saudi Arabia all represent different concepts. If someone attacks Iran, the Shia 
automatically believe his/her attack is directed at them. Similarly, if Saudi Arabia or 
Turkey are criticised, Sunnis feel the criticism is done for sectarian reasons. You do 
find Shia criticizing Iran, and Sunnis Turkey and Saudi Arabia, but these three 
countries have also become symbols of division, especially Iran.  
Over the years, there has never been a conception of justice in Iraq that was ‘free 
standing’ or not in conflict with a major doctrine, and this has contributed to the 
alienation and the feeling of injustice by large sections of the population and division 
of society. In order to have a stable democracy and strong state, a ‘free standing’ 
conception of justice must be devised and this must relate to the shared political 
culture of most citizens and at the same time it’s not in conflict with any major 
religious or philosophical doctrine. Although the Iraqi society is diverse culturally, 
ethnically and religiously, but there are common characteristics relating to the 
country and its shared culture as well as certain Islamic and Christian values that 
can be promoted. At the same time, certain divisive sectarian or ethnic practices 
must be jettisoned in order to create this shared conception of justice that is free 
standing and appeals to all citizens.   
It’s clear that employing religion in politics is divisive and doesn’t lead to enhancing 
the national identity or unifying the country. Since there is no stipulation in the 
Qura’an or Sunna for a religious government, according to the theory promoted by 
Ali Abdu-Razik and has now been recently embraced by the most senior authority in 
Sunni Islam, Al-Azhar Mosque.508 And because the Shia traditional school (quietist 
trend) approves of separation of religion and politics, and this is supported by the 
views of many prominent and highly respected Shia scholars and religious leaders 
such as Muhammed Mahdi Shamsudeen, Hani Fahs and Muhammed Hussein 
Fadhlallah, devout Muslims, be they Sunni or Shia, can live happily and 
conscientiously under a secular system whereby there is free standing conception of 
justice that appeals to all citizens and is not in conflict with any major doctrine.  
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In fact they could make it a religious duty to promote shared values that promote 
national unity and social coherence. This in turn enhances Iraq’s stability and 
prosperity and maintains the pluralism, debate and dissensus that have become 
permanent features of modern society.    
Major Hurdles to Democracy    
Modern society is characterised by pluralism, quest for justice, rejection of 
oppression and dissensus. The new political class in Iraq has not recognized these 
principles and still raises the banner of Shiaism, Sunnism, Arabism and Kurdisism 
among others.  The mainstream thinking among the Shia majority is that their way of 
life, doctrine and culture must prevail because they are the majority. This does not 
accord with a ‘free standing conception of justice’ stated by John Rawls.   
 What is needed is a conception of justice that is recognised and endorsed by all or 
nearly all citizens. This will achieve justice and removes oppression and at the same 
time preserves the current pluralism. Democracy is about inclusion of all citizens, 
regardless of their differences, be they religious, ethnic or regional. Since the Shia 
doctrine contrasts the Sunni doctrine in almost everything, from the religious 
calendar to jurisprudence and rituals as well as its reading and interpretation of 
historical events, it’s important to formulate a common ground between all citizens 
that distances society from disputes and division and adopts a political discourse that 
is recognised by all citizens, yet not in conflict with any reasonable doctrine. 
People can still express and practice their religious views and values, but within civil 
society. The Iraqi society is deeply divided on religious and doctrinal matters and not 
well-ordered. According to Rawls’ theory, certain religious matters can be tolerated in 
such a society, but they must support and strengthen public reason. Any divisive 
issue must be relegated to civil society. This means that most religious issues should 
be left out of the public debate. However, there are religious principles such as 
fairness, charity brotherhood and justice can be included in the political debate since 
they strengthen public reason and all citizens, even non- Muslims can identify with 
them.  
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In the last 20 years or so, Iraq has become a religious society, but since religion is so 
divisive, in Iraq at least with its religiously-diverse population, only those religious 
vocabulary that support clear conclusion of public reason should be allowed. In a 
religious society such as the Iraqi one, this would be difficult to implement. However, 
for democracy to consolidate there must be serious efforts on the parts of the 
political class to jettison any divisive matter from the public domain. So far, there has 
been no such effort. In fact the opposite is happening where the Shia are trying to 
impose their doctrine and culture on the rest of the population, while the Sunnis have 
resorted to violence to defend their culture and religion. 
It has been established in the previous pages that Islam doesn’t require a religious 
government. Muhammed was not a ruler to be emulated, but a prophet, and the Shia 
traditional school, the quietist trend, believes in separation between politics and 
religion in the era of the ‘Major Occultation’ of the ‘Absent Imam’.509 Yet, the main 
political parties currently operating in Iraq are Islamist which take a different view to 
the above. They wish to establish a controversial system of religious government 
that is in conflict with traditional Islamic schools, be they Sunni or Shia, and at the 
same time anti-democratic by their own admission. They regard the democratic 
system as anti-Islamic and believe only in ‘democratic mechanisms’. This is a big 
impediment to democracy especially with the spread of traditional religiosity, which 
was suppressed under Saddam Hussein, as well as illiteracy and political naivety.  
If democracy is to succeed in Iraq, there is a need to establish a secular system 
where only secular parties are allowed to operate and where the national identity is 
paramount to all other sub-identities. Political Islam can be dealt with in two ways. 
First; from an Islamic point of view since it runs counter to traditional Sunni religious 
school and Shia quietist trend, both of which believe in the separation of religion and 
politics. Second; from a modern democratic viewpoint since Islamists themselves, 
despite their lack of belief in democracy, operate from within the democratic system, 
not declaring their animosity to it unless they find it necessary. There has been a 
distortion, probably intentional, of the meaning of secularism in the Muslim world as 
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Hani Fahs made clear.510 It has been portrayed as anti-religion when it’s an impartial 
system that allows all creeds and thoughts to prosper. If this distortion is dispelled 
though education and awareness-raising measures, people will choose a secular 
system that will preserve their religious beliefs and culture and at the same time 
serve their interests in creating a modern society with an advanced political and 
economic systems.       
People’s unawareness in politics is also an impediment to democracy especially 
when this field has been neglected, on purpose, by rulers for centuries, as Ali Abdur-
Razik explained in his book.511 This will take time and it can be remedied though the 
spread of independent, free and professional media and social media as well as 
through the accumulated experience as the democratic process moves on. 
Therefore, people’s electoral choices will remain lacking clarity, regarding which of 
the parties serves them best, until such time as political awareness is improved. 
Islamist parties want to establish a system of government that is similar to the 
caliphate or imamate which Razik identified as unislamic, despotic and comes at the 
expense of people’s dignity. It’s also undemocratic since it cannot legislate laws that 
run counter to established Islamic teachings as the Iraqi constitution stipulates in 
Article 2A. This is a huge impediment to democracy which is all about satisfying the 
wishes of the people and serving their interests. In sum, certain religious values 
which can strengthen public reason and accord with democratic principles can be 
allowed, but, unless this is all done in democratic and secular settings, some political 
groups will resort to religion as a way of climbing to power. 
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Chapter 6 
 Political Islam and Democracy 
 
Introduction 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the ideologies of Islamist political parties are 
based on perceived religious principles which they believe in. In order to understand 
their different political approaches and ideologies, it’s important to examine the main 
Islamic principles for both Shia and Sunni Islam. But this study is about democracy, 
not religion or religious doctrines, therefore, I will limit the discussion to what I 
believe relevant to politics and democratization in Iraq.  
 
Since Sunni Islamist political parties no longer form the main Sunni political body in 
Iraq, as most Sunni Islamists have given up on political Islam  prior to 2010 
elections, as explained in chapter 1, I will be focusing on the Shia doctrine and Shia 
political parties, especially when they have been ruling the country since 2005. Their 
religious beliefs are no longer a matter for them since they are using them to govern 
everyone in the country, including those who do not share them. 
        
Historical Background 
After the death of Prophet Muhammed, the Muslims were divided on the issue of 
succession into two groups. One supported Muhammed’s cousin and son-in-law, Ali 
ibn-Abi-Talib, to be his successor, while others decided it was a matter of discretion 
among Muslims and it was up to them to choose his successor.512 They gathered at 
the public house of Beni Sa’eda tribe, and elected Abubakir As-Siddique, 
Muhammed’s father-in-law and long-time friend, as his successor. Although the 
dispute was settled within six months, when Ali recognised the new caliph, the two 
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sides, who were later called Sunni and Shia, remained divided politically and 
doctrinally till today.513  
There are at least seven recognizable Islamic doctrines or ‘schools of jurisprudence,’ 
(Mathahib) followed widely by Muslims, four in Sunni Islam and three in Shia Islam. 
These seven doctrines are named after their founders: Al-Hanafi, Al-Maliki, Al-
Hanbali and Ash-Shafiei (Sunni).  Al-Ja’afari, Az-Zaidi and Al-Ismaili (Shia).  
 The Shia Doctrine 
The Shia was a protest movement at the way the succession to the Prophet was 
conducted by his companions and an opposition to naming Abubakir as caliph. 
Although Abubakir’s accession to power was largely accepted by the majority of 
Muslims, a group of other companions, who were later called ‘the Shia’ or ‘followers’, 
believed that succession should have remained within the Prophet’s family, and 
since Muhammed had no son, his cousin and son-in-law, Ali, should have become 
caliph. It was a political dispute, not a religious one.514 This protest movement 
developed into a distinct doctrine, led by the descendents of Ali who were the 12 
imams revered by the Shia. The development of Shiaism won’t be relevant here and 
has been discussed elsewhere.515  
What matters are the beliefs and practices that could impede (or enhance) the 
application of democracy. Believers are inclined to impose their beliefs and practices 
on others when in government. All citizens and residents of Iraq are likely to be 
affected, when these beliefs or practices are regarded as part of public life, although 
they can remain part of civil society as per John Rawls theory. Any political 
conception of justice must be ‘free standing’ so that all citizens can recognize as 
valid and acceptable and can adhere to. 516 If those beliefs become public they will 
impinge on the lives of the non-religious and other religious minorities who will 
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‘become more dogmatically biased toward their own sect’.517 There are at least five 
religious traits that distinguish the Shia from Sunnis:  
Imamate/Infallibility518 
This stipulates that the nation must be governed by infallible imams designated by 
God.519 These are the infallible twelve imams, beginning with Ali and ending by the 
Mahdi, who the Shia believe to be in occultation for the last 1200 years. He is 
referred to as the Absent Imam (al-gha’eb) or the Expected Messiah (Al-Mahdi Al-
Muntadhar).520  
There are two Shia schools within the Twelvers to deal with the vacuum left by the 
occultation of the Absent Imam politically. One believes that people should take care 
of their affairs as they see fit until the imam re-appears, and this school is referred to 
as the ‘quietist’ school to which the late Shia spiritual leader, Ayatullah Khoei 
belonged to.521 Traditionally, most Shia religious leaders belonged to the quietist 
school. But the current religious leader, Ali Sistani, belongs to a new middle school, 
although he belonged to the quietist school before 2003.522 He was even thought to 
believe in the principle of ‘separation of mosque and state’.523  But after 2003, Sistani 
believed ‘the state was necessary to protect Islam’ but this is not the same as 
demanding direct clerical rule as a precondition to ensuring the Islamic identity of the 
country’.524  
Some scholars may have changed their positions after the rise of the second school 
which believes that Islamic teachings and codes should be applied through the 
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application of Sharia law by an Islamic government supervised by a jurisprudent. The 
most prominent proponent of this interventionist school is Ayatullah Khomeini who 
developed the theory of the ‘Rule of the Jurisprudent’ which is applied in Iran.525 The 
idea of infallibility and ‘jurist leadership’ are questioned by some Shia scholars, such 
as Abdulla Nuri, who was Iran’s minister of interior in 1990’s. Nuri wonders if the 
‘Jurist Leader’ is unveiled, and the Absent Imam is the one who appoints him, “how 
can we interpret what caliph Ali said, “I’m not free of mistakes”… how can we 
interpret the Quran verses that mean “consult them in affairs”, and “their affairs is 
established through consultation”.526 
 
According to Haider Al-Khoei, the grandson of Ayatullah Khoei (died in 1992), Sistani 
opposes Khomeini’s school since he calls for a civil state.527 However, Sistani’s 
thoughts on politics are middle way between the ‘quietist’ Khoei and the 
‘interventionist’ Khomeini.528 
Iraqi Islamists would establish a system similar to the Iranian one and this won't be 
democratic since it excludes the non-believers in the theory of ‘Rule of the 
Jurisprudent’ from participation in government or elections. An Islamic government 
would automatically exclude non-Muslims, non-religious or even those who believe 
faith should remain a private matter, from participation and benefits. Those excluded 
would be a substantial portion of society, in Iraq at least where the majority is 
secular.529 Democracy stipulates that no one should be excluded.  
Emulation-(Taqleed)  
Taqleed literally means ‘emulation’ and it refers to the requirement of every person 
who is not well-versed in religious matters to follow the teachings, guidance and 
orders of a senior cleric, who is carefully picked from a few prominent clerics, as his 
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religious guide.530 This cleric must have a long record of religious studies and must 
have declared himself as possessing 'the highest knowledge in religion' (marji3) with 
the ability to pass a religious judgment (ijtihad).  
During the ‘Major Occultation’ of the Absent Imam, a believer must follow strictly the 
guidelines of one of the highly acclaimed religious scholars. These scholars have the 
rank of ‘Deputy of the Absent Imam’ and have the same authority as that of the 
Imam’s.   
What the ‘marji3’ says is obligatory on his followers. If he declares jihad, the faithful 
must obey without hesitation or they are regarded as sinners if not total infidels. This 
is where the threat to democracy lies as ordinary Shia develop deep reverence for 
their religious leaders to the point that they would not question their views, including 
voting for a specific candidate or list.531  
Although taqleed is confined to religious matters532, ordinary people do not recognise 
the difference and ask their religious leaders for political guidance. Ayatullah 
Basheer An-Najafi issued a televised guidance/fatwa three days before the 2014 
election advising believers to vote for the list of (Citizen) led by Ammar Al-Hakeem. 
At the same time he spoke ill of PM, Noori Al-Maliki, and said voting for his list (SoL) 
was religiously unacceptable. The fatwa/opinion was aired by TV channels opposed 
to Al-Maliki.533  
Notwithstanding the fatwa, SoL increased its parliamentary seats by 4, from 89 to 93. 
In contrast, the ‘Citizen List’, in whose favour the Najafi fatwa was issued, increased 
its parliamentary membership by 14 seats, from 17 to 31.534 Najafi’s followers would 
have voted according to his guidance, therefore, some of the extra seats can be 
attributed to the fatwa.  
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Shia religious leaders usually issue guidelines to their followers on how they should 
conduct their lives. The faithful are told if they follow these guidelines, God will 
reward them in heaven. If not, they will attract His wrath. That’s why they refer to 
their ‘maraji3’ in every issue they are not sure about, and the religious leaders have 
to provide answers for any question asked. They also direct their followers on public 
issues such as Jihad, among other things.  
 
If the spiritual leader’s authority is extended to politics, Shia voters, especially the 
devout, would consult their ‘maraji3’ on political issues. During the last four general 
elections, many voted according to what they believed their religious leaders wanted. 
If the ‘marji3’ didn’t have a view on political issues, his associates would provide 
such a service.  
One spiritual leader, Ayatullah Muhammed Al-Ya’aqoobi, established a political 
party, the Islamic Fadheela (Virtue) Party, IFP, which all his followers joined and/or 
voted for in elections.535 The party got 15 seats in 2005, 7 in 2010 and 6 in 2014. 
Since the leader is a ‘marji3’, he must be obeyed by those who follow him. When 
believers vote, they won’t be voting their conscience but the clergyman’s conscience 
as Dr Akeel Abbas put it.536  
Khums  
Khums-(fifth)-is an annual religious tax equal to one fifth of people’s incomes (after 
deducting their cost of living) levied on all the faithful. They have to pay it to their 
spiritual leader voluntarily.537 The proceeds of the tax, in addition to the proceeds of 
another tax, zakah, levied at 2.5% on all income before the cost of living, are spent 
on the ways the spiritual leader feels fit. It’s mainly spent on religious schools, 
salaries of students and staff, housing, endowments and so on.  
 
Jawad Shahristani, the main representative of Ayatullah Sistani and his son-in-law, 
says 50,000 students are supported by religious tax paid to Sistani. He heads 27 
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institutions that are sponsored by Sistani in Iran, including centres for culture, social 
welfare, medical care, astronomy, translation, and high tech.538  
These religious taxes have accumulated over the years and turned Shia religious 
leaders into powerful figures with numerous mosques, hussainiyas, offices, 
publishing houses, hospitals and schools under their control. A marji3 is basically a 
state within state. In a democracy, the state is the only one that collects tax from 
citizens.  
 
Jihad  
Although Jihad, has been interpreted as ‘holy war’ it has a wider meaning, but 
military action is one of them. In one of the Prophet’s hadeeths, he referred to the 
military action as ‘minor jihad’, while the ‘major jihad’ was to exercise self-
discipline.539 But what really concern us here is the ‘minor jihad’ since other forms of 
jihad are personal and peaceful.  
Ayatullah Mahmoud Taleqani-(1910-1979)-an Iranian high-ranking Shia cleric, 
classified jihad into four categories: ‘First, jihad waged against foreigners in order to 
“remove those obstacles which are placed before those who cannot see the truth”; 
second, jihad to protect Islam and Islamic countries, which involves the defence of 
one’s rights and dignity; third, jihad against protected minorities (dhimmi) if they rebel 
against the Muslim law and “become hostile (muharib)”; and finally jihad against the 
despots’.540   
Another Shia scholar, Ayatullah Murtaza Mutahhari (1920-1979), whose teachings 
have greatly influenced many Shia, including Ayatollah Khomeini. Mutahhari argues 
that ‘a purely aggressive war—such as in pursuit of greed, territory, over-ambition, or 
as a result of a feeling of one’s own racial superiority over another group—is 
incorrect, even evil. However, if a war is undertaken in order to defend one’s land, 
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property, freedom, or self-esteem, then war is legitimate, even “commended and 
necessary for human existence.”541  
Abdulaziz Sachedina, a scholar, author and chair of Islamic studies at George 
Mason university,  points out that one Shia interpretation of jihad that dates back to 
early Islamic times permits the ‘jihad of the Sword’ even against fellow Muslims “if 
the latter are engaged in spreading discord in the earth.”542   
Jihad can only be declared by religious leaders if and when they see fit. Once they 
issue the jihad fatwa, it becomes a sacred duty on every able-bodied Muslim to fight 
the intended enemy. Although jihad is the same among Sunnis and Shia, but it 
becomes more personal and specific among the Shia because every individual has 
to follow a certain religious leader, in line with the principle of taqleed. If that leader 
declares jihad, they must obey him. If they don’t, the individual becomes a sinner or 
infidel.543  
 
Jihad is declared with no regard to the views or discretion of the government or the 
law of the land, regardless of whether the government is elected or appointed. It can 
also be declared against minorities (dhimmi) as Taleqani decreed, or even fellow 
Muslims according to Sachedina. 
In a democracy, only the elected leader can declare war and even then, he or she is 
accountable to parliament. Jihad could run counter to the basic principles of 
democracy and the legal state. An elected government is bound by a constitution 
and accountable to an elected parliament, and thus, should have the first and final 
say on declaring war, be it defensive or offensive.  
 
Jihad was declared by Ayatullah Sistani against (ISIS) when it attacked the city of 
Musil in June 2014 and it was obligatory on all able-bodied Shia who follow him to 
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fight ISIS. The jihad fatwa contributed enormously to halting the advance of ISIS 
terrorists on Baghdad.  
 
Shrines and Religious holidays 
These are shrines which are presumed to be burial places for imams and revered 
persons. The most prominent of which are the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf, Imam 
Hussein’s and Imam Abbas’s in Karbala, Kadhimain in Baghdad and Al-Imamain Al-
Askariyyain in Samara. There are many other shrines across Iraq, although they are 
less important.  
The Shia faithful gather in large numbers at these shrines at certain dates of the 
Islamic year in order to worship and also attend religious sermons. Many Shia across 
the world regard visiting these shrines as an important pilgrimage at specified dates 
such as anniversaries of deaths or births of the imams… Iraqi Shia faithful perform 
these pilgrimages several times a year, and when they can. Not all Sunnis practice 
this rite; in fact many of them disagree with it.544 
Since the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein, these pilgrimages have become 
phenomenal. Millions of people go to these shrines and the state has to provide 
security for these pilgrims in difficult circumstances as terrorist organizations, Al-
Qaeda and ISIS in particular, have targeted pilgrims specifically and hardly a single 
occasion passed without bloodshed.  
 
But all these terrorist threats did not prevent the faithful from participating in these 
ritualistic practices. These pilgrimages serve to enhance people’s beliefs in their 
faith. They also serve to enhance the authority of religious leaders who could 
measure their influence through these gatherings. Islamist politicians have used 
these gatherings to rally political support and almost all of them participate actively in 
them publically. 
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These shrines are so important that devout Shia from other countries go to defend 
them wherever they are, or even foreign states justify interfering in other states to 
protect shrines. Iraqis have gone to Syria to defend Shia shrines over there.545 Indian 
volunteers flock to Iraq to defend sacred shrines.546 The Iranian President Hassan 
Rohani pledged to protect Shia Shrines in Iraq against ISIS.547 This shows the 
importance of Shrines in Shia Islam. While the Shia regard them as holy, ISIS 
extremists spare no effort to destroy them and regard the Shia as apostate.548 
Pilgrimage to these shrines has proven to be very disruptive of civil life in major 
cities. They have caused resentment among the non-religious and members of other 
sects. Securing millions of pilgrims have also been a costly operation and never 
accident-free.   
The above five Shia beliefs do interfere with the application of democracy and 
infringe on state and government sovereignty (especially jihad and khums). They 
also cause the state to incur a lot of cost in security and lost labour through paid 
unofficial holidays for state employees.         
Sunni Doctrines 
The Sunnis have four doctrines which are believed to be close to each other 
theologically. The differences between them do not amount to making any distinction 
that is relevant to this study; therefore Sunnis from different doctrines act almost as 
one sect since they agree on all important matters regarding politics and 
governance.  
 
Sunni scholar, Muhammed Al-Aloosi regarded Sunnis as one sect.549 Ordinary 
Sunnis do not feel there is a difference among themselves since all their practices 
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and beliefs are similar. Whatever the differences, Sunnis do not believe in, follow, or 
practice, the above mentioned Shia beliefs (except jihad), although one cannot rule 
out any practice on an individual basis as some Sunnis in Iraq visit some shrines but 
they do not have elaborate rites of visitations as the Shia do.  
There are important Sunni shrines in Baghdad such as Imam Al-Gailani and Imam 
Al-A3tham. They are also full of worshipers during Fridays and religious occasions. 
Jihad is practiced by Sunnis and all those jihadists who come to Iraq to fight are 
following this principle. 
However, Sunni clerics do not exercise similar authority on their followers as their 
Shia counterparts do and this is acknowledged even by Sunni scholars such as 
Ahmed Al-Kubaisi.550 Nor do they have financial resources to spend on their 
followers as the Shia leaders. Sunni imams have traditionally been appointed by 
governments thus, they are state employees who have to follow official guidelines.  
 
On the other hand, Shia clerics have been, and still are, independent of the 
government, financially and professionally. This gives them the freedom and 
resources they need to a build large following. One phenomenon that needs 
attention in Sunni Islam is the spread of extremism and violence. The insurgency in 
Iraq, explored in chapter-11, had taken an extreme religious/sectarian orientation 
and attracted fighters from many countries in the Middle East, Africa, Asia and 
Europe. Those fighters believe they are performing the religious duty of jihad. 
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Sunni Arabs 
Sunni Arabs in Iraq represent around 20% of the population551, excluding Kurds and 
Turcoman who are divided between the two sects, but are politically classified 
according to their ethnicities. 
The Arabs (Sunni& Shia) constitute around 80%, while the Kurds, Turcoman, 
Assyrians and others form the rest. Muslims form 97% but they are divided between 
Shia (65%) and Sunni (35%).552  
The Sunni Arabs were grouped under the Accordance Front (IAF) between 2005-
2010, largely dominated by IIP.553 In the 2010 elections, IAF disintegrated and most 
Sunni Arabs joined Iraqia list. However, Sunni Islamists were still represented in 
parliament by IIP (only six MPs). In 2014, they regrouped under Iraqi Forces Union-
(IFU). 
 Other Sunni Islamists (non-Arabs) have different alliances. But, the Islamist Kurds 
are allied with the secular Kurdistani Alliance-(KA) on ethnic basis. In contrast, the 
Sunni secular Turcoman were allied to ‘Iraqia’ List.  
There are Sunni Islamists Turcoman who are organized in the Iraqi Turkmen Justice 
Party which is associated with the IIP and they are represented in the Kirkuk 
Provincial Council. Iraqi affiliations do not last long after elections, and could change 
when circumstances change. 
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Shia Islamist Parties 
There are four main Islamist Shia parties. They vary in their commitment to, and 
understanding of, the type of political Islam they seek to implement. They are: 
 1-Islamic Da’awa Party-(IDP) 
This party was established in the late fifties by Shia clerics to counter secular pan-
Arab, socialist and communist movements which swept Iraqi society then, although 
the spread of communism was the main concern of religious circles at the time.554 
Experts believe IDP was founded in 1958 in response to the declining place of Islam 
within Iraqi society.555 There was dramatic fall in the number of students in the Najaf 
seminary (hawza), from 6,000 to fewer than 2,000 between 1918-1957 and this was 
worrying for religious leaders and the establishment of the Da’awa was to redress 
this decline.556  
Not many people outside the party had noticed any public activities of IDP till after 
the Islamic revolution in Iran in February of 1979, the year in which the party 
established a military wing.557  
The Iranian revolution and the intensifying repression of the Saddam regime against 
the party expedited its shift from peaceful religious activism to a violent form which 
employed urban guerrilla warfare. The party planned and executed several 
explosions and assassination attempts in Baghdad and other Iraqi provinces.  
As IDP anti-regime activities intensified, Saddam Hussein issued a decree on 31st 
March 1980 banning the party and enacting a law that punished IDP members with 
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death retrospectively.558 In April 1980, IDP operatives threw a hand grenade on Tariq 
Azeez, Minister of Information, while giving a speech at Al-Mustansiriyya University 
in Baghdad. On April 5th, a grenade was thrown on a crowd mourning the death of 
students in the earlier attack.559 Muhammed Baqir As-Sadr, one of IDP’s founders, 
was brought from Najaf where he was under house arrest, to Baghdad to be 
executed with his sister, Amina.560 Some sources say he was tortured and his sister 
was raped in front of him prior to his execution.561 Many IDP members were 
executed under that law; others had fled to neighbouring countries, mainly Iran and 
Syria. As-Sadr had publically supported the Iranian revolution.562 He declared this 
support in an interview with the Iranian radio, Arabic service in early 1980, in which 
he expressed support for the Iranian leader, Ayatullah Khomeini.563 
IDP believes in the application of Islamic law under the guardianship of a senior 
cleric that is chosen from existing clerics at the time. The party had a leadership 
position under the title of ‘Spiritual Guide’ occupied by Ayatullah Kadhim Al-Ha’eri, 
although the position has been abandoned by the party, but the guiding principle has 
not changed. Members of the party have to be practicing Muslims before they join 
the party according to senior IDP members.564 Haeri has issued a fatwa to his 
followers not to elect any secular candidate.565 
IDP officials in many provincial governing councils have attempted in recent years to 
apply Sharia Law. They closed clubs, shops, restaurants and hotels which sell 
alcohol using different pretexts such as the ‘expiry of their licenses’ or ‘complaints 
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from residents’. This has been widely reported in the media, in both English566 and 
Arabic.567   
They even banned alcohol drinking at the Iraqi Literary Union which is traditionally a 
liberal organization. The leader of the Baghdad Provincial Council in 2009-2013, 
Kamil Az-Zaidi, a senior IDP member and currently an MP, took a tough stance 
against alcohol-drinking. Crackdowns on places selling alcohol continued for a few 
months and even the Christian Ashurbanipal Cultural Club in Baghdad was raided 
and ransacked for allowing the drinking of alcohol within its premises and footages of 
this attack was shown on Al-Sharqia and Al-Hurra TV channels.568   
Other provincial councils banned music, songs, festivals, art exhibitions and shows 
and anything they regarded as un-Islamic. One music show was organized by the 
Iraqi Ministry of Culture to be held in the Babylon province. The IDP-controlled 
Babylon Provincial Council refused to hold it under the pretext there was ‘no suitable 
place’ for it and ‘they were not given enough time in advance’ to find one! In Basra, 
the Governing Council there also banned music concerts and this caused public 
outrage. Many writers condemned these acts.569 IDP is considered the least violent 
among Islamist parties in Iraq with educated and sophisticated members.  
2- Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (SIIC) 
This party was established in 1983 in Iran. Its original name was (Supreme Council 
for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq-SCIRI) but it was changed to SIIC in 2008. It was 
established as an umbrella organization for all Iraqi Islamist groups opposing the 
Saddam regime. They all joined the council, including IDP. The first SCIRI President 
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was Ayatullah Mahmoud Al-Hashimi.570 Hashimi gave up the SCIRI presidency in 
mid 1980s and joined the Iranian government. He became head of the Iranian 
Judiciary, the third highest position in Iran. He also became member of the 'Council 
of Guardians'. He reverted to his original Iranian name of Shahroudi.571  
SCIRI was transformed from an umbrella to a distinct party, headed by Ayatullah 
Muhammed Baqir Al-Hakeem, who was killed by bomb blast in Najaf on the 29th 
August 2003, just over three months after his return to Iraq.572 His brother, Abdul-
Azeez Al-Hakeem, succeeded him. He died in 2009 and was succeeded by his son, 
Ammar.  
SIIC is family-led party that seeks to establish an Islamic state. Ali Allawi detected 
earlier intentions by SCIRI leader, Ayatullah Baqir Al-Hakim, of establishing an 
Islamic, rather than a democratic secular state. Al-Hakim demanded, upon his return 
to Iraq, a ‘constitutional government where Islamic values and precepts would be 
honoured’. He also ‘spoke of a tolerant and just society, but clearly in Islamic rather 
than democratic or secular terms’.573 Allawi asserts that Al-Hakim had a plan to 
refine the concept of Marji’3iyya to give it two clearly distinct identities: one religious 
and spiritual and another political. 
 A leading member of SIIC, Muhammed Al-Haidari, declared in early 2003 that his 
party intends to establish an Islamic state.574 Another SIIC member, Sadruddeen Al-
Qubanchi said 'power is now in the hands of the people and this means we are not 
committed to ideas imported from abroad'.575 It’s clear that SIIC is committed to 
establishing an Islamic government, and not necessarily democratic one. SIIC is 
disliked by all other Iraqi political parties as Paul Bremer revealed.576  
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The Badr Organization-(BO) which was associated with SIIC since its establishment, 
broke away and joined SoL in late 2010. Badr’s leader, Hadi Al-Amiri, became 
minister of transport (2010-2014).577 Badr was a military organization that turned into 
a political party, but it has reactivated its military wing and it’s now fighting ISIS within 
the Hashd (Popular Mobilization Unit-PMU). 
3- The Sadrist Trend (ST)  
This is a popular political/religious movement which was founded by Ayatullah 
Muhammed Sadiq As-Sadr in 1992 when he declared himself a marji3 after the 
death of Ayatullah Khoei. As-Sadr was assassinated in 1999, believed to be by the 
Iraqi security services, although the regime denied it. A leading BP official, 
Muhammed Hamza Az-Zubaidi, who served as PM in the 1990s, attended the 
mourning service of the slain Ayatullah on behalf of the government. But there was 
no doubt in the minds of most people as to the identity of the killers. It’s the regime’s 
agents.  
After the fall of the regime in 2003, the residents of poor Shia areas and slums 
across Iraq, who form the bulk of this movement, looked up to his youngest son, 
Muqtada, to lead them. It has become a formidable political movement with 39 seats 
in parliament of 2010-2014. They are officially called ‘Al-Ahrar’ [the Free]. In the 
election of 2014, they won 34 seats, which is slightly less but this may not be due to 
a reduced popularity but to the change of the electoral system.  
The movement had a militia, the Mahdi Army, which was frozen as a gesture of 
support for the government, although it was reactivated in 2014 under the name 
‘Saraya As-Salam’ or (Peace Brigades) and now fighting within PMU. ST is strong 
and intent on applying Islamic Sharia code in every area of people’s lives with no 
hesitation whatsoever. Even before it participated in the first government of Ibrahim 
Al-Ja’aferi, the movement established ‘Sharia courts’ in some areas and started 
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issuing warrants and conducting ‘trials’ with punishments being passed and 
implemented.578  
ST’s ‘Mehdi Army’ had fought battles with the American military and also with the 
governments of PM Allawi in Najaf in 2004 and PM Al-Maliki in Basra in 2008 (called 
by the government Cavalry Charge).579  
The Sadrists’ first minister of Transport, Salam Al-Maliki, banned the sale of alcohol 
at Baghdad International Airport.580 It’s still banned as it met with the approval of all 
Islamist parties in the government. Once a civil law is changed to religious, no one 
dares to reverse it afterwards. When the Iraqi flag was changed in 2008, no one 
dared to remove the phrase ‘Allahu Akbar’(God is Great), even though it was added 
by Saddam Hussein in 1991.581  
Many religious fanatics, believed to belong to ST, were responsible for killing 
ordinary people for violating Islamic code, even by shaving beards. ST blamed all 
such wrong-doings on a breakaway group called, Asa’eb Ahlul-Haq, led by Qais Al-
Khazali. The latter group has now entered the political process in 2014 election 
under the name ‘As-Sadiqoon’ [the Truthful], and won one seat.582    
ST was the most zealous and forthright in its intention of applying Sharia Law. They 
are anti-Western, anti-American and the the most vociferous group in their 
opposition to ‘occupation’ since the fall of the regime, even though they benefitted 
from it considerably through their participation in the government and the 
representation they have in parliament.  
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Iran has developed strong ties with the movement and its leader, Muqtada As-Sadr, 
went there in 2007 to ‘study’. The militia is believed to have been armed by the 
Iranians. In 2007, it used sophisticated modern devices to kill two provincial 
governors, the Muthanna, and Diwaniyya governors, both men belonged to their 
Shia rival, the Badr Organization.583  
But they have moderated their political discourse and As-Sadr declared those who 
are fond of weapons and wars are the enemies of As-Sadr family. The movement is 
now working closely with its traditional rival, SIIC.584 This moderation came after the 
breakaway of ‘3Asa’eb Ahlul Haq’ which is believed to have a close association with 
Iran.585  
In 2014, As-Sadr announced he would withdraw from political life and won’t be 
responsible for the decisions and views of ‘Al-Ahrar’ bloc in parliament. He was 
angry at their performance on the pensions bill which gave parliamentarians large 
salaries and retirement rights.586  
  4- Islamic Fadheela Party (IFP)  
This party was established in 2004 by Ayatullah Muhammed Al-Ya’aqoobi. Al-
Ya’aqoobi’s followers have been part of ST, but, he declared himself a marji3 and as 
a result, he achieved theological independence of the original movement.  
IFP is an all-out Islamist party and led by an ayatullah who is fully in charge of the 
rank and file of the party and its literature. When IFP Secretary General, Nadeem Al-
Jabiri, showed some independence, he was summarily removed from the 
leadership.587 Another party chairman, Abdur-Raheem Al-Hussaini, resigned after an 
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argument with Ya’aqoobi.588 Another prominent member, Sabah As-Sa’edi, MP, also 
resigned for ‘lack of diversity within IFP’.589   
 
FIP is hardly democratic, nor is it committed to democracy or freedom. The party 
seeks to apply Sharia whenever possible. In 2014, the Justice Minister, Hassan Ash-
Shammari, an IFP member, introduced a controversial personal status bill based on 
the theology of the Ja’afari doctrine.590 It would allow the marriage of 9-year-old girls, 
which is the legal age for marriage in Islamic religious texts. 
The bill was highly controversial and even other Islamist parties were not 
enthusiastic to pass it, perhaps they didn’t wish to see IFP becoming the standard-
bearer of Islam. Still, the council of ministers passed the law but parliament has not 
yet approved it. The introduction of PSL by IFP is a clear proof that the party won’t 
hesitate to introduce Sharia law in its strictest version at the first opportunity. 
There are other Islamist groupings such as the Reform Trend-(RT), led by Ibrahim 
Al-Ja’afari. In 2010 elections it got just one seat held by Ja’afari. In 2014, it won 6 
seats and Ja’afari became foreign minister.  
Non-Arab Shia Islamist Parties 
Shia Islamists within other ethnicities such as Kurds and Turcoman either formed 
parties of their own or factions within Shia Arab Islamist parties. Large sections of 
the Islamist Shia Turcoman are allied to IDP, SIIC and the ST.  
 Sunni Islamist parties   
Apart from fringe protest groups, such as the Association of Muslim Scholars, which 
has been diminishing in influence, there is only one Sunni Islamist party in Iraq and 
this is the Iraqi Islamic Party-(IIP). It was established in the early sixties but it 
dissolved itself soon afterwards. 
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The Muslim Brotherhood established a branch in Iraq but it suspended its activities in 
the early 1970s following a crackdown on Sunni Islamist activism by the Ba’athist 
regime.591 IIP re-established itself abroad in the 1990s and moved back to Iraq after 
the fall of the regime in April 2003. It participated in the Governing Council with its 
leader, Muhsin Abdul-Hameed, becoming GC member and president.  
 
IIP fought the second elections in 2005, in coalition with other Sunni groups, and 
won 23 seats from the 44-seat for IAF. Ayad As-Samarraei, now IIP leader, became 
a parliamentary speaker in 2009, succeeding the maverick, Mahmood Al-Mash-
hadani, who was forced to resign. But in the elections of 2010, the party only got 6 
seats after most Sunnis deserted Islamist overtly sectarian politics and joined the 
secular cross-sectarian Iraqia List led by Ayad Allawi.  
 
Even IPP leader, VP Tariq Al-Hashemi, left the party and formed his own political 
entity Tajdeed (Renewal) and joined Iraqia.592 In December 2011, Al-Hashemi fled 
Iraq to Turkey after being accused of involvement in terror attacks. He was later 
convicted in absentia of organizing terrorism acts, receiving a death sentence. 
Since IIP is a sect-based party, like IDP, IFP, SIIC & ST, all its potential supporters 
are drawn from the Sunni religious community. It’s clear that Iraqi Sunnis, by and 
large, have deserted Islamists politics and now focus on preserving their rights as a 
minority. 
 
Islamist Parties under Democracy   
The democratic system, for the time being, seems to be the only means by which all 
Islamist parties in Iraq could remain in existence, given the fact that there is no single 
dominant group among them currently, although every group seeks to achieve such 
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status.  
 
Despite their Islamist rhetoric, they are deeply divided. As we saw earlier, their 
backgrounds are different and some of them are led by historically rival families (Al-
Hakeem and As-Sadr families who lead (SIIC) and (ST) respectively, are a stark 
example). Also, IFP is an offshoot of (ST), Badr was traditionally the armed wing of 
SIIC and there is rivalry now between them. IDP is also divided between the original 
party and the offshoot which is IDP-IO. In addition, there is now rivalry between two 
wings within the original IDP; Al-Maliki wing and Al-Abadi wing.  
We also noted earlier, that Sunni and Shia sects are historical rivals and have totally 
opposing interpretations of history and religion. Any Islamist party will have to be 
either Shia or Sunni and will have to argue issues in accordance with its doctrinal 
jurisprudence. This means there is a ‘natural’ divisiveness in Islamist politics which 
always raises tension, and worse, it could lead to violence or even civil war as we 
saw in 2005/6/7.  
The division among Islamist parties led them to seek alliances with other secular and 
Kurdish nationalist parties against each other. Following the elections of 2010, 
Islamists parties such as Sadrists and SIIC among others, were opposed to giving 
their fellow Islamist, IDP leader and PM, Noori Al-Maliki a second term in office.  It 
was Iranian pressure on other Shia groups, such as Badr Organization, that 
persuaded them to unite behind Maliki.593  In 2012, the Sadrists joined secular and 
Kurdish nationalist blocs in a collective effort to field a no-confidence vote in the IDP-
led government of Noori Al-Maliki.594  
 
Current PM, Haider Al-Abadi, is only supported by certain Islamists parties, but a 
large faction of his SoL list, led by former PM Noori Al-Maliki, seeks to undermine his 
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rule and has managed to unseat his defence and finance ministers in two no-
confidence votes that are widely linked to Mr Al-Maliki.595 
On the other hand, secular parties have also remained, divided, lacking relevant 
political programmes and charismatic leaders and thus unattractive to the population 
at large. Perhaps one of the reasons why Islamists have succeeded is the absence 
of organised secular parties with clear and relevant programmes. The leading 
secularist, Ayad Allawi, admits secularists have failed but their failure is not as 
‘intrinsic’ as the Islamists.596 
Despite their deep differences, Islamist parties, be they Sunni or Shia, can unite and 
have united in the past, on issues which restrict people’s freedoms and deprive 
women of their rights. Only recently, 22nd Oct 2016, parliament passed a law to ban 
alcohol. Both Sunni and Shia Islamists were united in that and without the 
coalescence of the Islamist parliamentary Speaker, Saleem Al-Juboori, of Sunni IIP, 
with Shia IDP, SIIC, IFP and other parties and individuals, the bill would not have 
become law. The secular Kurdish KDP, whose member, Muhsin Saadoon presides 
over the parliamentary legal committee, which must have formulated the law, has 
also connived in this process for short political gains, knowing that the law won’t be 
applied in Kurdistan.  Similar actions, such as passing the controversial Jaafari 
Personal Status Law, could happen in the future which means democracy and civil 
liberties and freedoms are not safe under Islamists.  
 
This chapter has laid out the main characteristics and backgrounds to Sunni and 
Shia doctrines as well as Islamist parties which are based on them. This is important 
in order to have an informed perspective regarding the dynamics of the political 
process in Iraq today and how volatile the political process can be if religion 
continues to be used for political purposes.      
                                                            
595
  The Arab Weekly-2/10/2016: https://goo.gl/xhr5PA  
596
  Appendix-1, p33  
165 
 
 
Part 2 
Impediments to Democracy 
Chapter 7 
Use of Religion for Political Purposes 
Using John Rawls’ classification, the Iraqi society can be described as ‘not well-
ordered’, suffering from ‘profound divisions’ about constitutional essentials when 
certain religious arguments were tolerated.597 Hence, the focus should be on 
whether the religious convictions of the believers truly contravene the ideal of public 
reason.598 
 
 A conception of justice must be ‘free standing’ which means that it must not refer to 
any particular doctrine, be it ideological, religious or philosophical.599 Justice as 
fairness must not be founded upon any comprehensive doctrine. It must not bear a 
relationship to any particular doctrine, but it must be articulated in such a way that all 
or most members of the democratic society in question feel they can relate to it. Its 
basic idea must be found in the ‘public political culture’ of that society.600  
But at the same time, it must not be, wherever possible, in conflict with any 
reasonable comprehensive doctrine or doctrines so that the followers of these 
doctrines won’t find it conflicting with their beliefs if they adopt such a concept. We 
know that Islamic religious discourse is divisive, since it divides people into Sunni 
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and Shia immediately because their differences are so deep and extend to history, 
politics and culture.   
The Shia traditional religious teaching allows, in fact stipulates, the separation of 
religion and politics. This is the quietist tradition which current religious leader, 
Ayatullah Ali Sistani belonged to before 2003.601 On 5th May 2016, Sistani’s 
representative in Karbala, Ahmed Al-Safi, announced that the ayatullah won’t be 
expressing his views on Iraqi political issues as he did in the past.602 This mneans he 
doesn’t wish to get involved in politics anymore. The mainstream Sunni teaching has 
a similar position; in fact Sunni scholars over the years have preached that people 
should always obey the ruler, even if he wasn’t a Muslim.  
 
Sheikh Ali Abdur-Razik proved that neither the Qura’an nor the Sunnah require an 
Islamic government and the concept of caliphate/imamate was not Islamic but a 
pursuit by rulers to advance their worldly desires using heavenly means.603 Iranian 
Shia scholar, Abdulla Nuri, believes ‘with the exception of God, nothing is absolute in 
Islam’.604  Prominent Lebanese Shia Scholar and religious leader, Muhammed Mahdi 
Shamsuddeen believes in ‘the nation’s right to rule itself in the way it sees fit’.605  
 
Lebanese Shia leader, Ayatullah Mohammed Hussein Fadhlalla, called for the 
establishment of ‘the state of human beings’.606 Now there is a religious basis for 
excluding religious discourse from public debate, but since Iraqi society is ‘not well-
ordered’, there can be a space for religious discourse but only if doesn’t cause 
disagreement or violence among people who have different religions or doctrines. In 
other words, any religious discourse must belong to the national political culture and 
must not be in conflict with any other reasonable doctrine.  
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Many observers and participants in the Iraqi political process, including former 
Islamists, have blamed the use of religion for political purposes for the failure of the 
democratic process. The main parties which have won elections in the last ten years 
have been Islamist, be they Shia or Sunni. These parties are not committed to 
democracy and some have actually been anti-democratic in theory and practice.  
They have not shrunk from declaring their rejection of democracy because it ‘violates 
the Qua’anic text’.  
 
Why do Islamists reject democracy? 
Dia Ash-Shakarchi, who was a cleric during the 1990s and became MP for IDP in 
2005, before he turned secular, identified three reasons for Islamists’ rejection of 
democracy. First: ‘Democracy means the rule of the people and this contradicts their 
belief of ‘the rule of God’ which is one of the necessities of monotheism according to 
verse-44 of chapter-5 of the Qura’an.  
 
Second is social/ethical reason. One necessity for democracy is for the state to 
guarantee general and private freedoms. Islamists believe the social aspects of 
democracy have ‘corruptive consequences’ (according to their understanding of 
corruption). Third is political reason which is fear of competition. Non-Islamist 
political forces may oust them from power if democracy prevails. They fear they 
cannot monopolize power in a democracy. Pluralism in the framework of an Islamic 
state will confine competition to the parties of political Islam, excluding secular or 
‘civil’ forces.607 
 
The religious rhetoric in the first and second elections in 2005 has induced large 
sections of the electorate to vote for the Islamist list under the pretext of being the 
one ‘sanctioned by the religious authority’. Although the religious leader Ayatullah 
Sistani himself never publicly declared his position, he only urged people to vote for 
the right candidate, but four of his representatives stood with UIA in the first elections 
of 30th January 2005. This made large segments of the Shia electorate believe that 
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Sistani supported UIA and this was used by UIA candidates to claim they enjoy the 
Ayatullah’s support. UIA had publically used large posters of Sistani for 
electioneering purposes across Iraq in the first and second elections in 2005.608  
Their list number, 555, was emblazoned on these photos to further deepen the 
impression that he supported UIA. In the second election of 15th December 2005, 
UIA candidates claimed they still enjoy Sistani’s support since it’s the same list that 
he endorsed only 10 months earlier. 
Secularists accuse Islamists of not believing in democracy while Islamists say, albeit 
reluctantly, they do and got to power through democratic ‘mechanisms’. Dr Fareed 
Ayar, member and spokesman of IHEC, admits that Islamist parties have violated 
the rules right from the first elections, but it wasn’t easy to find them guilty because 
they used tactics that made them not liable legally, such as claiming that those who 
used religious symbols were their supporters and they have no control over them.609  
IHEC was and has been weak and incapable of enforcing its regulations. Several 
serious violations during the first and second elections were reported, but IHEC 
failed to take action. Over 2000 complaints were submitted and some were very 
serious ones.610 Islamists have not hidden their violations either. They used religious 
symbols, places of worship and fiery sectarian and religious speeches publically. 
SIIC for example is the most overt in the use of religious symbols. They printed the 
name of the Prophet and his descendents at the back of their posters to make sure 
devout Muslims do not throw them away.611  
 
All UIA candidates claimed they were supported by the religious leader, Ayatullah 
Sistani, although he never acknowledged that officially.612 The interim PM and leader 
of IDP, Ibrahim Al-Ja'afari, used a prayer book emblazoned with his photo showing 
him praying to promote himself as a pious man.613 Also, mosques, religious centres 
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and supportive clerics were used to promote the UIA. Many of their candidates were 
clerics who lead prayers and perform religious duties at mosques and religious 
centres and used them to promote their list.614 On top of that, there were many 
candidates who wore religious cloth and this is a strikingly obvious religious symbol. 
Religious parties’ manipulation of sect and religion to their favour, and violation of the 
rules contributed to the failure of democratic consolidation in post-2003 Iraq. This is 
confirmed by elite interviewees who pointed to the numerous advantages that 
Islamists have over secularists, especially the use of mosques, religious centres and 
religious cloth and slogans for election and political campaigning. Islamic 
personalities, especially clerics, are largely immune from blame or criticism due to 
their religious status. Their mistakes would go unchecked since they are revered by 
ordinary people and any criticism by rival candidates can backfire on them.  
Religious Immunity 
Corruption under Islamist parties has intensified and it’s difficult for the press, 
people, and even judges, to question them due to their 'religious immunity', political 
power and protection of the military wings in their parties. There is no single instance 
in which a cleric was charged of any wrongdoing, including those accused of murder 
and kidnapping. Some of their followers are extremists and can take matters into 
their hands and even kill those who criticize them. Their militias are also active and 
feared by people. There are several instances of killings and assassinations such as 
that of journalist Hadi Al-Mahdi on 8th September 2011 in his flat in Baghdad by 
‘unknown’ assailers. Al-Mahdi was an outspoken critic of Islamists and many 
observers believe his assassination was planned.615 Kamil Shyaa, the advisor at the 
Ministry of Culture, was assassinated by armed men as he was going home on 23rd 
August 2008.616 Many candidates were assassinated or targeted.617 Journalists were 
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killed through targeting rather than combats.618 The battle between candidates in 
Iraqi elections was not between equals; Islamists always had the upper hand. It was 
between the powerful and the weak, the armed and the armless, the revered and the 
not-so-religious or perhaps the ‘infidel’.  
Religion was used to immunize Islamist politicians from criticism and they were able 
to win due to this undeclared immunity and reverence. The situation has slightly 
changed, and it’s possible now to criticise some religious parties and some of their 
leaders, but it might be a bit late to have any effect. They are now established, rich, 
organised and powerful, while their opponents are weak, poor, dispersed and 
divided.  
If Islamism has impeded democracy, and protected inept leaders from criticism and 
kept them in power, can it be argued that democracy needs a secular system to 
progress?  
 
Shia scholar Sayyid Hani Fahs said that the only way to 'activate the humanitarian 
dimension of religion is through a civil state'.619 Fahs says he avoids using the word 
'secularism', even though he means it, because 'secularism has bad connotations in 
our countries'. The aim of democracy is to ‘reach secularism’, and ‘secularism 
without democracy is not really secularism', he asserts. He further contends that 'the 
principle of separation of religion and politics needs to be applied in the East'. 
'Enlightenment is the solution, not Islam' Fahs concludes. 620 This undermines the 
very basics of the ideology of Islamist parties.  
 
Enlightenment, Fahs contends, means 'creating a state for individuals, a legal state 
where individuals have free choice and human rights to which we add from our 
peculiarities without annulling any of their original qualities'.621 Human rights are one 
concept even though it has a variety of interpretations, he explains.  
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But Fahs approves of religious parties participation in the political system although 
with the qualifications 'under the ceiling of the law'. He calls for 'an administrative and 
epistemological system that forbids religious parties, peacefully and through 
democratic means, from forming a religious state'. This statement clearly says a lot. 
A religious state is not acceptable to him and it should not be allowed. He justifies 
this way of averting the establishment of a religious state by saying that Western 
democracies didn’t ban religious parties but they imposed the democratic system 
and culture on them whereby they can be developed through democracy and this is 
how western religious parties were matured.   
Fahs warns of the dangers of religious government for religion. He examines the 
Iranian example and asks; ‘if the people are not happy with their religious 
government, they would seek to topple it and this would mean 'toppling religion'’.622 
This is an eventuality that he doesn't wish to see happening anywhere because he 
fears for the fate of religion. 'We must nurture democratic persuasion through 
dialogue', he avers.623  
Fahs reveals the taqleed principle (emulation) is limited to religious issues and 
cannot be extended to political matters. A religious leader can encourage people to 
vote. If he supports a particular candidate he will 'lose his comprehensiveness and 
falls'. He acknowledges that 'people do not differentiate between fatwa, 
encouragement or opinion.' Therefore, they can take one to mean the other. He also 
regards Sistani’s representatives standing in the elections of 2005 as a mistake. 
Fahs clearly states 'When religion interferes in the making of a state, it corrupts it as 
much as it interferes in it. When the state interferes in the production of religion, it 
corrupts it as much as it interferes in it'. He asserts that ‘those who wear religious 
cloth should not engage in politics' and this 'must be enacted within the law'. 
Ambassador and former minister, Samir Sumaidaie, accuses Shia Islamist parties of 
not believing in democracy but they found an opportunity to grab power through 
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democracy. 'For them it's simply a ladder to get on top'.624 It’s noticeable that Islamist 
politicians do not even mention the word ‘democracy’; instead, they use 
‘mechanism’.  
Sumaidaie doesn’t mince his words. 'The efforts made by the Americans to help 
install democratic structures … were hijacked, sabotaged, and used as a stepping 
stone to jump to a position of power. Once that was achieved, power was 
consolidated using non-democratic means'. This reveals the real fear for democracy 
in Iraq. Some former Islamists, such as Dia Ash-Shakarchi and Sharwan Al-Waeli, 
left Islamist parties because of this trend. 
Coexistence is Possible! 
Sumaidaie contends it’s possible for democracy and Islam to coexist. 'Islam is no 
more reactionary and anti-democratic than Christianity'. 'Democracy could not have 
been established in Europe without forcing the Church out of the political arena. The 
same has to happen with Islam'. But why should there be religious reforms? Isn't it 
easier to separate religion and politics as all democratic countries have done? 
 
Sumaidaie explains what reforms are needed. 'Reforming Islam in such a manner 
that the more extreme interpretations of its tenets are banished and its softer, more 
humane and accommodating elements are promoted to a dominant position and the 
acceptance of the principle of the separation of religion from the state'. He goes on to 
say: 'Only then will democracy take root and thrive in Islamic societies'. 
 
Many have tried to reform Islam, including Ali Abdur-Razik, but as reformists appear 
they attract calls to go back to basics. Any religious reform has to be done from 
within the religious establishment.   
 
It’s easier, as many intellectuals have called for, including John Stuart Mill, John 
Rawls, Ali Abdur-Razik and Hani Fahs, if politicians agree on a political system that 
respects all religions but operates independently of all, serving citizens of all faiths 
and creeds in matters that concern their lives, leaving what concerns the afterlife to 
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individual believers to manage and religious and philosophical debates to civil 
society. 
 
Sumaidaie, and others, in comparing democratization in Iraq to what happened in 
Europe when the church was forced out of politics; they are in effect calling for the 
establishment of a secular system for democratization to succeed. He rules out the 
idea of 'Islamic democracy' because 'under Islamist doctrine, certain principles are 
considered eternal and unchangeable because they are divine instructions, whilst 
under a secular doctrine, anything can be changed if that is the will of the people'.  
Sumaidaie admits the strength of Islamist parties and their ability to mobilize religion 
to rally the faithful to gain power. 'Religion is a very potent force especially in 
conservative societies where education is limited and people are not aware of the 
ramifications of supporting sectarian religious parties' he explains. But with limited 
awareness, Islamist parties who Sumaidaie says 'have not been performing 
according to their ideals and proved to be prone to dishonesty, corruption, misuse of 
power, negligence and incompetence' still get elected. 
Would Islamists, when they are in government, work on developing real education 
and promote awareness if both lead to shrinking their popularity? Or promote the 
sorts of education and awareness that suits them and perpetuates their rule and 
influence? They have done the latter and religious education is spreading fast in 
Iraq.625 
Islamists' ideas sound good when they are in opposition, but 'they become empty 
rhetoric when they are in power' Sumaidaie avers.626 The problem here is that in a 
rentier state, they have the means to sustain their power, notwithstanding the fact 
that 'the administration of a country in this highly complex…and requires competent 
skilled leaders who can use modern tools to achieve specific economic, educational 
and service results' as Sumaidaie argues. The Muslim Brothers, who 'had no clue 
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what to do' according to Sumaidaie627, have been forced out of power by the military; 
but had 'democracy' prevailed in Egypt, they would have maintained their power for a 
while, although the fact that Egypt is not a rentier state didn’t work in their favour. 
  
Sumaidaie describes Islamists in Turkey as successful. But he associates this with 
the fact they are 'not acting as an Islamist but rather as a secular party within a 
secular political framework'.628 Secularism has been well-established in Turkey since 
Ataturk’s time and it would be difficult for the Islamists to change that within a short 
period of time, although the possibility still exists that they may seek to change that. 
Prominent sociologist and author Dr Faleh Abdul-Jabbar, argues it’s difficult to 
'marry' Islam with democracy629, even though he agrees that there is a space for the 
religious to live within a democracy, in line with Rawls’s theory. ‘If tolerance exists,  
followers of all religions can cohabit peacefully even within a non-democratic state’ 
Abdul-Jabbar asserts.630 But ‘tolerance in the minds of religious persons always 
comes with ‘tacit reserves’ even in the most tolerant of countries’ according to John 
Stuart Mill.631 Perhaps it’s misguided to hope for tolerance in a religious society.  
The Need for Tolerance 
Abdul-Jabbar affirms tolerance comes before democracy and is necessary for any 
state, be it democratic or not. 'If there is no tolerance, it’s difficult for different people 
to live together even under democracy'. He maintains that 'democracy is based on 
one man one vote principle' and this gives all people the right to live in the way they 
wish without infringement on their rights. 
Abdul-Jabbar explains 'there is a difference between creed and its interpretations’. 
He invokes the thoughts of scholars such as Abdurrahman Al-Kawakibi and Hussein 
An-Na'eeni who interpreted the Islamic creed as requiring the ruler to be constrained 
by a constitution. The thoughts of the two prominent Sunni and Shia scholars do 
accord with modern political thoughts. But Islamic scholars cannot all agree on one 
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course of action regarding politics and governance; hence the need for tolerance. 
  
Although Abdul-Jabbar accepts that ethnic and religious groups can be represented 
fairly in elections,  he warns ‘the collapse of national identity and its replacement by 
sect, class or race, limits democracy and weakens it'. He attributes the difficulty of 
questioning PM Al-Maliki to his ability to ‘persuade others within his sect that any 
questioning of him would be a questioning of the whole sect'. This has reduced the 
whole sect to its representatives in government, he contends.  
 
Abdul-Jabbar highlights the position of Iraqi secularists and liberals who stood in 
elections. They were considered ‘infidels’, and thus, were forbidden by Islamist 
parties in government from participating or holding rallies. 'The Islamic formula for 
sectarianism is to have a monopoly over the sect and prevent any diversity within the 
group'. He calls this ‘monopoly and prevention' and regards it as a serious 
impediment to democracy. 'To Islamists, a Shia is the one who is politically Shia and 
this impedes democracy in a serious way'. 
  
He identifies the absence of accountability and the monopoly of representation, by 
undermining the chances of non-Islamists of representing the sect and depriving 
them from benefits, as a serious impediment to democracy. 'This is destruction and 
an economic war, rather, dictatorship of needs'. 632 
Abdul-Jabbar asserts that Article (2A) impedes democracy. The article was inserted 
by Islamists. Although clause 2B bars enacting laws against democracy, clause A is 
stronger because the 'constant Islamic rulings' are known and clearly defined, while 
the ‘principles of democracy’ are vague and disputed and no documentary reference 
to refer to if there was a dispute. 
Academic and writer Dr Akeel Abbas believes article 2 is self-contradictory because 
‘it tries to reconcile irreconcilable contradictions’.633 ‘Democracy and religion belong 
to diametrically opposed orders of reality’. ‘The former is based on debate and 
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questioning that leads to following the opinion of the majority, while protecting the 
rights of the minority whereas the latter is based on holy texts that accept no debate 
or questioning and pay no attention to the opinions of the majority or minority’. Dr 
Abbas argues this article ‘causes conflict instead of establishing balance and gives a 
disproportionate role to the clergy as the interpreters of religious texts, whereas there 
are no codified, binding democratic ideas or texts that can be resorted to’.634   
 There is also the notion of ‘different democratic systems’ that Islamists always refer 
to in their arguments. They think this gives them the right to demand a system that 
‘suits Islamic societies’ which might lack fundamental aspects of modern democracy.    
Abdul-Jabbar finds it bizarre that the constitution has a stipulation that forbids issuing 
laws that contravene Islam. But he has words of praise for Ayatullah Sistani. 'The 
religious establishment has actually made the constitution less extreme (in religious 
terms) than would have been if left to political Islam'.  
 
Abdul-Jabbar is confident that society has the ultimate say on any restrictions 
imposed on it. ‘Islamists cannot really introduce restrictions against the will of 
society’. He rules out the possibility of a coup d’état. ‘Even the PM cannot launch a 
coup’ because he will face resistance from all population centres….A military violent 
action can be done, but no coup is acceptable'.  
Regarding 'dissimulation', and whether it affects democracy, Abdul-Jabbar believes it 
will only restrict people’s freedom of choice if clerics interfere in politics. He agrees 
that Ayatullah Sistani restricted people's freedom in 2005 when he supported the 
Shia list of UIA. But in 2010, he told people to vote for whoever they wanted. 635 
Former PM, Ayad Allawi, questions the ability of Islamic countries to establish 
democracy: 'Where and in which Islamic country is there democracy similar or near 
to what we see in democratic countries? He asks rhetorically.636 He argues there is a 
problem in understanding religion in Muslim countries; it 'prevents nurturing 
democracy'. This echoes the views expressed by Samir Sumaidaie who stipulates  
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reforming  Islam before democracy can take root in Iraq.  
Allawi blames foreign influences, colonialism, occupation, lack of self-determination 
and domestic reasons for ‘severely impairing the evolution of democracy in Islamic 
countries’. To him there exists a religious impediment to democracy not only in Iraq 
but in Islamic countries as well.  
 
Local Values 
'Democracy must take ‘local values’ into account and it should not be a photocopy of 
the UK, USA or France' Allawi contends. This is similar to Islamist politicians’ 
demand although the aims maybe different. While Islamists want to adjust 
democracy to suit their beliefs and interests, Allawi wants to assure conservatives 
that democracy doesn't lead to abandoning prevalent national and religious values. 
As a secular and western-educated, Allawi wouldn’t accept tribal values or those 
critical of women’s rights or personal freedoms. Democracy can take local nature, 
and this explains why French democracy is different to British, American or Indian 
ones. But democracy must incorporate liberal values, freedoms and minority rights. 
The starting point for the democratic process for Allawi is 'the presence of the rule of 
law, basic rights of citizens and citizenship, and the presence of institutions that can 
defend democracy'.  
He explains how Islamist parties emerged. 'They started as reactions to foreign 
involvement, degradation and insults that came with it but they soon became too 
sectarian, violent and authoritarian as we see in Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia… etc’. Allawi is 
clear. ‘The state must be secular’. No place for Islamist parties, which, he described 
as prone to violence, authoritarianism and sectarianism.  
He highlights another point. ‘Islamist parties are political entities, not sacred religious 
beings, and they have no right to pose as the only ones who know Islam and can 
explain it and use it politically’. Islamist parties are political entities, but they are 
taking advantage of religion and have clerics as political leaders. Ordinary people 
cannot distinguish between real apolitical religious leaders, and political leaders who 
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pose as religious leaders.  
Leaders of Islamist parties perform religious duties such as leading Friday prayers 
and giving sermons in mosques and religious centres.637 People consult them on 
religious matters whether in their political headquarters or in mosques and religious 
centres. They seize any opportunity to express their political viewpoints and promote 
them as religious positions and require their followers to obey, follow and support 
them. They may not have the right, morally and politically, but until there is an 
enforceable law to stop them exploiting ordinary people, they will continue to take 
advantage of people’s religious feelings and unduly benefit from this practice.  
John Stuart Mill states ‘in the modern world, the greater size of political communities, 
and above all, separation between spiritual and temporal authority … prevented so 
great an interference by law in the details of private life’.638 Separation is necessary 
for the prevalence of freedom which is necessary for democracy. He interprets the 
separation of religion and politics as ‘placing the direction of men’s consciences in 
other hands than those which controlled their worldly affairs’. 639   
 
Mill outlines ‘the disposition of mankind, whether rulers or fellow citizens, to impose 
their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on others, is so energetically 
supported by some of the best and some of the worst feelings incident to human 
nature, that it is hardly ever kept under restraint by anything but want of power; and 
as the power is not declining, but growing, unless a strong barrier of moral conviction 
can be raised against the mischief, we must expect, in the present circumstances of 
the world, to see it increase’. 640 He warns of the revival of religion and compares it 
with bigotry in the uncultivated mind that could provoke people into actively 
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persecuting those whom they have never ceased to think proper objects of 
persecution’.641  
Although Allawi admits that secular parties have failed but he distinguishes between 
their failure and that of the Islamists’. 'National and socialist parties have failed after 
decades of being in power (while) Islamist parties have failed in a much shorter time'. 
Is there any difference? Allawi replies: 'The failures of Islamist parties are mainly 
intrinsic while the failures of old secular parties are largely external (e.g. Cold war) as 
well as intrinsic'.  
If Islamists’ failure is ‘intrinsic’, there is no hope for real democracy with them in 
power since they will fail due to focusing on the wrong issues. Politics is about 
managing people’s affairs and providing services to them. Using religion is merely an 
attempt to grab power. Samir Sumaidaie puts it eloquently; Islamists’ ideal model is 
‘one man, one vote, one time’.642   
But once you are in power, you need to succeed, otherwise people will throw you 
out, if not peacefully, under democracy, it’s violently. Islamist parties need to focus 
on how to serve the people and stop interfering in people’s personal matters or 
conducts. Dr Akeel Abbas calls this ‘political religiosity’, and he believes it can only 
‘deepen sectarian identities and undermine Iraq's national identity’.643  He adds 
‘Religion in Iraq is essentially sectarian, hence divisive instead of uniting’! Ali Allawi 
argues ‘people’s mood could change and if religion is useful now, it may not be so in 
the future’.644 
Democratic Mechanism 
Islamist MP Dr Walid Al-Hilli thinks of democracy as a ‘mechanism’ no more. He 
seems to confuse democracy with the Islamic principle of ‘shura’ which means 
consultation.645 This shows he has some objection to 'democracy'. Akeel Abbas 
contends that ‘even those pro-democracy enlightened clergymen and Islamists 
cannot cite from Islamic teachings any real evidence in support of democracy 
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beyond the reference to the shura principle which merely involves consultation 
among the elite about state decisions and policies (little to do with democracy as 
people's real participation in selecting their representatives and rulers)’.646  
As a member of IDP leadership, Al-Hilli has been participating fully in the democratic 
process in Iraq since its inception. Many suspect he and his party are seeking a 
different political system than a liberal democracy when they are questioned in 
depth. He emphasized 'shura' and ‘democratic mechanism’. He clearly believes in a 
system other than democracy. 'Shura' is non-obligatory advice to the ruler. In line 
with this tradition, the Iranian parliament is called (Majlis Shura Islami) or Islamic 
Consultative Assembly. Al-Hilli asserts that 'the practice of Shura in Islam preceded 
the introduction of ‘democratic mechanisms’ in the West by hundreds of years'. To 
him, both democracy and shura refer to the 'necessity to consult the nation (umma)'.  
Obviously, there is a great deal of difference between democracy and consultation. 
Democracy is mandatory, while consultation is optional. When people vote in a 
democracy, they in effect 'appoint' new leaders and 'sack' old ones, or renew the 
mandate for old ones and reject the new seekers of power. It’s people’s decision. In 
a consultation, there is no decision taken by the consulted. It’s the ruler who initiates 
the consultation and the advice is not obligatory.  
Al-Hilli even went as far back in history as the era of King Solomon to give examples 
for democracy! He invokes the story of the 'Queen of Sheba' and how she consulted 
her people seeking their opinion on how to respond to a letter from King Solomon 
(delivered by a hoopoe). There are no modern instances of democracy in his mind, 
something which doesn’t bode well for democracy. 
  
Al-Hilli contends that Islam encourages 'consulting' people and it gives incentives for 
it, which is 'the great reward in heaven'. This sort of encouragement, according to 
him, makes people committed to the idea in contrasts with western democracy which 
'has no incentives'. 'Shura is subject to the principles and moral values which direct 
all Muslims towards the aims that satisfy God' while ‘democracy differs from Russia's 
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to America's and European countries', each understands it differently'.647 So 
democracy and shura are two different concepts now, although they are substitutes 
except shura is better since it has ‘incentives’. Worse still, democracy is not one and 
the same thing since ‘it differs from one country to another’ according to Dr Al-Hilli, 
and this means that 'Iraq can have its own democracy designed especially for it 
which will be different from the democracy prevalent elsewhere'. 
However, Al-Hilli makes a distinction between different Islamist parties since ‘they 
believe in different political principles’. ‘Their problem stems from their understanding 
of Islamic creed'. He acknowledges, however, that there are parties which use 
religion for political purposes. 'They are nationalist, sectarian or liberal but they use 
Islam to deceive people'. He also acknowledges that some Islamist parties made big 
mistakes but he blames this on ‘their lack of experience and lack of openness to 
Islam with its wide concepts'.648 Does this mean that politicians can use Islam for 
deception? This is another reason to choose a secular system. 
  
Al-Hilli agrees that extremism and the use of 'takfeer' [excommunication] is a 
problem, in addition to 'narrow horizon' and failed political programme. But he 
maintains there is a need for Islamist parties ‘as much as there is a need for non-
Islamist parties’.  
 Al-Hilli argues 'shura and democracy and the diversification of views all help to 
diversify parties in performing their roles. We don’t fear the multiplicity of Islamic or 
secular parties and their different programmes, but we do fear the infiltration of these 
parties by intelligence agencies of this country or that, making the party a platform 
for this country or that country or its intelligence agency'.649 
What is worrying for many in Iraq in positions like Al-Hilli’s is the open rejection of 
democracy. This is a serious impediment to democracy since Al-Hilli's views 
represent a trend prevalent in Islamist parties which currently dominate Iraq. If 
moderate Islamists parties, such as IDP, do not believe in democracy, the hardliners 
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are certainly hostile to it. If democracy is to be established for real, it is imperative to 
remove this impediment. Political parties must declare their commitment to 
democracy, as opposed to consultation. The public must be educated that the only 
democracy that can serve the people is the one that is recognised in established 
democracies in Western Europe, North America, and Japan. Other versions, if they 
existed, are modified to serve the interests of certain classes and parties; the poor 
and ordinary are not among them.  
Economist Dr Kadom Shubber argues that it is difficult to restrain Muslim scholars 
from expressing their views on issues they feel strongly about. He calls for a 'civilised 
dialogue to instill the ingredients of a healthy and functioning democracy' and as a 
result he expects all interlocutors, including religious and tribal leaders, to respect 
the decisions of the representatives of the people.650  
Shubber agrees that politicians shouldn’t wear religious cloths in order not to give the 
wrong impression. He affirms that 'for a democracy to function effectively, those in 
power must regard themselves essentially as takers from the voters who put them in 
their positions, if this happens the electorate would be free to exercise their power.  
But religious parties tend to oblige people morally and religiously to vote for them. 
The electorate are now takers from politicians and those in power due to the use of 
religion and the position of Iraq as a rentier state. 
Author Dr Kanan Makiya says, when he authored his two famous books “the 
Republic of Fear” and “Cruelty and Silence”, he thought 'anyone would be better than 
Saddam Hussein in the leadership of Iraq'. But he is disappointed now with the rule 
of the religious parties whom he labels as a 'thieving mafia' because they 'distribute 
state posts on the basis of stealing the state'.651  These are Strong words from Dr 
Makiya on the religious parties which came to power in part due to his oppositional 
activities to the regime of Saddam Hussein and persuasive lobbying of the Bush 
administration.  
Like Sumaidaie and Allawi, Makiya believes that Islam can and must change as 
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happened in Judaism and Christianity. 'Catholics jettisoned a lot of their religious 
practices in order to accord with modernity'.652 He can even see 'signs for 
rationalism' in Islamic thinking, especially among the young generation. He sees a 
crisis within Islam but he believes the 'new Islamists' will be able to change that and 
argues there is a sector of society that is determined to 'rethink everything'. 
These modernizing and reformist trends cannot really face violent Salafist trends, 
such as Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Nusra Front, Taliban, Boko Haram, Ash-Shabab, and others 
in different parts of the Muslim world, so they are silenced by the sheer power and 
brutality of the violent trends. Violent religious trends must be defeated first before 
any modernizing can take place. Makiya believes that within the Shia doctrine 'there 
is a room for flexibility'. In this he agrees with Faleh Abdul-Jabbar who indicates that 
there are 'large islands of liberalism' within the Shia doctrine in comparison to small 
ones within Sunni Islam.653  
Makiya maintains that 'change is possible and Islamic tolerance is possible'. He 
regards tolerance as a temporary substitute to secularism. He argues tolerance is 
easier to achieve than secularism; yet, like Hani Fahs, he regards 'the separation of 
state and religion as necessity for religion'. It might well be good for religion to be 
independent of politics, but what most people are concerned about is the state and 
society. Religion should be the exclusive realm of religious leaders and scholars. 'We 
are talking of natural developments that will happen eventually, not necessarily now' 
he explains. Makiya blames Iran for whatever is happening to Iraq. 'It’s Iran who 
supported the religious parties. Without Iran they would have had no influence'. 654 
Hussein Al-Hindawi asserts that religion has played certain roles against the 
application of democracy, even in Europe. But he reckons that this is not always the 
case. 'Religion can play a role in favour of democracy. 'Religious leaders can present 
Islamic ideas which serve democracy but do not contravene Islam.655 He finds 
common grounds between Islam and democracy. 'Islam favours a just rule and 
democratic rule is just … it’s fair with all people'.  
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Islamic Democracy 
Al-Hindawi doesn't explain why a religious leader should promote democracy when 
he doesn't believe in it. They must believe the application of democracy is in their 
interest. They may do so once they come under popular pressure. In Lebanon, 
religious leaders such as Muhammed-Mahdi Shamsuddeen believed in the mandate 
of the nation on its destiny.656 Hani Fahs believed in the separation of state and 
religion.657 Ayatullah Muhammed Hussein Fadhlalla believed in establishing the 
'state of human beings' bereft of any ideology.658 Al-Kawakibi and Al-Na’eeni before 
them believed in restricting the ruler.  
 
In Tunisia, there is a moderate Islamist movement led by Rachid El-Ghannouchi, 
who believes in diversity. Ghannouchi has recently adopted ‘Islamic democracy’. 
‘Ennahda has moved beyond its origins as an Islamist party and has fully embraced 
a new identity as a party of Muslim democrats’ Ghannouchi wrote in Foreign 
Affairs.659 Not only that but he announced that his Islamist party has given up all its 
social and religious activities and will focus on political activities only. This is 
because there is a popular culture to support these ideas, as Hani Fahs had 
explained, and those religious leaders have read this culture accurately.660  
Dr Al-Hindawi distinguishes between different religious scholars, depending on their 
positions on secularism. He says Ayatullah Kadhim Al-Haeri, who lives in Iran but 
has Iraqi followers, is against secularism, while others have no problem with it.661 Al-
Hindawi charges that religious parties exploited religious scholars who have no 
political project. This is largely true since they claimed Sistani supported them while 
the ayatullah has no political project except in exceptional circumstances.662   
Al-Hindawi elaborates that the Shia project in 2003 was to 'return the rule of Iraq to 
the majority and this was done during the first elections'. He thinks they should have 
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stopped at that and built a modern state based on democracy. 'Some clerics have no 
problem with building a modern state', he maintains. The religious authority 'can take 
a corrective position' on politics he advises. 'Imam Khoei believed in the separation 
of religion and politics'. Al-Hindawi affirms Shia religious scholars are not hostile 
towards democracy since building a just state is in the interest of the Shia and the 
Muslims.663 
He demands that religious leaders should explain their positions and declare 
whether those Islamist political parties represent them. They should forbid them from 
using their names. He maintains that religious parties are not democratic nor are 
their constitutions. But ‘they have become more professional in using democratic 
language and democratic game for their interests' he admits.664  
Dia Ash-Shakarchi attributes the difficulties of democratization in Iraq to the 
'prevalence of strict and closed-minded religiosity and the weakness of the culture of 
religious tolerance especially among the religious or those who possess an 
emotional loyalty to the sect'.665 Shakarchi, like Hani Fahs, blames the 'prevalence of 
a wrong, distorted and warped conception of secularism' in Iraq and the Muslim 
world where it is regarded as anti-religious.  
Shakarchi regards a religious fatwa in political affairs as a serious impediment to 
democratic transition and calls for the practice of issuing fatwas in political affairs to 
be banned in order for the democratic process to succeed. However, he realises this 
would clash with the 'emotional religious zeal' and this will require laying cultural 
foundations which will take decades. Even a fatwa that has a positive impact on the 
democratic process 'will have a negative effect when it becomes an absolute 
criterion that is not subject to discussion, criticism, refutation and disagreement' as 
the latter four criteria are important in a democratic system’ he contends.  
This view of Mr Shakarchi maybe too extreme, since a fatwa in favour of democracy 
from an influential religious leader such as Sistani, would be very effective in pushing 
the democratic process forward. As Faleh Abdul-Jabbar indicated, if it were not for 
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the moderating force of Sistani, Islamist parties would have written a more extreme 
constitution in 2005.   
Shakarchi regards a secular party as 'fairer and more democratic than a religious 
one', although he stipulates it must be democratic. 'The secularism we call for can 
only be realized when it is associated with democracy'.666 This is in line with Hani 
Fahs’s opinion that there is no true secularism unless it is associated with 
democracy. A secular political system would protect the non-religious from the 
repression of radical Islamists. Shakarchi calls for banning parties established on 
religious or sectarian basis. 'They are the antithesis of the principle of citizenship 
which is a basic pillar for the democratic system' he declares.667 
He summarises Iraq's problems into two: political Islam and political sectarianism 
and insists democracy must be based on secularism and this means the non-
interference of clerics in politics. He even calls for a law to ban politicians from 
discharging the tasks of a clergyman. 'If clerics want to work in politics, they should 
drop the religious cloth and refrain from any activity that is usually practiced by 
clerics. If a politician wants to be a cleric, then he should quit politics'. Shakarchi 
himself was a man of the cloth when he entered parliament in 2005. He gave up 
wearing the cloth after he engaged in active politics. He is categorical about the 
influence of religious dress on ordinary religious individuals, although he concedes 
many people have changed their views about clerics and do not revere them as they 
did eleven years ago.  
'Secularism defends the freedom of the atheists as much as it defends the freedom 
of the religious and the freedom of religiosity' he declares. He calls for a social 
campaign to educate the public that 'secularism is more suitable for the country and 
religion itself'. He also identifies 'hypocrisy' as a social problem and he believes 
Islamists practice it more because 'they try to portray themselves as democrats when 
they are not'. He maintains that Islamists ‘rode democracy when they saw there is no 
other way to achieve their dreams of establishing an Islamic state'.668  
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Shakarchi asserts that the politicisation of religion and political sectarianism have 
indeed contributed to bringing unqualified officials 'who concealed their lack of 
knowledge and experience behind religious rhetoric'. He charges that not only are 
they unqualified, but also lack integrity. 'Corruption was strengthened through hiding 
behind religious and sectarian slogans'. He blames 'Islamist and sectarian parties 
and unqualified politicians' for the failure of the democratic transition. 
Shakarchi now affirms 'foisting religion into politics, or even into public affairs, to any 
degree, represents an impediment to the process of democratic transition'. He insists 
this is mostly the case in a 'society where religion plays an influential role in it, and 
has not gone through a democratic experiment before'. 
 
Islamist politician Dr Adil Abdur-Raheem asserts that establishing a democratic 
system that depends on 'proper democratic mechanisms and respects the cultural 
values of the people' won't have a problem with religious values. He admits problems 
with such a system may arise with religious groups for political motives. We notice 
the use of 'democratic mechanisms' again by another Islamist.669 It shows Islamists 
only believe in 'democratic mechanisms' which are also used in Iran where 
candidates are vetted before they stand for election and they must believe in the 
principle of ‘Islamic Jurisprudence’ and be loyal to the Islamic Republic regime.670  
 
Abdur-Raheem agues the effect of a fatwa depends on the (stature of) the issuing 
authority and the number of followers, with the existence of a space that is not 
affected by fatwa. There are people who don’t follow fatwas, but those who follow 
religious guidance are not so few in Iraq. Some religious leaders are more influential 
than others and, consequently, their fatwa/guidance are followed by more people, 
but, in principle, a politically motivated religious fatwa/opinion, does compel the 
devout, no matter how few, to vote in a certain way instead of voting according to 
their conscience, without the interference of mentors. Any such fatwa will influence 
                                                            
669
  Ibid, p64/69 
670
  Michael J. Totten-No, Iran is not a democracy-World Affairs Journal-16/2/2006: 
http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/blog/michael-j-totten/no-iran-not-democracy   
Also: Colin Freeman-Iran’s 'democratic elections’ only missing one thing-choice’ -Daily Telegraph-8/6/2013:  
https://goo.gl/igDcj6  
188 
 
 
election results. 
Abdur-Raheem states that religious and secular parties 'share a common culture; 
that is the culture of monopoly of power, exclusion, and marginalization (of rivals)'. 
He asserts this phenomenon is prevalent and 'Iraqi political activism has been 
suffering from it for decades'. Iraqis have a common culture, but what differentiates 
secular parties from religious ones is the former uses political means and economic 
programmes to attract voters, while religious parties rely on religious and sectarian 
rhetoric to rally their supporters and immune themselves from criticism.    
Abdur-Raheem asserts that democracy should give 'equal opportunities for all' 
arguing that religious parties may also be ‘interested in the economic side of politics 
while secular parties could turn to sectarian rhetoric'. The latter point highlights the 
danger of sectarian discourse in politics, not forgetting that religious parties are 
political parties that use religion to further their aims.   
 
Abdur-Raheem agrees that wearing religious cloth 'enables candidates to gain votes' 
but he regards this benefit limited 'due to the existence of sections of society that are 
not influenced by the religious discourse'. But many individuals would not have made 
it to parliament or government without the religious connection because of their 
political incompetence and he acknowledged this. Some have been serving in 
parliament for the last ten years, with no contribution. 
 
Ali Allawi points to religious impediments, such as arguments that 'Islamic political 
authority cannot be based on simply the views and positions of a political majority'. 
He contends that political choices 'must necessarily be constrained by religious 
injunctions that are above and supersede the will of a majority'. 671  
Strikingly, he does not regard a fatwa as an impediment to the democratic process. 
On the contrary, he finds the position of the religious authority as 'consolidating' to 
democracy. He invokes the position of the Catholic Church in post-war Europe which 
consolidated 'the democratic process in the face of a communist alternative'.  
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But is the example of the Catholic Church in Europe relevant to Iraq and the role of 
religion in Iraqi politics? Christianity is different from Islam and many Muslims believe 
Prophet Muhammed was a ruler and they want to emulate him. That was not the 
case with Christ.  Many Muslim scholars do not give people the right to legislate for 
themselves since ‘this is the role of God and all matters are laid down in the Holy 
Scripture; the Qura’an’, and this was alluded to by Mr Allawi himself. Also, the role of 
the Church that Allawi is talking about came after the Church was stripped of its 
political power.  
Allawi, a practicing Muslim, believes that a secular party is 'better placed to be fairer 
and more democratic' than a religious one, 'unless it turns secularism into another 
religion, as had happened in Turkey and Tunisia'. This practically means that 
applying any idea religiously in politics impedes democracy, even if it’s secularism.  
Allawi agrees that 'wearing the religious garb' is useful politically today. But he 
remembers 'thirty years ago, it was ridiculed and those wearing it were not only 
powerless but were considered reactionary outcasts'. So, the current power of 
religion may not last long or remain as potent.  
Democracy requires the absence of any compulsion in politics, while using religion 
involves compelling believers to vote in a certain way even if it means they are voting 
against their interests. Allawi admits that the religious discourse does help politicians 
get votes but 'Iraqis are prone to radical shifts and there might be a mass migration 
away from the use of religious rhetoric and symbols'.672 In principle, Allawi argues 
that 'only good can emerge from a politics rooted in ethics, which includes ethics 
based on the idea of religious virtues and values'. Allawi, however, concedes that the 
political class is 'unprincipled' and uses 'the politics of fear, marginalisation and 
anxieties of dispossession' in order to 'push people into primary identities that are 
antithetical to the politics of enhancing the public interest'.  
Former Islamist minister and MP, Sharwan Al-Waeli, now believes that there should 
be a separation between politics and religion. Harm comes out of mixing religion and 
politics. There was a terrible exploitation of religion in politics, as it was used for the 
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promotion and marketing of parties and persons'. 673 
He points out that politicians have used religion to 'market themselves' and he 
particularly blames those who 'belong to political Islam'. He vindicates the position of 
the religious authority. 'Unlike the political parties, the marja3iyyah was the only party 
that kept its distance from benefitting from religion and acted as the sponsor of the 
national project'. 
He justifies the position of the religious authority in allowing its representatives to 
stand in the first elections and says this was to 'save a project and not for personal 
gains'. But he acknowledges 'there are those who claimed, in whispering tones or 
insinuation, to enjoy its support, or spoke out on its behalf, but it did not interfere'.674 
Al-Waeli distinguishes between the main religious authority of Ayatullah Sistani and 
other religious leaders who may have different positions in support of other parties or 
lists. 
He warns 'religious and sectarian loyalty is harmful to the democratic process', and 
reveals 'religious parties have exploited people’s religious and sectarian emotions'. 
But he is not sure if secular parties are fairer than religious ones 'because we have 
not tried their rule so far'. But if only harms can come out of mixing religion and 
politics as he pointed earlier, then it must be less harmful if secular parties came to 
power.  
 
Mr Al-Wa'eli expects secular parties to have a better chance in the future because 
'religious parties began to field secular and religiously non-practicing personalities 
among their candidates'. Also, 'they began to talk about the ‘civic state’. They have 
been trying to market their traditional personalities in order to get votes this way. 
Religious parties resorted to talking about the civic state because they have failed'. 
He reads this as a 'change' in Iraqi society away from religious parties. 
He charges that big blocs 'came to prominence because of their sectarian and 
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religious rhetoric', which he believes to have been 'extreme and focused' in the last 
elections. 'Those who resorted to sectarian and religious rhetoric got many and 
incredible votes'. Mr Al-Wa'eli expects that the results of the last elections will convey 
the following negative message to new members of parliament: 'if you are sectarian 
and able to collect money (illegally), you will win'. He maintains that 'religiosity is not 
a condition for integrity or efficiency’. He emphasises the need to get capable people 
who could benefit society, 'not those who pray and fast in front of people'.675 
He acknowledges that the political process brought non-qualified people 'either 
because they belong to a religious family or a religious party or they have a relation 
with this or that individual'. He reveals that 13 people from the Shia Endowment 
Office became members of the National Assembly in 2005 'because of their 
contacts'.676  
 
Intrinsic Failure  
Maysoon Aldmaluji doesn’t rule out a role for Islam. 'A moderate version of Islam 
could live peacefully alongside a democratic system'. But she has her stipulations for 
this type of Islam. 'It does not take an active part in everyday politics, yet monitors 
the overall process and takes part in forming public opinion'.677 She identifies the 
values of democracy as follows: 'human rights, women’s rights, minority rights, 
freedom of speech, freedom of conscience and religion'. She contends that 
democracy is indivisible and cannot be divided into Islamic and western. 
She argues that Islamist parties ‘identify themselves with ancient historic events. 
They use the Qura’an as their reference in legislative, executive and judicial matters. 
They do not recognize any example outside this framework'. She admits, however, 
while secularists ‘identify themselves with national symbols, and use international 
declarations, agreements and protocols as their references, Islamist parties' 
symbolism is easily identified with the populace'.678 
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'They have the advantage of Western and regional support. I am totally convinced 
that the Bush administration gave weight to Islamist parties in forming the Governing 
Council’. Like Hussein Al-Hindawi, Aldamluji believes the Americans abided by the 
Shia religious leadership’s views in drafting the constitution'. She charges the timing 
of the first elections was set to suit Islamist parties. 
She accuses Islamist parties of ‘inability to deliver the justice they promised’. Like 
Ayad Allawi, she believes failure of Islamist parties is intrinsic. Iraq is a 'complicated 
state with a complicated social system' she argues and 'Islamist parties did not set 
out to build a democratic state'. This view conforms to their tendency to reject 
democracy and only accept its mechanisms. Aldamluji doesn’t see any need for 
religious parties accusing them of causing sectarian conflicts and failing to run the 
state. 'They claim to speak on behalf of God according to their interpretation of the 
Qura’an'.679  
She is adamant that democracy cannot exist under religious or totalitarian parties, 
even if they were secular. 'Democracy...is a set of modern values that recognize the 
freedom of individuals and rights of groups (women, children, elderly, etc.). I do not 
believe that democracy can be identified as Islamic or Western'. 
Aldamluji argues that Islamist parties have impeded democracy on more than one 
level: 'they stick to Islamic doctrine on personal affairs, allowing children to marry at 
the age of 9 or less, they discriminate against women in inheritance and allow 
women to be beaten by their spouses and siblings as a measure of discipline. A 
woman's testimony is not allowed in a court of law. They encourage sectarianism 
and permit religious discrimination against non-Muslims'. 680 
Former IHEC’s Spokesman, Dr Fareed Ayar reveals that '4 million Shia went to the 
polls to elect Shia representatives without any real electoral programmes nor any 
guarantee from those they would elect for freedom of speech afterwards'. Other 
communities were equally guilty of voting based on sub-national ethnic or sectarian 
affiliations. 'Two million Kurds voted on an ethnic basis', Ayar goes on to say. 'Two 
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million Sunnis and Christians and others also voted on the same bases'. 681 He 
contends that those elections were not conducted properly because 'the level of 
awareness of the Iraqi people was not up to the standard of realising the meaning of 
democracy'. John Stuart Mill describes this humorously. ‘He who lets the world, or 
his portion of it, choose his plan of life for him, has no need of any other faculty than 
the ape-like one of imitation’. 682   
Ayar invokes the voting patterns in established democracies. 'In a proper democracy, 
voting must be on the basis of the political projects and programmes presented by 
the candidates, parties or political groupings'. This did not happen in Iraq. He regards 
voting on the basis of sect, religion or ethnicity as 'based on compulsion not 
freedom'. He gives examples. 'A Shia cleric can order a thousand Shia voters to vote 
for one candidate who is not known to them. This is voting not electing and there is a 
difference between the two' he declares. He firmly believes this is an impediment to 
democracy. 
In Ayar’s view, the formation of the first government was not democratic because 
'those who were elected were not afraid of the electorate withdrawing their support 
from them since they voted for them because they were Shia, and, as long as they 
remain Shia, they will vote for them again'. He describes the current democracy in 
Iraq as 'fragile' and this is because it’s 'based on ethnic, religious and sectarian 
bigotry'.  
He affirms secular parties 'serve democracy more than religious parties which do not 
believe in democracy to begin with and regard it as a 'despicable satanic act'', 
quoting some 'prominent' Islamic writers. 
Regarding religious symbols, Ayar reveals: 'We (IHEC) had banned the use of 
religious symbols but religious parties managed to manipulate the ban in a very 
strange way', Ayar explains. 'They were printing many publications bearing the 
pictures of religious leaders, sheikhs and sayyids, and when we would hold them to 
account, they would deny having done so and attribute it to their supporters'. 
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Ayar calls for the banning of parties established on the basis of religion and he 
believes this doesn’t breach the principles of democracy. 'If we allow them to work, 
the voter would be under the influence of the clergy and this restricts his freedom. In 
fact, his freedom would be non-existent because of his connection to religion'.683 
He affirms that the religious discourse encourages the making of false claims, 
hypocrisy, and opportunism. He reveals many people became MPs and officials as a 
result of using a religious discourse while they were Marxists in the past. 'The road to 
power is now through opportunism and the use of religion', he laments. 
It might be argued that opportunism is always associated with politics and business 
in all countries. But the danger for democracy might be the exploitation of religion for 
political purposes and the effects this has on the country as a whole.  Ayar warns of 
this phenomenon in a very serious way. 'This double (deceitful) fanatic religious, 
sectarian discourse has created the bigotry and backwardness in all dimensions of 
life that is currently happening in Iraq'. 
He blames the same religious discourse for bringing unqualified persons to 
parliament, government and leadership in the country. 'This is the reason why the 
country has reached this decadent stage on all levels', he explains.   
Dr Akeel Abbas agrees that there are religious impediments hindering the 
establishment of a fully democratic system. He observes that clergymen, clerical 
institutions, and Islamist parties look suspiciously at democracy, considering it a 
'Western invention that has no basis in Islamic teachings'.684 He maintains that the 
lack of evidence from the Qura’an or Islamic thought to support the establishment of 
democracy poses a dilemma even for those pro-democracy, enlightened clergymen 
and Islamists. 
Religious fatwa, real or imagined, undermines the very notion of elections 'as one's 
voting his/her own conscience' Abbas avers. He adds: 'It becomes rather voting the 
clergyman's conscience by thousands or millions of his followers'. There are other 
negative aspects to this phenomenon. 'It stops individual voters from developing the 
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necessary skills to examine the electoral platforms of the different candidates'. 
Voters can become enlightened and educated through the process of 'examining and 
comparing different platforms and making a personal voting decision based on it'. 
According to Abbas, this enables people to think independently, not as followers who 
vote based on voting decisions made by their religious leaders. 
 
He agrees that religious clothing and rhetoric bring electoral benefits. Because 
'religion is the dominant way of thinking in Iraq currently, many voters attach special 
value to politicians' acts, displaying signs of religious loyalty or affiliation'.A secular 
party, Abbas contends, is better placed to be 'fairer and more democratic' than a 
religious party. This is because 'a religious party, particularly in Iraq, is tied to pre-
modern loyalty and understanding of human affairs, instead of the modern interests 
of the voting public'. There is another issue which Dr Abbass points to in this regard. 
'A genuinely secular party has the potential to appeal to the interests of Iraqis, 
regardless of ethnicity and faith, whereas religious parties inherently appeal to the 
interests of particular groups'.685 
Dr Abbas calls for an electoral system that includes only secular parties because 'it’s 
definitely better for the country'. He sees benefits in this for the consolidation of a 
trans-communal national identity. 'Without secular parties that transcend sects and 
ethnicities, Iraq will continue to be prey to sectarian and ethnic strife'.  
Abbas also draws an important comparison between the religious and non-religious 
parties. 'Because religious rhetoric helps politicians get more votes, this encourages 
the non-religious to pretend to be religious in order to get more votes, even though 
they are not religious in actual life. Common voting appeals and patterns are 
religious in nature, something that leaves non-religious parties at a clear 
disadvantage. These parties sometimes find themselves “forced” to adopt religious 
gestures and rhetoric which, in turn, gives the entire political and electoral process a 
religious character that is not genuine or truly representative'.686 This can only create 
double standards which he believes will 'promote a false spirit of political religiosity 
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that will deepen sectarian identities and undermine Iraq's national identity'. 
The use of religious and sectarian slogans has negative effects for the country and 
the democratic process in general because 'they have definitely helped bring 
unqualified officials who may have hidden their inabilities behind their religious 
rhetoric', Dr Abbas warns. He also provides the evidence. 'It is very clear from the 
abysmally poor performance of the state machinery, particularly in its upper echelons 
and decision-making bodies'. He reckons that this is because 'a large portion of the 
general public tends to evaluate public officials based on their religious ethics, not on 
professional competence'.  
Democratizations in Iraq has partially, not fully, failed; according to Dr Abbas. 
Elections 'as a periodical mechanism to renew or rescind the trust in the sitting 
government has been somewhat deeply established in Iraq over the past 11 years'. 
But 'the entire election process is unfairly skewed in the interest of religious parties', 
he adds. 687 
Dr Kamal Field expects the influence of religious leaderships and others to remain 
strong until a breakthrough occurs in the level of education and general knowledge 
of the people'. 688 But the reverse is happening. Religious education has been 
enhanced many folds with so many religious schools and universities opening across 
Iraq under Islamists.689 Field argues that democracy ‘didn't come as a result of mass 
desire'. 'It’s actually like a plant that was growing in a hostile environment'. But Iraqis 
rebelled in 1991 seeking freedom and hoping for a democratic system, but they were 
brutally suppressed.690 Democracy maybe growing in a hostile environment, but this 
because religious parties are educating people it’s anti-Islamic. 
Field rejects the classification of parties as 'secular and religious'. Instead, he 
classifies them as 'believing in good governance or not believing in good 
governance'. 'The best party will be the one which believes in the principles of good 
governance', he declares.691 He agrees that wearing a religious cloth has an 
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influence on ‘simple people’, but he, like Ali Allawi, contends that this is a short-term 
phenomenon. 
He agrees that 'religious rhetoric helps politicians get more votes', and adds ‘it 
encourages the non-religious to jump on the religious bandwagon in order to get 
more votes', but he affirms this is not peculiar to Iraq.  
Voting on Religious Basis 
Dr Field agrees that people in Iraq have voted according to their religious and 
sectarian affiliations. This is 'because they do not trust or know any alternative'. He 
also agrees with the notion that 'using religious and sectarian slogans has helped to 
bring to power unqualified officials who may have hidden their inabilities behind their 
religious rhetoric'.  
Dr Abdulkhaliq Hussein agrees that a fatwa, even if it was false, impedes the 
democratic process. 'I believe religion and politics should not be mixed'.692 He 
invokes the European experience in which the political problems were not solved 
until 'they had separated religion from politics'. He believes that Iraqi religious 
leaders 'have not issued any fatwa in favour of any religious or political group'. 
Strictly speaking, this is true since no statement under the title 'fatwa' has been 
issued by a serious religious leader. But religious leaders and clerics have 
expressed opinions in favour of UIA.693 This was acknowledged by Islamist 
politicians Sami Al-Askari694 and Sharwan Al-Waeli.695 People cannot differentiate 
between a fatwa and an opinion since both are opinions originating from senior 
religious leaders. They regard any such opinion as obligatory direction to be 
followed. 
Hussein admits implicitly that some politicians have given a false impression that 
their parties are favoured by the religious leader. But he is ‘confident’ that these 
politicians 'will fail' and 'their attempts will be counterproductive'. His view has not 
been borne out in reality. Those politicians and their parties won elections after 
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elections and have become prominent through these false claims.  
He affirms 'religion is deeply rooted' in Iraq, and it’s advantageous 'if a religious 
leader can encourage people to cast their votes without bias to any political party'.  
Although Dr Hussein supported Islamist PM Noori Al-Maliki, he admits that 'a secular 
party is better placed to be fairer and more democratic than a religious one'. But he 
qualifies this. 'Democracy means to use ballots instead of bullets to choose the 
government. What about if the religious party wins? Are we going to revoke 
democracy and the results of the ballot boxes and install an unelected secular 
government?' This would be dictatorship, he reckons. The solution in his opinion is to 
‘re-educate the people about democracy'. He invokes Robert Lowe’s 'we must 
educate our masters'.696  
He explains that even if religious parties were to be banned, 'religious politicians 
would establish parties under secular names'. He cites the experience of the Turkish 
Islamists as a case in point. He concludes it’s difficult in a democracy to ban religious 
parties. The idea is not to ban the political activities of religious people as their 
involvement in politics is important since they form a large section of the population, 
but it’s to limit the use of religion in politics since modern societies are characterised 
by pluralism, debate and dissensus and people do not follow one religious or 
philosophical doctrine.697 Therefore, religious discourse is divisive and doesn’t 
appeal to all citizens.  
With regards to wearing religious cloth, Dr Hussein doesn't believe that they are 
significant in getting more votes. Hussein brings the case of Ayad Jamaluddeen, who 
wears religious clothes but still lost in both general the elections of 2010 and 2014. 
But Jamaluddeen is a 'diehard secular' despite his religious garb. Why should 
religious voters vote for someone who is openly calling for distancing religion from 
politics and who is alleged to be non-religious? Jamaluddeen was MP in 2005-2010 
and his religious status (and garb) must have played a part in getting him there. He 
joined a secular list which wanted to have men of the cloth in order to prove it wasn’t 
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anti-religious. 
He acknowledges 'only a very small minority voted for a candidate from an opposite 
sect or religion'. He accepts that 'religious and sectarian slogans have helped to 
bring unqualified officials' but he argues 'time is the best healer' and 'unqualified 
officials will be exposed'. 698 
Adnan Al-Janabi regards a fatwa in favour of or against any participant in the political 
process as an impediment to democracy 'since democracy depends largely on the 
free will of individuals to vote for their preferred party'.699 Not only does he believe a 
secular party is 'better placed to be fairer and more democratic than a religious one', 
he also calls for the banning of religious parties. He agrees that 'wearing religious 
cloth or using religious rhetoric helps politicians get more votes in a religious society 
such as the Iraqi one. ‘This makes the non-religious pretend to be religious in order 
to get more votes'. 700 
Al-Janabi expects the double standard, which politicians practice these days, will 
'lead to what Iraq is now: a failed state on the verge of civil war'. Al-Janabi observes 
that people have been voting according to 'their religious and sectarian affiliation' in 
the previous elections. Religious rhetoric, in his opinion, has helped bring unqualified 
officials who have hidden their inabilities behind their religious rhetoric. Al-Janabi 
concludes 'democracy has failed'.  
Bassim Anton argues one impediment to establishing a democratic system is using 
religion to stop the spread of democracy. This is an important point. Not only is 
religion used to get to power, but also to stop the spread of democracy. Anton 
argues that a fatwa can affect elections and impede democracy especially when 
there is a large percentage of Iraqis who 'go to the ballot box influenced by emotions 
not wisdom'.701 He further argues that religious parties only appeal to people's 'sense 
of religiosity' and they 'provoke sectarian loyalties' instead of presenting their 
economic programmes and pledging to their supporters to implement them. 
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Anton calls for a law to ban religious parties from standing in elections in order to 
'prevent the exploitation of the emotions of simple people and the manipulation of 
religions for electoral purposes'. He has evidence that wearing religious cloths or 
using religious rhetoric 'helps politicians to get more votes' and this is manifested in 
pushing some secular politicians to join religious lists to win elections and 'it worked 
for them'.  
This use of religious and sectarian slogans, according to Anton, 'has helped to bring 
unqualified and inefficient officials who were able to hide their professional 
deficiencies behind the religious rhetoric and the proof is 'parliament’s failure to 
produce economic laws'.  He lists a few impediments which contributed to the 
(partial) failure of the democratic transition. Among them are the dominance of the 
religious portfolio (on Iraqi politics) and the (undue) strength of the religious parties. 
Shorouq Al-Abayachi contends there are many religious impediments to democracy 
which have been 'accumulating over the long decades of modern Iraqi history 
without any serious remedies by any social, political or cultural institution'.702 
She regards a 'fatwa in favour of one candidate or against another an impediment to 
democracy, even if it was imagined and not true'.  She states she has experienced it 
directly during past elections. 'The religious emotions of people were exploited for 
the benefit of parties and individuals who worked for their personal, party or 
sectarian interests without the real enforcement of democratic practices and without 
serving the interests of the people who elected them'. She is alarmed that these 
people were elected once again despite all their shortcomings. 
Al-Abayachi regards a secular party 'more just than the religious one' because 
secular parties believe in the principle of citizenship and the separation of religion 
and state 'in a way to guarantee the non-exploitation of religious emotions for 
sectarian and ethnic purposes'. The logical upshot of this view is to call for a secular 
political system based on the separation of religion and state that guarantees the 
application of the principles of equality and justice for all citizens regardless of their 
sub-identities. This, in her opinion, is required 'due to the pluralistic nature of Iraqi 
                                                            
702
  Ibid, 104 
201 
 
 
society'. 
She agrees that wearing religious cloth and using a religious discourse help 
politicians get more votes 'especially in rural societies where illiteracy, poverty and 
ignorance are prevalent'. In her estimation, this has fostered 'the practices of 
religious pretence' because candidates seek to get to high positions or to win 
additional votes. She says this has sometimes meant indulging in 'agitating sectarian 
emotions among the Sunni and Shia'. This supports what has been argued by others 
such as Dia Shakarchi, that Islamist parties are automatically divisive since they are 
either Sunni or Shia. 
 
Ms Al-Abayachi blames 'political and religious hypocrisy' for the failure in building 
state institutions on the basis of the right criteria of propriety and competence. This 
hypocrisy has also 'entrenched ignorance and retarded concepts' in Iraqi society. 
She observes that 'incompetent and unqualified officials' prevail in most Iraqi 
governmental institutions and this is a result of the use of sectarian and religious 
slogans. 'The political manipulation of religion and sectarianism is also another 
problem which impedes democracy. This has 'enhanced warlords and militarism 
instead of civility and openness'. The proliferation of religion-based militias and 
armed groups supports this view. Wahda Al-Jumaili expresses hope that ‘a civil state 
that believes in human beings before loyalty to religion or sect’ can be built, although 
she thinks this is premature in Iraq ‘where religious parties have climbed to power on 
the back of religious feelings of Iraqis’.  
She argues that fatwas have been instrumental in the last ten years and they have 
changed the direction of elections, but acknowledges the religious authority has now 
distanced itself from politics. She laments religious parties for climbing to power on 
the back of religious feelings of ordinary people. She reckons the benefit of using 
religious discourse or wearing religious cloth is decreasing after ‘the exposure of the 
falsehood of those who claim to be religious’.  
 
This view can only be ascertained in future elections. How wide-spread is this 
‘exposure of falsehood’? Are the electorates now really immune from religious 
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influences during elections? There is disillusionment among many people and this 
can be seen in the social media and continuous protests and demonstrations in Iraqi 
cities over government failures, but it’s not clear whether this will be translated into 
votes.  
 
Politics based on religion is a serious impediment to democracy. This is because 
religious discourse is divisive since not all people affirm to one religious or 
philosophical doctrine. Religion belongs to the sphere of holy texts that do not accept 
any debate, while democracy is based on pluralism, debate and cohabitation 
between different peoples.  Democracy is the zeitgeist in most of the world with no 
major contestant as a political system (with the exception of the reinvigorated 
fundamentalism in the Islamic cultural community).703 As we have seen above, the 
evidence is overwhelming that democracy can only exist and consolidate under a 
pluralistic secular system that allows people to live together in dignity, with no 
compulsion to do what they do not wish to or believe in.
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Chapter 8 
Sectarianism 
Prologue 
One of the problems that hurt Iraq as a state, let alone the current process of 
democratization, is sectarianism. It’s not a new problem; the British faced it when 
they were trying to establish the new state back in the 1920s. The Shia opposed the 
British occupation and fought alongside their former oppressors, the Ottomans, 
against the British occupiers who were regarded as 'infidels” while the Ottomans 
were their coreligionists.704 At the outset of WWI, in November 1914, Shia  religious 
leaders (mujtahids) issued fatwas declaring jihad against the British in defence of the 
Ottoman Empire. Following the war and dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, the 
Shia of Iraq rose up in an armed rebellion against the British. Sunni scholar 
Muhammed Al-Aloosi regards the Shia position as ‘honourable’ and describes the 
Ottoman Empire’s policy as ‘extremist in (pursuing) ignorant Sunnism’ and as a 
result the Shia situation was ‘no good’ due to sectarian directions of state policy’.705 
 
Having crushed the mainly Shia 1920 rebellion, the British didn’t pay enough 
attention to the sectarian makeup of Iraq when forming the first government of 
Abdur-Rahman An-Naqeeb who was not an ordinary Sunni citizen, but a Sunni sect 
leader. He was the head of the Gailani religious clan, the decedents of Imam Abdul-
Qadir Al-Gailani, a revered Sunni Imam and leader of a Sufi order, with a big shrine 
in Bagdad. His name, An-Naqeeb, means the head, clearly reveals he is the head of 
this distinguished religious Sunni family as well as all the ashraf (nobles) of 
Baghdad. His mere presence as the leader of the new government of Iraq, especially 
when it came immediately after the bitter defeat of the 1920 revolution, gave the 
mainstream Iraqi Shia the impression that the British were in effect building a Sunni 
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state and were penalising them for their opposition to their rule.706 
 
When the first Iraqi government was formed by An-Naqeeb, the Sunnis 
predominated and held the most important posts.707 An-Naqeeb was known to have 
disdain for Shia clerics and for those who participated in the 1920 revolution against 
the British.708 He also had a lot of admiration for the English as he told Amin Rihani; 
the Lebanese writer and poet.709 ‘The English have the knowledge, wealth and 
wisdom. What do the (Iraqi) nationalists have? Do they love the country more than 
us, when it’s our country before it’s theirs? Most of them are still foreigners’.710  
 
Due to these critical views of his fellow countrymen, An-Naqeeb’s reputation among 
Iraqis deteriorated considerably, and the British were soon trying to find a 
replacement leader for all Iraqis. King Feisal, before them was not happy with him 
and sought to replace him and he was replaced against his wishes, by Abdul-Muhsin 
As-Sadoon.711   
 
Some senior Iraqi politicians of the monarchy era believed the British preferred to 
deal with the Sunni minority because ‘they will always need to rely on a (foreign) 
power for support, and they were always ready to cooperate with it’.712  The Sunnis, 
who had accumulated lots of administrative experience during the Ottoman period, 
also provided the British with a bureaucratic class capable of running the 
administrative bodies of the new state.713 
 
The Shia, in contrast, were disadvantaged in this regard as they were marginalized 
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under the Ottomans, who distrusted them and practiced systematic discrimination 
against them in many ways, while Sunnis were selected for virtually all administrative 
posts in the governorates which would be merged to become Iraq following WWI, 
namely Basra, Baghdad and Mosul. By appointing An-Naqeeb cabinet, which had 
some Shia ministers, the British followed in the Ottomans’ footsteps, although there 
was a difference in the sense that the Shia rose against the British, not the 
Ottomans.714 
 
The British followed this by bringing a non-Iraqi Sunni king, Feisal, the son of 
Hussein bin Ali, the Hashemite Sharif of Mecca and leader of the anti-Ottoman Arab 
Revolt (1916-1918), to rule Iraq whose population is at least half Shia.715 Some Shia 
notables, including those hosted by Sharif Hussein in Mecca, such as Noor Al-
Yassiri, welcomed the selection of the Sharif’s son as king of Iraq.716 They joined 
Sunni community leaders in sending letters to Sharif Hussein requesting that one of 
his sons become the king of Iraq.717 
 
Sunni Dominance 
After the installation of the monarchy on August 23rd 1921, the ruling class in Iraq in 
the following years was dominated by Sunnis. Most governments were led by Sunni 
politicians, the most prominent of whom was long-serving PM Noori As-Saeed.718  
 
The Shia felt disenfranchised and thus there were calls among Shia clerics to 
boycott the government and its institutions. The Shia clerics who made these calls 
were distrustful of taking part in government not only because of the 
disenfranchisement of their community but also because of traditional theological 
Shia arguments which reject the legitimacy of any government not headed by one of 
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the twelve imams of Shiaism, whom the Shia believe to be infallible.719  Their non-
participation has other reasons in the view of Abdul-Kareem Al-Uzri, a minister of 
finance in the monarchy era.  
 
Al-Uzri contends that ‘the British were unable to reach agreement with Shia political 
leaders, first among whom were the religious scholars, whose position was 
intransigent and uncompromising, insisting on complete independence’.720  He 
acknowledges that the British had one option left available to them in the face of 
Shia intransigence which was to deal with the group that was willing to cooperate 
and reach a political settlement with them and that was the Ottoman Sunni officers 
and civil servants who worked in the former Ottoman administration.721     
 
There was a feeling of discrimination among the Shia population throughout the 
period between 1921 and 2003, except perhaps during the rule of Brigadier Abdul-
Karim Qassim (1958-1963), who sympathised with the poor, of whom the majority 
were Shia. This has created friction and distrust between the two main sects in the 
country. Any move towards establishing a strong political system by any politician 
was viewed with suspicion by the Shia. 
 
Khalil Osman shares Al-Uzri’s view on the Shia intransigence. “Political 
marginalization under the monarchy accentuated the sense of collective identity 
among the Shi’ites who tried to renegotiate their inclusion in the national polity. But 
the rigidity of the political system restricted the possibility of accommodating their 
demands”.722 
 
General Qassim gained the trust of the Shia because he had balanced views 
regarding Shia-Sunni differences. He was of mixed parentage; Sunni father and Shia 
                                                            
719  Joseph Eliash, 'Misconceptions Regarding the Juridical Status of the Iranian ‘Ulamā’', International 
journal of Middle East studies-volume:10-issue:1-(1979)-p9-25. 
720  
Al-Uzri-(1991)-op.cit.p349 
721  Ibid.p348-52 
722
  Osman-(2014)-op.cit.p92 
207 
 
 
mother.723 Qassim was seen as 'fair' by the Shia public and even his political 
opponents, such as Hassan Al-Alawi, later admitted that Qassim was patriotic and 
fair and he expressed regret for opposing him.724 Qassim attempted to redress the 
grievances of the masses of impoverished Shia peasants through a land reform 
program which sought to take agricultural land from the feudal lords, including Shia 
tribal chiefs, and distribute it among the poor Shia farmers in the south.725   
 
Most of the major landowners were Shia (23 Shia-14 Sunni-9 Kurds).726 Qassim also 
introduced laws that were seen to be fair and built cities for the poor, the most 
noteworthy of which is what is now called Sadr City, formerly known as Revolution 
City, the name Qassim had given to the populous district of Baghdad.727   
 
However, Sunni Arab nationalists, by and large, didn't like Qassim because his 
policies were designed to empower the poor which were mainly in the Shia south. 
The Sunnis were mostly inclined towards, and sympathetic with, Arab nationalism. 
This was at odds with Qassim’s Iraqist streak which was promoted by the Iraqi 
Communist Party, which was very popular among the Shia youth.728 But Arab 
nationalism was regarded by some experts on Iraq as internally divisive and 
externally irredentist and destablising force in Iraq.729 
 
Since the army was dominated by disgruntled Sunni officers, Qassim constantly 
faced coup attempts, mutinies and assassination attempts till he was toppled at the 
hands of Arab nationalist army officers (mainly Sunnis) led by his erstwhile 
revolutionary partner, Colonel Abdu-Salam Arif, helped by BP led by Colonel Ahmed 
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Hassan Al-Bakir, among others.730 Arif became president and Al-Bakir Prime 
Minister. Qassim was summarily executed with a number of his colleagues at the 
Baghdad radio station on 9th February 1963.731 Fifty years on, Qassim is still popular 
in Iraq, especially among the poor Shia. They celebrate the 14th of July coup, and 
remember his execution on 9th February. 
 
Discrimination under Ba’ath 
Arif had soon betrayed his divided Ba’athist allies and turned against them, forcing 
them out of power in November 1963, after 9 months of fragile partnership. But he 
didn't stay for long as he was killed three years later in a mysterious plane crash in 
the south of Iraq. His brother, Abdu-Rahman Arif took over as president. The latter 
was weak, and this led to his dismissal in a coup led by the Ba’athists on 17th July 
1968. Ahmed Hassan Al-Bakir and Saddam Hussein, both Sunnis and relatives from 
Tikrit, dominated the scene. It was clear from the outset, as Charles Tripp states, 
that the new regime was dominated by the clan of Sunni army officers, not too 
dissimilar to those who had governed Iraq a decade ago.732 After 11 years in power, 
Al-Bakir resigned in July 1979 to be succeeded by Saddam Hussein.733 Saddam 
ruled with an iron fist for 24 years until he was toppled by an American military 
invasion on 9th of April 2003.  
 
During these years, the government was dominated by Sunni Arabs.734 While some 
Shia did participate in the Ba’ath government, they were not trusted by the 
establishment, especially after the Iranian revolution of 1979 which overtly opposed 
the Saddam regime accusing it of sectarianism. More and more Shia were 
imprisoned, executed and fled the country escaping a new wave of repression and 
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crackdown. Many Shia religious leaders were executed under the pretext of alleged 
Iranian loyalties.735 Underground Shia organizations, which looked up to the Iranian 
revolution as a role model in facing up to their repressive government, took up arms 
as the regime escalated its repression against Shia activists and religious leaders. 
 
Shia Islamist activists engaged in bomb attacks and assassination attempts against 
senior BP officials. There were also calls by leaders in the Iranian revolutionary 
regime on the Iraqis to rise up and topple BP rule. This only led to more brutal and 
repressive measures by the regime. Through the use of excessive and brutal force, 
the Ba’ath government managed to crush the Shia Islamist threat but at a very high 
price in lives.736 
 
Many Shia felt discriminated against by the Sunni-dominated government, although 
the regime was secular, but it was regarded as Sunni based on the family 
background of its influential leaders. Saddam’s violent reaction to those who hold 
different views to his made it difficult for him to build any bridges with Iraqis in 
general. Although BP had many Shia among its membership, some in senior levels, 
those who had real power were Sunnis close to the two Sunni presidents, Al-Bakir 
and Saddam Hussein, who came from the same village and were close relatives!737  
 
The important ministry of defence was almost always occupied by a Sunni minister 
from Tikrit (It was first occupied by Hardan At-Tikriti, then Hammad Shihab, then 
Saddam's cousin and brother-in-law, Adnan Khairulla Tilfah, then Saddam's cousin 
Ali Hassan Al-Majeed). There was hardly any Shia member in the Revolutionary 
Command Council, the highest authority in the land, between 1968-2003, and even 
when the number was increased to include non-Sunnis, it was reduced again to five 
members in 1977, all of whom were Sunnis.738 The five members were Ahmed 
Hassan Al-Bakir, Saddam Hussein, Sa'adoon Ghaidan, Izzat Ad-Doori, and Taha Al-
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Jazrawi.739  
 
Many Shia of Iranian and Kurdish origins were regarded as ‘foreigners’ and they got 
'deported' from their own country in the seventies and eighties and their belongings 
were confiscated under the pretext that they were originally foreigners.740 On the top 
of that, their sons were imprisoned or executed.741 
 
Shia, in Iraq and across the world, saw this as an act of sectarian cleansing. The 
friction between the two sects, which was brewing under the surface, came out into 
the open during the Iraq-Iran war in the eighties. Many Shia soldiers and officers 
defected to Iran or Syria, whereas many Shia civilians left the country and sought 
refuge elsewhere. Those who stayed had to prove their loyalty to the regime in many 
ways, either by joining BP or any of the numerous security apparatuses, and work 
hard to please the regime through submitting reports, false or true, on their fellow 
countrymen. Sectarian distrust among the people grew further following the 1991 
post-Gulf War uprising.742 
  
This episode was characterized by the use of brutal force by the regime to suppress 
the uprising, which spread to fourteen of Iraq’s eighteen provinces, including the 
shelling of Shia shrines, as well as the use of Shia rhetoric and religious symbols by 
the rebels, who also engaged in violent activities against those they suspected of 
belonging to BP or the state’s security services.743 Khalil Osman states, “The 
rebellion in southern Iraq was marked by a vigorous assertion of Shi’ite identity, 
featuring overtly Shi’ite religious symbolism and rhetoric... But the passionate and 
strident assertion of Shi’ite identity vis-à-vis the despotic Ba’athist state gave rise to 
fears and feelings of exclusion among Sunnis which resulted in their loss of 
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sympathy for the rebellion.744 
 
By 2003, the main Shia Islamist parties and other ordinary Shia, secular or Islamist, 
were determined that no Sunni domination of the government should be allowed 
once again and were equally determined that they, being the majority in the country, 
must play an active role in politics and be the ruling class of the country. But the 
Sunnis were not to give up power easily. They resisted the American occupation 
which led to their ouster from power and the establishment of a Shia-dominated 
regime. The Sunni population, especially in the capital, Baghdad, and the provinces 
of Anbar, Musil, Salahuddeen and Diyala, boycotted the political process, hardly 
participated in the first elections of January 2005 and heavily rejected the 
constitution, which was mainly written by Shia and Kurds, helped by the Americans 
and the British, with some Sunni participation.745  
 
The prevalent view among the Shia is that Iraqi Sunnis have never settled and 
accepted Shia rule. This view is enhanced by the fact that Sunni fighters from other 
parts of the Arab and Islamic worlds flooded the Sunni provinces of Anbar, Musil, 
Salahuddeen and Diyala, as well as the capital Baghdad, and began to blow up 
government offices, street markets, mosques and religious centres, killing tens of 
thousands of innocent civilians. Although the Sunnis did participate heavily in both 
the December 2005 and March 2010 elections, Sunni unrest continued unabated, 
fuelled by continued feelings of marginalization. In fact, the regime change in Iraq in 
2003 gave rise to a crisis of identity among Sunnis who found it difficult to cope with 
their loss of power and influence. Insurgent groups used these feelings of discontent 
and anger among Sunnis to gain sympathy and recruit fighters.746 
 
Sectarian politics, which may have been covertly practiced before 2003, became the 
order of the day.  As American forces left Iraq in December 2011, the provincial 
council in the Sunni province of Salahudden demanded a federal region, and 
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submitted a request to Central government to conduct a plebiscite in the province 
over federalism.  The government declined to carry out the plebiscite saying it will 
lead the Ba’athists across the country to assemble in the province. PM Al-Maliki 
refused to instruct the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) to conduct 
the referendum in violation of Law 13-(2008), which states the government has to 
refer the request to IHEC within 15 days. 
 
Sunni Displeasure 
The former Speaker of Parliament, Usama An-Nujaifi, a Sunni from Musil and leader 
of the main Sunni list ‘Muttahidoon’, declared during a visit to the US in 2012 that 
Sunnis in Iraq were unhappy with the current arrangement and wanted a federal 
entity. That was the first time he mentioned such a demand based on sectarian 
grounds. In January 2013 a protest began in the western Sunni province of Anbar 
which lasted solidly for a year, until it was dispersed by the Iraqi army which entered 
the province to chase outlawed armed groups which took over some parts of the 
province.  The Shia-dominated government of PM Al-Maliki, which grew more 
distrustful of Sunnis, was reluctant to meet their demands because it felt they were 
nothing but an attempt to weaken their grip on power and to restore the influence of 
the Sunnis. Tension between the government and Sunni population reached its 
height at that time and didn’t calm down until Al-Maliki was forced to relinquish power 
in mid-August 2014. Nujaifi repeated the demand for a Sunni federal entity 
recently.747  
 
It’s established that people voted largely on sectarian grounds in all elections held in 
the post-2003 period. This is clear from the fact that reflected the country's sectarian 
distribution. Also, many politicians, academics and independent observers 
acknowledged it. This meant that those candidates with high sectarian rhetoric stood 
a better chance of being elected. Parliament became dominated by sectarian figures 
from both sects. Political programmes hardly existed and the main issue became 
which sect governs the country. If it couldn't, it should at least impede the other from 
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governing. 
 
The main political parties were those that expressed the interests of sectarian and 
ethnic groups and sought to maximize the shares of their respective communities 
and party members and supporters in power. In the 2014 parliamentary election, 
Hanan Al-Fatlawi, a Shia female physician and lawmaker known for her vociferous 
sectarian views, was re-elected with over 90,000 votes in the Babylon Province.748 
This is a high number of voters, considering that she is a woman. Only 22 female 
candidates, out of 83, were elected without the help of the gender quota law in the 
2014 elections.749 
 
Islamist parties sought to aggravate sectarian fear within their communities to 
guarantee that they maintain a large electoral base of support. Sectarianism has 
been connected to power politics. It occurred under the influence of multiple 
struggles over power, resources and socio-political developments, set into motion by 
the creation of the nation-state.750 
 
Sectarianism subverts democracy as Iraqi politics in the last ten years has shown 
and as Iraqi politicians and academics have pointed out in exclusive interviews. It 
thwarts the power of the electorate to choose between competing political programs. 
Within the charged sectarian atmosphere of Iraq, elections became occasions for 
exacerbating intercommunal tensions, rather than a means through which citizens 
participate in shaping government and its policies. Voting became an exercise in 
which community members flex numerical muscles to obstruct the claims to the 
state’s power and other resources made also at the ballot box by other communities. 
 
Under these circumstances, the electorates of various communities have tended to 
use their voting strength to defend the shares of their respective communities in 
power rather than to contribute to the process of making policies that address the 
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interests of all citizens irrespective of their sectarian background. This state of affairs 
made the peaceful rotation of power, a key mechanism in a democracy, more difficult 
as evidenced by the political crises surrounding the formation of governments in the 
post-2003 period. 
 
Nowhere did sectarianism in post-2003 Iraq subvert democracy more than in the 
distorted version of majority rule that it nurtured. Under Iraqi sectarianism, the 
democratic principle of majority rule has no longer been a rule by a political majority. 
It has rather been translated into the rule of sectarian communities. As such, majority 
rule as a means to decide on public issues based on political programmes that 
address the interests of the broader citizenry and on the principle of citizenship was 
lost. Amid the heated competition between large sectarian groups over power 
resources, feelings of marginalization among minorities were reinforced and 
heightened. This shook the twin pillars of democratic governance represented by the 
principles of majority rule and protection of minority rights. 
 
Sectarianism has also undermined the emergence of competent governance. It 
contravenes basic democratic principles since voters should be free of all pressures 
to vote for their preferred candidates who should be chosen on the basis of their 
suitability and their political and economic programmes. If sectarian politics prevails, 
then people's choices will be limited and those individuals who pursue militant 
sectarian policies and use radical rhetoric are likely to be elected. Officials elected on 
their shrill sectarian rhetoric are rarely efficient or competent. This is confirmed by 
the views of distinguished interviewees. 
 
Holding elected officials accountable in such a system has been highly problematic. 
Government accountability in the sense that those enjoying executive powers ought 
to explain their policies to the elected representatives could not be practiced. Former 
PM Noori Al-Maliki and ministers from his bloc refused to appear before parliament 
to explain certain policies or policy failures. 
 
At times, anti-corruption measures have become a tool in the hands of the executive 
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branch to marginalize and score points against political rivals. At other times, efforts 
to bring corrupt officials to justice for wrongdoings have been aborted by outcries 
from their communities and political parties claiming that they had been targeted for 
sectarian reasons. This undermined the rule of law which is a fundamental pillar of 
democracy. It’s defined as “the sovereignty of law over the people and elected 
officials”.751  
 
When a country moves from a non-democratic to democratic system, those in power 
should implement the law and be punished for their wrongdoings. People in a 
democracy, expect and have the right to have fair rulers not tyrants whose actions 
are not bound by the law. 
 
Democratization entails the expansion of accountability, the independence of the 
judiciary, and the public protection of property rights.752 This expansion can happen 
when there is rule of law. Rule of law is important for justice, equality, social stability 
and economic development, which are essential in a successful democracy. When 
the rule of law expands in a country, democracy gets consolidated. When 
sectarianism undermines the rule of law, democracy and democratic governance are 
undermined. 
 
Sectarianism in post-2003 Iraq has made government less responsive to the will of 
the public. Elected and non-elected officials, who win their public offices based on 
power sharing arrangements that restrictively allocates posts based on sectarian and 
partisan affiliation, have been more inclined to respond to the aspirations of their 
communities rather than the demands that cut across communal lines and benefit 
the broader citizenry. As such, citizenship built on a foundation of equality of citizens, 
in rights, dignity and respect, regardless of their sectarian identity, lost its 
meaningfulness in Iraq. 
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Sectarianism has become a source of polarization, prejudice and intolerance which 
contributed to undermining social peace between Iraqi communities, turning diversity 
into an arena of inter-communal rivalry and discord rather than serving as an 
indicator of cultural richness and an opportunity for building networks of inter-
communal harmony, dialogue and cooperation. 
 
It has also contributed to the creation of a dysfunctional state and democratic 
system. Contaminated by sectarianism, the institution of democratic politics in Iraq 
became a source for political instability rather than a mechanism for channeling 
societal interests and meaningful citizen participation in the selection of government 
and determining its policy. 
 
Sectarianism Impedes Democracy 
Prominent Iraqi sociologist Faleh Abdul-Jabbar explains that sectarianism impedes 
democracy in three serious ways: 
1-It negates accountability and this has a destructive result. 
2-It limits representation since this becomes the right of sectarian politicians to 
represent the sect they claim to belong to. 
3-Sectarian officials deprive those who disagree with them from benefits; using 
economic tools to force citizens to comply with the diktats of the rulers (the 
dictatorship of needs).753 
 
Abdul-Jabbar regards the Islamic formula for sectarianism a 'monopoly over the sect' 
since it prevents diversity within the group. It’s 'monopoly and prevention' that 
renders a Shia as 'the one who is politically Shia' and the same goes for others. He 
regards it as a serious impediment to democracy. 'To Islamists, a Shia is the one 
who is politically Shia and this impedes democracy in a serious way.754  
  
The absence of accountability and monopoly of representation, through the 
prevention of non-Islamists from representing the sect and depriving them from 
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benefits is an economic war or ‘dictatorship of needs’ as Abdul-Jabbar calls it.755 
This way, democracy becomes a dictatorship. 
 
When there are few work opportunities outside the state, since the rentier state owns 
the economy, citizens are forced to belong to the ruling party (or parties) and would 
be inclined to obey the government of the day... This weakens democratic 
institutions since it limits people's freedom.  
 
Former Iraqi PM, Ayad Allawi, regards sectarianism as one of the reasons for the 
failure of Iraqi democracy so far.756 However, he reckons the pluralism of Islamic 
parties in Iraq doesn't make them sectarian, only if there is one party, it will be 
sectarian.757 But this opinion is at odds with realities on the ground according to 
Khalil Osman.758  Allawi admits, however, that Islamist parties, which he believes 
were created as a reaction to foreign interference and domination, have become ‘too 
sectarian, violent and authoritarian’ and this contradicts his earlier assertion that the 
multiplicity of Islamist parties prevents sectarianism.759  
 
There is a multiplicity of Islamist parties in Iraq (IDP-IFP-IIP-SIIC-ST-RT-IDM among 
others), yet sectarianism has intensified, perhaps because sectarian parties compete 
among themselves in their sectarian discourse. Islamist parties can unite on certain 
issues as they did in 2005 to oust Allawi from the premiership and in 2010 when they 
backed Noori Al-Maliki for PM even though Allawi had more seats. In Oct 2016, they 
united to pass a law banning alcohol. This means they can act as one party at crucial 
times for themselves. 
Former Islamist MP Dia Shakarchi blames 'political sectarianism' for impeding 
democracy.760 He attributes the difficulties of democratization to the 'prevalence of 
strict and closed-minded religiosity and the weakness of the culture of religious 
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tolerance especially among the religious or those who possess emotional loyalty to 
the sect'.761 Shakarchi regards the feeling of belonging to a sect as 'the biggest 
impediment to the process of democratic transition' followed by belonging to religion, 
ethnicity and region. He goes further by claiming that Islamist parties are necessarily 
sectarian because they have to be either Sunni or Shia. 'There is no trans-sectarian 
Islamist party, neither in Iraq nor anywhere else'.762  
 
Although most Islamist parties claim to be 'for all Muslims', in reality, there are no 
Sunni members in the Shia parties of IDP, IFP, SIIC, BO, or ST and no Shia 
members in the Sunni lists or IIP. When one asks them for the reason, as I have, 
they would say their parties are open to members of both sects but no one from the 
other sect has crossed the boundary ‘due to sectarian polarization’! Shakarchi also 
blames corruption on sectarianism. 'Corruption was strengthened through hiding 
behind religious and sectarian slogans'. 763 
Shakarchi estimates that 90% of voters voted on sectarian basis. 'Most parties or 
electoral coalitions are either Sunni or Shia, and each side insinuates to its audience 
from among its respective sect that it’s the protector of the sect from the ‘terrorism’ of 
the other sect, or the protector of the latter sect from marginalization and repression 
at the hands of the former'. He regards sectarianism 'the biggest impediment to the 
process of democratic transition' in Iraq.764 
 
Former minister, Ali Allawi, affirms sectarian bias 'impedes democratisation in Iraq'. 
He asserts ‘primary identities overshadow the democratic process'.765 He 
acknowledges that people did vote in the last elections according to their sectarian 
rather than religious affiliations.  
Prominent academic and author, Dr Kanan Makiya, regards sectarianism a huge 
hurdle in the face of any progress. He has even called for a 'fatwa' against 
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sectarianism.766 MP Miss Maysoon Aldamluji cites sectarianism as one of the factors 
that caused the failure of the Iraqi democratic experiment so far.767 She is adamant 
that Islamist parties 'encourage sectarianism and permit religious discrimination 
against non-Muslims'.768 She blames them for 'causing sectarian conflicts in Iraq and 
failing to run the state'.769 Academic Dr Akeel Abbas, who authored a book about the 
subject, regards sectarianism as one of the impediments to democratization. It 
resulted in sectarian strife which 'made people resort more to their sectarian 
identities, seeking protection in sect-based militias that are more trusted and 
effective than the state itself'.770 He explains that sect-based parties, by their nature, 
are 'not pluralistic and have in mind the interests of their sect followers' not all the 
citizens as modern parties have. He concluded that ‘sectarianism and tribalism are 
structurally anti-democratic’.771 
 
Hussein Al-Hindawi regards the current Iraqi state as sectarian, just like the previous 
one.772 MP Adnan Al-Janabi773, economist Bassim Anton774, academic Kamal 
Field775, Islamist politician Adil Abdur-Raheem776, former minister Sharwan Al-
Waeli777, former spokesman of IHEC, Dr Fareed Ayar778, MP Shorouq Al-
Abayachi779, MP Wahda Al-Jumaili780 who complained of Shia discrimination against 
Sunnis, MP Waleed Al-Hilli781, have all highlighted the negative influence of 
sectarianism on democracy and society as a whole. Writer Dr Abdulkhaliq Hussein 
described it as ‘entrenched’ and he reckons it may take a generation to disappear 
but he blames this on the Sunnis 'who found themselves no longer dominant in the 
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newly found democratic regime, while the Shia find themselves threatened by Sunni 
extremists'. 782  Dr Ayar says our current democracy is fragile because it is based on 
‘sectarian bigotry’. 783 
 
Kurdish writer, and former presidential chief of staff, Kamran Qaradaghi, blames 
‘sectarian polarization’ for deepening ‘the principle of belonging to the community, 
whether ethnic or sectarian, before belonging to the state’.784 Islamist politician Adil 
Abdur-Raheem, in his defence of religious parties, acknowledged their use of 
sectarian rhetoric although he charges that secular parties could turn to sectarian 
rhetoric'.785 Sharwan Al-Waelil acknowledges that sectarian loyalty is widespread in 
Iraq. He adds: 'religious and sectarian loyalty is harmful to the democratic process', 
and 'religious parties have exploited people’s religious and sectarian emotions'. ‘The 
citizen has reached a stage where he cannot compromise on the sectarian identity 
even though he is hungry, unemployed and his rights are taken away. This trend is 
harmful to society’ he declares.786  
 
MP Wahda Al-Jumaili lists ‘favouring sub-identities over national identity’ as an 
impediment to democracy and she blames it on the ‘failing of politicians’.787 
MP Miss Shorouq Al-Abayachi argues that electoral popularity is linked to a high 
tone of sectarianism.788 This explains why some candidates have increased the dose 
of sectarianism in their discourse during the elections. MP Hanan Al-Fatlawi went as 
far as saying she would like to see seven Sunnis (killed) in place of every seven Shia 
killed in fighting terrorism.789 She got over 90,000 votes in Babylon in the subsequent 
elections.790 
 
 Al-Abayachi has observed that the electorate in Iraq voted in the last four elections 
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on the basis of religious and sectarian loyalties. She singles out the elections of 
2005, although she admits the density of this trend has decreased in the elections of 
2010, but returned in full force in 2014.791 This is corroborated by Sherwan Al-Wa'eli 
who said sectarianism was very high in the election of 2014. 792  
Dr Al-Jumaili argues that sectarianism is back because of the weakness of the state 
and affirms sectarian loyalties were the basis of voting since 2005. MP Sami Al-
Askari admits sectarian agitation has been prevalent in Iraq since the fall of the 
Saddam regime and it has contributed to 'pushing the electorate into specific 
directions’.793   
Sectarian divisions have prevented the emergence of an Iraqi national leader who is 
able to unify the country and have a vision for the future. Ali Allawi states “The 
search for the will-o’-the-wisp, the Iraqi national leader, predictably got nowhere, 
there were only Shia, Sunni and Kurdish politicians, a smattering of self-styled 
liberals and secularists, each determined to push their particular agenda forward’.794  
Prominent Iraqi sociologist and author, Dr Ibrahim Al-Haidari, affirms sectarian 
loyalty always conflicts with loyalty to the national identity and constitutes an 
impediment to practicing democracy which requires a belief in pluralism and respect 
for the other. ‘Sectarianism impedes achieving democracy because it divides the 
national identity and breaks it up, while democracy unifies sub-identities in one 
national identity because it’s based on the concept of citizenship and respect for the 
other’.795 
 
Sectarianism is a form of group discrimination that contravenes the basic principles 
of democracy which are based on freedom of the individual and respect for the law. 
It constitutes a serious impediment to democracy and progress. If democratization is 
to succeed in Iraq, there must be a complete eradication of sectarianism from state 
institutions. This could have been done with some support from the democracy 
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sponsor, the US, back in 2004/2005.  
 
Parties should not have been allowed to form on the basis of sectarian identity and 
sectarian vocabulary should have been banned from the political discourse in the 
Transitional Administrative Law in 2004 and then the permanent constitution in 2005. 
It has become a lot harder now since it will need some concerted effort to rid Iraq of 
sectarianism which may not be easy especially when current sectarian forces are not 
prepared to give up their only weapon which they rely on to stay in power.  
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Chapter 9 
Lack of Democratic Tradition (Culture) 
 
Many people talk of the lack of democratic tradition as one of the reasons for the 
failure or lack of progress in the democratization process in Iraq. Others talk of the 
need to blend democracy with local values in order to make the new system familiar 
and more acceptable to people. Others say democracy is a new system and it has to 
be taken in its entirety since it’s indivisible. There is a valid argument for both views.  
 
Samuel Huntington predicted ‘democracy could become a dominant feature of the 
Middle East and North Africa in 1990s’.796 His prophecy didn’t materialise, although 
the Arab Spring broke out in the second decade of the 21st century. But even then, 
Huntington identified the obstacle for democracy in Islamic countries as ‘cultural’.797 
But he rejected the notion that certain cultures are permanent obstacles to 
development in one direction or another. He regards cultural obstacles as limited.798 
 
Iraqi sociologist, Ali Al-Wardi, saw democracy and democratic values, as ‘social 
rather than political virtues’.799 Al-Wardi emphasized the ‘disjointed’ nature of Iraqi 
society, but he was not ‘fatalist’ regarding the possibilities of change. Rather, he 
insisted that ‘no social or political project could succeed if it didn’t take a realistic 
account of the country’s history’800. Al-Wardi did come out in favour of a form of 
democracy based on both recognition of the country’s diversity and proportional 
representation. He maintained that ‘Iraqi people are divided against themselves and 
their sectarian, ethnic, and tribal struggles exceed those of any other Arab people 
and there is no way of resolving this condition better than adopting a democratic 
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system, where each group can participate in power according to its proportional 
number’.801   
 
Lebanese Islamic thinker and author, Hani Fahs, asserts that social realities must be 
taken into consideration when devising a political system.802 He invokes the 
experience of the late Lebanese religious leader Sheikh Muhammed Mehdi 
Shamsuldeen, Tunisian religious leader, Sheikh Rachid Al-Ghannouchi, and 
Sudanese religious leader, Sheikh Hassan At-Turabi who adapted their ideas to suit 
the local culture. ‘They realised the importance of accepting social realities’. 
Fahs expected the Muslim Brothers in Egypt to fail when they were in power, and 
this was on the record in September 2012. They were toppled by the army on 30th 
June 2013. He explained that 'they started doing all sorts of unacceptable practices'. 
He argues they introduced a culture that had no relation to the 'pluralistic Egyptian 
society where the Copts, Muslims and the non-religious, lived together'. 'If 
Muhammed Mursi cannot become president of all Egyptians, he should abandon 
politics altogether' Fahs declared. 
Fahs reveals that 'there are religious jurisprudents who do not abide by the 
conditions of their religious mandate. They want to interfere in the very fine details on 
whim'. 'A sultan, and by that I mean ministers, managers, governors, presidents and 
rulers, must not wear a (jubba)' he declares.803 He expected Iraqi Islamists to reflect 
what they have learnt in exile in their performance in government.  
In his criticism of the Iraqi experiment, former GC member, minister and 
ambassador, poet and writer, Samir Sumaidaie, cites 'the lack of democratic culture' 
among the political leaders and most of the electorate as an impediment. This makes 
it “democracy without democrats” he declares.804 Sumaidaie argues that a 
functioning, robust and durable democratic system cannot happen by chance but 
through evolution and struggle between forces with political power, which they do not 
wish to relinquish, and other forces which struggle to devolve political power and 
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make it accountable to the people. He affirms parts of the structure of the 
dictatorship (cultural, financial, and social) remained potent and resistant to the new 
order, which threatened their dominance. 
He insists that there is a need for a 'democratic culture' to prevail, not necessarily 
among the people, but at least among the ‘ruling elite’.805 It’s a valid point, but how 
can this be achieved in a democracy where the ruling class is elected by the people 
and they are bound to be of the same culture? Voters wouldn’t elect people of 
different culture. Culture does take a long time to form and it may develop in a way 
that is not necessarily conducive to enhancing democracy. 
 
Novelty of Experiment 
Mr Sumaidaie suggests a few steps to accelerate democratization such as: 
Organizing a democratic movement, pushing forward the process of education and 
enlightenment, launching an ideological battle with anti-democratic forces, 
encouraging openness to the world through travel and cultural and other forms of 
exchanges, and enlisting and leveraging the help of international organisations and 
interested world powers.  
If sectarian conflict in the region deepens, it will entrench sectarian forces in Iraq, 
while if the Iranian theocratic regime suffers from an internal crisis and collapses, it 
would have a positive impact on democracy in Iraq. If the situation in the Gulf, and in 
Saudi Arabia, in particular, changes dramatically, it would have a profound influence 
on the whole region.806 Sumaidaie's views sound well-thought out, but linking 
establishing democracy to reforming Islam means it may take a long time if it ever 
happens. 
Dr Faleh Abdul Jabbar defines the principles that govern impediments to democracy; 
‘democracy is based on the free choice of the individual and whatever impedes this 
freedom impedes democracy’.807 This must extend to the social, tribal, familial, 
religious and cultural restrictions imposed on individuals which restrain their electoral 
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choices. 
Islamist MP, Sami Al-Askari, also blames the slow progress of the democratization 
process on the novelty of the experiment 'after decades of dictatorship and 
oppression'.808 He goes a lot farther by saying 'our Islamic societies, Iraq is no 
exception, have not known anything but the culture of despotism through centuries. 
Freedom of expression was reserved for the strong only'.809 He affirms Iraqi society 
is dominated by tribal values and these values do not accord with the spirit of 
democracy and personal freedom.  
Al-Askari emphasises the need for freedom of expression to prevail first and in a 
gradual manner, benefitting from different factors, while it is 'getting freed from tribal 
and clerical restraints'. To him, democracy in Iraq existed 'in theory' over the last 8 
years where elections were free and voters did vote for candidates of their choice, 
except in some cases.  But he contends there are influential factors such as social 
structure and the novelty of democratic experience and the 'role played by the 
religious establishment in political and social life', have all contributed to 'pushing the 
electorate into specific directions which were designed earlier'. 810 
But Al-Askari argues this happens in any democracy. 'Talking of an electorate that 
makes its own choices without external influences is really academic' he asserts.811 
His last assertion is not supported by facts since the electorates usually examine the 
different political programmes and evaluate different political views before making 
informed voting decisions.  
Al-Askari admits that wealth and belonging to certain families do play an effective 
role in winning elections in Iraq. 'Elections are like a staircase where some people 
can climb but taking the staircase is not available for every one'. He again gives an 
example from the West. 'The rich in Western democracies are the ones who can get 
to decision making positions and prominent families in America inherit the 
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presidency and seats of Congress'.812 In the Iraqi context the last statement must 
mean that those who were able to snatch money and positions now will stay in 
power for generations since people in a democracy are influenced by money and 
familial prominence! This must also mean the current phenomena that came as a 
result of corruption, violence and despotism will have a lasting effect.  
It’s interesting that Al-Askari is talking about rich families in the US ‘inheriting’ the 
presidency and seats of congress when the incumbent US president, Barak Obama, 
comes from a very humble background with a foreign African father.  
Islamist MP Walid Al-Hilli blames the past political culture of despotism under the 
former regime for being an impediment to the progress of democracy. He also 
blames 'the racist feelings' of some people who are 'biased' against members of the 
other race.813  
 Al-Hilli insists that the biggest impediments to democracy, whatever the form of 
democracy he believes in, are 'education and culture' or the lack of them. He 
contends that the problem is 'the absence of the desire to understand the 
requirements for democratic mechanisms'. He reckons that many people didn’t 
understand democracy but 'they started singing democracy's praise according to 
their whim and not as it should be'. 
 Al-Hilli is hopeful that democracy in Iraq 'will develop in the future'. He doesn’t claim 
success, although his party, IDP, has been in power since 2005 and the last three 
PMs were members of it.  
 
Academic and writer Dr Kadom Shubber, states that tribalism in Iraq is 'deep-rooted' 
and it’s difficult to dismantle tribal networks, and the religious authority is revered, 
and this has led to elections resulting in a 'poor expression of the true popular will'.814 
Civil rights, he contends, are normally acquired…as a consequence of 'hard-fought 
struggles by those who demand them'. They are not given to them 'on a silver 
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plate'!815 He lists certain requirements for the success of a democratically-based 
political system. First, 'People need to recognise that the system is both necessary 
and fair, in order for them to be motivated to utilize it and respect its outcomes'. 
Second, top leaders 'must show flexibility and mutual respect for one another'. 'No 
political system is foul-proof, and loopholes might spring up any time. The onus is on 
societal leaders to find speedy remedies’. Third is the system must have proper and 
adequate safeguards. These involve legal and security elements designed to ensure 
the system’s smooth functioning, as well as adjudicate when disputes arise.816 
Those conditions, Shubber explains, do not exist in Iraq. He gives his reasons; 'this 
is a nation that had been ruled ruthlessly by a brutal dictatorship for over 30 years’. 
He cites ‘antiquated bureaucracy, no acceptable legal system nor transparent or just 
enforcement framework and violent state apparatuses’. Ordinary people have come 
to understand that the ‘only effective deterrent to malpractice, crime, corruption and 
other wrongdoing was harsh punishment or the prospect of it' he explains. Shubber 
contends that most Iraqis were 'ill-prepared' for the positive changes in their political 
system post 2003'. Also, the changes that came about 'became the target of some 
criticism from most ordinary people'.  
The president of the first electoral commission-(2004-2008), Dr Hussein Al-Hindawi, 
cites some historical and cultural hurdles to democracy in Iraq. ‘40 years of retarded 
totalitarian regime left its mark on Iraq’.817 He regards the Saddam regime as 
‘particularly bad’ in comparison with other totalitarian regimes such as Spain’s 
Franco who he described as ‘anti-communism and that’s it'.818 He credits Franco for 
establishing a real democratic system in Spain. 'He was a true believer in democracy 
but he thought the time wasn't right for it'. The last statement is controversial. Franco 
was a dictator who headed an authoritarian regime which, as we saw in Chapter 4, 
by its nature allows the development of democratic forces. 
Al-Hindawi, speaks of difficulties presented to Iraqi democracy by ‘the absence of 
democratic tradition’. He says it made it difficult for people to understand democracy. 
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'A blanket given to the voter by a candidate persuades him to vote for that 
candidate'. He describes such a voter as 'having no respect for his opinion'.819  But 
when people lack the basic necessities of life, such actions are not surprising. 
Hindawi highlights another cultural problem. ‘The political class has no respect for 
democracy'. 'There is no single person who has any respect for the concept of 
democracy among Iraqi politicians’ he contends. It’s a damning statement from the 
president of the first electoral commission who was tasked by UN with administering 
the democratic system. It’s difficult to establish a democracy when politicians do not 
respect it or believe in it. This is a real impediment.    
 
Al-Hindawi excludes one person of his sweeping statement. 'Perhaps Ahmed Al-
Chalabi has more understanding of democracy than others because he lived 
abroad'. But Chalabi never won an election on his own. He had to be part of an 
Islamist list to win a seat. Al-Hindawi is categorical that 'none of the elite who lived 
abroad is democratic; on the contrary, they think that democracy is a (deceit)'.820 
 
He explains that those who believed in democracy during the opposition era did that 
'because they were weak'. In other words, they did it because they wanted help form 
other countries for ‘toppling Saddam Hussein and establishing a democratic regime 
in its place’. They used democracy in their discourse because the world would 
sympathize with this cause. But once the dictator was removed, they went back to 
their old ideas. Hindawi’s last statement accords with Adam Przeworski’s view that 
not all who engaged in opposing the authoritarian regime are necessarily pro-
democratic. Some use the democracy slogan as a step toward 'devouring their 
authoritarian opponents and their allies in the struggle against the old authoritarian 
regime'.821  
Al-Hindawi reveals that among the Iraqi Diaspora, estimated to number 2-4 million, 
'most of those who went back to Iraq were the ones who lived in non-democratic 
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countries such as Syria and Iran'.822 This is largely true, since most people who 
immigrated to Western countries stayed there, with a few exceptions, largely 
politicians who travelled between Iraq and their new countries, and some others who 
couldn’t succeed in the west due to their lack of skills or understanding of language 
and culture. Very few among those who returned to Iraq were people who lived, 
worked and achieved in the West. But even those few who have retuned, ‘have 
actually lived in their own narrow societies and hence didn't understand the 
European experience' according to Hindawi.823 Many of those Hindawi referred to 
didn’t speak the language of the countries they lived in, nor did they understand their 
cultures. 
Former MP Dia Shakarchi has a long list of reasons for the difficulties the democratic 
experiment in Iraq is facing. The first impediment to democracy in his opinion is the 
absence, or the low level, of the requisite of democratic culture, which includes the 
'culture of citizenship'. ‘This culture, or awareness of it, denotes the feeling of 
belonging to the nation of Iraq, and also the belief in freedoms and equality and 
respecting other opinions’.824 He identifies another impediment and that is 'the 
culture of focusing on the role of the individual and the failure of the culture of 
institutional action to take root'. By individual he means the leader. Shakarchi is 
actually criticizing the absence of collective and establishmentarian action in Iraqi 
culture.  
He notes the absence of peaceful transfer of power in Iraq, even in the ranks of 
'democratic secular parties'. This sounds like a contradiction in terms since 
democracy stipulates the practice of ‘peaceful transfer of power’ to the winner in 
elections. But those secular parties which have made it their mission to introduce 
democracy to Iraq, have not practiced democracy within their parties to prove that 
they are democratic. Most party leaders have remained in their positions since their 
establishment as the mechanism to replace leaders has not been activated.  
Another problem Shakarchi highlights is 'double standards' which, he charges that 
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the political elite are 'infected' with it.825 He is also adamant that tribal, regional and 
sectarian loyalties do impede democracy.  
 
Adil Abdur-Raheem identifies the prevalent culture in Iraqi society as the culture of 
'religious, partisan, tribal, sectarian or regional loyalties'. He says 'Some candidates 
were chosen despite not possessing parliamentary qualifications'. 826 
The only criterion or 'qualification' in a democracy, however, is the choice of the 
people. What he means is that the candidates were not fit to be members of 
parliament. In other words, the wrong people were chosen due to the confusion, 
misinformation and the lack of clear political programmes. But this might also be 
attributed to the lack of awareness among the electorate. As for educational 
qualifications, the law in Iraq stipulates that no one can stand for parliament unless 
they possess an international Baccalaureate (successful completion of secondary 
school education).  
He identifies ‘'well-entrenched loyalty’ in Iraqi culture as a problem. 'It brings weak 
people to state institutions and is one of the factors that impede democracy'. What is 
meant by loyalty here is not political affiliation but sectarian, tribal and ethnic 
affiliation. He confirms that loyalty, be it religious, tribal, partisan or sectarian, 'was 
the basis for voting in the previous period'. 
 
Ali Allawi also cites cultural impediments to democracy. ‘The prevalence of tribal and 
patriarchal values that 'reduce the scope for individual action, thereby limiting or 
undermining one of the principal premises of democracy' he asserts. He also alludes 
to the idea of lack of democratic culture in Iraq. ‘Very few Iraqis have been steeped 
into the liberal democratic politics’ he declares.827     
He adds sectarian, tribal and regional affiliation or bias to the cultural values that 
impede democracy. These primordial identities 'overshadow the democratic 
process', he asserts. He agrees that hypocrisy by politicians and the electorate 
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necessarily has an adverse effect on the performance and efficiency of the political 
class.828 
 
Mr Sharwan Al-Wa’eli identifies a common problem which is Iraqi democracy is not 
indigenous. He argues it ‘was built abroad and this has led to real misunderstanding 
or misreading of the realities inside Iraq since the internal situation was not taken 
into consideration'. He identifies 'giving freedoms' too soon was no good and the 
transformation of the country 'by 180 degrees was done all over a sudden'. This, he 
contends, has made the Iraqi democratic transition 'immature'.829 
He contends 'the transformation from a centralized totalitarian system that had legal 
rules for everything to a chaotic system in every sense has led to distorting the 
understanding of democracy'. 'Standardised global views on democracy' were bound 
to fail in Iraq since democracy is not just ideas and procedures, in his opinion, but it’s 
a practice as well. His reading is that both the political class and the people had 
misunderstandings about democracy. For the political class, it’s 'monopoly of power', 
while the people need 'cultural concepts that raise their standard to the point where 
they can apply democracy in practice'.830 
Al-Wa’eli associates the exploitation of the electorate by politicians with poverty in 
the country. He charges that politicians played with the emotions of the electorate for 
political purposes. 'Political parties have exploited the citizen and his need to get a 
job and other simple needs, especially where 37% of the population is poor. 
Politicians have played with people's emotions and stole their votes''.831  With regard 
to tribal loyalty Al-Waeli notices it’s not strong in cities although it is still strong in 
villages.832 
Historical Example  
Maysoon Aldamluji laments that Iraq was given a 'strenuous opportunity to turn into a 
democracy' but the experiment has not been successful. 'In many aspects, Iraqis 
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today are not better off than they were before 2003'.833 Aldamluji lists poor historic 
examples of democratic tradition, absence of democratic institutions, weak judicial 
system and lack of vision among the ruling elite as obstacles to democracy.834  
She explains why a historical example is necessary for the establishment of 
democracy in Iraq: '‘Historic examples apply to all countries…that begin the process 
of democratization for the first time, not just Iraq. A nation builds up its democratic 
traditions through accumulating collective experience'.835 
Dr Fareed Ayar reserves a very different explanation about the suitability of 
democracy for Iraq. It’s especially significant when it comes from a member of the 
electoral commission that organized the first two elections and the referendum on 
the permanent constitution. Ayar is adamant that 'democracy is not an ideal idea for 
Iraq’. 'It’s a good system for those who appreciate what democracy is all about’. 
‘Therefore we need to specify the nature of the people or human groups where 
democracy is to be applied'.836 
Ayar does not hesitate to speak up. 'I believe democracy doesn’t benefit Iraq 
currently and we must find a new idea or a system other than democracy'. He must 
have damning evidence, which must have come after his 4-year stint with IHEC that 
made him reach this drastic conclusion. 
It was Fareed Ayar who explained it all for politicians on a personal level and to the 
public through the media and public meetings. Based on his study of the first 
elections held in Iraq, he asserts the application of democracy is neither 'good nor 
right in the sense it’s prevalent now'. 
One can sense anger, regret and disappointment pouring as he goes on to describe 
the electoral scene during the first two elections. While admitting that there is free 
press in Iraq now, Ayar argues the proliferation of the media 'doesn't lead to 
progress nor to guiding the people towards their basic issues because the channels 
are mostly religious and they broadcast material that soils the reputation of the Iraqi 
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people'. 837 
 Ayar has a point there since writers such as Jack Snyder also believe the media can 
play a role that is anti-democratic. Snyder states that the media provide political 
elites opposed to, or who feel threatened by, democratization, with the wherewithal 
to win the public over to their anti-democratic cause. He notes that the elites in newly 
democratizing states “often retain partial monopoly control over the media, and the 
market is divided into segments by national identity. This kind of imperfectly 
competitive market may yield the worst of both worlds. On the one hand, elites have 
no alternative but to compete intensely for the mobilization of mass support. On the 
other, by targeting captive ethnic or national market segments, they can avoid 
debating in a common forum where ideas are publicly and rigorously scrutinized by 
competitors and expert evaluators.”838 
Ayar makes clear that 'religious, ethnic and regional fanaticism flies in the face of 
democracy and impedes its application'.839 However, he disagrees with the current 
system which treats all voters on the same footing. He contends that people are not 
the same and, therefore, should not be treated in the same way. 'There are illiterate 
people who go to vote, and beside them stand educated people who are graduates 
of renowned universities. There is a huge difference between the two. How can they 
be equal?'840 
Notwithstanding Ayar’s insistence that this is not a matter of discrimination, this view 
clearly has no basis in democracy and flies in the face of international law and the 
principle of the citizens' fundamental equality of rights and duties under the law 
which constitutes the bedrock of the concept of citizenship.  
Ayar concludes that all these aspects of democracy, such as elections and 
parliaments, 'are of no benefit to third world countries presently because peoples are 
in need of a just rule associated with ruthlessness'. He marvels at the fact that in 
many cases ruthlessness seems to yield benefits for third world countries while 
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democracy does not. 
 
He doesn’t seem to question the legitimacy of the undemocratic regime he is 
proposing. 'That legitimacy comes through the ballot boxes alone is an incomplete 
statement’ he opines, ‘the brain boxes’ are the ones which bring legitimacy'.841 He 
argues the army should be given a role in cementing democracy, although he 
doesn't trust the current army which he regards as weak and blames democracy for 
this weakness.  
 
Effectively, Ayar’s argument stipulates that the consolidation of democracy depends 
in part on the role played by the army, but as democracy is consolidated, the army is 
enfeebled, and therefore the consolidation of democracy is weakened as a result. 
According to this reasoning, democracy appears caught in a vicious circle from 
which it cannot break free. 
 
Dr Ayar’s worst fear stems from the prospect of the breakup of Iraq. 'I reject division 
even if it comes through democracy in which my belief has been shaken'. He regards 
the reign of Brigadier Abdul-Kareem Qassim as the 'only the real democratic regime 
in Iraq'. 'The country,' he notes, 'was more beautiful, cleaner and better, and the 
people were comfortable'.842 Clearly, Ayar’s understanding of democracy differs 
hugely from reality. He associates democracy with successful policies and strong 
government and economy. Although this would be the aim of a democratic 
government but it may not be the end result.  Government failure doesn’t make it 
undemocratic.   
 
Undemocratic Culture  
According to John Rawls’ theory, there are three types of societies, depending on 
the political circumstances they live under, each of which needs a different 
approach.843 The first one is a society that is ‘well-ordered and its members 
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recognise a firm overlapping consensus of reasonable doctrines and it’s not stirred 
by deep disputes’. The second type is also ‘well-ordered’ but it’s subject to serious 
dispute with respect to applying one of its principles of justice. The third type is a 
society that is not well-ordered and where there are serious divisions about 
constitutional essentials when certain religious arguments were tolerated.844 Iraqi 
society must fall into the third category since it’s deeply divided and not well-ordered. 
Diamond-(2005) stated the existence of several issues that Iraqis were divided about  
and he described them as ‘different cultural groups’. 845  
 
Among the reasons that Dr Akeel Abbas lists for the partial failure of the democratic 
experiment is ‘a dominant, mainstream culture that is essentially undemocratic in its 
basic values and system of meaning’. Another one is ‘the weakness of civil society 
organizations and secular parties’.846  
He affirms tribal and sectarian affiliations or biases impede democratisation because 
'they feed into collective, hierarchal thinking, instead of individualistic thinking that is 
usually the basis of any genuine democratic process'. 
Dr Abbas regards tribal and sectarian affiliations as 'structurally anti-democratic', 
although he makes a clear distinction between them and regional, sub-national 
affiliations which he doesn't believe to be impediments to democracy. 
He points to the lack of knowledge or practice in Iraq of 'individualism and genuine 
respect for pluralism' which he considers as one of the 'fundamental pillars of any 
effective democracy'. 
 
Abbas contends the challenges to democratization in Iraq are 'primarily cultural'. 'The 
non-democratic culture will have to democratize to allow the emergence of a genuine 
democratic experience'. He advises that this requires reforms in the areas of 
education, law and state performance. 'It is a generational project that would 
probably take 20-30 years to materialize, if everything runs relatively well'.847   
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Dr Kamal Field sees progress through the idea of ‘good governance’. He agrees that 
tribal, sectarian or regional affiliations or biases, impede democratisation, but only if 
'the values of the tribe are contradictory to the values of democracy or good 
governance'.848 It’s established that biases of any kind do affect and impede good 
governance which depends on fairness, equality and transparency and this 
ultimately affects democracy. Field compares the influence of Iraqi political leaders 
on the political system with other advanced countries. 'In Iraq the personality of the 
political leader plays a role in creating the character of the political system. In 
advanced countries….leaders have a limited role in exploiting the leadership 
position'. 849 
Field contends that the 'general cultural and educational standards do not currently 
accord with the democratic option’ and this is one of the difficulties for democracy.850 
But isn’t this because voters felt they were under religious obligations to do so due to 
intensive campaigning by Islamists? If a breakthrough in education is the only 
possibility for democracy to succeed, religious education has been enhanced many 
folds under Islamists with so many religious schools and universities opening.851 
 
Dr Abdul-Khaliq Hussein blames the long decades of the despotic regime of Saddam 
Hussein for what he calls the 'chaos' which he says was inevitable after the collapse 
of the regime. He explains the current difficulties in historical perspectives and how 
other nations faced similar upheavals. He referred to the 'Thirty Years’ War [1618-
1648] in Europe' between Catholics and Protestants, which ended with the Treaty of 
Westphalia in 1648, where 'nearly 20% of the European populations were 
annihilated' in that war. He also referred to 'the sectarian wars' in Britain.852  
Despite this gloomy picture, a sense of optimism still seeps through as he observes 
that 'in the end, tolerance prevailed'. This prompts him to sound a hopeful note about 
the future of democracy as well as social and inter-communal peace in Iraq. 
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'Eventually, the Iraqi people will learn how to live together in peace, and come to 
cherish a democratic regime' he says. ‘But no one…knows how long this eventuality 
will take to arrive’ he reveals. 
One difficulty he alludes to, which is cultural. It’s the fact that 'the loser cannot accept 
defeat'. Still, he has an explanation for this. ‘That’s how democracy started in the 
West. Eventually democracy and acceptance of the results of elections have become 
an integral part of their cultures. Iraqi people are no different'. 853 
He asserts that democracy 'has never been born fully developed anywhere in the 
world and those who expected that Iraq would become Sweden or Britain 
immediately after Saddam’s downfall were mistaken'. 
Hussein stresses that democracy needs time to flourish 'particularly in a country that 
has no history of democracy prior to 2003'. It shows he also attaches importance to 
the prior existence of 'democratic culture'. 
Although he strongly believes there are cultural and religious obstacles to 
democracy, he is hopeful because 'the situation is not hopeless'. The problems Iraq 
is facing are not peculiar to Iraq, in his opinion. 'Almost all the great European 
democracies have faced such problems', he avers. He identifies Iraqi culture as 'a 
mixture of modernity and Bedouin [values]' coupled with the effects of sectarian and 
racial conflicts. He argues the 'pluralistic nature of Iraqi society' requires a 
democratic system. 854   
Adnan Al-Janabi explains that Iraq is a 'tribal society with “Bedouin” mentality which 
has no respect for representative governance'..855 This is selfless politics that a tribal 
sheikh who rallies his tribesmen to vote for him in elections, admits that tribalism is 
an impediment. Al-Janabi also regards regional affiliations or biases as hurdles to 
the development of democracy. 
Mr Bassim Anton argues that tribal, sectarian and regional loyalties do impede 
democracy and the evidence is 'many educated people didn't even get 10% of the 
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tribal voters'. He contends that secular parties are 'mostly fairer and more 
democratic' because 'they usually have high percentage of educated and cultured 
people among their membership'.856   
He doesn't believe the democratic transition has completely failed, 'the democratic 
culture has spread, even though in a distorted way sometimes'.857 However, he lists 
a few impediments which contributed to the partial failure of the democratic 
transition; among them is ‘the weakness of democratic culture (awareness or 
education). 
He argues that society, parliament and government ministries were divided on 
sectarian basis because most voters in the last three or four elections voted on the 
basis of their religious and sectarian loyalties. 
He points to the 'initial weakness of politicians and rulers at the beginning stages’, 
‘the sectarian division' of the Governing Council , 'the dominance of personal 
interests of politicians and rulers and financial and administrative corruption'.858   
MP Shorouq Al-Abayachi regards 'the patriarchal fatherly, tribal male mentality' as the 
most important cultural impediment that has been enforced through increasingly 
failed governmental policies since the beginning of the 1990s'.859 She also lists as 
impediments 'the collapse of the middle class and the disappearance of its civilized 
values', which acted like as 'nurturing environment' for the cultural and sectarian 
diversity. Al-Abayachi links democracy and tolerance to the existence of the middle 
class. 
She holds that the spread of illiteracy and ignorance in Iraq is due to the collapse of 
the educational institutions and the spread of poverty that’s responsible for creating 
this situation. She also blames wars, dictatorships and later sectarian conflicts for 
enforcing the attitudes and mentality she mentioned. Al-Abayachi also lists tribalism 
and regional loyalties among impediments to democracy. 'These sub-identities have 
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contributed to the loss of the Iraqi national identity'.860 She argues these loyalties 
have contributed to the enforcement of 'submission to the clerics and the clergy in 
general and to tribal and regional personalities', while real democracy 'depends on 
the spirit of citizenship and the horizontal extension of responsibilities according to 
competence and talents and based on equality between citizens without any 
consideration of their religious, sectarian and regional backgrounds'.861 
Dr Wahda Al-Jumaili, acknowledges the existence of tribalism but doesn’t regard it 
an impediment to democratization. She explains it was an option that people 
resorted to. ‘The nature of Iraqi people is tribal, and when the state is weak, the 
citizen resorts to any other refuge that can protect him which is the tribe, region or 
sect’.862  
Al-Jumaili contends the culture of society and politicians promotes a ‘central system, 
a ruling party and despotism’, so democracy is alien to Iraqi culture. Among the 
challenges to democracy in her opinion are the discord, division and weakness of 
social peace and favouring sub-identities over national identity’. She pins this on ‘the 
failing of politicians who are decision makers’.  
Kurdish writer, Kamran Qaradaghi, also attributes the failure to establish the 
institutions required for a democratic state, to the ‘absence of democratic culture’.863  
Economist Kamal Field avers there is an absence of 'the norms of coexistence' 
between people of different opinions or beliefs in Iraq. He explains this reflects the 
lack of equality in rights and duties.864  He regards this as an impediment to 
establishing democracy.  
Sociologist Ibrahim Al-Haidari believes democracy ‘cannot grow in a country where 
there are no democrats and democratic culture’! He states that ‘we still haven’t learnt 
democratic ethics and are not trained to practice it on sound basis and in a way that 
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contributes to our progress’.865 He identifies a serious social problem regarding 
democracy. ‘When an opportunity to exercise freedom arises, we quickly exploit this 
margin of freedom and democracy so that it turns into chaos. The individual only 
knows the negative side of freedom; that is the excessive audacity in speaking and 
acting, the taking of the right[s] by force without any regards for the state and the law 
and without respecting the [rights of the] different other. On the contrary, the other is 
insulted and exploited, and acts that reflect shallowness of culture and ethics are 
performed’ Al-Haidari contends.866 
He regards what he calls ‘Pastist culture’ as ‘parental, patriarchal, auditory, oral, non-
written’ and contends it ‘stands against democracy at the level of praxis because it is 
neither liberal nor informed’. He regards this as the reason why most of the electorates 
vote on the basis of their religious, sectarian, tribal, partisan affiliations as well as private 
interests. Furthermore, Al-Haidari contends that ‘the use of democratic mechanisms to 
hold elections in an atmosphere where individuals do not enjoy complete social/political 
awareness, nor self-independence, aborts the democratic process and facilitates the 
ascendance of non-democrats to power’. He attributes this to the ‘weakness of the state 
and the spirit of citizenship, the split identity and the non-development of real and 
effective democratic forces in society’. He argues it strengthens the tribal, sectarian and 
regional spirit and consolidates it at the expense of the homeland, citizenship and 
democracy. 
Al-Haidari has a final piece of advice. ‘We must learn about freedom, the individual’s 
independence and a real democratic culture, then we can practice them as values and 
behaviour in daily social life starting from the family, through civil society establishments 
which are independent of the state, till we reach the top of the pyramid of power. This is 
the only way to rid ourselves of backwardness, despotism, violence and terrorism. If 
democracy is a culture, then it must grow automatically and spontaneously and from 
within’.867 Samuel Huntington regarded the weakness of democratic values among key 
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elite groups as well as the general public a contributing factor to the first and second 
reverses.868 
In conclusion, as we have learnt above, democracy is alien to Iraqi culture, Iraqis are 
new to it and they need to learn about it in order to practice. It came to Iraqis all of a 
sudden and it requires some education in order to consolidate. This will take time. 
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Chapter 10 
Political and Administrative Errors 
1 
Deba’athification 
The Ba’ath Party-(BP)- had two million members; at least that’s what it claims and 
what the US has acknowledged.869 It’s true that most of them were not necessarily 
believers in its ideology nor enthusiastic for its policies, but under the rule of Saddam 
Hussein everyone needed to join BP in order to get on in life, get a job anywhere in 
the civil service or education or because he/she was coerced.870 Some joined to 
progress in their career or just to feel safe from persecution. In the army, everyone 
had to join. The same goes for education.871 Students cannot be admitted to certain 
universities and colleges unless they join BP; most of them did. The media 
profession was only open to Ba’athists.872 Only those who work in the private sector 
can escape joining because they didn’t need to, although they still had to show 
support in other ways. 
Even if 10% of the two million members were true believers, this amounts to 
200,000. It’s a huge number of people to alienate when you are trying to build a 
democracy from scratch. On 16th of April 2003, General Franks, the Commander of 
the US forces in Iraq banned BP in his ‘freedom message’.873 On the top of banning 
BP from political participation, Bremer signed Order number 1, the Deba’athification 
of Iraqi Society on the 16th May 2003. The order basically excluded the four top 
ranks of the party from holding any public sector jobs in the highest three layers of 
responsibility. He estimated the number to be 20,000 members and most of them are 
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Sunni Arabs.874 Larry Diamond estimated the number of Ba’athist affected by the 
decision to be between 30,000-50,000 individuals.875 He even thinks the final 
number is a lot higher. This created the feeling of discrimination since a particular 
section of society is hurt more than others. The instruction from the US Defence 
Secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, is that the order ‘must be carried out even if 
implementing it causes administrative inconvenience’.876 So, Americans expected 
inconvenience as a result of implementing this decree because most of state 
employees were Ba’athists.  
In addition, this was done without any consultation with Iraqis or political parties or 
professional bodies which may have given them a different advice. Bremer told his 
staff ‘we would engage ‘responsible’ Iraqis’ in the Deba’athification process. ‘We do 
not know Iraq as well as Iraqis do’.877 But this Iraqi ‘engagement’ was kept secret as 
no one knows who Bremer consulted, if he ever did. Later, Bremer acknowledged 
that banning Ba’athists from holding senior official posts was ‘a lot more than 
inconvenient’ since ‘senior Ba’athists had formed the leadership of every Iraqi 
ministry or military organization’.878  
In fact this policy caused chaos in Iraqi institutions, not only did it create enemies for 
the new regime within the Iraqi people, since there was almost no family that didn’t 
have a Ba’athist within its ranks. But it also caused hardship and discord among 
many people. Bremer admitted it was a mistake to let Iraqi politicians be in charge of 
the implementation of Deba’athification.879 Iraqi historian, Dr Kanan Makiya, called it 
‘unwise’. ‘It was by far wiser not to have banned BP after 2003 because of how many 
people had been members of it and because of the suspicion that would naturally fall 
upon anyone who had been a member, thus encouraging the politics of "settling of 
accounts," which turned out to be one of our biggest problems after the fall of the 
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regime because all the new leaders engaged in it on a very wide scale’.880 Former 
PM, Ayad Allawi, regarded politicizing Deba’athification as one of the reasons of the 
failure of democracy in Iraq.881  
Academic Akeel Abbas asserts this policy is ‘wrong-headed and counterproductive’ 
because ‘BP has some following among Iraqis who, if BP is barred from politics, will 
go unrepresented, potentially turning into a disgruntled and angry segment of 
society.’882 He adds this policy ‘sends BP to the world of the underground with 
potential resort to violence, instead of making it go away as the Deba’athification 
policy makers envisaged’. That’s exactly what happened. BP went underground and 
violent. Abbas adds ‘this has the effect of upsetting the democratic process in Iraq as 
the past 12 years have shown’. Abbas concludes that BP should be given the choice 
of disavowing violence, allowing the judicial system to prosecute its members 
accused of political crimes in fair trials, and, consequently, allowed to enter politics 
and only if it refuses should it be banned from entering politics.883   
Economist Kadom Shubber shares Abbas’s opinion that banning any party would 
force it to go underground, adding that this may ‘enhance their status in the eyes of 
the public’. He called for the establishment of ‘Truth & Reconciliation Commission’ 
which allows those who committed crimes to ‘repent’ and those affected by their 
crimes to ‘forgive them’. This way, ‘only a limited damage is done’.884 
Other intellectuals, such as Hussein Al-Hindawi, believe the principle to exclude BP 
was right but implementation was ‘riddled with mistakes, violations, arbitrary 
decisions, and sometimes self-interested exploitation’ that were met with ‘collusive 
silence from the judiciary’. He regards Deba’athification as a ‘political project, not a 
law, and herein lies the problem’. He concludes that the aim ‘should have been to 
ban BP since 2004 as a Fascist party opposed to democracy’. Al-Hindawi reveals 
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that Saddam Hussein’s brother, Barzan, had asked Saddam to dissolve BP after the 
invasion of Kuwait because he believed ‘it became harmful to the Iraqi people’. 885  
Academic Kamal Field believes there was some justification to ‘exclude BP 
immediately after 2003’ because the masses of the party were used directly and 
indirectly to repress Iraqis, especially those who belonged to other political parties. 
But he adds this ‘should have been reviewed after establishing the new political 
process in Iraq to give opportunities to all those who have not committed crimes to 
engage in normal life’ and this should have ideally been done in 2010 or at least in 
2014.886 
Maysoon Aldamluji, has a similar view. ‘Individual BP members who have not 
committed crimes, should have been allowed to stand in elections, but not the party 
as an institution that had monopolized political life in Iraq and manipulated all 
government and nongovernment institutions for its interests’.887 But she brings in 
another factor. ‘External interferences made the elections unequal’. She points out to 
another problem which is ‘the absence of law for political parties’ in all the previous 
elections.888 Political Parties Law was only passed in late 2015. She concludes by 
stating that there was enough justification for excluding BP in the first and second 
elections. But this needs to be reviewed since ‘crimes have diversified and they are 
no longer exclusive to BP’. She affirms ‘ending Deba’athification will bring some 
stability to the country’.889  
Sociologist Faleh Abdul-Jabbar contends it’s fair to exclude BP from the political 
process because Ba’athists deprived others from their rights. ‘They bear moral 
responsibility, even those who were not in positions of responsibility’.890 This sound 
harsh if we take into considerations what went on in other countries which 
democratised after the fall of one-party rule.  
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Sociologist Ibrahim Al-Haidari agrees that banning BP left the new regime with so 
many enemies, but he believed it was necessary. He blames Iraq’s problems past 
and present on ‘the heavy legacy of BP and its ideology’. But he qualifies his 
approval of the banning. ‘This type of banning needs an alternative social and 
political philosophy and a real national democratic project, not sectarian power-
sharing’. Since he is German-educated, he knows the German experience of 
Denazification well. He believes it was right and successful, but attributes this to the 
establishment of a ‘constitutional system that is based on respect for the law and 
supports the reconstruction of what was destroyed in the war’. He alludes that this 
doesn’t exist in Iraq, thus, Deba’athification was bound to fail.891  
Samir Sumaidaie agrees BP should be banned because it didn’t believe in 
democracy. The Ba’athists, ‘by their words and deeds, declare themselves as having 
the absolute right to lead. It is the "leading party".  Its legitimacy is based not on 
elections but on "revolutionary legitimacy"’. Sumaidaie believes BP shouldn’t be 
allowed in Iraqi politics even if its members declared their belief in democracy 
because it would be ‘a totally different animal. It cannot be the Ba’ath Party’.892 But 
Sumaidaie goes further than this; ‘argument about BP applies to Islamist parties’. 
‘They should be barred from the democratic process because they aim to use 
democracy to reach power and then utilize it to destroy democracy. Their ideal 
model is (one man, one vote, one time)’.893  
Activist Hashem Ganem believes that the political dynamics would have been 
enhanced if BP was invited to contest the first post 2003 elections.  ‘All of Iraq’s ills 
would have been leveled at its doorstep during electioneering’. He reckons that BP 
‘would have not won any seats in parliament, and if they did, it would've been a 
miserly number of seats’. Ganem believes that allowing BP to partake in the first 
elections post 2003, would have shown maturity and inclusiveness, which would 
have been a stunning political maneuver, and a serious step towards reconciliation. 
But he admits that ‘it would have been inconceivable for BP to join the political fray 
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and would have made the same ludicrous demands to return to power, reinstate 
Saddam, the US to compensate for the war damage and called for Jihad.  Then all 
consequential violence would have been identified so clearly as theirs’.894 
Ayad Jamaluddeen, a Shia cleric and MP-(2006-2010)-called for dialogue with BP 
and allowing those Ba’athists ‘whose hands have not been stained with the blood of 
the Iraqi people’ to participate in the political process. He in fact called for ‘forcing’ 
the Iraqi government to conduct a dialogue with the Ba’athists in order to save the 
blood of Iraqis’. He told Asharq-Alawsat newspaper ‘it’s a conflict over power 
between two groups. The one in power now who got there via American tanks and 
another one that lost power through American tanks’.895   
Most Iraqis as well as politicians and security experts across the world blame the 
security deterioration on Ba’athists or remnants of the previous regime which are 
known to be fighting alongside terrorist organizations such as ISS.896 This is largely 
caused by their exclusion from political participation.  
Examples from other democratic transition: In Spain, all parties were allowed to 
participate in the elections, including the Communist Party which was banned under 
Franco, and more controversially, Herri Batasuna (HB), a party that advocates 
independence and ‘revolutionary change in the Basque Country and doesn’t hide its 
sympathy and indirect support for ETA terrorists’.897 HB managed to get some 
representation but it was contained politically.  
 
Spain allowed even anti-democratic forces such as Fuerza Nueva. It’s a neo-fascist 
group that was allowed to participate in the 1979 election in which it only attained 2.1 
percent of the total vote, electing only one deputy and disintegrated as a political 
force soon afterwards.898  Even Antonio Tejero, the general who participated in a 
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coup in 1981, was allowed to run a party, Solidaridad Espanola, from his jail in the 
1982 election. He only won 0.13% of the total votes. ‘Democracy doesn’t mean that 
every citizen supports democracy, nor that anti-democrats should not enjoy 
democratic freedoms for legal and nonviolent activities’.899   
Juan Linz & Alfred Stepan (1996) state that ‘the defence of democracy is the duty of 
democratic parties and leaders and ultimately of the voters, making possible 
government by democrats’.900 Separatists’ violence increased considerably in Spain 
during the transition to democracy, but this didn’t stop the democratic leaders from 
including anyone in the democratic process.   
In Argentina for example, they dealt with the issue of the crimes of members of the 
former regime by dividing those potentially guilty into three categories: 
1-Those who gave orders to violate human rights 
2-Those who carried out the orders 
3-Those who engaged in human rights violations beyond the actions they were 
ordered to take  
Categories 1&3 were indicted and tried, while those in category 2 would be tried only 
if they knew that the orders were illegitimate.901  
In Poland, there was no barring of any party. In fact the Communist and Peasant 
parties, which were allies during the previous regime, won an absolute majority in the 
election of September 1993 and could have theoretically drafted and passed the 
constitution in parliament unilaterally.902  
In Hungry, there was low societal demand for revolutionary purges, and ex post facto 
justice was substantially low. Most of the technical experts, and even judges, were 
considered usable by the new democratic government.903 Even when parliament 
passed a ‘qualified purge law’ the constitutional court overturned it. There was a 
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‘lustration law’ passed in 1993, but it was restricted to those who played a coercive 
role in the 1956 revolution.904    
There are of course understandable reasons for this tolerance and perhaps it has to 
do with the fact that the Communist, at least the moderate faction, had played a role 
in making the transition possible, especially in the round table negotiations with the 
moderates of the opposition, which led to the transition. Both sides realised that they 
could not triumph alone, they both recognised the depth of the social and economic 
crisis and feared that the repeat of the 1956 would do harm to their future.905 This 
sort of understanding and responsible position was not possible in Iraq, and that is 
also understandable in the light of the suppression and repression that the Ba’athist 
practiced during their 35-year-rule. Neither BP, nor the influential opposition parties 
which came to power after the US invasion, perhaps with the exception of INA led by 
Ayad Allawi, a former Ba’athist himself, had any room for compromise nor a space, 
no matter how small, of mutual trust.  
The lack of cooperation is also due to the nature of the change, which was done by a 
foreign invasion. There were no negotiations or any understanding between the two 
acrimonious sides which remained locked in their historical animosity at the expense 
of the strength of Iraqi state and the project of democracy.  Even Iraqi opposition 
parties which came together to form a leadership council and later participate in a 
coalition government lacked serious cooperation as the US civil administrator of Iraq 
stated.906  
Many in Iraq disagree with the Deba'athification law (now called the Accountability 
and Justice), for their different reasons. Former Ba'athists oppose it because it has 
deprived them of participating in the political life and management of the country as 
well as excluding a large proportion of them form earning a living as state 
employees. Sunni politicians disagree with the very principle of political exclusion 
and have called for abolishing the law and the removal of all its consequences. They 
also believe it was applied in a sectarian way since it targeted them more than 
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others.  
 
In addition, many Shia disagree with it on a matter of principle as we saw earlier, and 
even those who believe it was right to introduce it, such as Paul Bremer, Ibrahim Al-
Haidari, and Hussein Al-Hindawi, say there were serious errors in its application. 
Others, such as Maysoon Aldamluji, Kamal Field and Akeel Abbas, believe it’s time 
to depart from the politics of exclusion.  
Deba’athification alienated a large portion of Iraqi society from the political process 
and barred the most experienced managers from participating in building the new 
state. It was unfair and it established a precedent for an unfair treatment of the state 
to a section of its population. This has weakened both the state and democratization 
and caused discord among Iraqis and contributed to the destabilization of the 
country. It has become a serious impediment that has to be removed if 
democratization is to succeed in Iraq. 
2 
Disbanding the Iraqi Army and police 
The second order that the US civilian administrator had issued was an order to 
disband the Iraqi army. The 715,000 men-strong Iraqi army, together with other 
security apparatuses.907 One US official commented on this decision ‘that was the 
day we made 450,000 enemies in Iraq’.908 Larry Diamond estimates that over a 
million more people would be affected if their dependents were counted.909 That 
decision created massive unemployment and unnecessary hostility to the new 
regime among so many people.  
Had the army remained in place, or called up to duty under a new command after the 
fall of the regime, it would have acted as a formidable force to enforce law and order 
and give the state the reverence it needed among the population. Instead, US and 
Iraqi officials and institutions relied on private security companies where there have 
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been an estimated 30,000 private contractors working in Iraq in 2004.910 According 
to some data, this number has increased in later years and the number of Pentagon-
funded contractors in Iraq was 162,428 in July 2008.911  
The old Iraqi army, as Bremer acknowledged,’ had some true professionals, and 
partly for that reason, was distrusted by Saddam’.912  But it was ‘self demobilized’ 
according to the Pentagon after the fall of the regime.913 ‘At liberation, there was not 
a single Iraqi military unit standing intact anywhere in the country’.914 The American 
plan that Gen. Jay Garner was going to implement after the fall of the regime was 
apparently not to keep the army in place. They planned to employ most of Iraqi 
soldiers, some 400,000 ‘Shia soldiers’, in construction projects in order to get a living 
wage.915  Later on, Bremer acknowledged the need for an Iraqi army; ‘we have to 
find some place in Iraqi society for former soldiers’.916 But he admitted that bringing 
back the old Iraqi army would ‘run against major policy and practical obstacles’.917 In 
fact he called it ‘Saddam’s army’ and considered it as part of the instruments of 
repression, alongside the infamous Mukhabarat security services and BP.918   
Security in Iraq was almost non-existent after the fall of the regime and the 
disappearance of its security apparatuses, including BP, which had a security role. 
There was almost no presence to be felt for a government in the country, with the 
exception of US tanks and troops who didn’t actually perform any policing duties, nor 
were they trained or qualified to do so. This was acknowledged by US officials, who 
realised later the need for Iraqi police officers to go back to their posts as well as 
bringing in US military police to guard Iraqi police stations. Around mid May 2003, 
over a month after the fall of the regime, Paul Bremer, asked the US deputy 
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commander, General John Abizaid, to send more military police (MP) to perform 
security duties as Bremer put it.919  Bob Gifford, US advisor to the Iraqi interior 
ministry, had explained the deteriorating security situation in the country to the new 
administrator. ‘Whatever law and order that existed under Saddam has broken down 
completely’ Gifford told Bremer in his first meeting with him in May 2003.920  
After April 9th, chaos and looting was the order of the day and world media had 
widely reported the looting that took place across Iraq. US Secretary for Defence, 
Donald Rumsfeld, was alarmed by the numerous reports of looting and violence 
which overtook any other news on the US victory in Iraq. But Rumsfeld dismissed it 
as just ‘Henny Penny. The sky is falling’.921  
 
But it was a fact; chaos and looting were widespread across Iraq. According to Iraq’s 
former defence minister, Ali Allawi, ‘nearly every ministry and state institution, 
including the national museum, were looted and then burnt down’.922 Looting was 
unchecked for at least three weeks, according to Gifford. ‘It had destroyed many of 
the government buildings in Baghdad. Only the Oil Ministry was spared because 
American troops had been ordered to guard it’.923 
The Iraqi police were nowhere to be seen in the streets. ‘They disappeared, like the 
army’ Gifford said.924 Violent crime was increasing including armed robbery, 
kidnapping, sexual assaults and murders. The criminals were armed with heavy 
weapons such as RBGs and AKs since all buildings associated with the army and 
intelligence agencies were looted and demolished across the country according to 
Gifford.925  Disbanding the Iraqi army left a dangerous security void that was quickly 
filled by enemies of the new political order.926 Even the UN compound, in the Canal 
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Hotel, was lightly-protected. This lack of security caused the UN to move its mission 
to Jordan after it was bombed on 19th August and 22 of its staff, including UN envoy, 
Sergio de Mello, were killed. 927 That was a serious setback in the efforts to establish 
a democratic system in Iraq.  
The US forces in Iraq were insufficient to keep the peace in the country. Estimates 
by military experts such as Gen. Eric Shineski, put the number of troops required to 
pacify and control Iraq properly at 500,000.928 In fact Paul Bremer himself admitted 
ten years later that the US made strategic mistakes in Iraq; one of them was keeping 
insufficient number of troops. He estimated the required number to be 400,000.929  
 
More troops would have improved security in Iraq and at the same time made it 
easier for pro-democracy forces to have a better chance of succeeding in their 
efforts to establish a viable democracy and enhance their positions in the new order. 
According to Ali Allawi, ‘A larger force would have given the coalition’s local proxies 
the wherewithal to at least face up to the challenge of the Islamists more 
forcefully’.930 Islamists filled the vacuum left after the fall of the regime, and ‘nearly all 
administrations that had been put in place after the war in southern cities and Sadr 
City in Baghdad, fell apart and power seeped to the newly emergent Islamists and 
their local allies’. 931 
With high crime rate, no effective government that can enforce law and order and the 
existence of many power centres supported by armed militias, it’s really difficult to 
establish democracy since ‘a democratic government needs to be able to exercise 
effectively its claim to the monopoly of legitimate use of force in a territory’.932  
Paul Bremer acknowledged this difficulty. ‘We are not going to rush into elections 
since Iraq has none of the mechanisms needed for elections- no census, no electoral 
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laws, no political parties and all the related structure we take for granted’.933 
However, the US did proceed with elections on 30th Jan 2005 without achieving any 
of the above requirements that Bremer stated from the outset.  
Bremer, comparing Iraq to Germany and Japan, admitted that the US and its allies 
have not taken a job this big ever since the end of WW2.934 He also acknowledged 
the need for political structures for democracy to work. ‘Let’s keep in mind the 
lessons of Germany and Japan. Democracies do not work unless the political 
structures rest on a solid society… political parties, a free press an independent 
judiciary, open accountability for public funds. These are society’s shock absorbers. 
They protect the individual from the state raw power.’935 It’s clear that the necessary 
ingredients for democracy to stand up were not there.  
America’s Iraqi allies were weak due to the lack of US forces to back them up, while 
their Islamic rivals were strong with armed militias to establish their authority. 
Although the US had warned Islamic militias not to enter Iraq and get organised 
forces and if they did they would be treated as combatant936, that warning was not 
heeded, they did get organized forces, although ‘they remained undetected by 
officials appointed by the occupying authorities’.937 Why were the US forces unable, 
or perhaps unwilling, to detect those organised forces is another mystery, but it’s a 
failing by all accounts.  
 
Professor Ahmed Hashim is critical of the US counter-insurgency campaign and he 
blames it for playing “a key role in the outbreak and perpetuation of the 
insurgency.”938 He accused US decision-makers of “rigid and inflexible ideological 
approach” which undermined the chances of implementing policies vital in any 
successful counterinsurgency strategy. Policies such as measured reactions and 
minimal use of force, political responses, integrated civil-military operations and 
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rectitude towards civilians and prisoners have been largely absent from the US 
efforts to suppress the insurgency. 
Disbanding the Iraqi army was a blunder with disastrous consequences on the 
political process and was clearly an impediment to establishing a strong democratic 
system with the tools to enforce law and order and support a democratic government 
strong enough to impose its authority on all citizens and treat them on equal basis. It 
left the state very weak while Islamist parties, all of which had armed militias, were in 
a very strong position. They became the only political broker in the country with the 
tools to enforce their agenda and the ability to protect the areas they control and 
impose their will on the whole country in the end.  
 
People could clearly see that the only political forces on the ground with real power 
were the Islamists. This persuaded them to deal with them, accepting their authority 
and voting for them in elections. As we have established earlier in the study, Islamist 
do not necessarily believe in democracy nor in a modern state. They look up to Iran 
for emulation and support, not western democracies. 
 
3 
Unsuitable Electoral System 
The first Iraqi electoral system according to which the first elections were conducted 
was proportional representation (PR) where the whole of Iraq was one constituency. 
But the system was changed in the National Assembly after Islamists won the 
elections to multiple constituencies but with stipulations to guarantee representation 
for minorities. PR is the ‘most widely used set of electoral systems in the world, and 
its variants can be found at some level of government in almost every country 
(including the United States, where some city councils are elected using forms of 
PR)’.939 
                                                            
939
  Charles King-George Town University-(2000): 
http://faculty.georgetown.edu/kingch/Electoral_Systems.htm  
257 
 
 
The electoral system was changed several times but the changes were all in favour 
of big parties who are able to basically send unelected persons to parliament while 
those who get thousands of votes do not become members of parliament. This has 
made it very difficult for small parties and political minorities to get any 
representation at all. The list led by Mr Sharwan Al-Waeli, got three seats in the local 
elections in the province of Thiqar, because the electoral system was Saint Lague 
(SL), but the same list failed to get any representation in the national elections of 
2014 because they were conducted according to Modified Sainte Lague (MSL).940  
Reidar Visser, a political analyst and researcher, says ‘modified Sainte-Laguë “gives 
bigger parties more advantages than a pure Sainte-Laguë would give’. In addition, 
he believes that Iraq ‘has created its own version of modified Sainte-Laguë’.941 
Mr Al-Wa'eli calls for more enforceable regulations for elections in order to commit 
candidates and parties to abide by the law. The 'current law states that no religious 
symbols, photos, places of worship or state institutions can be used for electoral 
purposes'. But these conditions were all violated, he says. 'Some parties spent 
billions (of Iraqi dinars) and no one asked them where they got the money from'.942  
 
Many politicians and intellectuals are calling for a new electoral system that only 
allows secular parties to operate believing this to be in the best interest of the 
country. Dr Akeel Abbas affirms ‘an electoral system that includes only secular 
parties is definitely better for the country. Without secular parties that transcend 
sects and ethnicities, Iraq will continue to be prey to sectarian and ethnic strife. Sect-
based parties, by their nature, are not pluralistic and have in mind the interests of 
their sect followers’.943 Bassim Anton argues an electoral system that ‘allows only 
secular parties to be active in politics is better for the country than a system which 
permits religious parties which might appeal to religious sentiment or provoke 
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sectarian loyalties’.944  
 
Dr Kadom Shubber, who styles himself as ‘Islamic liberal’ is also critical of the 
electoral system which he says ‘gave the impression of being half-baked and 
primarily benefiting those already clinging to political and financial power’.945 He 
blames the 'backwardness' of the electorate who have 'little sense of the major 
factors such as economic variables, international relations, public services, 
education, and the security problem'. This has led to voting practices being 
influenced by the “big boys” and these were party bosses, religious scholars or tribal 
chiefs, he avers. 
Some electoral systems such as First Past the Post (FPP), generates ‘unearned 
majorities out of minority electoral support’.946 MSL, as applied in Iraq, allows non-
elected persons to represent people in parliament while it excludes popular 
individuals from representing their constituents. Jassim Al-Hilfi, a candidate for the 
Civil Democratic Alliance-CDA), got over 16000 votes in Baghdad in 2014, yet he 
didn’t become an MP, while others made it to parliament with just 2000 votes.947 Mr 
Al-Hilfi is now campaigning to reinstate the PR system in cooperation with ST ‘in 
order to put an end to the current unjust law that was enacted to benefit only the 
large blocs’ as he told Al-Monitor magazine.948 
Since the first elections of 2005, the electoral system was changed in every election 
and big parties manipulated it in their favour. They have sent candidates to 
parliament who haven’t won while others who have got thousands of votes were 
barred by the system such as Ms Haifa Al-Ameen in Thiqar and Mr Jassim Al-Hilfi in 
Baghdad, both belonging to the secular CDA.949 The electoral system is clearly an 
impediment to democracy since it’s not perceived as fair by large sections of the 
political society, especially smaller parties, and it doesn’t give people in the 
                                                            
944
  Ibid, p101 
945
  Ibid, p40 
946
  Przeworski-(1991)-op.cit.p28 
947
  Mithal Al-Aloosi- CDA’s number of Seats isn’t Fair-Alghad Press-20/5/2014: https://goo.gl/YQCP5I  
948
  Omar Sattar-Al-Monitor-10/10/2016: https://goo.gl/X0ZO7G  
949
  IHEC-election results-2014 
259 
 
 
opposition any hope of winning in the future. Secular INC, for example, had to join 
forces with Islamist SIIC, RT, ST and IFP in order to win. PR system is perceived to 
be fairer and it allows people across the country to vote for their preferred list. It also 
promotes a national agenda rather than regional or sectarian one.  
 
4 
Partisan Election Commission (IHEC) 
Many in Iraq accuse IHEC of being biased since all its members are appointed by 
major parties. The former president of IHEC, Dr Hussein Al-Hindawi, asserts that 
IHEC is now controlled by political parties and this distances ‘the democratic process 
from propriety and integrity’.950  
Former national security minister, Mr Sharwan Al-Waeli, who leads an election list, 
asserts that partisan electoral commission cannot be fair. He charges that ‘vote-
rigging took place in the last elections more than any other elections and I am a 
witness to it’. He attributes this to a weak electoral commission. ‘When the electoral 
commission becomes strong and not subject to blackmailing, it would not matter 
even if the governing party is contesting the elections’. 951 
 
He is skeptical about IHEC’s independence. ‘The loyalty of IHEC’s members was to 
the influential parties who are participating in the government, that’s why IHEC is 
now restricted’. He regards the first IHEC (of which Dr Hindawi was the president 
and Dr Ayar a spokesman) as stronger and more independent because it was 
formed by the UN. 952   
Dr Faleh Abdul-Jabbar regards independent commissions as part of the new division 
of authority in modern countries, added to the classical division of authority. ‘This is 
the power of independent commissions’. He blames the Iraqi Federal Court for 
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effectively ‘abolishing’ the independent commissions and regards this role as 
‘disabling to democracy’.953  
Sami Al-Askari believes IHEC was never Independent. ‘Once it got out of the control 
of UNAMI and US embassy, it entered into partisan quotas. IHEC’s former and 
current members were candidates of political blocs and they represent the interests 
of their blocs when taking decisions’.954 Hamdya Al-Husaini was an IHEC 
commissioner for two terms (2004-2012).955 She is now MP for the Citizen’s List. 
Qassim Al-Abboudi, was IHEC commissioner 2008-2013.956 He is now MP for Badr 
Organization which is part of SoL.957 Faraj Al-Haidari was the IHEC’s president-
(2008-2012).958 He was a member of KDP.959  
Przeworski (1996) states that ‘democratic institutions must be 'fair': they must give all 
the relevant political forces a chance to win’... they must also be effective: ‘They 
must make even losing under democracy more attractive than a future under non-
democratic alternatives'.960 The current IHEC is neither fair to all, because it’s 
partisan, nor effective because it has not prevented vote-rigging.  
Since Iraq has a diverse society, ethnically, culturally and religiously, as well as 
deeply divided on major issues, elections must be conducted in the highest possible 
degree of transparency and integrity in order to strengthen people's trust in the 
results of elections and adherence to the laws and regulations. This requires an 
IHEC that is not only really independent, but also seen to be independent by 
participants and voters alike.    
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5 
Ambiguous & Rigid Constitution 
The constitution was written and ratified in six months and many experts believe it 
was rushed and not conducive to democratic consolidation due to ambiguities, 
contradictions, vagueness and religious, ethnic and administrative restrictions. 
Although constitutions are generally compromises between political parties and 
obstacles can be overcome if there is a political will, they can be problematic if 
society is deeply divided.   
The Iraqi constitution was written after it was clear that the power relations between 
different political groups were in favour of the Islamists who had won massively and 
were, thus, able to include what they wanted in it. Stable constitutions are the ones 
written when the power relations between different political forces are not settled in 
favour of some forces at the expense of others. These constitutions are likely to 
emphasize rights of minorities and give guarantees to potentially weak political 
forces and reduce the stakes of competition. They are more likely to induce losers to 
comply with the outcomes of the democratic interplay and are more likely to be 
stable constitutions.961 
Faleh Abdul-Jabbar contends that the current constitution is an impediment to 
democratization. 'Many articles in the constitution impede democracy… article (2A) 
that says ‘No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of 
Islam’ contravenes another article (2B) which says 'No law may be enacted that 
contradicts the principles of democracy’. Abdul-Jabbar finds it bizarre that the 
constitution has a stipulation that forbids the issuing of laws that contravene Islam.  
He charges there is a legal vacuum in the constitution since there are at least 58 
articles that need to be regulated by law. Abdul-Jabbar, with 19 other writers, have 
written a book in Arabic which discusses the problems in the constitution.962 On a 
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positive note, Abdul-Jabbar argues the constitution would have been more extreme if 
it was left to Islamist parties to write, but ayatullah Sistani stood in their way.963 
Dr Akeel Abbas argues article 2(A&B) is self-contradictory because ‘it tries to 
reconcile irreconcilable contradictions’.964 ‘Democracy and religion belong to 
diametrically opposed orders of reality’. ‘The former is based on debate and 
questioning that leads to following the opinion of the majority, while protecting the 
rights of the minority whereas the latter is based on holy texts that accept no debate 
or questioning and pay no attention to the opinions of the majority or minority’, he 
explains. He is confident the article ‘causes conflict instead of establishing balance.  
 
It also gives a disproportionate role to the clergy as the interpreters of religious texts, 
whereas there are no codified democratic ideas or texts that can be resorted to’. 
Hussein Al-Hindawi argues the group the Americans handed power to, or those they 
dealt with, ‘were totally ignorant in law, even in Islamic law’. None of them was like 
(Ayatullah) Hussein Na’eeni who proposed a constitution to limit the authority of the 
ruler’.965  
Ayad Allawi regards the constitution as an impediment of democracy. ‘It was written 
in 2-3 months and an authoritarian regime is developing out of this democracy’ he 
charges.966 Maysoon Aldamluji reveals that on a number of occasions, Islamist 
parties attempted to impose Islamic rulings, like banning the sale of alcohol or 
replacing the Personal Status Law with Islamic jurisdiction (Sharia). ‘Every time they 
did this, they used clause-(A) of article-2 of the constitution as reference. Clause-(B) 
of article-2 was no deterrent, as there is no text to refer to’.967 Only public resistance, 
backed by the Marji3iya in Najaf, stopped those attempts. Imposing Sharia law on 
the country is not democratic nor is restricting people’s rights and freedoms.  
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Abdul-Khaliq Hussein believes the constitution is democratic but with defects.968 
Bassim Anton regards the constitution as one of challenges facing democracy 
because it is brittle and vague and this ‘renders it subject to different 
interpretations’.969 Sami Al-Askari, who was a member of the National Assembly that 
wrote and approved the constitution, acknowledges there are restrictions imposed on 
the constitution, but they are ‘an embodiment of the culture of society in its current 
stages. On the one hand it preserves the constant features of Islamic culture, and on 
the other, it is committed to the criteria of the democratic system’.970  
 
Dia Shakarchi, who was a member of the constitutional drafting committee in the 
National Assembly, says the gap between him and members of UIA was widening 
due to ‘their strict Islamism and their insistence on emphasising their Shia sectarian 
identity and their attempt to add as much as they can of religious and sectarian 
colour to the constitution’.971 Constitutions that are observed and last for a long time 
are those ‘which reduce the stakes of political battles. Pretenders to office can 
expect to reach it while losers can expect to come back’.972 Napoleon was alleged to 
have said that constitutions that can last are the ones which are ‘short and vague’. 
They only ‘define the scope of the government and establish the rules of competition 
leaving substantive outcomes to the political interplay’.973 But the Iraqi constitution 
was clear regarding restrictions but ambiguous with rules and rights.  
It is difficult to amend the constitution since this requires consensus among the three 
main components (Shia, Sunni and Kurds). Any constitutional amendment requires 
the non-opposition of two thirds of the electorate in three provinces according to 
article 142-fourth.974 This would be very difficult requirement to meet. This stipulation 
was inserted by the Kurds in the TAL. It was also adopted in the permanent 
constitution. It may be advantageous for the Kurds, it blocks any amendment they 
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disapprove of, but it’s a disadvantage for the country.  
 
Successful democracies are those where the institutions make it difficult to fortify a 
temporary advantage. 975 This advantage that the Kurds have gained during times of 
disunity and ambiguity is being fortified by this stipulation in the constitution which 
makes it almost impossible to amend the constitution since the Kurds would never 
agree to removing it.  
A stable democratic government must have two opposing characteristics. It must be 
'strong enough to govern effectively but weak enough not to be able to govern 
against important interests'.976 
It’s clear that the current Iraqi constitution is one of the impediments to the 
consolidation of democracy because it is advantageous to the Kurdish minority and 
Islamists parties. It cannot be amended and it has articles that threaten civil liberties 
and freedoms which form the basis of a consolidated democracy.  
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Chapter 11 
Exogenous Factors 
1 
Weak Sponsor Commitment  
 
Among the impediments to democracy in Iraq is the lack of commitment by the main 
sponsor for democracy, the United States. Although the US has tried to establish a 
truly democratic system, it had weak plans and no effective partners in Iraq to help 
build such a democratic system. Many of the secular elite who should have been 
natural partners of the US, blame the failure of the democratic experience on the 
lack of resolve by the US to back with vigour the establishment of a genuine 
democratic system. 
  
Initially the Americans appointed a US general, Jay Garner, who lacked deep 
knowledge of Iraqi politics and culture as head of an organization that was tasked 
with overseeing the transition into democracy. Garner mishandled the whole thing 
and in the words of Larry Diamond, ‘cut a poor image for the United States’.977  
 
The US then went to the UN and obtained Resolution 1583 which recognised it as an 
occupying force. The idea of occupation didn’t go well with Iraqis. It led many of them 
to believe that the US was not really serious about democracy since democracy and 
occupation do not go together. At the beginning, many Iraqis (43% according to one 
survey) saw the Americans as liberators. But six months later, two thirds of Iraqis 
saw coalition forces as occupiers.978 The UN was against the idea of occupation and 
it tried hard to convey this to the US administration to allow an interim Iraqi 
government, but to no avail.  
 
The CPA used the UN as a cover of legitimacy but it didn’t listen to it after it 
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approved the formation of the Governing Council. The UN envoy, Sergio De Mello, 
was very frustrated and bitter before he was killed in an attack on the UN 
headquarter in Baghdad on 19th August 2003.979 The compound, in the Canal Hotel, 
was lightly-protected.980 That drove the UN to move its UNAMI mission to 
neighbouring Jordan after it suffered ‘the most devastating tragedy in its history’.981  
 
A strong and leading UN role in the political process would have enhanced Iraqi and 
Arab popular belief that the democratic change was serious since it had international 
backing. Iraqis’ faith in the US was seriously shaken after their intifada against 
Saddam Hussein in 1991 when the US called upon the Iraqi people to ‘take matters 
into their own hands and force Saddam Hussein, the dictator, to step aside’ but only 
to abandon them to their fate.982     
  
It was clear the Islamists, some of whom the US had sought hard to assemble in the 
London conference in Dec 2002 and later in the governing council in Jul 2003, were 
intent on establishing an Islamic state rather than a democratic one. Ayatullah Baqir 
Al-Hakim, the leader of SCIRI, made this clear upon his arrival in Najaf in May 2003. 
He called for a ‘constitutional government where Islamic values and precepts would 
be honoured’.983 He spoke of a tolerant and just society, but in Islamic rather than 
democratic or secular terms.  
 
Ahmed Al-Chalabi, a leading secularist who supported US efforts to topple the 
regime, and some have even attributed the US involvement in Iraq to his efforts and 
dubbed him as the man ‘who literally changed the world’,984 complained to the British 
that the Americans had too many Islamist candidates for the Governing Council.985 
This long-time ally of America was forced to move into open opposition to them in 
                                                            
979
  Ibid.pp55-57 
980
  Ibid.p46 
981
  Ibid.p58 
982
  Ibid.p123. For the Iraqi 1991 intifada, see Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring-(2014)-(ed. Larbi 
Sadiki- Chapter-35) 
983
  Allawi-(2007)-op.cit.p111 
984
  Aram Reston-‘The Man Who Pushed America to War’-Nations Books-(2008)-p.xi  
985
  Bremer-(2006)-op.cit.p89 
267 
 
 
2003.986 In fact he was accused in April 2004 of forging Iraqi money, even though he 
was the head of the Governing Council’s Finance Committee. In August 2004, he 
was accused of passing US secrets to Iran and giving flawed information to 
Americans, and arrest warrants were issued against him and his assistant and 
nephew, Salem Chalabi.987 They were later acquitted of all charges.  
 
Chalabi was secular and ‘better known for love of all things western’, using Bremer’s 
description, yet the US failed to keep him an ally.988 Their other important ally, Ayad 
Allawi, who was chosen as interim PM, also complains and scorns at Americans’ 
lack of support for democracy. He blamed the US occupation of Iraq and the 
decisions made by the Americans such as ‘Deba’athification, disbanding the state 
(army and police)’, for the failure of democracy in Iraq. 989 His party even accused 
Americans of supporting Islamist parties, rather than democratic ones as its 
spokeswoman, Maysoon Aldamluji clearly told this study. She was convinced that 
Islamist parties ‘enjoyed Western and regional support’. 990 ‘The Bush administration 
gave weight to Islamic parties in forming the Governing Council, and abided by the 
views of the Shia religious leadership (Marji3iya) in drafting the constitution. Even the 
timing of the first elections was obviously in favour of Islamic parties’ she avers.991 
 
The choice of Paul Bremer to lead Iraq was considered a mistake since he was not 
an expert on Iraq as he publically acknowledged. He had no prior involvement in the 
Iraqi crisis and this was apparently one of the reasons why he was appointed.992 He 
even regarded his experience as Ambassador to Malawi and Afghanistan as relevant 
to Iraq.993 Other CPA senior staff were not much better in their understanding of Iraq.  
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CPA advisor for ‘religious affairs’, Hume Horan, was criticised for his impractical 
ideas about Iraq’s future role. Horan ‘mused about the possibility, and desirability, of 
an Iraq, Israel, democratised Iran and Turkey axis at play in the Middle East, a vision 
fully endorsed by the neoconservatives in Washington’. ‘Such an axis would act as 
an exemplar to the rest of the Arab world’.994 Ali Allawi called it ‘jaundiced reasoning, 
based on ideology-driven motives and a selective reading of history was very 
prevalent in Baghdad in the early days of CPA’. ‘It conveniently underplayed the 
significance of tendencies and actual events that fell outside the framework of 
analysis’.995 The huge US military power and influence were not used effectively to 
support democracy. 
 
Larry Diamond, who was advisor for democracy to CPA, reported that many Iraqis 
were worried that the US would walk away after the transfer of power on June 30th 
2004 and he assured them ‘from my deepest conviction, this won’t happen’.996 He 
reported that one enlightened cleric in Babylon, Farqad Al-Qizwini, implored him as 
he was leaving the province; ‘Remember, you said you would be with us until the 
end’.997  This shows that people were worried that the US would abandon the 
democracy project. They didn’t really believe the US was serious about democracy 
in Iraq and were worried it will walk away. Qizwini was part of an American 
intellectual, theological and political effort to reconcile Islam and democracy which 
Diamond describes as ‘bold’.998 He is known for his liberal Islamic views and he was 
a natural ally for the US and democratic forces. Yet, the Americans yielded to 
pressure from SCIRI and didn’t include Qizwini in the Governing Council because ‘he 
was too liberal for their tastes’.999 SCIRI had vetoed the inclusion of other Shia 
liberals according to Diamond. Despite their military might, the Americans showed 
weakness before Islamists parties to the determent of democratic forces. 
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MP Sami Al-Askari argues that the US 'had unlimited possibilities to interfere since it 
had over 100,000 soldiers on the ground'.1000 Even in 2010, Al-Askari says that the 
US 'secretly supported and encouraged the secular ‘Iraqia List’ to form a government 
and take away the leadership of the government from Islamist ‘SoL’.1001 However, 
this didn’t happen and the US in the end backed a second term for Maliki.  
 
MP for CDA, Miss Shorouq Al-Abayachi, charges 'the Americans weren’t really 
serious about establishing democracy in the whole area'.1002 She catalogues her 
evidence on why she believes in this scenario. 'The Americans declared Iraq as the 
first front for fighting terrorism in order to protect America'. She contends this has 
helped to spread the phenomenon of 'militarism and weapons and led to the 
weakness of the law and state control and spread of militias and armed groups 
outside the control of the state'.‘Iraq was turned into an arena for regional and 
international conflicts which contributed to most of the country's current ills: the 
failure of building the Iraqi state according to a specific national identity; the control 
of the state by Islamist parties which govern on the basis of sectarianism; the 
disappearance of the middle class and the advent of a class of warlords steeped in 
militarism and corruption; the spread of illiteracy, ignorance and poverty in a big way 
among Iraqis; and the spread of corruption’. 1003 
 
Ms Al-Abayachi blames Americans for all that and she explains why. ‘They could 
have protected Iraqi borders instead of opening Iraq as a basic front for fighting 
terrorism, inviting all terrorists of the world to Iraq in order to fight them. They 
shouldn’t have put Iraq under occupation, instead, they should have formed a 
national transitional government that introduces a transitional programme for three 
years at least based on the removal of the effects of the Saddam totalitarian regime 
and preparing the way for real democratic elections under full international 
supervision. They should have achieved the project of Iraqi reconstruction without 
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corruption and disputes between the State Department and the Pentagon. They 
should have respected the dignity of the Iraqi people before anything else'.1004 
 
These are the possible options Ms Al-Abayachi believes the Americans could have 
done to save democracy. Some points, such as not backing democratic forces and 
forming a transitional government for a longer period of time, are shared by others.  
 
Ali Allawi stated that ‘the inability of the coalition to impose law and order created 
another set of problems that gave rise to wide-scale human rights abuses’. There 
were reports of politically motivated killings which targeted the known members of 
the former security apparatus.1005  Allawi reveals that the politically motivated killings 
in Baghdad alone reached several hundred in May 2003. What is shocking is that 
‘religious leaders appeared to sanction the killings’.1006  
 
The campaign of killings got wider and wider. ‘By June 2003, the killings began to 
include academics, artists, bureaucrats, teachers, journalists, and professionals who 
were not seen to be part of the regime’s control and repression’.1007 This chaotic 
situation that followed the fall of the regime was acknowledged by Paul Bremer 
himself.1008 He even asked for extra US military police to patrol Iraqi streets.1009 
MP Adnan Al-Janabi, blames the US for dismantling the Iraqi state 'with disastrous 
consequences'. ‘The Americans didn’t come to build, instead they demolished an 
existing state’ he charges.1010 Akeel Abbas lists American failure as one of the 
reasons for the failure of democracy in Iraq. ‘The initial US failure in keeping the 
peace and restoring basic services has given a strong and lasting impression that 
democracy does not work, giving rise again to the familiar anti-democratic 
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desire/theme of the strong man as the saviour’.1011 
 
Dr Hussein Al-Hindawi argues that the American call for democracy in 2003 was 
false. He repeats ‘there was no truth in their call for democracy. Building democracy 
doesn't depend on Ahmed Al-Chalabi, for example’.1012 He blames the Americans for 
a number of mistakes. Firstly, they were 'listening to what Najaf was saying' when 
writing the Iraqi provisional constitution in 2004. This view is shared by Maysoon 
Aldamluji. He also blames the Americans for handing power over to a group of Iraqis 
who 'were totally ignorant in law, even in Sharia law'. He argues that 'none of them 
was like (Ayatullah) Hussein Na'eeni who proposed a constitution to limit the 
authority of the ruler' in the early 20th century.1013 
Maysoon Aldamluji also blames Americans for their lack of support for 
democracy.1014 Dr Fareed Ayar even accuses Americans of corruption and lack of 
support for democratic forces in the country.1015  
Samir Sumaidaie, however, contends Americans have made efforts in the direction 
of building a democracy but he blames others for standing in the way of these 
efforts. ‘The effort made by the Americans to help install democratic structures such 
as a constitution and elections etc. were hijacked, sabotaged, and used (by Shia 
Islamists) as a stepping stone to jump to a position of power. Once that was 
achieved, power was consolidated using non-democratic means’ he reveals.1016 The 
question is how can this be hijacked from a superpower that everyone fears and 
reveres, especially when it had an advanced army of 130,000 soldiers on the 
ground?1017 Although it’s true the Americans have made efforts to create a 
democracy in Iraq, these efforts were not enough to establish a strong democracy.   
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Prominent author, Kanan Makiya, admits the US role was diminishing gradually in 
Iraq but he blames Iraqi politicians. 'The US departed because the Iraqi political 
parties and the political class turned their back to it. It could have contributed to the 
development of Iraq economically, culturally and scientifically', but it had to leave 
because most politicians were reluctant to support its presence in Iraq.1018 Most of 
those who blame the Americans are secular and closer to the democratic project 
than Islamists who blame the Americans for everything else except building a 
democracy.  
Ali Allawi blames the confusion over plans for the governance of Iraq on the US 
administration’s ‘lack of clarity about its intentions in post-Saddam Iraq’. He notes 
that ‘by the time the military option appeared to have been definitely selected, it was 
too late to start seriously thinking about the administration of a post-war Iraq’.1019 
Larry Diamond also acknowledges that the US invaded Iraq without ‘coherent, viable 
plan to win the peace’, although he contend there was preparation and the State 
Department planed for the Iraqi transition in Oct 2001in what was called then ‘the 
Future of Iraq Project’ which produced the ‘The Transition to Democracy in Iraq’ 
report.1020 But the report, according to Diamond, didn’t offer a ‘coherent or finished 
blueprint for the post-war political order’, although he believes it produced a ‘viable 
strategy for filling the vacuum of authority’. 1021 
But the US administration was not the only one at fault, according to Ali Allawi, who 
also apportions blame to the Iraqi opposition for not having formulated a unified 
vision for post-Saddam Iraq. Allawi, refers to the ‘Transition to Democracy’ report, 
compiled by the Democratic Principles Working Group-DPWG- and edited by the 
lawyer, Salem Chalabi, and the academic and author, Kanan Makiya, both of whom 
were close to INC. He argues this report, which is close to the thinking of the 
Pentagon, was ‘the most complete statement of what the liberals and westernised 
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groups within the Iraqi opposition sought for Iraq’s political future’.1022   
 
Allawi also mentions that some voices within DPWG criticised Makiya’s attempt to 
‘present the report as a collective effort and refused to acknowledge it as more than 
the work of fringe elements’. He quotes Ghassan Al-Attiyya, whom he described as 
an ‘important political thinker’, as saying that ‘the transitional authority would depend 
on the way the regime was overthrown. If it were under some UN approval, the UN 
would have the final say on the nature of Iraq’s transitional authority. If it was the 
result of a unilateral action by the Anglo-American coalition, the coalition would be 
the arbiters of the transitional authority’.1023 Since the removal of the regime was 
done without UN approval, it means that Al-Attiyya puts the responsibility of what 
happened next in Iraq squarely on the US and UK.  
Allawi classifies Iraqi opposition members participating in the London Conference in 
2002 into three groups. The first are ‘idealists’ who congregate around Ahmed 
Chalabi. Their chosen vision for post-Saddam Iraq was the ‘Transition to Democracy 
Report’ and their tactic was to have the conference adopt it. The second was 
comprised of the ‘realists’ who represented the views of the US administration which 
needed an Iraqi cover for the evolving plan to attack Saddam. No commitment would 
be made at the conference beyond general statements of encouragement for 
democratic rule and respect for civil and human rights. It was clear at that point, in 
Allawi’s view, that Washington was not going to hand power over to the Iraqi 
opposition since it was divided and didn’t merit US support.1024   
The third trend at the conference was the leaders of the opposition parties who had 
diverse expectations as to what they wanted to achieve as far as their own narrow 
interests are concerned. Washington held little expectation for the conference but 
this didn’t stop the main opposition groups from using it as a platform to cement their 
control over the political process and forming a mechanism for coordinating with the 
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US in the run-up to the war.1025 Some groups, such as the SCIRI, had feared it would 
lose out under an American military government. 
The US administration was against the idea of forming a provisional Iraqi 
government, which was favourable to opposition groups such as the INC. The INA, 
according to Allawi, did not have a public stance on the issue, although it worked 
against it because it wouldn’t take into account ‘internal opposition’ to Saddam. The 
CIA was opposed to such a government because it thought it would alienate internal 
opposition and dissuade it from any attempt to change the regime.1026   
 
In the end, the opposition conference in London succeeded in extracting a role for 
the opposition in the future administration of Iraq. It formed a 65-person committee 
form exiled opposition groups, the ‘Coordination and Follow up Committee’-CFC. 
Some independent Islamists protested that SCIRI had appropriated the role of other 
Shia Islamists. Ultimately, the London conference did avoid the discussion of what 
Allawi called ‘serious issues’ such as the role of religion in public life.1027 The 65-
member committee met in the resort of Salahuddeen in northern Iraq in January 
2003 and selected a 6-member leadership council made up of: Jalal Talabni-(PUK), 
Masaud Barzani-(KDP), Abdul-Azeez Al-Hakim-(SCIRI), Ahmad Al-Chalabi-(INC), 
and Ayad Allawi-(INA).1028   
As the US forces entered Iraq and the regime fell, Islamist forces and their allies who 
laid a claim to the loyalty of the population filled the power vacuum and parallel 
power structures evolved in almost every town and city of Iraq, although they 
remained undetected by officials appointed by the occupying authorities.1029 This 
happened despite US warnings to SCIRI that, if it tried to get organised forces from 
its Badr Brigade into Iraq, they will be treated as enemy combatants.1030 But this 
threat was not carried out as there was no exchange of fire between US troops and 
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Badr.  
The Sadrist movement, which was not known in the West prior to the war, sprang to 
life and was able to secure Sadr City-east of Baghdad- within days of regime fall. As 
Ali Allawi points out, ‘the movement had not been quashed by the Saddam regime, 
as many had thought, because it went underground’.1031 One of the incidents that 
may have weakened the trust in the American effort was their lack of support for 
those Iraqis who supported them and believed in their cause.  
 
One such Iraqi ally was Abdul-Majeed Al-Khoei, the son of the late grand Ayatullah 
Abul-Qassim Al-Khoei, who was the Shia’s world-wide leader till his death in 1992. 
Al-Khoei was approached by the CIA to help in the effort of controlling the Shia city 
of Najaf. He was flown into Najaf by a US military helicopter on 3rd of April, but was 
murdered by the supporters of Muqtada As-Sadr on 10th of the month.1032  
Al-Khoei would have played an important role in the post-Saddam Iraq due to his 
family’s position and the respect he enjoyed with most Iraqis. He was seen as a 
‘moderating force in Shia Islam and useful counterweight to the Iranian regime’.1033 
He was killed because there was not enough US protection for him. American troops 
stationed nearby didn’t interfere as commanders were instructed ‘not to approach the 
heart of the city lest it be interpreted as infringement of the sanctity of the city’.1034 
This must have sent a signal to all those who supported the US project in Iraq that 
they were not protected. If Mr Al-Khoei was left to die, they would be in a worse 
position.    
 
The Bush administration’s position on Iraq in the aftermath of the Iraq war was 
‘riddled with expedient decision-making, departmental infighting, conflicting 
strategies, and policy incoherence’. This undermined the credibility of the parties with 
whom the USA had been engaged with varying degrees of enthusiasm, even though 
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the ‘CPA had to deal with the same cast of characters’.1035 It’s surprising that 
Ayatullah Sistani was more concerned with democracy than the Americans. On 8th 
March 2004, Sistani issued a statement criticising article 61C of the TAL considering 
it as ‘usurping the democratic rights of Iraqis to choose their own constitution’.1036 
The article was demanded by the Kurds and accepted by the CPA which presented it 
to the drafting committee very late in the process.1037  
According to Adam Przeworski, outcomes under democracy ‘hold only if they are 
mutually enforced in self-interest or enforced externally by some third party’.1038 This 
third party, the US in Iraq’s case, was not willing to stand behind democratic 
outcomes.   
In conclusion, the Americans did not do enough to support democratic secular 
forces; instead they left the door open for Islamists parties and their armed groups to 
control Iraq. They knew, as acknowledged by Bremer, that Islamists were the ‘best 
organized’ and they would win early elections, while others lacked organization and 
support.1039 Islamist militias were operating uninterrupted and undetected.  
 
At the same time, the Iraqi expert exiles who returned to Iraq under the Iraqi 
Reconstruction and Development Council-(IRDC)-were sidelined and never 
consulted by the CPA.1040 IRDC was dissolved in June 2003 when the CPA handed 
power to Iraqi interim government. Although the makeup of IRDC was completely 
Iraqi, it’s not regarded as such by Americans who dissolved it when they dissolved 
the CPA. Instead of giving it a leading role as an Iraqi democratic entity, it was 
treated as a temporary US organization and it reported to Paul Bremer.1041 Most 
IRDC members returned to their countries of exile after it was dissolved, depriving 
Iraq of an educated experienced class of people who could have served the country 
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and consolidated democracy. 
 
2 
Hostile environment 
Iraqi democracy has faced difficulties from hostile neighbouring countries which are 
not democratic. Almost all surrounding countries are not democracies, and they 
never welcomed the change in Iraq, despite the fact they were all, except perhaps 
Jordan, either hostile or not on friendly terms with the Saddam regime. Turkey for 
example, refused to grant the US a passage to Iraq in 2003, even though it was a 
member of the US-led NATO Alliance. 1042 
Haggard and Kaufman-(1995)- state that ‘successful democratic opposition in one 
country has an impact on the perceptions and behaviour of actors in neighbouring 
countries or those with strong cultural links’.1043   The democratic change in Spain for 
example resonated throughout Latin America, while ‘People’s power’ revolution in 
the Philippines challenged other Asian dictatorships. Events in Poland and East 
Germany had influenced other eastern European countries.1044   
 
Larry Diamond acknowledges that ‘the efforts to bring democracy to Iraq were 
unfolding in a hostile regional environment’ and this has hindered the progress of 
democracy.1045 He contrasts it with the advent of democracy to Eastern Europe 
where there was a ‘welcoming supportive group of democratic neighbours in the 
West’ as well as the desire of Eastern European nations to join EU.  
 
In Asia, when democracy spread to the Philippines, Taiwan and Korea, there was 
the example of consolidated democracy in rich and successful Japan. In Latin 
America, democracy spread in 1980s because of the influence of the democratic 
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change in Spain which has strong cultural links to the continent, in addition to 
support form the US and EU. In addition, democracy had existed in some Latin 
American countries before the reverses to dictatorship, so people were familiar with 
it.  
 
Diamond reports that that Iraqis were worried about the US not taking into 
consideration the fact ‘all neighbouring states are undemocratic’. One of his Iraqi 
interlocutors told him that ‘there will be a campaign against democracy’ in Iraq.1046 
Not only was the regional environment hostile, but even the Iraqi internal 
environment is also hostile. Academic & economist, Dr Kamal Field, listed this as a 
major impediment’.  Field argues that democracy ‘didn't come as a result of mass 
desire'. 'It’s actually like a plant that was growing in a hostile environment'.1047 
The regional environment was hostile to democracy and this was a major reason 
why it has not succeeded in Iraq. As we will see in the next section, not only is the 
regional environment hostile, but there were also active interferences from regional 
countries to disrupt the course of democracy in Iraq and stop its fusion outside it.   
 
3 
Outside Interference 
 
This relates to regional countries, in particular Iran, Turkey, Syria, Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia. Since democracy is alien to Arab culture, and most Arab countries, with the 
exception of Lebanon and partially Kuwait and recently Morocco, have never had 
any form of a representative government, its introduction in Iraq alarmed states that 
fear most this new phenomenon.  
 
The five states above are believed to have interfered directly or indirectly to impede 
the progress of Iraqi democracy. Every one of them has its own reasons, but the 
main reason for the majority, except Turkey perhaps, is the ‘fear of the domino effect’ 
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that democracy might have in their own countries, in addition to fear of, or animosity 
to, Shia rule in Iraq, except for Iran which welcomes it, although it may not 
necessarily welcome democracy.  
 
The spread of democracy geographically has been due in a big way to international 
pressure. As mentioned in the previous chapter, successful democratic opposition in 
one country has an impact in neighbouring countries or those with which it has 
strong cultural links. The democratic change in Spain had an impact on Latin 
America. The ‘People’s power’ revolution in the Philippines impacted on Asian 
dictatorships. Events in Poland and East Germany had influenced other eastern 
European countries.1048  Iraq has many cultural and religious links to countries in the 
region and the regimes ruling there became alarmed at the prospects of democracy 
in Iraq. 
 
The fear of democracy has been largely fuelled by American early talks of 
democracy in the Middle East and how Iraq would be an exemplar for the whole 
region. This was laid out in President Bush’s speech on 6th Nov 2003 on his vision 
for the Middle East.1049 There is also the Eastern European example where all 
communist regimes fell one after the other. Adam Przeworski regarded the change 
there as one event or ‘one and a half’ since what happened in Romania was caused 
by what had occurred in Czechoslovakia and that resulted from the breakdown in 
East Germany and that followed the political changes in Hungry and what showed 
the Hungarians a way out was the success of negotiations in Poland.1050   
 
The Syrian regime played a very negative role and most foreign fighters were 
believed to have come through Syria.1051 There have also been reports that the 
Syrians had training camps for foreign fighters. In 2009, the Iraqi PM, Noori Al-Maliki 
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filed a complaint against Syria to the UN for playing a destablising role in Iraq.1052 
Because ISIS and Al-Qaeda before it embrace a doctrine similar to the Wahabi 
doctrine prevailing in Saudi Arabia, many observers as well as Iraqi and Syrian 
officials blame Saudi Arabia either for supporting terrorists or for not doing enough to 
fight terrorism.1053 Saudi fighters within ISIS form the second largest group among 
Arab fighters after Tunisians.1054 Qatar is also frequently accused by Iraqi officials of 
supporting insurgents and fighters in Iraq.1055 Turkey has been accused by the Iraqi 
government and several factions of supporting militias and providing logistical 
support for foreign fighters in Iraq. An Iraqi MP, Mr Shakhawan Abdullah, accused it 
of paying the salaries of members of an Iraqi Sunni militia.1056 Iran’s influence in Iraq 
is acknowledged by friends and foes alike. Most Iraqi Islamist opposition groups 
were based in Iran and supported by it in varying degrees.  
 
Sami Al-Askari has given a catalogue of interferences by other countries. ‘Since the 
fall of Saddam, the Iraqi political scene has been subjected to foreign interferences 
and influences’. ‘The military invasion and the fears it raised in the region, and the 
opportunities created by the collapse of the Iraqi state… have offered huge 
opportunities for regional and international parties to interfere in Iraq so as to serve 
their interest’. He also blames Iraqi politicians ‘who were ready to deal with this 
interference and welcome it so as to serve their interests and their aims as they 
compete among themselves’.  Al-Askari asserts ‘the presence of Iran is most visible 
in the Iraqi political scene among the regional powers.1057  
 
Iran was able to build bridges with its old allies and make new allies and this has 
offered it the opportunity of influence in the Iraqi scene’. But the Iranian role in Iraq 
was not necessarily to destabilise the new regime entirely but to support its Islamist 
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allies within it at the expense of others and this has given them an edge on others. 
Because Iraqi Islamists do not believe in liberal democracy, as I have established, 
the Iranian role has become an impediment to democracy since it supports factions 
that are not committed to it.   
Al-Askari points to a Turkish role as ‘the defender of Iraqi Sunnis’. He charges that 
Turkey formed an axis with Saudi Arabia and Qatar to compete with the growing 
Iranian role. He contends the Iranian and Turkish roles were ‘exposed’ during the 
elections of 2010. ‘Iran managed to group all Shia groups, except SoL, in a bloc-
(NIC). After the results were announced, Iran was active in putting pressure on all 
the players to make compromises which led to the formation of the second Al-Maliki 
government’. 1058 
He argues Turkey managed, with a mandate from the official Arab establishment, to 
group all the Sunnis in one list (Iraqia) and install the Shia Ayad Allawi as its leader 
in a bid to claw back the leadership of the government from the Shia Alliance. ‘This 
Turkish endeavour was about to succeed if it wasn't for the Federal Court with 
regards to the formation of parliamentary lists, and the success of Iran in bringing 
both Shia blocs, SoL and NlC, in a parliamentary list that was able to achieve 
quorum to form the government’ Al-Askari claims. He even accused the UN mission 
(UNAMI) of bias and trying to influence election results in favour of Iraqia!1059 
Ayad Allawi also blames foreign influences, colonialism, occupation, lack of self-
determination as well as domestic reasons for ‘severely impairing the evolution of 
democracy in Islamic countries’.1060 Kanan Makiya maintains that Iran is responsible 
for whatever is happening to Iraq now. 'It’s Iran who supported the religious parties. 
Without Iran they would have had no influence'.1061 Iran is a theocracy, not a 
democracy, and it wouldn’t be expected to support a true democracy.  
 
Samir Sumaidaie contends what happens in Iran or Saudi Arabia, has influence on 
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democracy in Iraq. 1062 ‘If the Iranian theocratic regime suffers an internal crisis and 
collapses, it would have an impact. If the situation in the Gulf and in particular Saudi 
Arabia is dramatically changes, it would have a profound influence on the whole 
region.’ He also asserts that ‘regional powers see democracy building in Iraq as a 
threat to their survival’. He regards the ‘malign influence’ of Iran, Turkey and Israel, 
as an impediment to democracy.1063  
Abdul-Khaliq Hussein regards relations with Iran, Turkey, the Arab world, USA, EU 
and the rest of the world’ as a challenge to democracy in Iraq. He adds ‘a few old-
fashioned regional governments do not want Iraqi democracy to succeed, because 
they fear it will inspire their own peoples, and that is why they support sectarianism 
and terrorism in Iraq’.1064 Whada Al-Jumaili regards Iraqi political leaders as ‘weak’ 
due to the ‘influence of foreign diktats’ on them.1065  
Foreign interference in Iraq has impeded democracy in a big way. This was done 
through support for armed groups to destabilise the country and also financial 
support for Iraqi political parties in return for taking expedient positions. Armed 
groups and militias are supported, financially and logistically by regional powers and 
they constitute a major obstacle to democracy. Only the state should have exclusive 
coercive powers over its citizens.  
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4 
Insurgency 
Many observers regard the insurgency as the most serious impediment to building a 
new political system in Iraq as it is a serious threat to its stability and prosperity. It 
was neither expected nor acknowledged by the Americans at the beginning.1066 The 
first detailed study on insurgency was conducted by Professor Ahmed Hashim which 
came three years after it began.1067 Larry Diamond reckons the resistance began in 
July 2003 when the Americans faced ‘a guerrilla war in Iraq against a much more 
entrenched enemy than it anticipated’.1068   
 
In August 2003 alone there were two major attacks by the insurgency, one on the 
UN headquarters in Baghdad killing the UN envoy Sergio De Mello and forcing the 
UN to withdraw from Iraq to neighbouring Jordan. The second was in Najaf killing the 
Islamist Shia leader, Baqir Al-Hakim, together with around a hundred of his 
companions.1069 The insurgency is associated with extremist Sunni Islamists who are 
violent and have a disdain for anything western. But Bremer regarded every surge in 
violence as a sign that ‘the resistance was getting more desperate’.1070 Instead of 
acknowledging it and providing remedies for its motives and alleviating the suffering 
of the Iraqi people, Bremer ignored it and thought Iraq ‘was not a country in 
chaos’.1071 
As we saw in chapter 10, the security vacuum left by disbanding the Iraqi army and 
the unemployment and discord created by the Deba’athification law, pushed many 
Iraqis to becoming enemies of the new order. Since there was an occupation by a 
foreign power, it attracted jihadist from across the world to come to Iraq and join the 
insurgency. According to the Telegraph, fighters came to Iraq and Syria from 
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Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Russia, Jordan, Turkey, France, Morocco, Lebanon, Egypt 
and Germany.1072   
Ahmed Hashim is highly critical of the US counter-insurgency campaign and he 
blames it for playing “a key role in the outbreak and perpetuation of the 
insurgency”.1073 He accuses US decision-makers of “rigid and inflexible ideological 
approach” which undermined the chances of implementing policies vital in any 
successful counterinsurgency strategy. Policies such as measured reactions and 
minimal use of force, political responses, integrated civil-military operations and 
rectitude towards civilians and prisoners have been largely absent from the US 
efforts to suppress the insurgency.  
 
Instead, US forces focused on killing the insurgents while turning a blind eye to 
cultural sensitivities and showing callousness towards civilian casualties. Hashim 
attributes the US military’s failure to have an effectively prepared counterinsurgency 
strategy to the ‘organizational or military culture, defined here as those values or 
beliefs that promote a conventional-warfare mindset to such an extent that little or no 
consideration is given to the study and effective preparation for the prosecution of 
small wars”.1074  Paul Bremer warned the US Congress in 2003 ‘If we fail to recreate 
Iraq with a sovereign democracy sustained by a solid economy, we will have 
provided the terrorists with an incredible advantage in their war against us…’.1075 
The terrorists did have that advantage with the failure of the Americans to recreate 
Iraq. 
Maysoon Aldamluji blames the US for the breakout of the insurgency. ‘The army and 
security forces were dismantled, leaving a massive vacuum that gave way to 
insurgency and militias to compromise Iraq’s security and sovereignty’.1076 Wahda 
Al-Jumaili asserts ‘the security challenge is serious and it has affected democratic 
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transition in a big way’.1077 Ibrahim Al-Haidari blames ‘irresponsible’ American 
conducts which have ‘helped deepen chaos and produced a political and 
administrative vacuum which resulted in fragile security and the spread of violence, 
terrorism and social fragmentation’… He contends that they have failed in providing 
an ‘atmosphere conducive for a margin of real freedom and democracy’.1078  
 
Security deteriorated mainly due to the resistance to occupation by various groups, 
internal and external. Shorouq Al-Abayachi contends that Iraq was turned into a 
‘basic front for fighting terrorism’ by Americans, who ‘invited all terrorists of the world 
to Iraq in order to fight them’.1079  Walid Al-Hilli contends that ‘the political process 
must be conducted in a proper security environment with the existence of free 
competition and equal opportunities for all’.1080  
Abdul-Khaliq Hussein regards ‘Sunni terrorism’ as an impediment to democracy.  
'Iraqi democracy was born at the time when Sunni Islamic terrorism was at its high'. 
He blames the 'religious leaders of the Wahabi sect' and BP remnants for that. He 
blames the Sunnis for 'exacerbating sectarian conflict because they have lost their 
power and found themselves at a disadvantage because of democracy. They have 
even collaborated with the terrorists like al-Qaeda and ISIS' he exclaims.  
 
Although the insurgency is entirely Sunni, but not all Sunnis cooperated with al-
Qaeda or ISIS. On the contrary, Iraqi Sunnis were the most to lose from the activities 
of terrorist groups such as ISIS. Sunni imams were beheaded for refusing to pledge 
allegiance to ISIS.1081 On the other hand, it was Sunnis who drove out Al-Qaeda 
from Iraq during the US surge campaign in 2006-8 in what was called the Awakening 
Councils’.1082  Democracy must not disadvantage anyone in a country if they act 
peacefully and abide by the law of the land.  
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The insurgency has impeded democracy in a big way since it targeted election rallies 
and IHEC officials, candidates, civic centres, mosques, markets, schools, 
universities, state institutions, civil society organizations, academics, doctors, 
professionals, and journalists. It has driven millions of Iraqis to flee the country, 
especially the educated and experienced.  
 
Democracy requires law and order, state bureaucracy, stability and more 
importantly, peace. The insurgency has turned Iraq into a battle ground, far away 
from the environment conducive to democracy. It has weakened all state institutions 
which are needed for democracy to take root. I have classified insurgency as 
exogenous because many of its fighters were foreigners and it was supported by 
foreign countries. Although there were many Iraqis among the insurgents, but it was 
an international jihadist campaign against the change that the US effected in Iraq 
which removed Sunni rulers and replaced them with Shia ones. Whatever the 
classification, it’s a serious impediment to democracy.  
 
5 
Armed Groups and Militias 
All armed groups constitute a threat to the state. ISIS took control of three provinces 
in 2014/15/16, but government forces managed to free two of them so far (Saladin 
and Anbar), while attempting to retake the third (Musil). ISIS is recognised 
internationally as a terrorist group and Iraq is getting help from the US, Iran and 
other countries to fight it back. It will be defeated sooner or later since it has no 
practical political programme. It belongs to ancient history. But the main challenge to 
democracy will be militias linked to Islamist political parties which proliferated over 
the last two years after ISIS took control of Musil in June 2014. Militias have been a 
military/political factor in Iraq since 2003.  
When the US military entered Iraq in early 2003, it warned Islamic militias not to 
enter Iraq and get organised forces and if they did they would be treated as enemy 
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combatant.1083 But that warning was not heeded; they did get organized forces, 
although ‘they remained undetected by officials appointed by the occupying 
authorities’.1084 Some of them entered into battles with the US and Iraqi armies.  
Sami Al-Askari identifies Sunni and Shia armed groups and militias as being a 
serious problem. He stated that these groups 'imposed their understanding of 
religious and moral values and practices on others'. This was extended to even 
killing those who didn't apply 'their understanding of religion and morals'. He argues 
this was made possible by the almost complete absence of the state during the 
period after the fall of the regime.1085   
But, as the state got stronger, the main militias which are Badr and the Mahdi Army 
integrated with Iraqi forces or demobilised after the threat of Sunni jihadi terrorism 
diminished after 2008.1086  
Militias resurged after the breakout of the war in Syria where some 5000 Iraqis went 
to fight in Syria against Al-Qaeda and ISIS, not necessarily supporting the Assad 
regime.1087 PM Al-Maliki had to deploy two combat-hardened militia units which 
returned from Syria in June 2014 to Iraq to fight ISIS after the collapse of the Iraqi 
army in Musil.1088 The turning point for the resurgence of Shia militias was when ISIS 
took control of Musil and Ayatullah Sistani issued a jihad fatwa to fight ISIS which 
‘provided the mechanism for the enormous and rapid expansion of militias’.1089 The 
fatwa was expedient for political groups to form their own militias which are loosely 
gathered under the banner of Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU) or Hashd.  
Although it’s difficult to know how many militias in Iraq now nor how many have been 
formed after June 10th 2014, nor the number of men who joined them as tallies differ 
from one group to another. The US War College estimates the number of Shia 
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militias in Iraq to be over 50.1090 These militias, with tens of thousands of trained 
armed men, are not going to disappear after the removal of ISIS. Their presence will 
constitute a threat to democracy and to the state itself which is already weak. This 
has pushed people to depend on militias for protection as Dr Akeel Abbas explained. 
‘Sect-based militias are more trusted and effective than the state itself'.1091   
 
In 2007 the two main militias, Badr and Mahdi Army clashed and as a results several 
officials, including the governors of two provinces (Muthanna and Diwaniyya), were 
killed.1092 The UN warned that the existence of militias will pose a problem for Iraq in 
the long term.1093  
The US Controller General, David Walker, said in a testimony before the Sub-
committee on Defence Committee Appropriations at the US House of 
Representatives that militias have penetrated Iraqi ministries.1094 Maysoon Aldamluji 
believes militias have compromised Iraq’s security and sovereignty.1095  
It is now established that there are several armed militias operating in Iraq, in 
addition to terrorist groups such as ISIS. The Shia militias, at least the new ones, 
were formed after the jihad fatwa of Ayatullah Sistani and he may be the one who 
has the moral authority to call upon them to demobilize. It’s doubtful that he would do 
so while ISIS’s threat is hanging over Iraq. Sistani is now 86. If he dies before the 
stabilization of the country, the legitimacy that armed groups got from his fatwa will 
be difficult to challenge.  
 
Armed groups do not respect the law or people’s choices and most of them are sect-
based religious organizations which impose their understandings of religion on those 
under their control. This has happened in Iraq and it’s bound to happen in the future. 
Unless militias are pacified or dissolved, democracy will be in name only.    
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Chapter 12 
Structural Factors 
1 
Stateness 
 
Since democracy is a system of governance, it requires a state; without a state there 
is no democracy.1096 Charles Tilly defines the state as follows: ‘an organization which 
controls the population occupying a definite territory is a state in so far as: 1-It’s 
differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory, 2-it’s 
autonomous and 3-its divisions are formally coordinated with one another’.1097   
 
The legitimacy of the state must not be questioned by any substantial group within it. 
If there is a ‘nationality group that claims the right of self-determination’ as is the 
case with the Kurds in Iraq, then the state legitimacy is questioned and this 
complicates matters for democracy or even for inter-state peace.1098 ‘When a large 
minority in a country is considered by another country as irredenta and where titular 
nationality and its leaders pursue an aggressive nation-building policy that alienates 
minorities, who then turn to neighbouring countries for support’ then there is a 
reason to question the state.1099  
 
In northern Iraq, there is a substantial Kurdish minority that has been pursuing a 
policy of ‘self-determination’ since the creation of the Iraqi state. This has weakened 
Iraq as a state and created a stateness problem. The Kurdish minority has never 
settled in Iraq since the creation of the Iraqi state in 1921. According to Michael 
Eisenstadt, there were Kurdish rebellions against central government as early as 
1919-20, as well as in later years (1923-24, 1931-32 and 1935-36).1100 In 1927 there 
were disturbances in northern Kurdish areas led by the two prominent leaders, 
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Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan and Sheikh Mahmud.1101 The two leaders have also 
demanded independence, although their aim was parochial, depending on tribal 
support.1102  Prior to Iraq’s full independence and proposed membership of the 
League of Nations, Sheikh Mahmud led an armed revolt demanding the separation 
of Kurdistan and turning it into a British protectorate.1103 The revolt was suppressed 
with the help of RAF and Sheikh Mahmud was sent into exile in Nassiria, southern 
Iraq. Later, the Kurdish leaders’ demands were modified and petitioned the League 
of Nations for cultural autonomy and self-rule.1104  
 
Iraq followed an Arabization programme in education and text books which 
emphasized secular and progressive themes, Arab nationalism and patriotism rather 
than ethnic separatism favoured by the Kurds.1105 This policy has further alienated 
the Kurds, especially during the Ba’ath regime when the state adopted a pan-Arab 
ideology. 
 
The Kurdish separatist movement sought military support from Iran exploiting the 
latter’s dispute with Iraq over sovereignty over the Shat Al-Arab waterway, especially 
after Iran abrogated the 1937 treaty.1106 The Kurdish insurgency became a serious 
threat to the Iraqi state after many factions joined Barzani, and with the assistance of 
Iran, the insurgency developed into a full-scale war in 1974.1107 The threat of the 
insurgency to Iraq forced the Ba’ath regime to enter into humiliating negotiations with 
the Shah of Iran which culminated in the signing of the 1975 treaty of Algiers in 
which Saddam Hussein accepted Iran’s claim that the Thalweg line should form the 
border between the two countries in Shat Al-Arab, and in return, Iran would cease all 
support for Barzani and the Kurdish separatists. The Kurdish revolt collapsed within 
days and 150,000 peshmerga with Kurdish leaders crossed the border to Iran, while 
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thousands others accepted the offered amnesty from the government.1108   
     
But demands for Kurdish independence continued even after the setback of 1975. 
The Kurdish armed movement resurged in later years. It remained at war with the 
central government almost continuously, except in periods where there was some 
temporary understanding. In 1991, following the failure of the intifada, the UN 
created a safe haven for the Kurds in the three provinces where most of the Kurdish 
population resides. Ever since, the Kurds had enjoyed quasi-independence status. 
Perhaps this is one of the reasons why irredentist feelings among Kurds have been 
enhanced because the sequence of elections didn’t serve the consolidation of the 
stateness since it started within their region. In Spain, for example, national elections 
were held before regional elections and this had helped to constitute ‘the supportive 
legal and effective membership of the national (Catalan), state (Spanish) and super-
state (European Community)’.1109    
 
Iraqi Kurdish writer and former presidential chief of staff, Kamran Qaradaghi, says 
the Kurds have made  a ‘resolution’ regarding the establishment of a Kurdish state 
and it’s now a matter of time.1110 Qaradaghi says the Iraqi democracy has not been 
successful and the Kurdish sense of belonging to Iraq was weak and has become 
even weaker after the crackdown on them during the previous regime. He 
specifically mentioned ‘the Anfal operations, ethnic cleansing, the use of chemical 
weapons and mass graves during the seventies and eighties of the last century. 
‘These events have deepened the Kurdish feeling of not belonging to the Iraqi state, 
especially after the declaration of republican Iraq as an integral part of the Arab 
nation’. The Kurds insisted on removing the reference to the Arab identity of Iraq 
from the interim, then permanent constitution in 2004 and 2005 respectively. In a 
recent survey, 82% of Kurds want independence.1111 As Peter Galbraith put it ‘for the 
older generation, Iraq was a bad memory…the new generation has no feeling of 
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being Iraqi’.1112    
 
 Sunnis have also been talking of a federal region of Iraq as mentioned earlier. The 
Sunni leader, Usamah An-Nujaifi said they were ‘unhappy’ with the current 
arrangement. This current ‘unhappiness’ could develop into something more serious 
and perhaps a separate Sunni entity might develop.  Some 25% of Sunni Arabs 
support ISIS according to Carnegie Endowment.1113 Only 13% of Sunni Arabs 
believe things in Iraq are heading in the right direction, 58% feel unfairly represented 
and 50% feel Iraq is a divided country.1114  
As for the Shia Arabs majority, they have deep pride in being Arabs, sharing 
tradition, customs and sense of Arab identity with the great clans and confederations 
of Arabia, despite the doctrinal differences.1115 But the fact that they are Shia in a 
largely Sunni Arab world which by and large discriminates against them, especially in 
Saudi Arabia and some Gulf states, makes them feel they need Iran to turn to for 
support.1116 If the Kurds choose independence, which looks likely, and the Sunnis 
follow suit or go for a federal entity, the Shia may feel compelled to forge closer 
relations with Iran. Maysoon Aldamluji, a secular Sunni, argues that ‘the indifference 
of some Arab countries to the Shia cause, compared with the ease in relations with 
the Iranian leadership, has pushed Shia leaders towards Iran’.1117  Iran in this case 
becomes more influential in Iraq and this is not a good outcome for democracy as 
long as Iran remains a theocracy. 
 
Although some prominent personalities, such as Samir Sumaidaie, say it’s unwise 
for the Shia to turn to Iran as this will increase the likelihood of confrontation with 
Arab countries, and he may be right in theory, but politics do not always work 
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according to theory.1118 Akeel Abbas blames discrimination on the assertion of 
sectarian identity, be it Shia or Wahabi. The Shia, he asserts, never complained 
before from discrimination by other Arabs against them.1119  
 
Maysoon Aldamluji contends that Iraq isn’t going for division; ‘it’s hard pill to swallow’ 
she avers. She also rejects the discrimination concept and her evidence is the 
Lebanese Hizbulla leader, Hassan Nasrullah, was ‘idolized by Arabs until he sided 
with Bashar Al-Assad’. She adds ‘the Shia are proud Arabs who refuse to be 
subordinated to Iran’.1120  Faleh Abdul-Jabbar contends that the Iraqi national identity 
has collapsed and it has been replaced by sect, class or race. ‘This collapse of the 
idea of national identity… limits democracy and weakens it' he asserts.1121  
 
Civic nationalism is shaped by the presence of strong administrative institutions and 
flexible elite interests that can adapt to democratization. For civic nationalism to 
emerge, “liberal institutions [should] precede mass politics.” Under such conditions 
elites do not feel threatened by the changes brought about by the democratic 
transition and “nationalism is likely to be inclusive and will probably take a civic 
form.”1122 Civic nationalism is nurtured by attachment to an assemblage of political 
ideas and institutions rather than to an ascriptive loyalty, such as ethnic identity. 
Snyder argues that belligerent nationalism can thrive even in cases with strong 
liberal press and lively civil society, such as Weimar Germany. “Racist, authoritarian 
nationalism,” he notes, “triumphed at the end of the Weimar Republic, not despite 
the democratization of political life, but because of it.”1123  
 
As we saw earlier, democratization could lead to weakening the state and perhaps 
division.  Similarly, Dr Khalil Osman argues that ‘democratization intensified the 
process of the hardening of ethnic and sectarian identities in post-2003 Iraq… 
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democratization undermined the prospects of coexistence among various 
communities and fomented inter-communal conflict’.1124 
Ali Allawi detected a key shift in Shia thinking ‘from the politics of victimization to an 
insistence on their right as a majority’. As such, a mere ‘acknowledgement of 
democracy and democratic rules of practice would no longer be sufficient to assuage 
the majority of the Shia’.1125  While, he admits, not all the Shia subscribed to this new 
thinking, a very large majority did so ‘moving the fulcrum of political identity and 
loyalty away from secular groups to and towards Islamists and sectarian figures. The 
pattern of Iraqi political life had decisively altered’.1126  
 
As Allawi has noticed, there were three contrasting currents flowing together in the 
drive to establish Iraq’s sovereignty. The first was comprised of the CPA, the liberals 
and the Kurdish camp. They were trying to ‘fashion the outlines of a federal and 
secular state in the broadly familiar terms of a modern pro western democracy’. The 
second was comprised of UN envoy Brahimi, the UN and Arab countries who sought 
to maintain ‘some vestige of the old united Iraq with a clear Arab identity and re-
empower Sunni Arabs’.  
 
The third was represented by ‘Sistani who articulated the demands of the Shia and 
… insisted on a role for Islam and its teachings in the new order’.1127 Sistani 
dominated the proceedings ‘not by his detailed interventions in the political process, 
but by setting markers that he considered sacrosanct such as the broad 
acknowledgement of Islam’.1128 Sistani, according to Allawi, achieved his objectives, 
not just through reference to Islam, but by inference to democratic theory’.1129    
Dia Shakarchi regards the feeling of belonging to a sect (rather than a state) as 'the 
biggest impediment to the process of democratic transition' followed by belonging to 
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religion, ethnicity and region. He also senses a weak sense of belonging to the 
motherland in Iraq.1130 Wahda Al-Jumaili regards the ‘ambition of the Kurds and their 
attempts to impose their will on the central government and their exploitation of 
Sunnis-Shia differences as a problem for democracy.1131 Dr Abdul-Khaliq Hussein 
regards the Kurdish issue as one of the challenges to democracy. He argues the 
Kurds are 'suspicious of any regime in Baghdad even the one that is elected 
democratically. That’s why they are always in conflict with the federal government, 
and this poses a threat to democracy'. The presence of diverse cultures and more 
than one nation existing makes pursuing democratization difficult. ‘Congruence 
between polity and demos would facilitate the creation of democratic nation-
state’.1132  Conversely, Polis/demos incongruence creates problems for democratic 
consolidation unless carefully addressed.1133 
In sum, Iraq has a stateness problem and this is not conducive to democratic 
consolidation.  The state in all democracies acts as the 'specialised agency for 
enforcing compliance' and, as time goes by, the state becomes independent of 
political forces in doing this task.1134 The state’s autonomy of intervention by political 
forces, that is controlled by institutional framework, is 'of fundamental importance in 
any democracy'.1135  
 
But what happened in Iraq, in the words of Ali Allawi, was ‘the corroded and corrupt 
state of Saddam was replaced by the corroded, inefficient, incompetent and corrupt 
state of the new order”.1136 The state institutions are partisan, and since parties are 
exclusively sectarian or ethnic, the institutions are similarly fashioned. Ministers 
brought their party followers and relatives to their ministries with no fear of breaking 
the law.1137  This trend has weakened the state and national identity further.  
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2 
Rentier State 
Iraq depends almost completely on its oil revenue. According to David Nummy, US 
advisor to the Iraqi finance ministry in 2003, oil revenue constitutes 98% of the Iraqi 
budget. 1138 Luay Al-Khateeb, non-resident fellow at Brookings Institute in Doha, 
says oil revenues constitute 43 percent of GDP, 99 percent of exports and 90 
percent of all federal revenues. Thus, to increase overall revenues, the government 
is always under pressure to increase oil production capacity regardless of market 
volatility.1139  
In 1990, Samuel Huntington listed Iraq, together with Iran and others, in the upper-
middle-income zone, which is above where transition to democracy might be 
expected. He said the economic preconditions for democratization were present, but 
democratization has not occurred.1140    
But Huntington had one qualification regarding democratization in these countries. 
‘The economic well-being of these countries was dependent on oil exports, a 
situation that enhanced the control of the state bureaucracy and hence provided a 
less favourable climate for democratization.1141   
Samir Sumaidaie contends that since Iraq is a rentier state, whoever controls the oil, 
gains immense political advantage by building a structure of patronage.1142 He 
contends that oil prolongs undemocratic systems and if it wasn’t for the oil, the 
Iranian regime ‘would have gone under long time ago’. Maysoon Aldamluji regards 
the ‘rentier economy’ as one of the impediments to democracy.1143 
Fareed Ayar explains that the rentier state ‘makes people dependent on the state 
because all resources are in the hands of the government and citizens become 
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dependent on the person who has the money and that is the Prime Minister. He 
distributes the money as he sees fit and this is one of the biggest obstacles to 
democracy’. He argues if a private sector exists, ‘taxpayers and people in general 
can hold government officials to account’.1144 Adnan Al-Janabi, a graduate of LSE 
and specialist in oil, affirms the ‘rentier state’ is the most difficult problem to surmount 
and it’s a serious impediment to democracy. 1145  
Bassim Anton, an economist and business expert, argues that Iraq's dependence on 
oil revenues ‘has weakened democratic transformation because it has led to the 
stoppage of other productive sectors, especially industry, which are considered the 
magnet for attracting businesses to productive factories which act to create cultures 
and facilitate the exchange of information and interests’. He states that selecting 
workers on the basis of economic interests achieves ‘part of democracy’.1146  
Economist Kadom Shubber contends that economic diversification should be part of 
any sound economic strategy of every nation. ‘A well-balanced economy assists in 
building a mature and healthy democratic system’ and this ‘requires people to be 
able to think freely, independently, and confidently’. ‘When individuals view their 
livelihood to be dependent on a linkage with a political party or an organ of the State, 
their judgment can be impaired, even paralysed, and hence might follow diktats 
handed down to them, he explains. ‘Even a "socialist" system can be anti-
democratic’, because the state employs most workers and they can be ‘strongly 
impacted by the political party that happens to be in power’.  
Shubber contends that Iraq ‘had a better-functioning democracy in the 1920's, 30's 
and 40's than in subsequent decades when substantial increases in oil revenues 
were forthcoming’. ‘As oil income began to flow in increasing amounts, other 
economic sectors were neglected, while the ruling class saw no pressing need to 
take heed of people's views or to subject themselves to national scrutiny’. 1147 
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Oil prices have collapsed since 2015 and this has eliminated 60 percent of oil’s 
previous market value.1148 Everyone now recognises that dependence on oil has 
many drawbacks. Thus, falling oil prices ‘may present a real opportunity for reform in 
Iraq’.1149 When Iraq moves away from the rentier state, people will have more say in 
their own affairs since they will be paying through taxes to finance state activities. 
Economic restructuring takes a long time to have an effect. With other problems 
facing the country, this may even take longer.   
Experts say high oil prices have intensified corruption and widened bureaucracy. 
‘When oil was selling at $90 to $100 a barrel…the cash fed a corrupt political system 
based on patronage. Instead of investments in public services, the money fed an 
unsustainable expansion of government payrolls and with it a rise in consumer 
spending’.1150 Rentier state is clearly a problem for democracy and unless Iraq 
moves away from it, democracy will remain weak.  
 
Reforms of the economy are urgently needed to reduce reliance on oil revenue. But 
can the current government or even system undertake such necessary reforms with 
all the party rivalries and infighting? ‘Fragmented and polarized party systems 
heighten partisan rivalries, magnify conflicts among organised interests and weaken 
the capacity of the executive to initiate reform’.1151 Political factors can lead 
politicians to discount future gains because of impending elections or to avoid 
protests or riots.1152 This has happened several times in Iraq, once when the 
government decided to abolish the ration card and again when it wanted to increase 
the prices of electricity.1153  
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3 
Level of Economic Prosperity 
I have established that democracy requires a state to consolidate, but this state must 
be strong and economically prosperous for democracy to be stable. In addition, there 
is a need for strong middle class, high levels of literacy and education, limited 
inequality, a productive market economy and a vigorous civil society.1154  This has 
been proven, although democracy has expanded to poor countries such as Mali, 
which didn’t meet the classic conditions since it has high level of illiteracy, dire 
poverty and life expectancy of 44 years.1155  
 
Iraq had suffered in its recent history from two devastating wars, 12-year sanctions, 
brutal dictatorship which led to a steady economic decline and destruction of the 
middle class. Per capita income had fallen by over a half to $1000. Education and 
health levels had declined sharply, child mortality rate had increased several times, 
and infrastructure had deteriorated while foreign debt had piled up to a staggering 
$200 billion. Over 40% of Iraqi adults are illiterate.1156 
Iraq was in the upper-middle-income zone in 1990, which is above where transition 
to democracy might be expected. 1157  But with the deterioration and destruction 
listed above, most of which had taken place after 1990, Iraq was well below the 
economic level required for democratization.  In addition, Iraq was wholly dependent 
on oil exports as we saw in the last section, which enhanced the control of the state 
bureaucracy and provided less favourable climate for democratization.1158   
One of the five conditions that must exist for democracy to be consolidated is 
institutionalised economic society.1159 This didn’t exist in Iraq then nor does it exist 
now. The other four are: lively civil society, autonomous political society, rule of law 
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and independent associational life and usable state bureaucracy.  
 
Democratization in Iraq coincided with economic, infrastructure, social and 
educational devastation and that was not conducive to successful democratization 
since people lacked the basic necessities required for a normal modern life. Iraq has 
faced dire economic difficulties over the last two years due to falling oil prices. It’s 
struggling to meet its obligations to state employees and is unable to maintain basic 
services such as education and health. In sum, the low level of economic 
development doesn’t help push democratization forward.  
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4 
Weak Institutions 
It was established earlier that democracy needs civil society, political society, 
economic society, rule of law, and a functioning state bureaucracy. Under the 
personal dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, there were neither political nor civil 
societies. Since the state controlled everything and depended on oil revenue, there 
was hardly any economic society that is not related to the state in which abound the 
practices of coercion, nepotism and whim.  
The state under Saddam was ‘an engine of power, accumulating resources, 
deploying patronage and maintaining control over its inhabitants… centered on the 
restrictive circles of Saddam Hussein’s associates, linked to him either through 
bonds of kinship and regional background or through history of personal trust’.1160  
Ali Allawi described it as ‘corroded and corrupt’ but ‘it was replaced by a corroded, 
inefficient, incompetent and corrupt state of the new order”.1161 Samuel Huntington 
called the regime type in Iraq, alongside the one in Cuba, a ‘personal 
dictatorship’.1162 According to Ali Allawi, when the Americans entered Iraq in April 
2003, they found the institutions of the state ‘moribund and the state ‘exhausted’, 
while ‘the ideology that had held Ba’athist rule together had decayed beyond 
repair”.1163 
For Saddam, and Al-Bakir before him, even the Ba’ath Party ‘was an extension of 
their personal power through a system of patronage which they alone would 
control’.1164 Despite the socialist rhetoric of the regime, all economic directives were 
geared to enhancing the control of the regime and its associates.1165  
Dr Kadom Shubber contends by 2003 Iraq had ‘antiquated bureaucracy, without any 
internationally acceptable legal system or transparent or just enforcement 
                                                            
1160
  Tripp-(2007)-op.cit.p216 
1161
  Allawi-(2007)-op.cit.p460 
1162
  Huntington-(1991)-op.cit.p41 
1163  Allawi-(2007)-op.cit.p16 
1164
  Tripp-(2007)-op.cit.p191 
1165
  Ibid.p197 
302 
 
 
framework. The State apparatuses became by far the most violent, savage and 
erratic part of Iraqi society, thereby convincing ordinary people the only effective 
deterrent to malpractice, crime, corruption and other wrongdoings was harsh 
punishment or the prospect of it’.1166 Samir Sumaidaie charges that ‘although the 
new system has some of the trappings of democracy, it remains without some of the 
important institutions to make it work’.1167  
Faleh Abdul-Jabbar contends the independent institutions are now undermined. 
They have added to them executive institutions such as the Sunni and Shia 
endowments which manage mosques and the two must be separated in a democracy. 
‘There is ambiguity regarding them, and now the council of ministers wants to take 
charge of them. These must be independent of the executive authority and 
supervised by parliament, not the government’.1168  
Ayad Allawi lists the ‘absence of law and order, lack of institutions, failure of the 
judiciary and its control by the executive and the dismantling of the state’, as reasons 
for the failure of democracy. He explains that ‘the starting point for the democratic 
process is the presence of the rule of law, basic rights of citizens and citizenship, 
and the presence of institutions that can defend democracy’ and these are non-
existent.1169 
Akeel Abbas asserts that state machinery performance is ‘abysmally poor, 
particularly in its upper echelons and decision-making bodies'.1170 He blames this on 
religious and sectarian slogans which 'helped bring unqualified officials who may 
have hidden their inabilities behind their religious rhetoric'.  
MP Maysoon Aldamluji charges that one of the impediments to democracy is ‘the 
absence of democratic institutions and the weakness of the judicial system.1171  
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Shorouq  Al-Abayachi blames weak social fabric and state institutions for the failure 
of democracy.  She states; 'in the light of the rupture in the social fabric of Iraqi 
society, which is based on sectarian and ethnic basis, and the absence of the force 
of law and security, as well as the absence of real developmental programmes and a 
vision for social and institutional reforms, all these have weakened, in a big way, the 
prospects of an entrenched democratic experiments over the next ten years'.1172  
 
Wahda Al-Jumaili contends the state is generally weak and blames other social ills 
such as sectarianism on state weakness.1173 Ibrahim Al-Haidari blames the rise of 
undemocratic forces on the ‘weakness of the state and the spirit of citizenship, the 
split identity and the non-development of real and effective democratic forces in 
society’.1174 It is now established that Iraqi state institutions were weak under 
Saddam and became weaker and corrupt under the new order and this is an 
impediment to democracy.  
5 
Corruption 
Democracy is consolidated 'when a particular system of institutions becomes ‘the 
only game in town’,1175 when no one can imagine acting outside the democratic 
institutions, when all losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions 
under which they have lost'.1176 When democracy becomes 'self-enforcing' we can 
think of it as established and entrenched within a society. This means when all the 
participants feel they find it best for their interests to use the existing system and 
have hope to get improvement sometime in the future. In other words, when 
democracy becomes a benefit to all and it’s harmful for any political force to try and 
subvert it. But is this enough to protect democracy? No says Adam Przeworski. He 
                                                            
1172
  Ibid, p107 
1173
  Ibid, p107-110 
1174
  Ibid, p112 
1175
  Linz& Stepan-(1996)- p5 
1176
  Przeworski-(1991)-p26 
304 
 
 
suggests some ‘rules of punishment, a bureaucracy to detect noncompliance and a 
set of incentives for the bureaucracy to detect it and apply the rules'.1177   
But punishment cannot be effective if detection techniques are not working 
especially when officials are easily bribed1178. Corruption is wide spread in Iraq and 
all the efforts to limit it have failed. Not a single person in Iraq today disagrees with 
this fact. One ‘courageous’ MP admitted that ‘everyone is corrupt including me. I was 
offered $5m by someone to stop investigating him. I took it, and continued 
prosecuting him anyway’! Mishaan Al-Jabouri was quoted as saying.1179  Sami Al-
Askari explains that corruption is widespread and ‘the prevailing social culture 
doesn't condemn it to the point that some people envy corrupt officials and wish they 
had the opportunity to practice financial corruption themselves and make illegal 
material gains’.1180 Ayad Allawi regarded corruption as one of the impediments to 
democracy.1181 So did Samir Sumaidaie, Waleed Al-Hilli, Kadom Shubber, Kanan 
Makiya, Dia Shakarchi, Ali Allawi, Sharwan Al-Wa’eli, Fareed Ayar, Abdul-Khaliq 
Hussein, Shorouq Al-Abayachi, and Kamran Qaradaghi among others.1182 Shakarchi 
charges that 'Corruption was strengthened through hiding behind religious and 
sectarian slogans'. He senses a 'mutual cover up of corruption among the same 
political foes'. Corruption cases are brought against individuals from rival parties but 
a deal is always reached to drop cases against each other.  
Judiciary is perceived to be biased as the Federal Court has passed many rulings 
that were thought to be in favour of the government, especially under the 
premiership of Noori Al-Maliki, when the court allowed the formation of election lists 
after the announcement of election results.1183 This could create a potential for 
‘endless negotiations after every election’. 1184 There were also many verdicts 
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passed against individuals accused of corruption or terrorism but were overturned 
after ‘deals’ were struck or after the new PM, Haider Al-Abadi, took over from the 
previous PM.1185  
Sharwan Al-Wa'eli points to politicians 'who can be bought with an armoured car or 
half a million dollars'. He reveals that he referred more than 500 corruption cases to 
the Commission of Public Integrity-(CPI)-but the judiciary didn’t act because there 
was no oversight. 'Even MPs who signed the referral of cases are now outside 
parliament', he reveals. 'This is a message to anyone who speaks out against 
corruption; it will backfire on you' he exclaims. 
He claims there are judges who occupy important positions but have ‘weak points’. 
'He who has a weak point is led easily', Al-Wa'eli declares. In other words, they can 
be easily blackmailed. He is referring to judges who cooperated with the Saddam 
regime. Those judges are weak because if they do not cooperate with the new 
rulers, they will be dismissed as 'Ba'athists or remnants of the previous regime'. 
Kamal Filed emphasises the need for 'good governance' which he believes is still 
lacking in Iraq. 'According to international experience, democracy requires the strict 
application of law and this is proportionately linked to the educational and cultural 
state of society' he asserts. Bassim Anton regards corruption as an impediment to 
democracy. 
 
Fareed Ayar sees corruption as the biggest problem in Iraq today. He also blames 
the US for corruption. 'Some Americans who came to Iraq were corrupt. There was 
corruption in many of the contracts that they brought to us including contracts for the 
IHEC'.1186  Adil Abdur-Raheem warns that an environment conducive to corruption’ 
has been created by the 'politicians’ double standard' and this can render the 
democratic political process devoid of its content.  
 
CPI director, Hassan Al-Yassiri, announced early in March 2016 that he has asked 
the central government to issue arrest warrants for 2165 officials charged with 
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embezzlement of public funds, and the list includes six ministers.1187 
Ali Allawi describes current politicians as ‘utterly unprincipled and corrupt’ who seek 
to ‘enhance their individual and family claims on power'.1188   
 
Corruption exists in all ministries. An entire battalion of the Iraqi police was found to 
be non-existent, while corruption is widespread in the army with ghost employees 
and shortage of supplies.1189  PM Al-Abadi announced that he has identified 50,000 
‘ghost soldiers’ who didn’t exist and he scraped their positions.1190 The US embassy 
accused the Maliki’s government of being “not capable of even rudimentary 
enforcement of anticorruption laws”.1191  
James Mattil, the US senior consultant to CPI, told the Senate ‘Iraq’s endemic 
corruption is an integral element of the insurgency, providing money, personnel and 
motivation to insurgents and terrorists’.1192 Terrorist groups, such as ISIS, have 
funded their activities through corruption before they seized territories in Iraq.1193 
 
Corruption is a serious impediment to democracy in Iraq because it weakens state 
institutions which are responsible for enforcing the system and render them 
ineffective. The judiciary, election commission, parliament, police, army and even the 
integrity commission, are all accused of corruption and very few people trust them. 
Corruption is responsible for funding insurgents and terrorists. Those who are hostile 
to democracy try to link democracy to economic success 'because they expect 
economic crises to turn some civilians against democracy which will increase the 
probability of a successful subversion to which they would respond... by 
overthrowing democracy'.1194 Unless corruption is brought under control, democracy 
in Iraq will remain vulnerable.  
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6 
Weak and Divided Secular Movement 
 
I have explained the strengths and weaknesses of Islamist parties throughout the 
study, and how they managed to get into power through fair means and foul. But one 
of the important factors that helped Islamists seize and maintain power is the 
weakness and division among secular parties, right from the outset. There were two 
main secular parties, INA and INC, with two formidable and resourceful leaders, Dr 
Ayad Allawi and Dr Ahmed Al-Chalabi. But they were so hostile to each other that 
they preferred to form alliances with Islamists rather than with each other. 
 
 Ahmed Al-Chalabi joined the main Shia list, UIA, and became deputy PM in 2005. 
When UIA splintered into two lists, SoL and NIC, he joined SIIC within NIC. Ayad 
Allawi had a unique opportunity when he was chosen to be the interim PM in 2004, 
but he was unable to unite secular groups under his leadership. When he lost the 
premiership in 2005, he remained at the political periphery until 2010 when he 
formed an alliance with Sunni Islamists such as Tarik Al-Hashimi and Mahmoud Al-
Mash-hadani and others, but couldn’t make rapprochement with Ahmed Al-Chalabi 
or other secular groups and personalities. Although he managed to maintain his 
nationalist line, the group he was leading looked more Sunni than pan-Iraqi.  
Allawi admits that secular parties have failed. 'National and socialist parties have 
failed after decades of being in power'.1195 He attributes the failure to external factors 
such as Cold war although he admits they are also due to intrinsic factors.  
 
The third secular force was the Dialogue Front led by Dr Salih Al-Mutleg. Although 
Al-Mutleg was able to join with Ayad Allawi in 2010 to form the Iraqia List, it was a 
temporary and fragile alliance that disintegrated immediately after the elections when 
Mutleg abandoned Iraqia and joined the Maliki government, becoming deputy PM. 
Ahmed Al-Chalabi died in November 2015, and his INC party has no prospect of 
remaining in politics, since it was almost a ‘one man show’ right from the beginning. 
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Allawi has maintained his pan-Iraqi secular nationalist stance, but he failed to form a 
true democratic party with obvious successors should he decide to retire, 
considering he is now 72. Al-Mutleg has apparently given up on pan-Iraqi nationalist 
politics. After the 2014 elections,1196 in which he lost half of his parliamentary seats, 
he joined the Sunni alliance of UIF. 
 
For democracy to succeed, there must exist a united, dynamic and really democratic 
national force with clear policies and charismatic leaders. This has continued to 
elude Iraq. Former PM Ayad Allawi acknowledges that secular parties have also 
failed. Dr Fareed Ayar charges 'secular parties in third world countries are too 
negligent'.1197 Dr Wahda Al-Jumaili hopes to see a civil state that believes in human 
beings and asserts this can only develop if ‘civic parties that believe in humanity 
before anything else develop’. She blames secular parties for lacking serious 
propositions for a national inclusive plan.1198  
Dia Shakarchi blames secular parties for being hesitant in declaring their secular 
views while Hani Fahs says ‘secularism has a bad connotation in our culture’ 
although it’s associated with democracy.1199 Dr Kamal Field asserts that people are 
influenced by the views of clergymen or tribesmen because 'the options 
available…are a few'.1200 This shows if there was a solid secular movement, the 
electorate will have more choice. Dr Akeel Abbas argues 'without secular parties that 
transcend sects and ethnicities, Iraq will continue to be prey to sectarian and ethnic 
strife'.1201 
As we saw earlier, Islamist parties have united at crucial times to defeat their 
opponents, and this has happened in 2005, 2010 and 2014, while secular parties 
have failed to do so. In 2010, there was one strong list (Iraqia) but it was made up of 
disparate Islamist and nationalist parties which were not able to last long. Unless 
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there is a solid secular and democratic movement that has a long term political aims 
(as opposed to personal ambitions of individual party leaders), Islamist parties would 
continue to dominate the political scene in Iraq. Since Islamists, by their own 
admission, are not committed to liberal democracy, this will continue to be an 
impediment to democracy.  
    
7 
Absence of Capable National Leaders 
The Iraqi democratic process has failed to produce national leaders and statesmen 
who command national respectability and approval. In the words of Ali Allawi ‘there 
were only Shia, Sunni and Kurdish politicians, a smattering of self-styled liberals and 
secularists, each determined to push their particular agenda forward’.1202  Dr Kanan 
Makiya describes the political class as ‘small men with no vision. They treated Iraq 
as booty’.1203 Samir Sumaidaie calls the whole process ‘kleptocracy’.1204 Maysoon 
Aldamluji lists the lack of vision among the ruling elite as one of the obstacles to 
democracy.1205 Dr Wahda Al-Jumaili, too, blames the ‘discord, division and weakness 
of social peace and favouring sub-identities over national identity’ on the failing of 
politicians who are decision makers.1206 
When the people are divided ethnically and religiously, political leaders cannot win 
without using sectarian rhetoric. Islamists are divided even within the same sect. 
Secularists are always divided. This problem will continue until leaders with national, 
cross-sectarian and cross-ethnic discourse are found. One of the main reasons for 
the success of the Spanish democratization was the ‘innovative leadership of Prime 
Minister Adolfo Suarez’.1207 He managed to stir the democratization process 
delicately but steadily, including all political forces but insisting on the application of 
basic democratic principles such as holding national elections and articulating key 
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issues of democracy. One of the factors contributing to the first and second reverses 
according to Samuel Huntington was the weakness of democratic values among key 
elite groups and the general public.1208  
 
Iraq has no capable leaders who can rise to the status of nation builders. Without 
principled and inspiring leaders, with clear vision for the future, democracy cannot be 
consolidated and reversal could take place or worse, disintegration of the country.  
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Chapter 13 
Conclusion 
Recommendations for Reform 
& 
Implications for Academic Research 
   
Conclusion 
The original contribution of this thesis to the body of knowledge is that it has 
identified the main impediments to democracy in Iraq and provided an insight, 
through its recommendations, into finding ways to overcome those impediments and 
consolidate democracy. The study has explored the democratization process in Iraq 
thoroughly, examined it from within, taken the opinions of different participants, 
experts and observers, compared it, in certain relevant aspects, to the experiences 
of other countries in southern Europe, eastern Europe and Latin America, which 
have democratised in the last few decades and finally weighed up the progress 
made so far and the challenges ahead, in an academic and impartial way. Although 
this study pertains to Iraq, it can be generalized in many of its findings to other Arab 
and Muslim countries because Iraq shares, in varying degrees, many cultural and 
religious characteristics with Arab and Muslim countries.  
Since democracy is a new phenomenon in the Arab world, this study sheds some 
light on impediments facing democracy in Arab and Muslim societies, and therefore, 
it has enhanced the theory of Arab democracy.   
One of the basic pillars of democracy is liberalism and this has been explored in 
detail taking the thoughts of one of the leading scholars of liberalism, John Stuart 
Mill, into account. It has also examined the role of religion in politics and examined in 
details the ideas of one of the most important political thinkers in this field, John 
Rawls, who has studied this phenomenon in depth and provided some important 
insights which I believe can be useful to the Iraqi experience. Rawls ideal of a 
political conception of justice that is ‘free-standing’ in order to appeal to all citizens is 
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what is needed in Iraq. Our modern society, as described by Rawls, is characterized 
by pluralism, objection to oppression, quest for justice, debate, and dissensus. 
Therefore, no single religion or philosophical doctrine can be affirmed by all free 
people. Thus, in order to enable all citizens to feel equal, it’s important that the 
democratic state doesn’t adopt any religious or philosophical doctrine. 
The thesis also explored democracy as a concept and how it developed over the 
years and what are its main institutions and benefits through the ideas of Robert 
Dahl, Joseph Schumpeter, John Dunn, Samuel Huntington, Juan Linz, Alfred 
Stepan, Adam Przeworski, John Keane, Barrington Moore and Larry Diamond. Their 
ideas were not accepted entirely but compared and discussed in connection with 
realities in Iraq. Since democracy cannot just happen without a preliminary process 
of liberalization and democratization, there was a need to examine the experiences 
of other countries such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Latin American and Eastern 
European countries. Each country has a different process depending on the type of 
the non-democratic regime it was governed by.  
In Eastern Europe, the Polish experience was totally different to the Romanian one 
because the non-democratic regimes in both countries were different. Similarly, the 
Spanish experience, which was considered most successful by Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan, was different to the Greek one or even to that of next door Portugal. 
Democratization becomes a lot easier if the non-democratic regime was authoritarian 
as was the case in Spain and Poland. But it becomes a lot complicated if the 
previous regime was totalitarian, post-totalitarian, or worse, Sultanistic or personal 
dictatorships such as Romania and Iraq.1209  
 
In addition to the complication left by the previous regime, which could be 
formidable, especially if it was totalitarian or Sultanistic, under which democracy 
crafters have to start from scratch by establishing political, civil and economic 
societies, as well as rule of law and functioning bureaucracy, there are other 
problems to be considered such as stateness, economic development and 
educational standard.  
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Spain was considered a classic example of success since it had irredentist 
tendencies in the Basque and Catalan regions but it managed to overcome them. It 
surpassed all the problems due to the exceptional qualities of Prime Minister Adolfo 
Suarez, the support it received from the European Union and US, the sequence of 
elections (national then regional) and the inclusive policies that were pursued, 
allowing all political parties to participate in elections, even those connected to 
irredentist tendencies and terrorism.  
This success may not have been possible if it wasn’t for the liberalization policies 
and openness of the authoritarian regime of Gen. Franco. Iraq could have benefited, 
and perhaps it could still do so, from the Spanish experience of inclusiveness and 
dealing with irredentist tendencies.  
The type of democratic system is also important for any democracy. A presidential 
system gives more powers to the president who owes his powers directly to the 
people who elected him/her, and therefore, doesn’t always conform to parliament 
wishes, while a prime minister has to always satisfy parliament which has the power 
to withdraw confidence from him/her. The study didn’t elaborate on this issue 
because Iraq has already adopted a parliamentary system which is regarded as 
better for countries which are ethnically and religiously diverse.             
In order to be relevant to Islam, which matters a lot in the Iraqi recent experience, the 
thesis explored the thoughts of Sheikh Ali Abdu-Razik on the issue of 
caliphate/imamate, or Islamic government, which he proved was not necessary in 
Islam, if not harmful to it. The thesis also examined, as time and space allowed, the 
thoughts of other important scholars such as Hani Fahs, who was interviewed 
exclusively for this study, Muhammed Mahdi Shamsuddeen, Muhammed Hussein 
Fadhlalla, Abdulla Nuri among others, who believed (respectively) in secular 
democracy, people’s right to decide for themselves on how they live or be governed, 
the state of the human beings and nothing is absolute except God.        
There is no role more relevant to democratization in Iraq than the one played by the 
Shia spiritual leader, Ayatullah Ali Sistani, which was largely positive but 
controversial due the exploitation of Islamist parties of his position. Sistani insisted 
on holding elections for the national assembly, not favoured by the Americans and 
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some secular Iraqi parties, and also encouraged the people to vote and limited the 
role of Islamists parties in connection with the permanent constitution. I examined 
the two trends in Shia Islam, the quietist tradition of Ayatullah Khoei and 
interventionist trend of Ayatullah Khomeini. Ayatullah Sistani stands in between, but 
closer to Khoei than Khomeini. No unnecessary intervention but no complete 
abdication of politics. 
I have clearly identified what I regard as impediments to democracy after studying 
the process from different angles. I identified 20 impediments to democratization in 
Iraq. Some of which can be overcome easier than others since they are not on the 
same level. Most of them could be overcome if the political will existed and the right 
leaders were found but only with the support of the international community. Other 
impediments such as stateness, role of religion, sectarianism, divided polities and 
absence of innovative leaders would require exceptional efforts on the part of Iraqis 
first, but the international community can still back real democrats in Iraq when and if 
the will to promote democracy exists.    
Democracy in Iraq has faltered but it has not failed completely since it’s still going, 
although with difficulty. There are many challenges ahead, some of which maybe 
insurmountable without support from a strong sponsor. Only the US can deliver such 
support, but the US seems to have given up on democracy in Iraq. Democracy has 
many enemies, internal and external, and may not survive without international 
support and protection.   
Some of the ingredients for democracy, such as freedom of expression, access to 
communication and pluralism, are present and maybe permanent. Others, such as 
personal freedoms, human rights and legal rights are not always available and could 
be taken away if Islamist parties consolidate their control over the country. On 22nd of 
Oct 2016, Islamists passed a law banning the production, importation and 
distribution of alcohol in Iraq. More strict applications of Sharia might be on the way if 
this law is not reversed. Although it’s in the interests of all parties concerned to make 
the system work, since the alternatives are harmful to everyone for the time being, 
but some groups believe they have more rights, or power, than others and hence 
conduct their affairs accordingly.  
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 Adam Przeworski states that because 'any order is better than a disorder, any order 
is established'.1210  I believe this is what has prevailed so far in Iraq; ‘any order’. But 
the battle between different forces is still flaring. However, according to Hardin 
(1987), democracy has never been internally subverted in any country in which it 
lasted for twenty years with the exception of Uruguay.1211 Democracy in Iraq is 12 
years old. Academic Dr Akeel Abbas contends 'without secular parties that transcend 
sects and ethnicities, Iraq will continue to be prey to sectarian and ethnic strife'.1212  
 
Even secular parties find themselves “forced” to adopt religious rhetoric which gives 
the entire political and electoral process a false religious character that is not truly 
representative. This false spirit of political religiosity will deepen sectarian identities 
and undermine Iraq's national identity. I argue that as long as the electoral system 
allows parties based on religion, sect and ethnicity, to operate, it will be difficult to 
achieve fully-consolidated democracy. 
Democracy could progress if western countries have wider engagement with Iraqis, 
and if they really help the forces of modernity, moderation and reason which are 
formidable if they can organise and coordinate their efforts. As Larry Diamond 
acknowledged ‘it requires a prolonged international engagement with Iraq costing 
billions of dollars and lasting for a number of years’.1213 It looks that the Islamic 
Republic of Iran has the upper hand, currently and in the foreseeable future, 
because it has worked hard to build good relations with most political groups.  
 
The US has recently increased its involvement in Iraq in an effort to help the country 
rid itself of the terrorist challenges. But so has Iran. If the US involvement is 
consolidated, it will strengthen the hands of the democrats and forces of moderation 
and reason. Iraq, even under Islamists rule, will need the help and support of the 
international community, given its current economic difficulties. This is a window the 
international democratic forces could use to really support democracy. Economic 
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help should be conditional on achieving progress on democracy and respect for civil 
liberties. If the US withdraws again, Islamists, and their Iranian backers, will have the 
upper hand for a long time to come. It’s a continuous battle between forces of 
modernity and conservatism, secularism and religiosity.  
There is no single route to consolidation of democracy. It’s a ‘process through which 
acceptance of a given set of constitutional rules becomes less directly contingent on 
immediate rewards and sanctions and increasingly wide-spread and routinized’.1214 
It’s ‘the transformation of the institutional arrangements and understandings that 
emerged at the time of transition into relations of cooperation and competition that 
are reliably known, regularly practiced and voluntarily accepted by those persons or 
collectives that participate in democratic governance’.1215  
Democratization in Iraq is a flaring battle between the modernists and the 
traditionalists, federalists and centrists, separatists and unionist, Arabist and Iraqists, 
and more importantly, between Islamists and secularist. It’s going to be a long battle, 
but democracy will eventually triumph, as it has done elsewhere in the world, when a 
compromise is reached. Democracy has arrived in Iraq through an arduous and 
unorthodox route. It has given people freedom and dignity after long years of fear, 
oppression and humiliation. Islam and democracy must be reconciled in order for 
them to live side by side, supporting and protecting each other.  
 
Democracy can and will support peaceful and humane Islam, but what needs to be 
established is whether Islam can also reciprocate and support democracy. The 
enemies of democracy, with their foreign backers, are trying to set it against Islam for 
short-term political gains for them and strategic gains for their backers. They have 
succeeded but only partially. The challenge ahead is how can democracy survive in 
this hostile environment with so many formidable enemies?  The tie and the turban 
will continue to interact and the battle will continue for generations to come. Instead 
of defeating each other, they can live alongside each other since both are there to 
serve humanity.  
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Recommendations for Reform and Further Research 
Finally, the study finds that for democracy to consolidate in Iraq the following points 
need to be explored further and addressed: 
1- The clear evidence from the research carried out for this study, strongly 
suggests there is a stateness problem in Iraq which means there is a need for 
a radical redrawing of institutions and perhaps also of the map of the nation. 
There cannot be consolidated democracy and freedom in Iraq until the issue 
of the Kurdish people is properly addressed. As long as the Kurds aspire to 
join a state other than the Iraqi one, their commitment to Iraq will be 
questionable and compromised. Democracy requires all the citizens of the 
state to feel part of it, obey its laws and work towards strengthening the 
economic and political system. This is not happening now because of the 
ambiguity of the Kurdish issue. The Kurds want to establish their own state 
but they are unable to because neighbouring countries do not accept it. This 
is likely to continue in the foreseeable future and it means continued instability 
for Iraq.   
2- The Iraqi Constitution is ambiguous and contradictory at certain points. It must 
be amended in order to remove all ambiguous articles and restrictions on 
democratic activity and amendment. In particular, articles 2 and 142-4th must 
be repealed. Research must continue to find the most suitable constitution for 
a democratic Iraq. 
3- Iraq needs to adopt a totally secular modern system that rejects all types of 
discrimination between citizens. A total separation between religion and 
politics is needed to preserve national unity and social harmony and enhance 
national identity. Civil society is the right place for all religious and 
philosophical debates.   
4- Most political parties are currently based on religion, sect or race. For a stable 
country, political parties need be formed on national political and economic 
basis and no national party should be established on the basis of ethnicity, 
religion or sect. 
5- Iraq has suffered from outside interference in the past. Therefore, and in line 
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with international norms, all political parties, groups, unions, syndicates and 
organizations must not have secret dealings or relationships with foreign 
countries or organizations. All their dealings must be declared. This should be 
enshrined into law. 
6- Iraq needs a proportional representation electoral system, with the whole 
country as one constituency. This will ensure a wider representation for all 
groups, especially minorities and those with spatial differences. This system 
will reduce tension since it guarantees representation for all groups with 
substantial followings. 
7- Iraq has been depleted of its educated and skilled people who have 
immigrated to other countries. This phenomenon needs to be halted through 
giving incentives for people to stay and for those abroad to return. For 
democracy to be consolidated, the country needs to retain its young, capable 
and professional workforce. No discrimination should be allowed between 
Iraqis on any basis and all rights acquired by Iraqis abroad must never be 
used as a basis for discrimination. Further research into the problem could 
provide further evidence of the magnitude of this serious brain drain. 
8- Deba’athification, or Accountability and Justice Law, has hindered Iraq’s 
progress since it has deprived it from experienced managers and 
professionals. This law needs to be abolished and all cases of abuse during 
the previous regime must be dealt with by ordinary courts. Further research 
into the damage this law has caused to Iraq as well as the perceived benefits 
could provide more insight into the problem and possible solutions. 
9- No Iraqi citizen, except those convicted of crimes, should be barred from 
participation in the democratic process or holding any public office at any 
level. Currently, there are legal and practical impediments to people’s 
participation. This is related to laws introduced to bar certain people from 
holding public office, such as the Accountability and Justice Law. 
10- All armed groups outside the army and police must be banned. Ways need to 
be found to incorporate current militias within the state, giving them specific 
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national tasks to implement, as happened in the US after independence.   
This area is very ambiguous at the moment due to the secret nature of militias 
and their incorporation into the Popular Mobilization Unit (PMU) or Hashd. 
Further research could uncover more evidence as to the scale of the threat 
militias pose to democratization and the stability of the country. 
11- The electoral commission must be totally independent of political parties and 
nominations and appointments to its managerial board must not be done 
through political parties. They should be administered through the judiciary 
with international monitoring. The commission should have its own 
independent regulatory body that is open to regular monitoring by 
international bodies and civil society organizations. The UN should be 
involved in the selection of IHEC’s management board as was the case with 
the first one in 2004 which is regarded as efficient and impartial. 
12- Similarly, independent commissions must be fully independent and each of 
them must have its own independent regulatory body to oversee its 
performance and make its findings available to the public. No partisan 
nominations to the executives of these commissions should be allowed.     
13- Since democracy is linked to the free market, Iraq needs a diversified market 
economy and the government must encourage, enhance and support the 
private sector and allow and encourage the development of the middle class. 
This must not be done at the expense of comprehensive welfare system that 
ensures basic support for the poor, needy and the sick. 
14- Revenue from natural resources, such as oil and gas, must be paid into a 
fund which can only be used to support the Iraqi state infrastructure. Iraq must 
cease dependence on oil revenue so that its government would be more 
accountable to taxpayers.  Further research into this phenomenon will be 
helpful to disclose how damaging oil revenue has been to the democratization 
process and how it has enticed officials to be corrupt.  
15- Employment in state institutions should be done through a central system and 
on the basis of merit. No political, familial, racial or sectarian consideration 
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should be given to any appointment. 
16- Government activities should be open and transparent and all transactions 
and procedures should be simplified and done electronically in order to 
prevent corruption. The principle of good governance and e-government 
should be applied to reduce corruption and speed up procedures.  
17- Sectarian and racial discourse inflames hatred and tension between different 
people must be eliminated from public debate and this should be done by the 
legislation and regulation of the media and the establishment of an 
independent monitoring body.  The whole area of political discourse vis-à-vis 
religious discourse needs a thorough and detailed research as to which 
religious discourse is less harmful to democratization and which one isn’t. 
18- All Iraqi media outlets must be independently funded and administered, and 
no partisan or sectarian channels should be allowed. The state broadcaster, 
Al-Iraqia (IMN), needs to be independent and run by non-partisan 
professionals in order to deliver impartial and accurate information to the Iraqi 
public at large. 
19- Educational institutions should be run by an independent and apolitical body 
which must ensure that all Iraqis are entitled to free elementary and 
secondary education which must be compulsory to guarantee a minimum 
standard of education. University education should be regulated according to 
the needs of the country and means available to the state. Incentives should 
be available for students to enter certain fields that are currently less popular 
but are vital for the economy.  The area of elementary, secondary and 
university education needs to be explored further in line with the needs of the 
economy and the financial abilities of the state. 
20- The independence of the judiciary should be treated as sacrosanct and an 
independent regulatory body should be established to monitor the activities of 
judges, lawyers and the courts to ensure high level of propriety and conformity 
with the law and professional conduct code. Judges should also be 
guaranteed protection for life in order to give them the self-confidence needed 
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to administer justice fairly and without fear. This is important in a tribal society 
where revenge is commonplace. 
21- Police must be trained and educated to the level required by a democratic 
modern state. They must particularly be exposed to international human rights 
conventions and laws. There should also be an independent body to monitor 
their performance. 
22- International conventions on human rights, trade, economic development and 
labour must be respected and Iraq should sign and abide by all international 
conventions and norms which are vital for the consolidation of democracy. 
This will enhance Iraq’s integration in the democratic international community 
and protect Iraq’s democratic institutions.  
23- With all due respect to all cultural, religious and tribal values that people 
observe, the ultimate arbiter in the country should be the law of the land. No 
Iraqi should be exempt from the law and no arrangement should be allowed to 
subvert the law under any circumstances. However, tribal and religious values 
that accord with international law and democratic principles can be tolerated 
and further research is needed as to what extent can these values be 
tolerated and which ones support public reason and which ones are 
entrenched that need a long time to disappear. Different parts of Iraq vary in 
the strength and type of tribal values people observe and any research should 
take this into consideration. 
24- The ministry of culture should play a pivotal role in enhancing public belief in 
democracy, human rights, respect for diversity, personal freedoms and the 
peaceful resolution of disputes within society. Ever since democratization 
began, the ministry of culture has been neglected wittingly or unwittingly with 
disastrous consequences. Iraq is new to democracy and lacks democratic 
culture and this should be the realm of the ministry of culture or functionally 
similar institution. Research into the type of activities the ministry of culture 
should engage in is urgently needed.  
25- There is a need to nurture and sponsor reforms in religion so that it can 
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conform to democracy and modernity. Moderate forces need to be supported 
so that they become effective in persuading people that social, political and 
economic progress can only be made in moderate and peaceful endeavours. 
The educational and cultural establishments should sponsor debate on the 
role of religion in a modern society in order to educate people that there 
should be no conflict between religious ideals and modern democratic 
principles and civil liberties which form the basis for democracy.       
 
These reforms will consolidate democracy, enhance fairness and strengthen national 
identity, increase social harmony and stabilize the country politically and 
economically. 
 Implications of the Study for Academic Research 
The implications of this study for academic research are numerous but the most 
important of which is exposure of the impediments to democracy posed by the 
employment of religion and sectarianism into politics. This aspect of Iraqi politics has 
been thoroughly researched by considering the views of religious leaders, politicians 
and intellectuals. This will enhance further research into this field where potential 
researchers will find all the views of important intellectuals detailed in the fifty 
interviews I have conducted.  
One other implication of the study is the finding that for democracy to be 
consolidated in any country, it needs strong international sponsors, friendly, or at 
least not so hostile an environment as well as economic incentives as those provided 
by the EU and US to Eastern European countries (EU membership and financial 
help). Researchers into democratizations in the Arab world will need to explore this 
area further and take into consideration the fact that democracy is seriously 
challenged to the point of failure without international guarantees of support and 
regional acceptance which is another important area that needs further research. 
Hostile environment can cause democratization to fail of falter as happened in Iraq. 
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Researched I needed to find out how fearful regional undemocratic powers are of a 
successful democracy in the area and why should a democracy be harmful to them. 
Another implication is that the study has found political inclusion to be helpful to 
democratization and exclusionist policies cause more harm than good to democracy 
as we saw in Iraq in the Deba’athification Law which alienated a large proportion of 
Iraqi society and pushed many people to carry arms against the democratic regime. 
 The Tunisians have come to this conclusion and dropped the law of political 
exclusion, benefitting from the Iraqi experience. Political inclusion and tolerance are 
imperative for the success of democratization, even with the existence of irredentist 
tendencies. They tend to deprive extremist groups from the popular support they rely 
on for their existence. In the end they disappear when people feel they do not need 
to be different since they are all equal. Spain is a case in point. This aspect needs to 
be further examined in any new research into democratization since it has now been 
proven through the success of the Spanish experience and the failure of the Iraqi 
one. 
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Glossary 
Ahrar [The free] name of a parliamentary group of the Sadrist 
Trend in the Iraqi parliament 
As-Sadiqoon  [The Truthful], parliamentary bloc for Asa’eb Ahlul Haq’: an 
off-shoot of the Sadrist Trend 
Asa’eb Ahlul Haq   [the Leagues of the Followers of the Righteous Path: Iraqi 
political movement 
Ayatullah Shia theological rank, second highest after grand ayatullah   
Badr [full moon]; militia turned political party. ‘Badr’ was 1st 
victorious Muslim battle in the 7th century.  
Da’awa  [Call]: a political party in Iraq 
Hadeeth A saying of the Prophet Muhammed (plural; ahadeeth) 
Fadheela  [Virtue], name of a political party in Iraq] 
Faqeeh  Jurisprudent  
Fatwa   Edict 
Hussainiya   Shia religious centre named after Imam Hussein  
Ijtihad  [discretion]; the ability to pass a religious judgment, a stage 
in the Shia theology where a student becomes qualified to 
pass a religious opinion 
Imam Literally ‘leader’ of congregational prayer, but in Shia Islam 
the term is used to refer to each one of the 12 imams, 
beginning with Ali Bin Abi Talib and 11 of his descendants 
who are believed to be infallible and possessing divine 
knowledge 
Jihad Holy war that is declared by a high religious authority 
[marji3]  
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Jihadist Militant Salafist Muslims advocating and/or involved in 
armed activities against those they perceive as enemies of 
Islam 
Jubba Islamic religious garb 
Marja’iyyah The supreme religious authority who can issue legal rulings 
[fatwa] in Shia Islam 
Marji3 Supreme legal authority in Shia Islam whose legal rulings 
and edicts are binding on his followers. [The digit 3 signifies 
an Arabic sound called (ain) that doesn’t exist in English] 
Mathahib doctrines, singular is (Math-hab) 
Mukhabarat  The intelligence apparatus  
Mujtahid  Senior cleric with authority to issue religious fatwas (edicts)  
Muttahidoon  [United], political group led by Usamah An-Nujaifi 
Salafism Sunni Muslims following the pious predecessors [salaf], i.e. 
the first three generations of Muslims 
Salafist Follower of Salafism 
Sayyid a Shia religious title which reserved for Shia clerics who are 
descendant of the Prophet Muhammed. 
Shia [followers] & a Muslim sect or its followers 
Sunnah [tradition], particularly the tradition of Prophet Muhammad & 
a Muslim sect 
Sunnis  Followers of the Sunni sect 
Takfeer Excommunicating other Muslims and declaring them as 
non-believers 
Thawrah Revolution 
Uhud A Mountain between Makkah and Medina where a battle took 
place between the Muslims and the pagan Arabs in which the 
Muslims were defeated. 
326 
 
 
Ummah Muslim community 
Wataniyyah Patriotism 
Wilayet Al-Faqeeh [Rule of the Jurisprudent]; a Shia system of government 
devised by Iranian leader Khomeini and prevalent in Iran 
Wilayatul umma ala nafsiha [the jurisdiction of the nation on itself], a concept 
of democracy developed by the Lebanese late scholar, 
Muhammed Mahdi Shamsuddeen 
Yaldiz Ottoman palace in Istanbul where the Ottoman Sultan used 
to live 
Yazidis A religious group based in the province of Ninawa in 
northern Iraq 
Zakat (or zakah)  A Muslim religious tax levied 2.5% of a believer’s total assets 
and financial wealth 
Al Definitive article in Arabic which usually precedes most 
surnames. It changes to (at, ath, ar, az, as, ash, ass, adh, and 
an) depending on the letter it precedes (it become an (i.e. An-
Nujaifi) when it precedes the letter n, as (i.e. As-Sadr) when it 
precedes the letter s and so on). However, most writers keep it 
(al) at all times to avoid confusion. 
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List of Abbreviations 
AF Accordance Front 
BP  Ba’ath Party 
BO Badr Organization 
CDA Civil Democratic Alliance 
CPA Coalition Provisional Authority 
CPA Commission for Public Integrity 
CPJ  Committee for the Protection of Journalists 
IDM Islamic Da’awa Movement 
IDP Islamic Da’awa Party 
IDP-IO Islamic Da’awa Party-Iraq Organization 
IFD Iraqi Forum for Democracy  
IFP Fadheela Islamic Party 
IHEC Independent High Election Commission  
IIP Iraqi Islamic Party 
IL Iraqia List 
INA Iraqi National Accord 
INA Iraqi National Alliance 
INC Iraqi National Congress 
IRDC  Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council 
KA Kurdish Alliance 
NDF National Dialogue Front 
NIC National Iraqi Coalition 
NA National Alliance 
PL Patriotic List 
RT Reform Trend 
SCIRI Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq 
SIIC Supreme Islamic Iraqi Council (previously known as SCIRI) 
SoL State of Law 
ST Sadrist Trend (Ahrar or the free) 
UIA United Iraqi Alliance 
UIF Union of Iraqi Forces 
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Appendices  
There are 13 appendices attached to this thesis. Below are details of their contents. 
Picture files have got to be opened with the right programme such as ‘Microsoft 
Office Picture manager’ while documents can be opened with Word: 
Appendix 1 lists 50 general interviews with politicians, experts and activists 
Appendix 2: Quotes from public figures translated from Arabic 
Appendix 3: Election brochure by PM Ibrahim Al-Ja’afari in 2005 which has his 
photo on a prayer book. 
Appendix 4: Hostile election poster which portrays PM Ayad Allawi as a Ba’athist in 
a military uniform that invokes Saddam Hussein’s memory. 
Appendix 5: UIA election poster with a photo of Ayatullah Sistani 
Appendix 6: Election poster for UIA List No: 555 with a photo of Ayatullah SIstani 
Appendix 7: UIA poster with a photo of Ayatullah Sistani and its list number 169. 
Appendix 8: A poster for PM Al-Maliki associating himself with the historic Shia 
leader Al-Mukhtar who took revenge for the killing of Imam Hussein. 
Appendix 9: A photo of Shia political leaders, Abdul-Azeez Al-Hakim, leader of SIIC, 
Hadi Al-Amiri, leader of Badr Organization, and Adil Abdul Mahdi, Vice President and 
senior member of SIIC, ‘cooking’ in public in the Shia Ashoora religious 
remembrance of Imam Hussein in their attempt to market themselves as pious Shia 
faithful.    
Appendix 10: Presidential order appointing the daughter of President Fuad Masum, 
Jawan, as advisor to the president.  
Appendix 11: A poster showing Ayatullah Kadhim Al-Haeri’s fatwa against voting for 
secular parties 
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Appendices 
1 
 
Introduction 
I have conducted interviews with several people who I thought relevant to the subject 
of democracy and democratizations and who are informed about the subject as well 
as the impediments facing democracy in Iraq. Many are politicians who participated 
in the political process, some were ministers or government officials, including one 
former prime minister, one former interior minister, one national security minster, one 
former minister of state and current member of parliament, several leading members 
of parliament, the president of the first Independent High Election Commission 
(IHEC), Member and Spokesman of the first IHEC Council, several leading authors, 
academics, writers, former members of parliament, leaders of political movements, 
Islamists, former Islamists and secular,  intellectuals and clerics, men and women, 
experts on business, economics, law, politics and sociology. I have also interviewed 
a famous poet in order to have a literary input and how the literary community 
viewed events.  
 
I have asked them the questions listed below and more in the case of those I have 
interviewed in person. Although the subjects of questions remain, but their structure, 
and order may change slightly from one person to another depending on the 
circumstances of the person or the interview. I have conducted some interviews on 
single subjects as the research progressed and more insight into the subject was 
developed. 
 
Expert Views on Democratization 
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Some of the interviewees have answered the questions clearly and directly, with 
some elaboration for some, while others have given short and/or vague answers to 
some of the questions, or not answered them at all even when I pressed them. I can 
speculate about the reasons, but I can never be sure. They perhaps didn’t really 
know the answers or they didn’t wish to make their true opinions public. I have 
spoken to many relevant people, and some have promised to cooperate with the 
research, including the current Prime Minister, Dr Haider Al-Abadi, who was among 
the first I contacted in 2012, when he was a member of parliament, but some, Al-
Abadi included, failed to cooperate for their own reasons. The interviewees listed 
below are the ones who did cooperate and gave me their frank answers.    
 
Sample Questions for the interviews 
This is the list of the initial questions which I have either sent to interviewees by 
email or had with me to remind me of the questions.  As can be seen from the 
interviews, the questions varied and increased as the research progressed. Below is 
just a sample since I added to them and conducted some interviews with just one 
question: 
  
1- What are the cultural and religious impediments to the establishment of a fully 
democratic system in Iraq? 
2- Since democracy depends largely on the free will of individuals to vote for their 
preferred party, do you think that a religious fatwa, be it real or false, in favour or 
against, any party or individual candidate, impedes the democratic process? 
3- Do you believe that tribal, sectarian or regional affiliation or bias impedes 
democratisation in Iraq? 
4- Do you believe that a secular party is better placed to be fairer and more 
democratic than a religious one? 
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5- In the light of the pluralistic nature of Iraqi society, do you believe that an electoral 
system that includes only secular parties is better for the country than one which 
allows religious parties who may appeal to people's sense of religious or sectarian 
loyalty, rather than their economic well-being which might be served by this or that 
political party?  
6- Do you think that wearing a religious cloth or using religious rhetoric helps 
politicians get more votes in a religious society such as the Iraqi one? 
7- If religious rhetoric helps politicians get more votes, do you think that this very fact 
encourages the non-religious to pretend to be religious in order to get more votes, 
even though they are not religious in actual life? 
8- What effect in your opinion will this double standard have on politicians 
performances and consequently on people's lives?  
9- Do you believe that people in Iraq have actually voted in the last three elections 
according to their religious and sectarian affiliations?  
10- Do you believe that using religious and sectarian slogans have helped to bring 
unqualified officials to power who may have hidden their inabilities behind their 
religious rhetoric? 
11- Do you believe that democratizations in Iraq have failed over the last ten years?  
12- If yes, can you enlist the main reasons for this failure? 
13- Have you noticed any positive signs for democracy in Iraq over the last 11 
years? 
14- What are the prospects and challenges for democracy in Iraq and what sort of 
time frame can you give for a true democratic experiment to take root in Iraq? 
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Interview 1 
Sayyid Hani Fahs 
Sayyid Hani Fahs, Lebanese scholar, prominent religious leader, and writer who 
studied theology in Iraq during the 1960s and 1970s and was very well-versed in 
Iraqi and Shia religious and political affairs. The interview was conducted in his home 
in Beirut in the autumn of 2012. It was recorded on a tape recorder. Sadly, Sayyid 
Hani Fahs died two years later, in mid September 2014. 
 
Answers 
I would say that 80% of the blood spilt in history is shed because of religion, over 
religion, or for politico-religious reasons. Our religions stand accused (of causing 
violence), even the religious text stands accused. We must agree to live together 
and we must agree that salvation is an individual not collective (effort), and the 
space of religion has room for all of us. 
 
We must go to the religious text agreed on one view. If it accords with it, then it’s 
fine, if it doesn’t, we must interpret it in the right way (to suit modern life). If it cannot 
be interpreted (in the way we want it), then we should stand before it and say: ‘You 
the religious text is sacred because we have said so’. If the religious text is rigid, 
then it loses its status as a sacred text and it becomes outside history.  
  
 Christianity was established on the principle of abolishing the religious law. Christian 
worships are optional and have no obligatory aspect. The establishment of 
Christianity was on the basis of abolishing religious law and this is what has given it 
the ability to last and regain the space of the spirit as an alternative for religious 
obligatory law. 
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As for Judaism, it is in the utmost difficulty because it is overwhelmed with religious 
legislation. The reason is because it’s a worldly idea and has no afterlife. Its 
legislations are so harsh to the point that it is almost limited to legislation, and this 
has descended to Islam and we are almost limiting Islam to legislation, while 
legislation in fact constitutes only one fifth of Islamic thought. We must humanise 
religion and read the details very well and make the big ideas overrule the fine 
details. This is probably the reason behind the establishment of ‘the jurisprudence of 
the aims’ (fiqh almaqasid) in Islam. 
 
If we want to activate the humanitarian dimension of religions, we cannot do that 
except through the civil state. I avoid saying (secularism) even though I mean it, 
because the word (secularism) has bad connotations in our countries. Arab 
secularists were ideologues and fundamentalists. The challenge for us is to produce 
our secularism and our democracy because these concepts must go through our 
cultural and social peculiarities. If we continue to apply tried experiments, we will 
never be able to do anything. There is no general comprehensive definition for 
secularism. When we say secularism we mean democracy since the final aim of 
secularism is to establish democracy. Secularism establishes the state of individuals 
not groups. The aim of democracy is to reach secularism, and secularism without 
democracy is not really secularism.   
 
The principle of separation of religion and politics needs to be applied in the East. I 
agree that religion and state are two different and changing concepts. They could 
integrate practically, systematically and functionally, but it must not be permitted to 
separate religion from social groups or individuals. The best option is enlightenment. 
Enlightenment is the solution, not ‘Islam is the solution’ (the latter is the emblem of 
the Muslim Brotherhood). Enlightenment means creating a state for individuals – a 
legal state where individuals have free choice and human rights to which we add 
from our peculiarities without annulling any of their original qualities. Human rights 
are one concept even though they have diversities. 
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Religious political parties 
When we propose the civil state, with freedom of expression and democracy, we 
cannot reject the formation of any party. I would accept religious parties under the 
ceiling of the law. I also accept the communist party. There must be an 
administrative and epistemological system that forbids religious parties from forming, 
peacefully and through democratic means, a religious state. Western democracies 
didn’t ban religious parties but they imposed the system and democratic culture on 
them. Democracy developed western religious parties. There were Christian parties 
in western democracies but they were developed later through democracy.    
 
Iran must be looked at through liberal eyes. It has reached a stage where there is no 
religious party at all, there is only religious authority. There are Iranian generations, 
even from the generation of the revolution, who have passed the stage of reforming 
the regime to the stage of toppling it, which means toppling religion. We must nurture 
democratic persuasion through dialogue. 
 
The Lebanese religious leader, Muhammed Mahdi Shamsuldeen, came from Iraq to 
Lebanon as a member of the Islamic Da’awa Party. But a few years before his death, 
he was transformed into believing in the principles of plurality and the nation’s right 
to rule itself in the way it sees fit (Wilayatul umma ala nafsiha) or ‘the mandate of the 
nation on its destiny’. Where did his ideas come from? They came from the 
Lebanese social culture which made him think that the existence of the ‘different 
other’ is a cultural necessity. He was unable to introduce an (Islamic) exclusive 
project (within the Lebanese pluralistic context). 
 
In Tunisia, Rachid Al-Ghannouchi (the leader of Ennahda Islamic Party) realised the 
importance of the Tunisian secular experiment of President Al-Habib Bourguiba. He 
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read it in an advanced way and he wrote his PhD thesis on it. Tunis of President 
Zeinul Abideen Bin Ali did not tolerate him. Bourguiba’s experiment in Tunisia was 
advanced despite its mistakes. The credit goes to President Bourguiba and also to 
the Tunisian People and religious jurisprudents who absorbed it.  
 
Let’s move to Sudan now and look at the example and intellectual experiment of 
Hassan At-Turabi, who is brave intellectually and let’s leave out his political 
experiment which had some mistakes. At-Turabi understood the Sudanese 
experiment well, and looked at the position of women in it and the positions of 
Christians and idol-worshipers. He even permitted Muslim women to marry men from 
the ‘People of the Book’. Where did he get his ideas from? They came from an 
accurate reading of the Sudanese social realities.         
 
In Egypt, the regime fell and the Brotherhood and Salafis came out to introduce a 
culture that has no relation to the pluralistic Egyptian society where the Copts and 
Muslims, as well as the non-religious, live together. The Muslim Brothers outside 
power have limitless intellectual freedom. But when they became close to power, 
they started doing all sorts of unacceptable practices. Salafis have even interrupted 
parliament proceedings to perform the call to prayer (athan). 
 
The Islamic Da’awa Party in Iraq benefited a lot form living in exile.   
Muhammed Mursi (the Egyptian former president) must become president of all 
Egyptians, be they Muslims, Copts, Christians, Orthodox, Anglicans, Sunni, Shia, 
women and men, or he should abandon politics altogether. If he doesn’t do that, his 
concepts will be exposed. The logic of the state is another culture. It’s the real 
culture. The field experiment makes your knowledge deeper.  
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Iran is a ‘Sunni state’ because it is flexible. The Iranian state is a national state and 
Islam is a pretext for government. 
 
‘Taqleed’ [emulation] in the Shia doctrine is limited to religious issues. I agree that 
Sistani’s fatwa and what Al-Jazeera (TV channel) has said (two days before the Iraqi 
elections of 15th December 2005), were one of the most important stimulators of the 
election process in Iraq, and not necessarily applying the fatwa of the spiritual 
leader.  
 
The spiritual leader usually encourages people to vote and does not issue fatwas, 
but people do not differentiate between fatwas and encouragement. The spiritual 
leader who issues a fatwa in favour of a candidate or against a candidate will end his 
comprehensiveness and he will fall. It is one of the arenas of the permissible  
His position is to give guidance not commit people (to voting).   
 
Sistani’s agents (representatives), if they had become part of a specific election list, 
this was a mistake on their part. I am for the cleric and others to play their political 
roles, as this is a right for them as citizens. But the religious leader must not carry 
with him (in his political endeavour) the religion and religious authority. If he does, I 
(as a citizen or an ordinary Muslim following him) would tell him I won’t follow your 
(political) opinion. God has not made this part of His worship (nor did He specify 
which form of a state a worshiper must follow or promote). The type of the state is 
outside the field of worship. It’s in the space of reason and this is a common 
knowledge or collective mind.     
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 When religion interferes in the making of a state, it corrupts it as much as it 
interferes in it. When the state interferes in the production of religion, it corrupts it as 
much as it interferes in it.    
 
 As for politicians wearing a religious cloth, I agree, there must be a suppression of 
some kind applied here to prevent it according to law. But this (prevention) requires a 
suitable historical moment and an appropriate religious culture. Those who wear the 
religious cloth should not engage in politics but it must be enacted within the law that 
has been promulgated jointly not by just one party. 
 
In Najaf, there is no ‘Wilayat Al-Faqeeh’ (Rule of the Islamic Jurisprudent prevailing 
in Iran). Having said that, there is what is more difficult than this. There are religious 
jurisprudents who do not abide by the conditions of their religious mandate. They 
want to interfere in every fine detail on whim. We need religious seminaries 
(hawzahs) that mix between religious knowledge and civic knowledge. But the 
makeup of the personality of clerics does not help here.  
 
Most clerics are people who possess power or they are manipulated by people in 
power in order to produce the jurisprudence of convenience. When the religious 
seminary (hawzah) is able to produce a cultured and knowledgeable cleric who has 
the freedom (of thought) and has more questions than answers, I would then 
approve of the entry of religious scholars into politics. When we (Muslims) reach the 
stage of (Bishop) Makarios, the late Cypriot President, whose church wasn’t present 
with him in government, (then we can allow clerics and religious leaders to enter 
politics). 
 
 Muhammed As-Sadr (former Iraqi PM in 1948 who was a cleric) and Ali Ash-Sharqi 
and Muhammed Ridha Ash-Shabibi (former ministers of education during the 
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monarchy who were clerics as well) and other clerics at that time, preceded their 
time a lot. They were liberated from their (cloth) in areas which were very sensitive.  
  
Being a religious leader means you are a sultan (someone who possesses ‘sulta’ 
[power]), while state administration is the most authoritarian of all authorities and 
there are other powers under it. Therefore, a sultan, and by that I mean ministers, 
managers, governors, presidents and rulers, must not wear religious cloths (jubba).  
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Interview 2 
Mr Samir Sumaidaie 
Mr Samir Sumaidaie was a member of Governing Council 2003/2004, minister of 
Interior 2004, ambassador to UN 2004-8 and Ambassador to US (2008-2012). He is 
of Sunni Arab background and secular liberal. Mr Sumaidaie is also a poet and artist 
and highly educated. The interview was conducted via email and answers were 
received on 6th of November 2013 in English.   
 
Answers 
 
It cannot happen by chance 
The Iraqi experiment of democratisation has not been successful. Clearly the whole 
political system has changed drastically from an institutionalized dictatorship based 
on a single leader, ruthless security apparatus and a personality cult, to something 
which is drastically different, and much more free and accountable. But although the 
new system has some of the trappings of democracy, it remains without some of the 
important institutions to make it work. A full description of the current “system” is 
beyond the scope of this reply. But, clearly, the lack of democratic culture among the 
leaders as well as much of the electorate makes it a ‘democracy without democrats’. 
 
A functioning robust and durable democratic system which meets the minimum 
criteria for democracy (not a perfect one; there is no such thing), cannot happen by 
chance. It is an evolution, and the result of a struggle between forces that have 
political power and do not want to relinquish it and other forces which struggle to 
devolve political power and make it accountable to the people. In Iraq, the 
intervention of the United States smashed an existing power structure militarily. But 
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other parts of that structure (cultural, financial, and social) remained potent and 
resistant to the new order which threatened their dominance.  
 
Those who were deprived of political power under the previous dictatorship, and 
were organized enough to present themselves as the new leaders, namely the Shia 
Islamist political parties and movements (such as the Sadrists) saw an opportunity to 
grab power using the instruments of democracy (elections) but did not believe in 
democracy as a system of government. For them it is simply a ladder to get on top. 
So the effort made by the Americans to help install democratic structures such as a 
constitution and elections etc. were highjacked, sabotaged, and used as a stepping 
stone to jump to a position of power. Once that was achieved, power was 
consolidated using non-democratic means.  
 
The backdrop to this is the hugely important fact that Iraq is a rentier state where oil 
is the main source of revenue and whoever controls it, gains immense political 
advantage by building a structure of patronage. 
 
Chaos Theory 
Coming back to the question, the above dynamic represents a real obstacle in the 
building of a democratic system. In a dynamic system such as a country in violent 
transition, Chaos Theory is very likely applicable, where a small divergence at the 
beginning results in disproportionate divergence at the end.   
 
Add to the above internal dynamic with American intervention acting on it, there is 
also the external dimension represented by the influence of regional powers which 
see democracy building in Iraq as a threat to their survival (e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, 
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and Israel). The malign influence of these powers acts as a further impediment to 
democracy. 
 
When you put all of these factors together, the obstacles are immense. 
The short term (five to ten years) prospects for democracy in Iraq are dim, for the 
reason alluded to above. The long term prospect (twenty to thirty years, say) are 
difficult to predict, and will depend on a wide range of internal and external factors.  If 
by “intertwine, you mean coexistence between” western democracy and Islam it is 
possible but conditional. 
 
Islam is no more reactionary and anti-democratic than Christianity. Democracy 
couldn’t have been established in Europe without forcing the Church out of the 
political arena. This came long after reforming the Church itself. The same has to 
happen with Islam. It has not happened yet. There was a reform movement in Egypt 
in the nineteenth century lead by Muhammed Abdu and Jamaluddeen Al-Afghani, 
but that did not survive the wave of reactionary Islam lead by Salafis, Wahhabis and 
the Shia clerics who ceased the Iranian revolution in 1979 and ruled Iran ever since. 
 
Islam has to be reformed in such a manner that the more extreme interpretations of 
its tenets are banished and its softer, more humane and accommodating elements 
are promoted to a dominant position and the acceptance of the principle of the 
separation of religion from the state is accepted. Only then can democracy take root 
and thrive in Islamic societies. 
 
Ruling Elite 
It is important to add that this does not have to be the universal culture within the 
country for democracy to have a chance. It would be sufficient for it to be the culture 
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of the leading ruling elite as was the case in Iraq in the early twentieth century, and 
in countries such as Bangladesh and Indonesia today. It would, however, remain 
fragile and threatened until this becomes the predominant culture. 
 
There is no such thing as “Islamic democracy” only democracy in Islamic society. 
What exists in Iran is not a democracy but theocracy. What exists in Turkey is 
democracy in a predominantly Muslim society. Although the ruling party has Islamist 
credentials or tendencies but it is a firm believer in secular politics, and exercises 
power within the framework of a strictly secular political constitution. 
Islamist (not Islamic) political parties are not all the same. But the common thread in 
their ideology is that the Qur’an and Shari’a are the primary sources of authority and 
legislation. Secular parties by contrast believe that the people are the source of 
authority. 
  
So under Islamist doctrine certain principles (and here, different interpretations come 
in) are considered eternal and unchangeable because they are divine instructions 
communicated through holy text, whilst under secular doctrine anything can be 
changed if that is the will of the people. 
 
Mobilizing the Faithful 
Islamist political parties have the advantage of mobilizing religion to rally the faithful 
to gain power. Religion is a very potent force especially in conservative societies 
where education is limited and people are not aware of the ramifications of 
supporting sectarian religious parties.   
 
Islamic parties have not been performing according to the ideals they have set 
themselves to. The leaders of Islamist parties have proved to be just as prone to 
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dishonesty, corruption, misuse of power, negligence and incompetence, as any other 
political parties, if not more. 
 
There is a correlation between Islamist political ideology and failure, I would argue 
because selling the slogan “Islam is the solution” might sound good when a party is 
in opposition but becomes empty rhetoric when it is in power. The administration of a 
country in this highly complex and interrelated time is not easy and requires 
competent skilled leaders who can use modern tools to achieve specific economic, 
educational and service results. That is exactly what happened in Egypt when the 
Muslim Brothers gained power. They had no clue what to do and how to do it and the 
economy (and with it, everything) nose-dived.  
 
In Turkey by contrast an Islamist leaning party is running the country well and 
achieving good economic results. But that is because it is not acting as an Islamist 
party but rather as a secular party, within a secular political framework. In Iran, it can 
be argued that if it were not for the oil, they would have gone under a long time ago. 
 
It is not so much that there is a need for Islamist parties as there is an opportunity for 
them to exist and thrive. What determines that is the stage of evolution of society 
and its awareness (or lack thereof) of the importance of separating religion from the 
state.  I think your question itself is somewhat problematic. It presupposes that there 
is a practical "fix" to get democracy established. This supposition is dubious. It 
reminds me of the old joke: - How do you ensure you live to be a hundred? - First 
you get to 99, then take it very easy! Hahaha! 
 
As I said in my first reply, democracy is an evolution. Evolutions are slow and subject 
to multiple complex conditions. In your own comment you point to a few: The 
prevailing sectarian culture, the lack of democratic traditions and institutions, and the 
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resistance of Islamist parties. In reality (and historically) democracy is established 
(very gradually - usually over many decades) by an elite, when the level of education 
of the general population (and therefore their awareness of their own interests, and 
the means to achieve them) have reached a critical minimum. 
 
Practical Steps 
I do not want to imply that there are NO practical steps that would aid and accelerate 
the process. Indeed there are. And they are absolutely necessary (though not 
sufficient in themselves). They include organizing a democratic movement (or more 
likely movements in the plural) and pushing forward the process of education and 
enlightenment and, yes, doing ideological battle with anti-democratic forces in the 
media, in schools and universities, NGO's, in Parliament, in homes, markets, coffee 
shops and circles of friends, encouraging opening to the world through travel, and 
exchanges (this is an effective form of education), and enlisting and leveraging the 
help of international organisations and interested world powers. 
 
This is a spectrum of activity that is broad, deep and prolonged. The change would 
be gradual and sometimes regressive, but as time passes it develops into an 
irresistible force, and change happens despite all the initially overwhelming 
resources of the resistance to it. (Object lessons can be drawn from the civil rights 
movement in the United States, and universal suffrage in Europe and the US, and 
the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, and the move from military 
dictatorships to democracy in Latin America. Practically all of these followed a set 
pattern of struggle, which is, though different from one to the other, are the same in 
essence). 
 
There are also additional factors which will help to accelerate the process. Times are 
changing and things happen faster nowadays. When the Constitutional movement 
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burst on the scene at the twilights of the Ottoman Empire (1908), it was a very 
sluggish development, and it failed to establish itself or even to save the state from 
collapse. Even after the establishment of modern Turkey, the trajectory was long and 
marked by military domination which only very gradually gave way to a fully-fledged 
civilian led democracy (The last battles with the military were fought in the last few 
years - you might even say they are still being fought in the courts).  
 
Enlightenment Comes Faster 
Now it is a different era. It is the age of mass communications, mass global media, 
and instant information. Enlightenment comes faster in these circumstances. People 
now can readily compare themselves and their lives with the lives of other people in 
other similar states. There are global ranking systems, in transparency, human 
rights, economic prosperity, security and quality of life. 
 
In addition the needs of the people are a powerful incentive. The kleptocracy we 
have now in Iraq has resulted in massive failure of the government to respond to 
people's essential needs: Security, housing, meaningful jobs, health, education and 
human rights. This is the most potent accelerator which has to be harnessed by 
democratic organizations and activists generally. 
 
So when we add up the forces against democratizing the country we find they are 
formidable - at first glance almost insurmountable. In the short term, they are. But 
when we add up the forces and pressures to change the status quo, we find that 
they amount to a great deal. Indeed they will prove irresistible at the end. 
 
Other factors will also influence the movement towards democracy, and they are 
difficult to predict. Regional developments: Struggles taking place in the region inside 
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and between neighbouring countries, will act to retard or accelerate the process. The 
link is not always direct but convoluted. If for instance, the Syrian situation continues 
to deepen sectarian conflict, it would entrench sectarian forces in Iraq, and vice 
versa. If the Iranian theocratic regime suffers an internal crisis and collapses, it 
would have an impact. If the situation in the Gulf and in particular Saudi Arabia is 
dramatically changes, it would have a profound influence on the whole region. Still, 
internal factors will be the most dominant. 
 
Time scale? That is the difficult question. It is not going to be months. But it is not 
going to be centuries either. That is little consolation for you and me. But we must all 
do what we can to keep the pressure on. The ultimate goal, remember, is a better life 
for the people of Iraq. 
 
I might call the "Ibin Khaldoon Doctrine" which I will paraphrase as follows: 
"When a civilization (society) becomes affluent it becomes soft and less willing to 
fight and therefore becomes vulnerable to the Bedouins (the dispossessed, in our 
context) who have nothing to lose". 
 
The middle and upper classes are less confrontational because they have a lot to 
lose. They (many of them) also have a choice. They can leave the country. A very 
poor family from the countryside, with no education, money or prospects are less 
devastated if they lose two out of eight sons to street militia violence when their eyes 
are on the prize of riches they never dreamed of. The Islamist parties are only a 
channel and a vehicle for this dynamic. Fundamentally there is a class fight and the 
proletariat have won not through Marxist ideology but through Islamist sectarian 
ideology. This will take time to play out. Yes there will be organizations as the one 
you describe but the wider framework is as I have outlined. 
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Correlations 
There is a correlation between this characterization and other divisions in society, so 
we have (at the risk oversimplification), a rough correlation between the 
characteristics on the left and the right of the column of divisions below: 
Poor v. Rich 
Islamist v. secular 
Ignorant v. Educated 
Corrupt v. Clean 
Incompetent and unqualified v. Competent and qualified 
Violent v. Peaceful 
Extreme v. Moderate 
Motivated exclusively by personal gain v. Motivated primarily by public service 
Fundamentally undemocratic v. broadly democratic 
This is a BROAD correlation, not to be taken to be a complete one. There are plenty 
of rich educated Islamists who are corrupt and every possible permutation of the 
above will be found in reality. Yet, the correlation does exist statistically and if we 
have a good think tank it could be tested statistically. I arrived at it through my own 
experience and analysis. 
 The broad correlation along the lines enumerated above puts the Sunna/Shia divide 
in context, and you can then explain why some Sunnis and some Shia are more 
prone to be on the left hand side of the above column of divisions, and some are 
less. 
 
 
368 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interview 3 
Mr Sami Al-Askari 
'Mr Sami Al-Askari', is a leading Islamist politician, former politburo member of the 
Islamic Da’awa Party, former Governing Council Deputy member in 2003/2004. MP 
for UIA and then SoL 2005-2014, and close associate of PM Noori Al-Maliki.  He is a 
Shia Arab Islamist. The interview was conducted via email and answers were 
received on 4th October 2013 in Arabic and translated by the author. 
 
Answers 
 
Centuries of Despotism  
Iraqi democratic experiment is new and it comes after decades of dictatorship which 
established the culture of exclusivity and oppression and this oppression is not just 
restricted to the ruling the establishment but within society and family. 
If we want to be frank with ourselves, we must admit that our Islamic societies, Iraq 
is not an exception, have not known anything but the culture of despotism through 
centuries. Freedom of expression was reserved for the strong only.  As for other 
social classes, most of them lived as oppressed people and obedient followers. The 
reality of women is the most outstanding proof of this despotism. Men, be they 
fathers, brothers or husbands, decide what women should or shouldn't do 
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Also there is a domination of tribal values on Iraqi society and these values do not 
accord with the spirit of democracy and personal freedom. In addition there is the 
religious despotism which is the worst and most dangerous of all types of despotism 
that humanity has ever witnessed over all times because it dominates the brains and 
bodies at the same time. 
 
It is impossible to expect democracy to prosper in such a society with the mere 
toppling of a despot and holding elections to choose a new leader. There is a need 
for freedom of expression and opinion to prevail first in a gradual manner, benefitting 
from different factors, while it is getting freed from tribal and clerical restraints.  
 
Theoretically the electorate were free. The elections in the last 8 years were 
conducted within the democratic mechanisms that are followed elsewhere in other 
countries. The law gave everyone who is legally and constitutionally entitled to vote 
the right to stand for elections. The law also allowed all citizens to cast their votes in 
the way they wish and choose. 
 
Unseen Factors 
I say theoretically because practical performance is governed by seen and unseen 
factors that influence the awareness of the electorate and their choices. If we rule out 
some cases where the electorate were forced to choose candidates or political 
entities against their political persuasions, and this exclusion is because these cases 
were limited and had not greatly influenced the results of the elections. But there are 
factors which are more influential contributed to pushing the electorate into specific 
directions which were designed earlier. Some of these factors stem from the general 
social culture and its recent experience of democracy. Others have to do with 
sectarian agitation which is prevalent in Iraq since the fall of the previous regime.  A 
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third type stems from the role the religious establishment played in the political and 
social life.       
 
The religious establishment was not impartial in the political rivalry between political 
blocs participating in the elections. No one expected it to be impartial especially 
when the competition is between religious and secular parties. In fact it would be 
erroneous if it was impartial since it chose to get involved in political life. But the 
religious establishment would not have influenced electorate choices if the political 
and religious awareness of the majority of those electorate were not influenced by 
the positions and opinions of the religious establishment and the clergy.    
  
Frankly, the choices of the electorate, in any democratic experience, would be under 
the influence of external factors. The media in western countries do greatly influence 
the making of electorates' minds and almost make their choices for them. Talking of 
an electorate who makes his own choices without external influences is really 
academic and doesn't actually correspond with the reality of electoral experiments 
even in the oldest of democracies. Newspapers, TV channels and other media play 
the biggest role in forming public opinion and the directions of the electorate.   
 
Since the fall of the Saddam regime, the Iraqi political scene has been subjected to 
foreign interferences and influences. The way the regime fell, through military 
invasion and the fears it raised in the region, and the opportunities that were created 
by the collapse of the Iraqi state, all these have offered huge opportunities for 
regional and international parties to interfere in Iraq so as to serve their interest. 
They have also benefitted from the unparalleled readiness of Iraqi politicians who 
were ready to deal with this interference and welcome it so as to serve their interests 
and their aims as they compete among themselves.   
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US Interference  
The presence of more than 100,000 US soldiers enabled the US unlimited 
possibilities to interfere in the ways the political process is going and shaping it within 
the visions and opinions of decision makers in Washington. In addition, there is the 
presence of Iran, which is the most visible in the Iraqi political scene among the 
regional powers. Iran was able to build bridges with its old allies and make new allies 
and this has offered it the opportunity of influence in the Iraqi scene. 
 
Turkey, of all regional powers, has also found a distinguished place in Iraqi political 
scene and played the role of the defender of Iraqi Sunnis. It formed, along with Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar and other powers, an axis to compete with the growing Iranian role. 
The elections of 2010 exposed the roles which were played by the two axis, Iranian 
and Turkish, in shaping the rival lists. 
 
 Iran, even though it failed to compel Al-Maliki to enter into a Shia bloc that groups all 
Shia parties together, but it did manage to group all other Shia groups, except State 
of Law, in a bloc. After the results were announced, Iran was active in putting 
pressure on all the players to make compromises which led to the formation of the 
second Al-Maliki  government.  
 
Grouping the Sunnis 
As for Turkey, it was able, with the mandate it got from the official Arab 
establishment, to group all the Sunnis in one list and install the Shia Ayad Allawi as a 
head of it in a bid to claw back the leadership of the government from the Islamic 
Shia Alliance which kept this leadership for two successive terms. This Turkish 
endeavour was about to succeed if it wasn't for the Federal Court with regards to the 
formation of parliamentary lists, and the success of Iran in bringing both Shia blocs, 
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State of Law and National Coalition, in a parliamentary list that was able to achieve 
quorum to form the government. 
  
As for the American role in this direction, it can be said it was not on one line 
(incoherent). The US has secretly supported and encouraged the Iraqia Alliance to 
form a government, and take away the leadership of the government from State of 
Law, and in this pursuit, it used the UN mission (UNAMI) which certainly played a 
biased role and influenced the results of the elections in favour of Iraqia. This was 
admitted by the former US ambassador who justified it that it would upset the Sunni 
Arabs if the results were changed as a result of the recounting process which the 
State of Law list demanded. When Washington realised that Iran managed to foil the 
Turkish project, it changed its position and supported Al-Maliki to continue for 
another term. It was also active in finding solutions and suggestions to facilitate the 
acceptability of this position among other parties, regionally and internationally. 
   
HIIEC Never Independent 
As for the High Independent Iraqi Electoral Commission (HIIEC), it was never 
independent. Once it got out of the control of UNAMI and the US embassy, it entered 
into partisan quotas. Members of the former and current HIIEC were candidates of 
political blocs and they represent the interests of their blocs when taking decisions. 
 
Iraqi society is generally governed by strict rules, some of which because of the 
prevalence of a tribal nature with its very extreme values or religious values which 
were brought about into stages. First one before the collapse of the former regime 
under the 'Faith Campaign' which the regime imposed on the people of Iraq during 
the 1990s, combined with the psychological impacts left by the regime's wars and 
the disasters it left behind, especially the economic embargo which Iraqis were 
subjected to.   
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The second stage was when the militias and armed groups controlled the cities and 
population centres prior to 2010. These Shia and Sunni militias imposed their 
understanding of religious and moral values and practices. They killed or cracked 
down on all those who didn't apply their understanding of religion and morals. This 
was helped by the almost complete absence of the state during that period. 
   
All this is true, but the opportunities available to society, and especially the youth, to 
discover what is going on outside Iraq through the internet which spread so fast, and 
through satellite TV channels which run into tens and also through the opportunities 
of travel which have become available to many. These opportunities opened up the 
minds of the youth and raised within themselves the spirit of change and rejection of 
the backward reality.   
 
It is true that society still imposes its domination on individuals, but it is true also that 
this iron fist of society is weakening and with it, the position of religious leaders in 
people's hearts and minds. Politicians have certainly contributed to the exploitation of 
religious and sectarian feelings with the aim of making political gains, but even this 
has begun to shrink and the response of youth to this type of religious and sectarian 
agitation is becoming less and less important. But the reaction of youth to this reality 
was probably manifested through election and political apathy, but we now witness 
youthful voices calling for active participation in order to effect political and social 
change and those voices, even though they are still low-profile, but they are 
promising.  
 
Corruption, which is spreading in state institutions, certainly constitutes a hurdle to 
economic development, and its roots go back a long time, well before the fall of the 
former regime. The most dangerous feature of this corruption is the fact that the 
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prevailing social culture doesn't condemn it to the point that some people envy 
corrupt officials and wish they had the opportunity to practice financial corruption 
themselves and make illegal material gains. 
 
Break of Social Structure  
The years of economic embargo which caused the breaking of the social structure of 
Iraqi society and the three destructive wars have all founded a social environment 
that accepts the exploitation of public money and employing all possible tricks to 
squander it. After the embargo, there was the administrative, political, security and 
economic chaos which increased the scope of corruption and opened up new 
opportunities for corrupt officials to get rich at the expense of the public. All this 
impeded the implementation of economic and service projects in the country and it 
largely disrupted the process of economic development.  
 
When Islamic parties were founded, the aim was to 'bring back the nation to Islam'. 
With the fall of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, the Islamic 
Caliphate, of which the Ottoman Empire was the most visible feature, collapsed. This 
vociferous fall brought about reactions in Islamic circles which was crystallised in the 
development of Islamic political movements at the fore of which was the Muslim 
Brotherhood. In Iraq there was the Islamic Da'awa Party, which is a Shia version of 
the Sunni brotherhood in other countries.   
 
The aim of the Da'awa Party and other Islamic parties was to spread religious 
awareness which was absent as secular, Marxists and Pan-Arab ideologies were 
dominant in people's minds. Although most people are Muslims and proud to be so, 
but they do not understand the reality of Islam, nor do they practice it in their daily 
lives. This is how Sayyid Muhammed Baqir As-Sadr presented his understanding of 
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how important it was to form an Islamic movement of change with the aim of bringing 
back Islamic awareness to society as a way to bring back Islamic rule. 
 
The Iraqi Islamic movement was successful in effecting a huge change in social 
directions and the way society deal with religion. The success was due to numerous 
factors among which were the triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iran led by Imam 
Khomeini, and the barbaric crack down on Islamic activists (by the regime of 
Saddam Hussein) which made millions of Iraqis sympathise with them. But that 
inhumane suppression has also meant the loss of most of its cadre inside Iraq and 
forced the rest to flee the country and live in exile in many countries. This has meant 
the movement lost touch with its supporters in Iraq. When the remaining leaders and 
cadres of the Islamic movement went back to Iraq they found themselves dealing 
with a new generation which was groomed in a different environment and subjected 
to different education in addition to the fact that they did not know a lot about the new 
generation (since both sides lived in different environments).  
  
Democracy is not a Religion 
Returning to Iraq was a great move for the movement but it was a return that was not 
well-prepared for. The Islamic movement participated in the government and got 
engaged in it deeply and it gave up or forgot its original aim which was the making of 
a new culture and creating a religious society. Da'awa became no different than any 
other political party in dealing with politics and the state and this calls for asking the 
questions you have asked. Democracy does not exclude religious parties or parties 
with religious leanings. Within western democracy, despite its secular nature, there 
are still some parties carry Christian names and probably these Christian parties are 
no different from current Islamic parties. 
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Democracy is not a religion but mechanisms and tools that enable people to manage 
their affairs in a way that they participate in choosing their rulers. These mechanisms 
and programmes cannot be separated from people’s cultures and their historical 
heritage. That’s why we see this pluralism in the forms of democratic rules in Europe 
and other countries.  
 
History has left its influences on society and these are factors that cannot be ignored 
when formulating laws and constitutions. The restrictions that were imposed on the 
constitution are an embodiment of the culture of society in its current stages. On the 
one hand it preserves the constant features of Islamic culture, and on the other, it is 
committed to the criteria of the democratic system 
 
 Iraqi democracy cannot be formulated to be a copy of the Indian democracy or 
German democracy or French democracy. What is stated in the constitution does not 
talk about religious schools and their differences, but about the constant principles of 
Islam and these are political issues that the Muslims have agreed upon, and are not 
subject to the discretion of jurisprudents nor to the differences of different doctrines. 
  
The use of religion and doctrine (sect) stems from the need of political parties and 
blocs to market themselves in a popular environment that sympathises with religious 
values. We have seen how the political parties were competing against each other to 
show their support for the religious establishment. This is not new in democratic life. 
Parties all over the world look for whatever attracts electorate approval and support 
even if they appear contradictory at times with their claims. 
  
Expedience  
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I personally remember in Iran and during its first legislative elections, and those were 
the only elections after the revolution where all the parties and political and 
intellectual trends were participating, from the far left to the far right. In those days 
the idea of (Wilayat Al-Faqeeh) or 'the Rule of the Jurisprudent', which was 
introduced by Ayatulla Khumaini was widely popular. Among the parties was the 
Iranian Communist Party (Tudeh). As everyone knows, the Communist Party 
(anywhere in the world) has nothing to do with religion nor the Rule of the 
Jurisprudent concept,  but the party slogans showed how far political parties can go 
to persuade voters to vote for them even through deception. One of the posters of 
the Tudeh Party said "(In order for the line of the Rule of the Jurisprudent to 
continue, vote for the candidates of the Tudeh Party). 
 
Wealth and belonging to certain families does play an effective role in elections. 
Elections are like a staircase where some people can climb but taking the staircase 
is not available for everyone. The rich in western democracies are the ones who can 
get to decision making positions and prominent families in America inherit the 
presidency and seats of congress. Public opinion which influences election results is 
governed by the media and money, therefore, if one has more money he will have 
better chances than those who don't. This is one of the defects of democracy. I am 
talking here about the general rule not the exceptions which may happen but they do 
not change the general direction. 
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Interview 4 
Dr Faleh Abdul-Jabbar 
 
Dr Faleh Abdul-Jabbar is a prominent Sociologist, political writer, academic, 
publisher and author, He is the Director of the Iraq Centre for Strategic Studies 
(ICSS), based in Beirut, Lebanon. He edited and co-authored a book entitled 
‘Dilemma of the Constitution’ which listed all the flaws of the Iraqi constitution. He is 
secular although of Sunni background. Interview was recorded on tape and 
conducted in his office in Beirut in the autumn of 2012. 
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Answers 
 
Difficult Marriage 
It is difficult to 'marry' Islam with democracy. Yes, there is a space for the religious to 
live within democracy. If tolerance exists, followers of all religions can cohabit even 
within a non-democratic state. 
 
 If there is religious tolerance, people of all religious persuasions could live in peace, 
regardless of the existence of democracy.  
Even under democracy, if there is no tolerance, it’s difficult for different people to live 
together. In America, one person was teaching Darwin’s theory, he was taken to 
court because of that. Fundamentalism started in 1916. Democracy is based on one 
man one vote principle, yet in America or other countries some women or blacks 
were not allowed to vote. 
 
There is a difference between a creed and its interpretations. Abdurrahman Al-
Kawakibi (Sunni scholar) and Hussein An-Na'eeni (Shia Scholar) interpreted creed 
as requiring the ruler to be constrained by a constitution.   There are large islands of 
liberalism within Shia Islam and small islands of liberalism within Sunni Islam. 
  
 
Identity Crisis 
The collapse of the idea of a national identity and its replacement by sect, class or 
race may represent the group fairly but it limits democracy and weakens it. For 
example, it was difficult to question PM Noori Al-Maliki because he was able to 
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persuade others within his sect that any questioning of him was a questioning of the 
whole sect. i.e. the whole sect was reduced to its representatives. 
  
Secondly, secularists and liberals who stood in the elections were considered infidels 
and thus were forbidden from participating and holding rallies. The Islamic formula 
for sectarianism is to have a monopoly over the sect and prevent any diversity within 
the group. Monopoly and prevention. So, to Islamists, a Shia is the one who is 
politically Shia and this impedes democracy in a serious way.  
  
The absence of accountability and monopoly of representation through the 
prevention of others (non-Islamists) from representing the sect and depriving them 
from benefits is destruction no less, and it’s an economic war (dictatorship of needs) 
and this is very strong in oil-rich countries because there is no work opportunities 
outside the state since the state owns the economy and the citizen is forced to 
belong to the ruling party and obey the government of the day. 
 
Constitution Impedes Democracy  
There are many articles in the constitution which impede democracy. One of them is 
the article that says 'no law should be enacted if contravenes constant Islamic 
rulings'...The existence of this article contravenes another article which says 'no law 
should be enacted if it contravenes the principles of democracy. In the old Iraqi 
constitution there was no article that forbids the issuing of laws that contravene 
Islam.  
 
There is a legal vacuum in the constitution since there are at least 60 articles that 
need to be regulated by law. There is no Union Council or a Constitutional Court that 
has jurisprudents. Independent commissions are part of the new division of authority 
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in modern countries, added to the classical division of authority. This is the power of 
independent commissions. The current Iraqi Federal Court plays a disabling role to 
democracy. It has (in reality) abolished the independent commissions. It has stopped 
the questioning of the minister for High Education. This is crippling the constitution 
(and impeding democracy). 
  
Democracy & Freedom 
Democracy is based on the free choice of the individual and whatever impedes this 
freedom impedes democracy. The government controls the Media Commission 
which should represent all points of views. In the UK, the BBC is financed by the 
state, but, it operates independently.   
 
It is fair to bar Ba’athists in Iraq from standing for elections because they had 
deprived people from their rights. They bear moral responsibility, even those who 
were not in positions of responsibility.  
  
Sectarianism impedes democracy in a serious way; 
1- It negates accountability, 
2- It limits representation since this becomes the right of the sectarian politicians,  
3- It deprives those who disagree with those in power from benefits; using economic 
tools to force citizens to comply with the dictates of the rulers (the dictatorship of 
needs). 
 
The constitution went wrong in many instances, here are a few: 
a- No law shall be enacted if it contravenes the fixed principles or pillars of Islam 
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b- There are 58 articles that need to be regulated by law  
c--Federal Council is not there 
d- Federal Court: what are the remits of this court? Now it’s impeding the 
constitution. It is breaking the constitution, not interpreting it. It has even made 
questioning of ministers illegal! Questioning PM and ministers must be done 
regularly. It has also made a mess of who should form the government. 
The independent institutions are now undermined. They have put with them 
executive institutions such as the Sunni and Shia endowments which manage 
mosques. The two (types of institutions) must be separated. There is ambiguity 
regarding them, and now the council of ministers wants to take charge of them. 
These must be independent of the executive authority and it is supervised by 
parliament, not the government.    
 
Oil money Impedes Democracy 
There is immunity for officials who take wrong decisions, but no immunity for criminal 
actions such as stealing. There is no such immunity. There are practical problems 
that only legal experts can see, 
Democracy is the freedom of individuals in their choices, information, activity, belief, 
expression choice, thinking and all other civil freedoms. Whatever impedes the 
freedom of individual impedes democracy…   
Oil money becomes an impediment to democracy because it is used by the 
incumbent to try and bribe others and derail the democratic process. 
Allocating posts is also allocating benefits and this, if not done according to agreed 
rules, could be used to derail democracy. 
The religious establishment has actually made the constitution less extreme (in 
religious terms) than would have been had it been left to political Islam. 
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Sectarian distribution of seats or positions does impede democracy… 
 
Restrictions on freedom introduced by Islamists depend on the acceptance of society 
of these restrictions, if society doesn’t accept them, they will be inapplicable.  
No fear of a coup d’état in the Iraq. Even the Prime Minister cannot lead a coup 
because he will face resistance from all population centres in the country. Kurdistan 
won’t deal with him, nor would Kirkuk, Musil, Basra and Anbar.  
 
A military violent action can be done, but no coup is acceptable anymore.  
The use of taqiyya [dissimulation] by the clergy will restrict the freedom of choice if 
they interfere in politics. But if they do not interfere in politics, they won’t affect 
democracy…Ayatulla Sistani restricted people’s freedom in 2005 only.  But in 2010, 
he told people to vote for whoever they wanted. 
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Interview 5 
Dr Ayad Allawi 
  Dr Ayad Allawi' is a former president of the Governing Council, Prime Minister, 
2003-4-5, Vice President 2014-present, and leader of the Wifaq (Accord) Movement 
(now party) and the Iraqia Patriotic List. Allawi is Pan-Arab nationalist and of Shia 
background. He is a medical doctor by profession. The interview was done via email 
and answers were received in English on 17th December 2013 via Dr Allawi’s 
secretary, Muna Alwash.    
 
Answers 
 
The democratic process has failed in Iraq because the political process itself has 
failed. What we see after 11 years is a stagnant economy, breakdown of law and 
order, lack of services, violations to human rights and the constitution.  
 
The inability of the legislative and the executive to produce laws as the constitution 
calls for. The constitution itself was written in 2-3 months and an authoritarian regime 
is developing out of the so called democracy. 
 
The reasons for the failure of democracy in Iraq are sectarianism, foreign 
interference especially from Iran, failed political process, disenfranchising millions of 
Iraqis, absence of law and order, lack of institution, failure of the judiciary and its 
control by the executive, the occupation, and the dismantling of the state, politicizing 
Deba’athification and religion and finally political money corruption, intimidation and 
violence. 
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If things remain as they are then the outcome will be catastrophic. 
Where and in which Islamic country there is democracy similar or near to what we 
see in democratic countries? So, there is a problem with the understanding of 
religion in Muslim countries which prevent the nurturing of democracy.  
The evaluation of democracy has been severely impaired in Islamic countries for 
domestic reasons as well as influences from outside; colonialism, occupation lack of 
self-determination …. Etc. 
Democracy must take local values into account, it should not be a photocopy of what 
we see in the UK or USA or France … etc. elections are the tip of the iceberg of 
democracy. 
The starting point for democratic process is the presence of the rule of law, basic 
rights of citizens and citizenship, and the presence of institutions that can defend 
democracy. Most importantly is the availability of a civil state and civil institution, and 
the core is the presence of real democrats, who believe in democracy. 
   
One (Islamic party) is sectarian, several (parties) are not. Islamic parties started as 
reactions for foreign involvement, degradation and insults that came with it but soon 
they (Islamic Parties) became too sectarian, violent and authoritarian as we see in 
Egypt, Iraq, Tunisia … etc. 
Moreover, Islamic parties are political entities not sacred religious (beings) and they 
have no right in posing as the only ones who know Islam and can explain it and use 
it politically. 
The secular parties in Iraq by and large have failed. National and socialist parties 
have failed now, but they failed after decades of being in power (while) Islamic 
parties have failed in a much shorter time. 
The failures of Islamic parties is mainly intrinsic while the failures of the old secular 
parties are external largely (e.g. Cold war) as well as intrinsic. 
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Interview 6 
Dr Waleed Al-Hilli 
 
 Dr Waleed Al-Hilli is a member of the politburo of the Islamic Da’awa Party and the 
party’s director of public relations. He is an academic and author. He worked as 
advisor to the president of the Republic of Iraq between 2006-2010, then he was 
elected as MP for Babylon in 2010-2014. Currently, he is Advisor to the Prime 
Minister (since 2014). He is of a Shia Arab Background. The interview was done via 
email and answers were received on 29th September 2013 in Arabic and translated 
by the author.   
 
Answers 
 
Digesting Mechanisms 
Iraqi democratic experiment after the 9th of April 2003 witnessed a clear 
development but it is still in the transitional stage.   A number of political entities and 
some active politicians have not actually digested democratic mechanisms because 
they didn't get the opportunity to practice them in a proper democratic atmosphere, 
or they have not actually practiced them in their jobs due to the suppression of 
political freedoms in Iraq by the former Ba’athist regime.   
 
There are other numerous reasons (for the difficulties it is facing) the most important 
of which is the sectarian or racist feelings of some people and this has coloured the 
conduct of those people with bias towards their sect or race.  
Most important impediments to democracy are education and culture by which the 
participants were brought up, and also the absence of desire to understand the 
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requirements for democratic mechanisms. Instead they started singing democracy's 
praise as they wish and desire and not as it should be. 
  
 Democracy in Iraq will develop a lot in the future, but this development depends on 
several factors the most important of which is the distancing of the Iraqi situation 
from foreign interventions.   
 The practice of Shura in Islam preceded the introduction of democratic mechanisms 
in the west by hundreds of years. The two expressions refer to the necessity of 
taking the opinion of the nation (umma) and consulting it. History reports a number of 
events in which the Prophet Muhammed (PBUH) consulted with his companions and 
he took their advice even though his opinion was different to theirs.  
 
An example of this is when the infidels came with a large army to Medina at the 
battle of Uhud in the year 3 of the Hijra calendar (migration of the Prophet from 
Makkah to Madeenah), the Messenger (PBUH) met with his companions and 
consulted with them at the Holy Grand Mosque and asked them their opinions of 
how to defend Medeena. Some companions said the best way was to leave Medina 
and defend it from the area of Mount Uhud which is situated 3 km from the city 
centre. 
 
Democracy at Mount Uhud 
The Messenger's opinion was to stay in Medina and build defences there to face the 
enemy from within the city, instead of leaving it for Mount Uhud. When the opinion of 
the majority (of his companions) was to leave for Mount Uhud, the Prophet decided 
to go to Uhud and this was the reason why the Muslim's army was defeated in the 
second stage of the battle. This caused the martyrdom and injury of tens of Muslim 
fighters. The Qura’an also mentioned the story of the Queen of Sheba when she 
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consulted with her people on their opinion of how to respond to the letter of the 
Prophet of God, Solomon.  
 
 Islam encourages consulting people and it gives incentives for that which is the 
great reward in heaven, and this leaves a kind of commitment on people, while 
western democracy has no incentives and abiding by it depends on a number of 
factors.  
Shura in Islam is subject to principles and moral values which direct all Muslims 
towards the aims which satisfy God, while democracies differ from Russia's to 
America's and European countries', each understand it differently. 
 
Shura in Islam is a position which attracts punishment and reward in the day-after 
when there is cheating and conspiracy. Western democracy is subject to 
conspiracies of this state or that to topple the regimes which oppose them. For 
example, the US and Europe all know that democracy is non-existent in Saudi 
Arabia, yet they deal with it as a first class ally because they need its oil. Therefore, 
human rights are forgotten when they collide with their interests.   
 
Any party is defined as an organisation and ideology. The organization is common to 
all parties where they follow the known organizational approaches. But the ideology 
differs. One ideology believes in God, His Prophets, Books and Angels as well as the 
Day-after. It believes in accountability in the Day-after and heaven and hell. The 
ideologies of other parties are different in the principles they believe in, whether 
communist, socialist, liberal or free.. etc..  
Islamic parties are different in the principles they believe in and their (political) 
directions. Most of their problems are in the political classification of events and in 
the understanding of Islamic creed in its correct form.  Some parties call themselves 
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Islamic, but they are actually nationalist, sectarian or liberal, but they use Islam to 
deceive people. 
  
Shura & Democracy 
There are numerous mistakes that some Islamic parties make, some of these 
mistakes are big ones, and this happens due to their lack of experience and 
openness on Islam with its wide concepts. The main reason for their failure is 
extremism and ex-communication of others (takfeer) as well as their narrow horizon 
and failed political programme. 
 
 The need for Islamic parties is required as there is a need for other parties. Shura 
and democracy and the diversification of views all help to diversify parties in 
performing their roles. We do not fear the multiplicity of Islamic or secular parties and 
their different programmes, but we do fear the infiltration of these parties by 
intelligence agencies of this country or that making the party a platform for this 
country or that country or its intelligence agency.  
  
Parties which believe in the process of political development on correct basis and the 
principles and values of human rights can find their way to success provided the 
nation has sufficient awareness of the importance of these parties and their 
competing freely according to democratic mechanisms, away from the role of 
(foreign) intelligence agencies and the intervention of others. The political process 
must be clear and conducted in a proper security environment with the existence of 
free competition and equal opportunities for all, away from unrealistic rhetoric with 
commitment to and scientific and practical aspects of the programmes.     
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Interview 7 
Dr Kadom Jawad Shubber 
 
Dr Kadom Jawad Shubber is a retired University professor in Economics, he was 
lecturer at the University of Westminster in London until his retirement 2 years ago. 
He is a London-based writer and business consultant and Founder and ex-Editor-in-
Chief of the International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance & 
Management. He is  a self-styled Islamic Liberal. He is Shia and his father was 
senior cleric who was executed by the regime of Saddam Hussein in 1980s. The 
interview was done via email and his reply was received in English on 26th of 
September 2013.  
 
Answers 
 
The earliest known and recorded form of democratic system is that of Athens in 
ancient Greece, well before the advent of Judaism, Christianity and Islam. 
 
It is noteworthy that not all adults in that ancient city state had the right to vote, while 
critical decisions were taken by the whole body of voters assembled at communal 
meetings. A criterion was set for those adults who could vote, chiefly in relation to 
the ability to carry arms. 
 
It is also to be noted that universal suffrage only became widespread in the 
industrialised West during the past 100 years, and was only accomplished gradually 
and under persistent pressures from the less privileged sections of society, who 
fought tooth and nail to acquire ordinary civil rights that are nowadays taken as 
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given. The struggles and sacrifices of the African-Americans are still fresh in our 
minds, while it should be recalled that British women only acquired the right to vote 
in the 1920’s, while their sisters in Switzerland gained the privilege in 1970’s. 
 
These historical backdrops help to show that civil rights are normally acquired as a 
consequence of hard-fought struggles by those who demand them, rather than given 
to them on a silver (or golden) plate! History also informs us that it is normal for the 
process to be piecemeal rather holistic and sudden. 
 
This is not to say – of course – that Iraqis did not endeavour to acquire the basic civil 
rights that they truly deserve. Moreover, a semblance of a democratic system with 
other prime liberties had existed over 30 years, from the setting up of the modern 
Iraqi state in the aftermath of the First World War until 1958 when the Iraqi army 
ended the Hashemite monarchy. 
 
What history does tell us, however, is that there are certain requirements for the 
success of a democratically-based political system in any nation. It is difficult to 
envisage the existence or birth of these requirements overnight or in an abrupt 
fashion, rather they should evolve gradually and enmeshed in the country’s culture 
and fundamental values. 
 
Three requirements 
Three main requirements can be put forward, in this connection.  
First, there has to be a reasonable level of understanding-cum-acceptance of the 
system. People need to recognise that the system is both necessary and fair, in 
order for them to be motivated to utilize it and respect its outcomes. 
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Second, prime leaders must show flexibility and mutual respect for one another. 
Religious, political, social, military, and business figures have to propagate the 
system and recommend it to ordinary citizens, so that harmony and smooth running 
can be secured. There can be no political system that is foul-proof, and loopholes 
might spring up at any time. The onus is on societal leaders to find speedy remedies 
that are effective and generally viewed as reasonable and practical. 
 
Third, the system must have proper and adequate safeguards. These involve legal 
and security elements designed to ensure smooth functioning, as well as adjudicate 
when disputes arise.  
 
It is hard to see how the above conditions can be claimed to exist in Iraq. To start 
with, this is a nation that had been ruled ruthlessly by a brutal dictatorship for over 30 
years prior to the Anglo-American campaign of 2003. While the period 1958 to 1968 
was probably not as harsh (excepting the aftermath of the bloody coup in 1963), 
there were no parliamentary elections over those years; nor indeed local or 
municipal voting. As a consequence, by the time Saddam was toppled in 2003, Iraqis 
had been accustomed to an antiquated bureaucracy, without any internationally 
acceptable legal system or transparent or just enforcement framework. The State 
apparatuses became by far the most violent, savage and erratic part of Iraqi society, 
thereby convincing ordinary people that the only effective deterrent to malpractice, 
crime, corruption and other wrong-doing was harsh punishment or the prospect of it. 
 
Ill-prepared 
It is probably fair to maintain that most Iraqis were ill-prepared for the positive 
changes in their political system post 2003. Perhaps more seriously, the changes 
that came about became the target of some criticism from most ordinary people. 
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Some of the changes (e.g. new electoral system, the constitution) gave the 
impression of being half-baked and primarily benefiting those already clinging to 
political and financial power. Both administrative and financial corruption came to be 
viewed as rife and disadvantageous to large sections of Iraqi society. 
 
In a country where tribalism is deep-rooted, while religious authority is revered, 
elections have typically resulted in a poor expression of the true popular will. The 
plain fact is that we have a rather backward electorate with little sense of the major 
factors that need to be considered, such as economic variables, international 
relations, public services, education, and the security problem, leading thereby to 
voting practices being influenced by the “big boys” whether these were party bosses, 
religious scholars or tribal chiefs. 
  
It is now appropriate to address directly the main questions posed in this research. 
In politics, “realism” is the first requirement. Thus, Iraqi society has to be recognised 
as it is, taking the fractious and mosaic features as given. Solid progress will 
necessarily have to follow an arduous and lengthy path. 
 
We cannot instruct Muslim scholars not to expound the tenets of Islam, or to refrain 
from commenting on poor public services or evidence of corruption. Nor can we 
issue a law (or a decree) that makes tribal networks null and void. 
 
Civilised Dialogue 
What we can do, however, is to have a civilised dialogue with leaders from all walks 
of life, in order to instil the ingredients of a healthy and functioning democracy. In 
essence, all must accept the outcome of the ballot box. If people’s representatives 
do not outlaw gambling or liquor, religious leaders should not become disgruntled - 
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they simply must improve their argument and keep trying. If the House of 
Representatives renders illegal all payments smacking of “tribalistic” ransom, tribal 
lords must accept that as an expression of the people’s will 
 
Appointments to all positions within the civil service must be based on merit, and in 
accordance with pre-set criteria, while selection must be done objectively and fairly. 
Leaders must exhibit fairness and objectivity, while speaking their minds and 
recognising that building modern institutions and applying the latest principles of 
good management will bring benefits to all. 
 
It is wrong to say that this is impossible within the Iraqi context. Yes, the current state 
of affairs is quite distant from the ideals we are seeking. Yet, Iraqis have it deep 
inside them that they respect fairness, goodness and professionalism. We need to 
nurture these values and bring them back to life, expelling expediency, and 
nepotism, attitudes such as “scratch my back and I scratch yours”. 
 
In a nutshell, therefore, we cannot prevent people from wearing religious dress, or 
indeed any type of costume: basic liberties are an essential element of a healthy 
democracy. Again, we have no right to demand that anyone give up their tribal, 
ethnic, regional or faith-related affiliations. 
 
We have every right, however, to ask all - particularly those with vocal voices that 
can be heard by many - to be objective, fair, honest and knowledgeable. It is hard to 
legislate for this: a culture that promotes a healthy democracy, fair society and 
modern successful institutions has to be built stone by stone by those who know and 
care. In the process, huge sacrifices will have to be made, but the final objective is 
sacrosanct and worth all the costs! 
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It is well-established and widely accepted that the design of any political system is 
influenced by a variety of social, economic, cultural, and historical considerations. 
This fact is firmly-documented in the theories postulated by political thinkers over 
many centuries - in the case of one political writer (the British Thomas Hobbs), the 
weather was viewed as the most significant factor in framing up the political system. 
  
Dependence on Oil 
Another major point in this regard is the dynamic nature of the political system. In 
other words, political forces and institutions must be sufficiently flexible, in order to 
respond positively and effectively to hard realities which keep changing and spring 
surprises from time to time.  
There is absolutely no doubt that it is unhealthy for any nation to rely unduly on just 
one economic sector, be it agriculture, or tourism or oil - or indeed any other single 
field of activity. Too much dependence on one sector can be very risky, even 
disastrous. As we have seen all too clearly over the years, oil prices may fluctuate 
sharply, while political disputes with neighbours (or even within a given country) can 
disrupt the pumping of "black gold", while ultimately the size of crude reserves is 
subject to depletion at some point in the future.  
 
Clearly, therefore, economic diversification should be part of any sound economic 
strategy of every nation. In the case of Iraq, this simple fact had been well-known to 
economists, politicians and other professionals for a long time, particularly since the 
early 1950's when the Reconstruction Council (& Reconstruction Ministry) was set-
up. Unfortunately, very little has been achieved by way of concrete results, despite 
the fact that the country is endowed with vast areas of fertile land, golden 
opportunities for tourism (leisure, cultural, religious), natural gas, non-oil minerals 
and other valuable possibilities.  
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Plainly, a well-balanced economy assists in building a mature and healthy 
democratic system. By its nature, a democratic set-up requires people to be able to 
think freely, independently, and confidently. When individuals view their livelihood to 
be dependent on a linkage with a political party or an organ of the State, their 
judgement can be impaired, even paralysed, and hence might follow dictates handed 
down to them.  
That is why "totalitarianism" is the anti-thesis of true democracy. Even a so- called 
"socialist" system can be anti-democratic, because most working people will be 
employed by the State and be strongly impacted by the political party that happens 
to be in power.  
 
It is therefore arguable that Iraq had a better-functioning democracy in the 1920's, 
30's and 40's than in subsequent decades when substantial increases in oil 
revenues were forthcoming. During the first three decades of national rule, public 
revenues in Iraq were generated from various forms of taxation, direct and indirect. 
As oil income began to flow in increasing amounts, other economic sectors were 
neglected, while the ruling class saw no pressing need to take heed of people's 
views or to subject themselves to national scrutiny, because rulers regarded 
themselves as givers to the masses and therefore as their masters!  
 
For democracy to function effectively, those in power must regard themselves 
essentially as takers from the voters who put them in their positions. This way, the 
adult population will be on sure grounds when they question, criticise and appraise 
their rulers. Furthermore, the economy must be in a healthy state, whereby people 
are not beggars from the State, and can move easily among sectors or set up their 
own businesses. This way, working people will be able to finance the various 
activities of the State in a confident fashion, based on a solid social contract between 
those who are governed and those who govern.  
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After further questions, Dr Shubber moved on some issues, especially wearing 
religious cloths and he agreed that politicians should not wear religious cloths. 
He gave the following answers on 3rd October 2013: 
 
Patronising Attitudes 
I would argue that tribal and religious leaders should learn to respect the views of 
people and allow them to decide for themselves. Leaders who care about the 
national interests and respect the ballot box should not adopt patronising attitudes. 
They should respect the motto of ‘one man one vote’ and allow the man and woman 
in the street a free vote to express their own will. In my view, part of the declaration 
id honour or ‘social chapter’ ought to be declaration by tribal and religious leaders 
not to meddle in politics unfairly. Ultimately, each nation must develop its own 
political culture so as to smooth the running of the prime institutions and cover 
loopholes in the legal system. This culture is still developing in Iraq.     
I might agree here that those seeking to be elected or putting themselves forward as 
politicians should give up religious dress in order to avoid giving the impression of 
having religious authority.  
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Interview 8 
Dr Kanan Makiya 
 Dr Kanan Makiya, is a prominent thinker, academic and Author of the “Republic of 
Fear” and “Cruelty and Silence” among other important books. He was received by 
President Bush a few times to consult him about Iraq before the invasion. He 
authored Charter 91 and is the co-author of the Transition to Democracy in Iraq 
Report. He is of Shia background and secular. The interview was conducted in 
London face to face in mid 2012 and notes were taken. 
 
Answers 
Dr Makiya says he is not interested in politics and he came into it as a matter of 
conscience after the heinous crimes that Saddam Hussein committed against the 
Iraqi people with complete impunity. He even fell out with his own father, the 
architect, Professor Muhammed Makiya, when he decided to go back to Iraq in the 
eighties to work in specific architectural projects there. He thought that was a 
betrayal of the cause of fighting Saddam Hussein. 
 
He wrote his famous book “The Republic of Fear' in the eighties exposing the 
repressive practices of the regime of Saddam Hussein. In the nineties, he wrote 
another book; 'Cruelty and Silence”, detailing the crimes that Saddam Hussein and 
his Ba’ath Party committed in the intifada of March 1991. He blamed the West and 
the US in particular, for their failure to support the Iraqi people who rose against the 
regime after they were encouraged by President George Bush to do so. 
 
Anyone is Better 
He opposed Saddam Hussein and thought that 'anyone would be better than him' in 
the leadership of Iraq as he told me. He calls the religious parties a 'thieving mafia' 
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and says they 'distribute state posts on the basis of stealing the state. They are there 
to benefit personally'.  
 
He believes that Islam can change as happened in Judaism and Christianity. 
'Catholics jettisoned a lot of their religious practices in order to accord with 
modernity'.  
 
Dr Makiya believes that there are signs for rationalism in Islamic thinking especially 
among the young generation. He sees a crisis within Islam and the 'new Islamists' 
will be able to change that. He believes there is a sector of society that is determined 
to 'rethink' everything.  
 
Within the Shia, he says is possible that there is a room for flexibility. He referred to 
Ali Allawi's book 'The Crisis of Civilization' which dealt with the issue of isolationism 
and he says this trend which dominated the language of the opposition, has long 
gone.  He also believes there is a need for a fatwa against 'sectarianism'. He 
maintains that Iraq is not an isolated case. 'Change is possible. Islamic tolerance is 
possible'. He quotes John Stewart Mill that 'Third Worldism will come'. 
 
When I asked him if secularism was the answer for Iraq's problems he disagrees. 
'Tolerance  is easier than secularism'. At the same time he maintains that 'separation 
of state and religion is a 'necessity for religion'. Still, Dr Makiya believes there is no 
guarantee for anything. 'We are talking of natural developments that will happen 
eventually, not necessarily now.  
 
Dr Makiya maintains that Iran is responsible for whatever is happening to Iraq. 'It’s 
Iran who supported the religious parties. Without Iran they would have had no 
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influence'. As for the diminishing role of the US in Iraq he explains: 'The US departed 
because the Iraqi political parties and the political class turned their back to it. The 
US could have contributed to the development of Iraq economically, culturally and 
scientifically' but it had to leave because most politicians were reluctant to support its 
presence in Iraq’. 
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Interview 9 
Dr Hussain Al-Hindawi 
 
Dr Hussain Al-Hindawi is a journalist, writer & poet. He is the former President of the 
first post-Saddam Iraqi Independent High Electoral Commission-IHEC (2004-2008). 
He holds a PhD in Philosophy from a French university. Prior to going back to Iraq, 
he was the director of the United Press International News Agency-Arabic Section, 
London. He is secular and of Shia background. The Interview was conducted face to 
face in London in mid 2012 and recorded on a tape. 
  
Answers 
40 years of retarded totalitarian regime left its mark on Iraq. Not all totalitarian 
regimes are bad in every aspect. Franco1216 in Spain for example was anti-
communism and that’s it. Franco called upon the heir to the former Spanish royal 
house, Prince Juan Carlos, and handed back power to them but under certain 
stipulation which is to establish a real democratic system in Spain. He saved Spain 
and was a true believer in democracy1217 but he thought the time wasn't right for it 
when he was a ruler. The Iraqi situation is different. 
 
 The destruction of the middle class 
                                                            
1216
 Dr Hindawi is mixing here between totalitarian and authoritarian regimes. Franco’s regime was not 
totalitarian, but authoritarian.  
1217
 It’s obvious that Dr Hindawi is no expert on Spanish affairs, although he is very well-versed on Iraqi affairs. 
Franco was a dictator and could not have been a true believer in democracy. This aside, Hindawi is one of the 
achievers in Iraq. He holds PhD in philosophy from France and is a widely-read author on philosophy, history, 
politics and literature as well as being a modern poet. He also became the president of the first Iraq electoral 
commission.  He later worked for the United Nations mission in Iraq as adviser. In 2104 he was appointed as 
adviser to the President of the Republic of Iraq. 
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The middle class is coward because they look for their interest. The bourgeoisie 
class was destroyed before that. The previous state was sectarian. The current 
situation is a continuation of the last. There is no basis for democracy in Iraqi society. 
The last elections in Iraq were held in 1954 and they were rigged, although there 
were some leftists opposition figures, such as Rafael Batti, won seats in parliament 
but they were a few.  
 
PM Fadhil Al-Jamali created the Reconstruction Council (RC). All the current major 
projects in Iraq were achievements of the RC's. Leftists do not have an 
understanding of Western democracy; in fact they had their own version of 
democracy whatever they call it (true democracy, or good democracy).  
 
American call for democracy in 2003 was false. There was no truth in their call for 
democracy. Building democracy doesn't depend on Ahmed Al-Chalabi, for example. 
The Kurdish parties do not differ much from the Arab parties in the sense that they 
are dominated by families. The middle class always looks for peaceful transition of 
government and believes in market competition and because there is no middle 
class, democracy failed in Iraq. 
 
In my experience as President of the Electoral Commission, I found that there is no 
democratic upbringing (culture) in Iraq which ensures the peaceful transfers of power 
in accordance with people's wishes expressed in the ballot box. There is no 
understanding of democracy. The electorate doesn't know his rights, and he keeps 
changing his views every 5 minutes.  
 
There was an absence of democratic legacy (culture) which could have helped 
people understand democracy. A blanket for example given to an electorate by a 
candidate persuades the electorate to vote for that candidate, not another. The 
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electorate has no respect for his opinion. He was under the influence of the tide of 
sectarian media. The vote has no value (in the eyes of the electorate). The political 
class doesn't respect democracy. There is no single person who has any respect for 
the concept of democracy. Perhaps Ahmed Al-chalabi has more understanding of 
democracy than others because he lived abroad. None of the elite that lived abroad 
is democratic, on the contrary they think that democracy is a (deceit).  
 
During the opposition, those who believed in democracy, they did that because they 
were weak. The Western liberal understanding of democracy is weak in Iraq despite 
the fact that even during the Babylonian era, there were councils that limited the 
authority of the king when declaring war or making peace. Most of the Iraqi Diaspora 
which is estimated to number between 2-4 millions, lived in democratic countries, but 
most of those who went back to Iraq after the fall of the regime were the ones who 
lived in non-democratic countries such as Syria and Iran. As for those who lived in 
Europe, they have actually lived in their own narrow societies and hence didn't 
understand the European experience. 
   
The Americans were listening to what Najaf was saying when writing the Iraq interim 
constitution (Transitional Administrative Law-TAL). The group that the Americans 
have handed power to, or those they dealt with, were totally ignorant in law, even in 
Islamic law (Sharia). None of them was like (Ayatullah) Hussein An-Na’eeni who 
proposed a constitution to limit the authority of the ruler.  
 
Even the critics are not objective when criticising the government or political parties 
for example. Fakhri Kareem, the media baron and publisher of Al-Mada Newspaper, 
criticised PM Al-Maliki alone and remained silent when it comes to the Kurdish 
parties or leaders for some reason.  
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The role of religion  
Religion played certain roles against democracy, even in Europe. But religion can 
play a role in favour of democracy. Religious leaders can present Islamic ideas to 
serve democracy and at the same time do not contravene Islamic principles. Islam 
favours a just rule and democratic rule is just because it respects the poor and it’s 
fair with all people. 
  
We must distinguish between different religious scholars as their positions are 
different.  Ayatullah Ha’eri for example is against secularism. Others do not have a 
problem with it but they believe in justice- but justice is relative and it could mean 
different things to different people. Religious parties played on this role and exploited 
religious scholars who have no political project. 
 
The Shia in general neglected politics and government and left it for the Sunnis In 
the past). In fact some Shia religious leaders have even forbidden people form 
participation even in studying at state schools.  
 
The project now is returning the rule to the majority and this was what happened 
during the first elections as all admit. They should have stopped at that. The Shia 
should have built a modern state based on democracy. Some clerics have no 
problem with building a modern state. 
 
The religious authority can take a corrective position. Imam Khoei for example 
believed in the separation of religion and politics. There is no hostile position towards 
democracy among Shia religious scholars. I believe that with times and the 
development, of the experiment, things will be corrected and go back to the right way 
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because the interest of the Shia and the Muslims is in building a just state. Past and 
present religious leaders were not against democracy, but religious parties are. 
 
Religious scholars should explain their positions. They should say whether those 
parties do represent them or not. They should forbid them from using their names. 
Religious parties are not democratic and they have no democracy within their 
constitutions.  They have not changed during the last period and they have become 
more professional in using democratic language and democratic game for their 
interests. 
 
They have controlled the election commission and this distances the democratic 
process from propriety and integrity. Religious parties were all one group and they 
are one and the same thing and do not represent different trends in society but they 
were divided into many factions for personal reasons or under the influence of 
regional powers. Again, there is no difference between Islamic parties. 
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Interview 10 
Mr Dia Ash-Shakarchi 
 
 Mr Dia Ash-Shakarchi is a political writer, author and former Shia cleric. He was a 
member of the National Assembly in 2005/2006 and was a member of the 
Constitution Drafting Committee. He was a senior member of the Islamic Da'awa 
Party until 2006 when he resigned from the party and renounced political Islam. He 
is now a staunch advocate of secularism and democracy. He abandoned political 
Islam as a matter of conscience when it was at its highest strength. This interview 
was conducted via email and answers were received on 16th July 2014 in Arabic and 
were translated by the author. 
 
Answers 
Distorted Secularism 
I can summarise impediments as follow: 
A- The absence, or the low level of, the necessary democratic culture and all its 
necessities and trappings such as the culture of citizenship, freedoms, equality and 
the acceptance of the other opinion. 
B- The prevalence of strict and closed-minded religiosity and the weakness of the 
culture of religious tolerance especially among the religious or among those who 
possess an emotional loyalty to the sect. 
C- Putting the sentiment of belonging to sub-national identities, especially sectarian 
affiliation, ahead of belonging to the motherland. This is the biggest impediment to 
the process of democratic transition followed by belonging to religion, ethnicity, tribe 
and region. 
 D- The prevalence of a wrong, distorted and warped conception of secularism 
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 E- Associated with this is the culture of focusing on the role of the individual and the 
failure of the culture of institutional action to take root. 
 F- The failure of the culture of transfer of power, and the absence of the tradition of 
transfer of power even among democratic secular parties. 
G- The phenomenon of double standards and its negative impact when the political 
elite is infected with it. 
 
I believe that any kind of foisting religion into politics, or even into public affairs, and 
to any degree represents an impediment to the process of democratic transition, 
especially in a society, where religion plays an influential role and has not gone 
through a democratic experiment before. There is an additional factor, and that is the 
lack of education. Therefore, in order to pave the way for the process of democratic 
transition and remove all hurdles from its path, the issuance of religious fatwa in 
political affairs must become a taboo, even though enacting a law of this kind will 
clash with the reality of emotional religious zeal and this will require establishing the 
cultural grounds for this type of legislation first. Even a political fatwa which has a 
positive impact on the democratic process will have a negative effect when it 
becomes an absolute criterion that is not subject to discussion, criticism, refutation 
and disagreement as these are among the fundamental democratic awareness in 
society. 
 
Sub-identities  
Tribal, regional and sectarian loyalties do impede democracy, certainly. Any kind of 
loyalty to sub-national identities, such as religion, sect, ethnicity, tribal affiliation, the 
family, and region, if it becomes ahead of the sentiment of citizenship, that is 
belonging to the motherland or the nation, that is to the human being who lives on 
the territory of that motherland, and I mean the loyalty that affects the political 
choices of the citizen, in terms of his support or opposition on the political level, and 
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in terms of his electoral choice, will amount to wasting the right criteria of choice, 
which must be based in the arena of politics on merit and integrity. 
 
If these loyalties take their right place, which should be after the loyalty to the 
motherland, they will be acceptable.  
 
A secular party is certainly fairer and more democratic than a religious one and I 
mean the secular and democratic party. The reason is that there is a specious 
argument that all dictatorships in the region have mostly been secular. But when we 
secularists talk about secularism, the secularism that we call for can only be realized 
when it is associated with democracy. As for the dictatorships that were classified as 
secular, they are actually dictatorships with non-religious intellectual tendencies, and 
may have been hostile to religion or even trading with religion at some other stage, 
as establishing their authority required them to do. We must distinguish between 
what is non-religious and what is secular. Dictatorships suppress all those opposing 
them, be they Islamist or secular.  
 
Only a secular democratic party that is committed to the principles of human rights, 
and engages in defending them, and that believes in equality based on citizenship 
and humanity, can lead the country. The existence of pluralism, i.e. the existence of 
a number of secular democratic parties, in all its diversified spinoff tendencies, 
whether liberal, leftist, social, conservative, and centrist, will be an enriching factor 
for the political scene and a factor for competition among political programmes. This 
is more beneficial to the country than competition over power and its privileges, as is 
the frequently the case with newly democratised societies and this is what happened 
in Iraq after 9th of April 2003.   
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It should be noted that there are religious people among the secularists but their 
understanding of religion and religiosity makes them favour the separation of religion 
and politics. So religion becomes a personal matter, where a secular person would 
defend the freedom to practice it as much as he defends the freedom of those who 
want to be free from religious commitments. The secular will protect the non-religious 
from being subject to the repression of his freedoms by radical Islamists, or the 
strictly religious. That is especially the case since interfering in personal affairs and 
attempting to restrict the freedom of individuals and groups has religious legal 
grounds through what is termed as ‘commanding virtue and forbidding vice’ or 
‘calling for religion’ (the Islamic call).   
 
Antithesis of Citizenship   
What I hope for the future, and maybe not in the foreseeable future because of my 
diagnosis of the difficulty of realizing amid the present conditions, is a political 
system where only secular parties are allowed to operate. Otherwise, I personally 
called at an early stage for us to have a political party law which bans the formation 
of parties on religious or sectarian bases, or even on ethnic basis. The parties of 
religions, sects, and ethnicities are the antithesis of the principle of citizenship which 
is regarded as a basic pillar for the democratic system since it embodies the principle 
of equality among citizens. In Iraq, we have two problems. Firstly, political Islam, 
which is represented by Islamist parties originally established for the purposes of its 
religious project which they called the ‘Islamasization of society’, as they regard 
society as Muslim but not Islamic. Therefore, they sought to change Muslim societies 
into Islamic societies. The second problem is political sectarianism, i.e. political 
Shiaism and political Sunnism.  
 
These trends are represented by parties that are exclusively for the Shia on the one 
hand, and parties that are exclusively for the Sunnis on the other. Sometimes we find 
the concurrence of the above mentioned factors in one party, or a political 
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personality, or a political thought, so that it is Islamic, on the one hand, and Shia or 
Sunni, on the other. And sometimes we find a sectarian party that is not necessarily 
Islamic but, for it, the sect becomes more like a tribe or ethnicity. As for Islamist 
parties, the fact of the matter, and we are not talking about abstract theory here, they 
are all sectarian. The Islamist party must be either Sunni Islamic or Shia Islamic and 
there is no example of a trans-sectarian Islamic party, neither in Iraq nor anywhere 
else, as far as I know. 
 
Personally, I believe that the application of secular democracy, which means 
complete separation between religious and political affairs, must mean the non-
interference of clerics in their capacities as clerics in politics. However, as a citizen, a 
cleric should be like any other citizen who has the right to engage in political, 
partisan and other activity and take up political position in the legislative or the 
executive branches. But I believe we should have a law in the future that bans 
politicians from discharging the tasks of a clergyman.  
 
If clerics want to work in politics, they should drop the religious clothing and must not 
practice any activity that is usually practised by clerics such as leading people in 
prayers, especially Friday prayers, preaching in sermons, issuing fatwas, performing 
marriages, or the like. If a politician wants to be a cleric, then he should quit politics. 
If a cleric wants to be a politician, then he should abandon his personality as a cleric, 
primarily by taking off his religious clothing and wearing civil ones. In societies where 
religion is still influential in public life, and where religion is still imbued with an 
emotional power, there is no doubt that religious clothing will have an impact on 
simple religious individuals, especially in a society where illiterates and the half-
educated still constitute the a big section. I say this although the clerics are not 
viewed now as holy as they were eleven years ago [in 2003], but there is still some 
influence for the clerics on the simple religious lay people, and even on others.  
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Religious Rhetoric 
During last ten years of Iraq’s experience, and despite the influence of religion on the 
general scene, I found a development in the opposite direction. The Islamist and the 
religious among the politicians, including the religious establishment, and even the 
religious authority, all have watered down their religious rhetoric and have turned to 
imbuing their rhetoric with a civic touch. They have reduced their use of religious 
literature and terminology.  
 
Regrettably, the secularists in Iraq, as is the case in all countries with a Muslim 
majority around the world, are always in fear of being stamped with the charge of 
‘infidelity’ or deviation from religion, or not respecting religious sanctities, so they 
have taken to going beyond the bounds of courtesy or consideration into hypocrisy. 
Some of them have taken to begin their speeches with the formula “In the Name of 
God, the Beneficent, the Merciful, for example, and those who have been the least 
drawn into the use of religious rhetoric, or let’s say watering down the secular 
discourse, are those who until today fear using the term ‘secularism’ so they replace 
it with ‘civic’ or with ‘liberalism’ in some countries, whereas liberalism represents one 
of the secular democratic trends.  
In my opinion, this exaggeratedly fearful conduct has represented a grave mistake 
since secular political trends, no matter how much they distance themselves from the 
use of this term, are judged as being ‘secular’. Therefore, it is more appropriate for 
them to declare their secularism, and then work to correct the misunderstanding 
surrounding it, as being synonymous with infidelity or atheism. 
 
We should have educated the people in this direction and this is what I have done 
personally within my modest means, and with efforts that are almost singlehanded, 
that secularism doesn’t mean infidelity or atheism, but is as such, frankly speaking, 
in as much as it does not see fighting infidelity and atheism as being one of its tasks.  
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Secularism, frankly speaking, actually defends the freedom of alternative faith which 
(believers) call infidelity. Secularism defends the freedom of atheism as much as it 
defends the freedom of religion and the freedom of religiosity. We should have 
educated people that secularism is more suitable for the country as well as religion 
itself, and I believe there is still time to do that.  
 
We do not need a deep philosophy that is difficult to understand, but the experiment 
of Islamists and the religious among the Muslims in the Western secular world is the 
best proof that the freedom of religion is preserved under secularism even more than 
in societies where Muslims constitute a majority.   
 
Foisting the Religion 
Hypocrisy is a social phenomenon in our societies, which is regrettably exemplified 
in the political sphere. Islamists practice it more than others.  This happens when an 
Islamist tries to portray himself as a democrat when he doesn’t believe in democracy 
because, in his culture in which he has been brought up for decades, it represents to 
him the rule of the people instead of the rule of God. This represents a negation of 
the philosophy of monotheism on the political level.  
 
But he rode the wave of democracy when he saw that there is no way to achieve his 
dream of establishing an Islamic state. The secularist also practises hypocrisy when 
he pretends to be religious for fear of being accused of infidelity or deviation from 
religion, although I do not see any contradiction between being secular and religious 
when one sees his belief in religion and his religiosity as a personal affair.  
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But hypocrisy is when (the secularist) foists the religious language into his political 
discourse without a need or reasonable justification. I personally regard honesty as 
an asset for the politician and hypocrisy is the opposite of honesty. Honesty doesn’t 
mean that politicians must say everything they know about facts that there is no 
need to be mentioned, or to reveal all the ideas and beliefs that they adopt, and 
under all circumstances, and to be unwise.  
 
There is a conversation surrounding every accident, and for every situation there is a 
discourse, as the saying goes. But there is a difference between not saying all that 
one knows and talking contrary to the reality that he knows or contrary to one’s 
convictions which he holds. The former is wisdom, whereas the latter is lying and 
hypocrisy. The corruption of a politician lies primarily in him engaging in lying, 
hypocrisy and double standards. 
 
Religious loyalty played an important role in elections, especially at the beginning of 
the experiment. As time went by, it developed into something worse, that is sectarian 
loyalty. Religious loyalty is narrower than sectarian loyalty since it includes the 
religious only, while sectarian loyalty includes the religious and non-religious from 
this or that sect.  I can say with certainty that 90% of voters vote on sectarian basis. 
Largely, Sunnis do not elect Shia and vice versa.  
 
What encourages and strengthens this bad phenomenon is that most parties or 
electoral coalitions are either Sunni or Shia, and each side insinuates to its audience 
from among its respective sect that it is the protector of the sect from the ‘terrorism’ 
of the other sect, or the protector of the latter sect from marginalization and 
repression at the hands of the former. Secular, trans-sectarian, trans-religious, trans-
ethnic parties are still weak.  
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Politicisation of Religion 
The politicisation of religion, as well as political sectarianism, has indeed contributed 
to bringing unqualified officials who concealed their lack of knowledge and 
experience behind religious rhetoric. The politicization of religion and political 
sectarianism have certainly contributed to the rise of politicians who not only lack 
qualifications, but also lack integrity. Financial corruption, and stealing or 
squandering public money, was strengthened through hiding behind religious and 
sectarians slogans. When sectarian and religious parties got into government or 
became influential, they started to cover up for the corrupt in their ranks. The 
phenomenon of mutual cover up of corruption among the same political foes 
appeared. Each party cannot expose the corruption of the other because it seems 
that the rival ‘other’ also holds corruption files against him. The use of religion has 
brought those who lack qualifications and integrity into office.         
  
Efforts to democratise Iraq have not failed, but they have not succeeded either. It is 
true that we, as democrats, have been hugely disappointed. I think it was possible to 
make important and huge strides over the last decade on all fronts, primarily on the 
level of making the democratic project successful, but also on the level of rebuilding 
state institutions and of making progress toward achieving development, with all its 
facets, the provision of services, as well as achieving a higher level of social welfare.  
 
There is no doubt that the coming to power of Islamic and sectarian parties and 
unqualified politicians, who do not care about anything but their personal perks, 
followed by the interest of their parties, and the interest of their sects third, all this 
has resulted in the failure of the project of democratic transition, which had great 
chances of success. From this angle, we can say that the project of democratic 
transition has not succeeded, and I do not wish to say it has failed, because there is 
still a system where democratic mechanisms, such as multi-party pluralism, elections 
and transition of power, are practised. This system has grounds to achieve more 
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success in the process of democratic transition. But it continues to, and will for a long 
time, be run by a non-democratic, unqualified and dishonest political elite. 
 
The reasons for the failure of the democratic transition are as follows: 
a. The domination of the forces of political Islam 
b. Resorting to political sectarianism 
c. The absence of parties, in the political sense of parties, because the existing ones 
are sectarian and ethnic parties 
d. The disease of double standards and hypocrisy which reaches the level of what I 
call ‘political esotericism’ [i.e., parties having a secret agendas] 
e. The non-separation between religion and politics 
f. The decline in cultural and educational levels and the spread of illiteracy. 
g. The absence of effective and influential democratic secular parties whose political 
thought does not belong to the past, but moves forward with a modern vision and a 
new thinking that possesses the courage to make a decision to rupture with the past, 
be it the distant past, especially that which is linked to religion or axioms that cannot 
be discussed, in addition to traditions, or the recent past and the political 
experiments of the first half of the past century.  
 
There are positive signs on the development of Iraqi democracy, but these are 
limited and represent slow and hesitant transitions. As far as the democratic political 
awareness in Iraqi society is concerned, there is a noticeable improvement. But this 
improvement has not been transformed into courage for change and a will for 
correction. 
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Pessimism  
Reforming the political process is still no more than a desire expressed by the 
citizens in all different types of expression. This desire has not been transformed into 
a will exemplified through the votes of the majority of voters, as if the voters are 
saying to the secular trans-sectarian and trans-ethnic democratic forces that reject 
the politicisation of religion: (Our hearts are with you but our votes are for the leaders 
of our sects). 
 
In the short term, I am not so optimistic, so I cannot put a specific time frame for the 
democratic experiment to take root. In the light of the current political, social and 
cultural scene, I think we need several decades in order to reach a modern secular 
democracy. But, as much as I am pessimistic I can see the future ahead of me 
where the dreams of the wise will be realised.  
 
I am certain that this represents a historical inevitability and a norm of life. The entire 
social march of human society goes in a wiser and more humane direction. When 
the principles and values of justice, equality, and respect for human rights and the 
sanctity of human freedom, and by this I mean responsible freedom, whose 
responsibility stems from the position of free choice, not from the position of 
imposition from the above and censorship, are observed, then people will be able to 
coexist in peace and love.  
 
Diversity becomes a factor of enrichment and free competition on an equal footing to 
achieve what is best and at the same time respecting the other opinion. Aren’t these 
the characteristics of the secular democratic system? Aren’t these the feature of 
modernity? Isn’t modernity nothing but marching in tandem with the times and the 
movement of history, rather than against them? This, therefore, makes me optimistic 
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about the future but I am not optimistic that this, or most of it, will happen in the near 
future.   
 
Nevertheless, we have to acknowledge a law that governs this development, i.e. that 
there is no iron formula for the laws of history, because the course of history does 
not unfold according to fixed laws like mathematics, physics and chemistry. Historical 
inevitability has a flexible and variable law. Some unexpected events, or which seem 
to be sudden, might act to expedite the march of history, while others slow it down. 
What we might expect to take place in three decades might happen within a decade, 
and vice versa. 
 
We need a long time until the general culture of society will have been transformed 
into a culture that rejects these corrupt and incompetent political forces, which 
exploits religion, sect and ethnicity for the sake of power. Until the emergence of a 
new political class that is free of the diseases afflicting the current political class, and 
until this class organizes itself, becomes capable of confronting the political 
octopuses which possess wealth, power, loyalty and expertise, and come to possess 
the ability to compete with it, and then displace it democratically from its positions, 
and replace it, and then legislate laws that are more in line with the spirit of 
democracy and the modern state, the state of secular citizenship, until all of this and 
other things happen, it is natural that we need time that might be long, and I 
personally believe that it will be long. But if we achieve a correction of 5-10% every 
parliamentary term, we will be marching in the right direction, toward the desired goal 
or goals. 
 
Moving into Secularism  
I have moved from Islamism into secularism, but throughout the stages I passed 
through, including the stage of my strict and naïve Islamism, and I wouldn’t describe 
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it as extreme, when I look back today in order to study and evaluate these stages, I 
can say in retrospect that the seeds of secularism have always been hidden within 
me, even though I discovered them lately. I believe that the nature of my personality 
has always been closer to secularism, and my place in the Islamist community was 
wrong.  
 
Despite this, I would like to summarise the main reasons for my transformation from 
Islamism to secularism, as well as the stages of this gradual, rather than sudden and 
abrupt, transformation through the completion of maturity, as follows: 
 
In the early 199s, a decade after I became an Islamist, I began to pay attention to 
democracy. I researched it and wrote about it in the light of my understanding of 
Islam, as a believer in religion, committed to its fundamentals, believing in its 
universality and inclusiveness of all corners and dimensions of human life, including 
politics. In other words, I believed then in political Islam, or Islamism, even though in 
the moderate type that seeks to be reasonable. As soon as I became interested in 
democracy, I found myself to be a firm believer in it, which pushed me into finding a 
‘legal’ cover for it from within religious thought.  
 
I was successful to a large extent, in my opinion, [to find and Islamic cover for 
democracy], although I do not believe today that what I did then was right. Since I 
was a member of the Da'awa Islamic Party then, I found some atmosphere within the 
party that were in harmony with my belief in democracy then, and this made me live 
the illusion of the possibility of turning this party into an Islamic democratic party. 
 
I tried before the fall of the dictatorship in Iraq to introduce a proposal to reform the 
Da'awa Party in more than one general party conference, and I continued to expect 
to succeed in the future, even though I failed then.  
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Before the fall of the dictatorship, I launched an initiative called 'The Iraqi Islamic 
Democratic Rally' whose communiqué was signed by more than 70 Islamic 
personalities, including leading Sunni and Kurdish Islamic personalities, among 
whom was a very well-known cleric.  
 
After the fall of the dictatorship, I started promoting democracy intensively despite 
my Islamism then, and the continuation of my membership in the Islamic Da'awa 
Party. My experience as a member of the National Assembly during the transitional 
period and as an active member of the Basic Principles Committee, which was the 
first subcommittee of the Constitutional Drafting Committee, of which I was the 
secretary, the distance between me and Shia Islamists, politically, intellectually and 
psychologically, in the Shia Islamic coalition known as the United Iraqi Alliance, 
started to get wider and wider. The reason for this gap is what I found as their strict 
Islamism and their insistence on emphasising their Shia sectarian identity and their 
attempt to add as much as they can of religious (Islamic) and sectarian (Shia) colour 
to the constitution.  
 
I also found them practicing political esotericism, so I began to distance myself from 
them and grew ever more distasteful of them. This experience wasn't the only reason 
for me to complete the rounds of my transformation towards secularism. There was 
also an intellectual development that was continuing to develop within me. 
 
I started asking myself and others the question whether religion should determine 
the religious politician's stances, political decisions, and opinions regarding finding 
solutions for social problems and meeting the society’s needs, which are political 
tasks that must depend primarily on reason and benefit from the human experience. 
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From Islamic Party to Islamic Rally 
I then decided to leave the Islamic Da'awa Party and declared my resignation from it. 
I founded a political grouping called 'The Rally of Democratic Islamists'.  But I soon 
reconsidered, posing the question why should this grouping be Islamist while all its 
contents are democratic and almost secular? I then called for changing the name to 
'The Rally of Iraqi Democrats' at the end of 2006. I then ended up launching the 
'Secular Grouping' project at the end of 2011.  
 
It is, therefore, an intellectual development that took a quarter of a century to 
complete. I moved from a strict Islamist, to moderate Islamist, to a democratic 
Islamist, to a democrat in the first place and Islamist in the second place, then a 
religious democrat, then religious secular democrat, and finally secular democrat. 
 
There is no doubt that my experience has contributed to the maturity of the factors of 
transformation even if, in my current estimation, it has taken a long time, quarter of a 
century. At the end of 2006 I embraced secularism completely with full and deep 
conviction until I became one of the most prominent proponents of the secularism of 
the state, clearly and without beating around the bush by using alternative 
terminology for secularism such as 'civicism' which has become so popular among 
secularists lately. I have repeatedly emphasised how wrong it is to replace 
secularism with 'civicism' as there are no real justifications to fear declaring our 
secular identity. 
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Interview 11 
Dr Adil Abdur-Raheem Muhammed 
 
 Dr Adil Abdur-Raheem Muhammed was the General Secretary of the Islamic Call 
Movement (ICM) which is an offshoot of Islamic Da’awa Party. He was the General 
Director of Education in the ministry of Education. He was a Shia. This interview was 
conducted via email. Answers were received in Arabic on 12th of August 2014 and 
were translated by the author. Dr Abdur-Raheem was sadly killed in a car accident in 
Baghdad in mid 2015.  
Answers 
The Culture of Loyalties  
The success of the democratic process depends on the presence of three things: 
1- Fair electoral law  
2- Clear and transparent electoral mechanism 
3- Full electoral awareness 
 
The electoral awareness is influenced by the cultural state of society. The prevalent 
culture in Iraqi society is the culture of religious, partisan, tribal, sectarian or regional 
loyalties. The criteria for these loyalties are far removed from mature and efficient 
choice. Some candidates were chosen despite the fact of not possessing 
parliamentary qualifications. 
  
Establishing a democratic system that depends on proper democratic mechanisms 
and respects the cultural content of the peoples will not face any problem with 
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religion, at least on the theoretical level, but problems may arise with religious 
groups for political motives. 
  
The influence of a religious fatwa depends on the (stature of) the issuing religious 
authority and the number of followers of that religious leader. However, there is a 
space that is not affected by fatwa.  
Loyalty is an entrenched culture in Iraq and this brings the weak to all state 
institutions and it is one of the factors that impede democracy. 
 
Islamists & secularists share a common culture  
There is no difference between religious and secular parties in terms of performance 
since they, whether Islamist or secularist, share a common culture and upbringing; 
that is the culture of monopoly of power, exclusion, and marginalization. This is an 
upbringing that Iraqi political activism has been suffering from for decades.   
Allowing only secular parties to work in politics contradicts democracy as one of its 
concepts is equal opportunities for all. Also, religious parties may be interested in the 
economic side of politics while secular parties could turn to sectarian rhetoric   
 
It is possible that wearing religious cloths enables candidates to gain votes but not 
always due to the existence of sections of society that are not influenced by religious 
discourse. Opportunities (to get more votes) are available for those who want to 
pretend to be religious 
   
Hypocrisy and opportunism (created by the politicians’ double standard) have 
serious consequences that can render the democratic political process devoid of its 
content creating in the process a conducive environment for corruption to grow. This 
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will lead to people refraining from doing any positive action and this will consequently 
lead to the failure of the political process. This will have negative effects on the 
social, economic and political levels 
 
Loyalty, be it religious, tribal, partisan or sectarian, was the basis for voting in the 
previous period.   
   
Both Islamists and secularists presented unprofessional and weak candidates in the 
parliamentary elections and also for government positions. 
Efforts to make the democratic transition were not successful at the required level 
because all people didn't make the necessary effort to make the transition possible. 
All of them stuck to their narrow views and cultures which favour sectarian interests 
over the interest of the public project.  
 
There are two factors for the failure of the democratic transition: external which is 
represented by the flagrant regional interference because their (the regional powers’) 
interests would not have been served if the democratic project in Iraq was 
successful. The other is internal and this is represented by a low culture (awareness) 
that smacks of monopoly of power, exclusion and marginalization which all political 
forces in Iraq suffer from.  
  
There has been a slight development that is noticeable in the freedom of expression 
and the media as well as the amendment of the electoral law and electoral 
mechanisms. There were also some rare instances of dialogue and understanding 
between political forces. 
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There are dangers that threaten the unity of Iraq and may consequently lead to the 
failure of the experiment. The deep division in Iraqi society is one of the biggest 
challenges ahead. In addition, the interests of international and regional powers in 
Iraq do not accord with Iraqi interests. If things go in a positive direction, then we will 
need decades for the democratic experiment to take root.  
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Interview 12 
Professor Ali Allawi 
 
 Professor Ali Allawi is the former minister of trade, defence and finance between 
2003-2006. He is also the author of several important books on Iraq among which is 
'The Occupation of Iraq' and 'Faisal 1 King of Iraq'. He is of Shia background. He is 
currently working as university professor in Singapore. The interview was done via 
email and answers were given in English and sent on 28th September 2014. 
 
Answers 
Types of Impediments 
a. Cultural impediments include the prevalence of tribal and patriarchal values that 
reduce the scope for individual action, thereby limiting or undermining one of the 
principle premises of democracy. 
 
b. Religious impediments are the arguments that Islamic political authority cannot be 
based on simply the views and positions of a political majority. Political choices must 
necessarily be constrained by religious injunctions that are above and supersede the 
will of a majority.   
 
Consolidating not Impeding 
A religious fatwa does not necessarily impede the democratic process. The positions 
of a religious authority can even consolidate the democratic process. A good 
example of this is the support of the Catholic Church to Christian Democratic parties 
in post war Europe. Arguably, they consolidated the democratic process in the face 
of a communist alternative.  
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Without doubt the tribal, sectarian or regional affiliation or bias impedes 
democratisation in Iraq. These primary identities overshadow the democratic 
process. 
 
By and large, a secular party is better placed to be fairer and more democratic than a 
religious one, unless it turns secularism into another religion, as had happened in 
Turkey and Tunisia.  
 
I think Iraq should allow for a blend of political parties that appeal to different 
constituencies. There is nothing that makes a focus on economic well-being (or 
crudely, class interests) better than a religious basis for politics. This is a false 
dichotomy that I do not subscribe to. Politics is to do with an ethic that focuses on 
expanding and enhancing the public interest, and not simply the improvement in 
individuals’ economic well-being.  
  
Iraq is NOT a religious society in the sense that is governed by a general 
commitment to an ethic of virtues rooted in a religious tradition. It is religious only in 
that it appears to formally accept the outer norms and features of a 
factional/sectarian understanding of religion. Wearing religious garb might be useful 
today. Thirty years ago it was ridiculed and those wearing it were not only powerless 
but were considered reactionary outcasts. Circumstances change and the fickleness 
of formal commitments to religion is well documented in Iraqi society.  
 
Rhetoric Brings Votes 
For the time being, this thesis (religious rhetoric helps politicians get more votes, and 
this fact encourages the non-religious to pretend to be religious in order to get more 
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votes, even though they are not religious in actual life) is correct. However, Iraqis are 
prone to radical shifts and it is quite likely that whenever their interests are seen to lie 
elsewhere, there will be a mass migration away from the use of religious rhetoric and 
symbols.   
 
Hypocrisy by the politicians AND the electorate necessarily effects adversely the 
performance and efficiency of the political class. People in Iraq have voted in the last 
three elections according to their sectarian affiliations (as opposed to religious). 
 
Only good can emerge from a politics rooted in ethics, which obviously includes 
ethics based on the idea of religious virtues and values. We have an unscrupulous 
political class that uses the politics of fear, marginalisation and anxieties of 
dispossession to push people into primary identities that are antithetical to the 
politics of enhancing the public interest. 
 
Democratization in Iraq has absolutely failed over the last ten years. It was an idiotic 
experiment based on the childish prognostications of ideologues in the west-mainly 
the US- and the exploitation of democratic principles by utterly unprincipled and 
corrupt politicians to enhance their individual and family claims on power.  
 
I have noticed no positive signs for democracy in Iraq. I have found ample evidence 
that electoral democracy in an environment that is full of conflicts and contradictions 
and an elemental struggle for power is a recipe for disastrous misgovernment.  
 
No true democracy can exist in Iraq until and unless the degree of political maturity is 
expanded exponentially and that primal loyalties and identities are transcended in a 
new calculus of power. I don’t think this will happen in my lifetime. We need stability, 
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institutional development, ethical renewal and leadership before we experiment with 
the ridiculous mechanism of arithmetic majorities as somehow representing the 
“public will”.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interview 13 
Mr Sharwan Al-Waeli 
Mr Sharwan Al-Waeil was a minister for national security in the period (2006-2010). 
He elected an MP for province of Nassiria between (2010-2014), He was a member 
of the IDP-Iraq Organization. He is currently an advisor to the president of the 
republic. He is of Shia Background and a former Islamist. The interview was 
conducted in Iraq in Mr Al Waeli’s house in the Green Zone in September 2014 and 
it was face-to-face and recorded on a tape. 
 
Answers 
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The Ills of democracy  
Democracy in Iraq was built abroad and this has led to real misunderstanding or a 
misreading of the reality inside Iraq. The internal situation was not taken into 
consideration because [the rule of] the consecutive unstable regimes, especially the 
former regime, and this has left wrong concepts and consequences on the Iraqi 
arena inside. The participation of the Iraqis from within Iraq was not real or clear. 
Rather, ideas, some of which were standard ideas which might be suitable for other 
peoples and not the Iraqi people, such as giving total freedoms, were brought into 
Iraq. The transformation was by 180 degrees all over a sudden. This has made the 
Iraqi democratic transition immature.  
 
The transformation from a centralized totalitarian system that had legal rules for 
everything to a chaotic system in every sense has led to distorting the understanding 
of democracy. The Iraqi cultural (awareness) reality should have been taken into 
consideration because the last time we had democracy was in 1958. Consequently, 
Iraqi generations have not opened their eyes to democracy. If standardized global 
views on democracy are applied to the Iraqi people, they are bound to fail. 
Democracy is not just ideas and procedures on their own. It is practice as well. The 
political elite understands democracy as the monopoly of power. The governed didn’t 
have a proper understanding of democracy either. The citizen is still in need of 
cultural concepts that raise his standard so that he could apply democracy.  
  
Religious practices 
Harm does come out of mixing religion and politics. There was an attack on religion, 
i.e. a terrible exploitation of religion in politics, as it was used for the promotion of 
parties and persons and marketing them. They have marketed themselves through 
religion, especially those belonging to political Islam (members of Islamic parties). 
There was a horrible exploitation of religion. Unlike the political parties, the religious 
authority (marja’iyyah) was the only party that kept its distance from benefitting from 
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religion and acted as the sponsor of the national project. Yes the religious authority 
allowed its representatives to stand in the first elections in order to save a project 
and not for personal gain. It intervened because it didn’t accept an elitist constitution. 
It insisted that the constitution be written by an elected national assembly. It did not 
interfere after that. But there are those who claimed, in whispering tones or by 
insinuation, to enjoy its support, or spoke out on its behalf, but it did not interfere. 
There are multiple religious authorities, and I am talking about the religious authority 
of Sayyid Ali Sistani, not the others.  
 
Fatwa 
If an individual is not culturally qualified (educated enough), and he is not self-
sufficient (culturally), then his emotions are liable to be exploited. Political parties 
have exploited the citizen and his need to get a job and other simple needs. Let’s not 
forget that those who are below the poverty line in Iraq constitute 37% of the 
population. The citizen has been exploited and his emotions have been played with 
by political parties and his vote was stolen.    
  
Tribal loyalty is not very strong in the cities, although it is still strong in villages, but 
sectarian loyalty is more wide-spread, and so is party loyalty, because a large 
percentage of the people rallied to the political parties. There are also religious and 
party loyalties among the tribes. Religious and sectarian loyalty is harmful to the 
democratic process. 
 
We don’t know if secular parties are fairer because we have not tried their rule so far. 
Perhaps in the future. Religious parties have exploited people’s religious and 
sectarian emotions.    
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Secular parties have more chance in the future but it’s not fairer on the whole. 
Religious parties began to field secular and religiously non-practising personalities 
among their candidates. They began to talk about the ‘civic state’. They have been 
trying to market their traditional personalities in order to get votes this way. Religious 
parties resorted to talking about the civic state because they have failed. Yes there is 
a change in Iraqi society and it’s away from religious parties. 
 
Electoral system 
Iraqi electoral system is shaky and it gets changed in every electoral season. I have 
challenged the provincial electoral law and managed to get parliament to adopt the 
Saint Lague electoral system and my list won 3 provincial council seats. But large 
parties try to deprive small parties from wining any seat. We have tried to pass a law 
to adopt the Saint Lague electoral system for the parliamentary elections but the big 
parties amended it to make it divisible over 1.6 instead of just one. There must be a 
popular will to change the electoral law, otherwise big blocs will keep manipulating 
the law. Big blocs came to prominence because of their sectarian and religious 
rhetoric. 
 
Religious and sectarian rhetoric was extreme and focussed this time and those who 
resorted to it got many and incredible votes. Yes, religious rhetoric is useful and 
promotional for candidates.   
 
The results of the last elections will convey a message to the new member of 
parliament that if you are sectarian and able to collect money (illegally), you will win. 
One of my MP friends advised me to change my message and make it sectarian in 
order to win, but I refused because sectarian talks is haram (sinful) in my opinion and 
I am a religious person. 
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Religious cloth 
There is a (political) benefit derived from wearing religious clothes; and not just 
clothes, but anything that refers to religion such as beards, rings, turban, and 
frequenting mosques and attending Hussaini rallies. As long as there is a benefit 
from religious rhetoric, non-religious candidates will keep using it. I have a friend who 
is not religious but he used religious Hussaini rhetoric in the election even though he 
is not religious at all.   
 
The problem is that people are not happy about these practices (the use of religious 
rhetoric) but during the elections, they vote for sectarian politicians because of their 
fear of the other. There is a secret which is that the citizen has reached a stage 
where he cannot compromise on the sectarian identity even though he is hungry, 
unemployed and his rights are taken away. This trend is harmful to society.  I am a 
practising Muslim from a practicing family but I kept away from these practices 
because of fear of being accused of showing off. I started relinquishing these rituals. 
This means that hypocrisy and deception began to affect real religiosity. There is a 
tradition that goes: “Men are evaluated according to the yardstick of the religion of 
Allah, whereas the religion of Allah cannot be evaluated by the yardstick of men.” 
Deceptive rhetoric is not real religiosity. 
  
Religiosity and political performance  
It is possible that a non-practising Muslim is a good politician and religiosity is not a 
condition for integrity or efficiency and the proof is that there were no signs of 
corruption or exploitation of public funds or exploitation of the police recorded against 
the Iraqi Communist Party even though they do not believe in religion to begin with. 
Political conduct differs from religious one. It is important that we get capable people 
who could benefit society, not those to pray and fast in front of people. Using religion 
in the political sphere is harmful to the political process.  
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The political process brought non-qualified people either because they belong to a 
religious family or a religious party or they have a relation with this or that individual.  
13 people from the Shia Endowment Office became members of the National 
Assembly because of their relations (with influential individuals or parties). You rarely 
find people who came to office because they are qualified. There are those who 
reached leadership positions under religious title.   
 
Effort of democratization 
There is a big waste in the efforts of democratization in spite of our determination 
and sacrifices. But we have not reached the stage of despair. There is a need for 
correcting the legislative code, from a party law, electoral law to a really independent 
electoral commission. The electoral commission which was formed during Bremer’s 
time was better than the current one because the UN participated in its formation. It 
wasn’t very strong but it was much better.  
 
Current law and religious rhetoric 
Current law states that no religious symbols, photos, places of worship or state 
institutions can be used for electoral purposes. Some parties spent billions and no 
one asked them where they got the money from. The electoral commission is weak 
and not independent. The constitution is there but it is violated.  The grounds are 
now ready for an independent and strong electoral commission. Vote rigging took 
place in the last elections more than any other elections and I am a witness to it. 
When the electoral commission becomes strong and not subject to blackmailing, it 
would not matter even if the governing party is contesting the elections. The current 
electoral commission has been formed from the main parties in parliament and the 
loyalty of the members of the commission was for the influential parties who are 
participating in the government, that’s why the commission is now restricted. 
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The rentier state 
Money is theoretically accounted for in the budget and exploitation doesn’t happen 
through the budget. It is hidden and the exceptions made by the government are one 
of the windows for corruption. For example, the decision of the council of ministers 
which give money during the elections in the form of workshops, appointments, 
facilitation (of events or projects) and this is done by all the parties participating in 
the government. There are politicians who can be bought with an armoured car or 
half a million dollars. On the other hand there are others who cannot be bought with 
a mountain of gold.  
 
Practically, oversight is weak and I have referred more than five hundred cases of 
corruption to the Integrity Commission but the judiciary didn’t do anything because 
there was no oversight. Even the MPs who signed on referring cases to the Integrity 
Commission are now outside parliament. This is a message that anyone who speaks 
out against corruption, it will backfire against him. We have a problem. The closest 
case to us is Lebanon but Lebanon has a strong private sector that has no relation to 
the state. In Iraq, the decisions to spend money are connected to the state not the 
institutions. There are things which are not constitutional such as the Agricultural 
Initiative, the Economic Initiative and the Educational Committee. These have no 
place in the constitution.  
There are judges who occupy important positions have weak points which make 
them weak before politicians and officials. He who has a weak point is led easily 
(easily blackmailed). 
 
Positive signs 
The positive thing is that the people began to distinguish between the good and the 
bad, whether form parties or individuals. When the people are free of parties and 
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when we have a ‘[civil] service council’, then individuals won’t be able to dominate 
appointments or the laws or the [electoral] commission. We will also benefit from our 
past mistakes.  
The parties began to reform themselves because they have become a source of 
anxiety for people as well as not acceptable in public opinion. Parties began to bring 
independent personalities among their candidates.   
Freedom of the media and criticism. Elections are only procedures but there was no 
real democratic practice. But the existence of the freedom to criticize could lead to a 
better situation.        
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Interview 14 
Miss Maysoon Aldamluji 
 
Miss Maysoon Aldamluji is an MP for Baghdad for the Iraqia Patriotic Bloc and was 
an MP for Musil in the 2006-2010 parliament since she originally comes from Musil. 
She was Deputy Minister for culture (2004-2006), She is Editor-in-chief of the women 
magazine, Noon. She is British-educated with an MSc and MA in architecture. She 
is of Sunni background. The interview was done by email and the answer was 
received in English. 
 
Answers 
 
I think Iraq was given a strenuous opportunity to turn into a democracy, in very 
difficult circumstances. Following many decades of tyranny, wars and sanctions, Iraq 
was invaded by foreign forces, Saddam Hussein’s regime was toppled, and army 
and security forces were dismantled, leaving a massive vacuum that gave way to 
insurgency and militias to compromise Iraq’s security and sovereignty. 
 
Iraqis No better off Now 
I do not think that the Iraqi experiment of democratization has been successful. In 
many aspects, Iraqis today are not better off than they were before 2003. However, I 
do not think that Iraq is a lost case. The opportunity still exists to build a real 
democracy in Iraq. 
 
The main obstacles, in my opinion, are the poor historic examples of a democratic 
tradition, absence of democratic institutions, weak judicial system, rentier economy, 
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sectarianism, centralization and legitimacy among the ruling elite. ‘Historic examples’ 
applies to all countries of the world that begin democratization for the first time, not 
just Iraq. A nation builds up its democratic traditions through accumulating collective 
experience.  
 
Iraq is part of the greater Middle East and it is affected by events in the region. It also 
has the potential to influence neighbouring countries. Democracy could prevail with 
both internal and external factors. Internally, a process of democratization will have 
to include building state institutions, decentralization, reconciliation and a strong 
independent judiciary. None of this is impossible to achieve. Externally, the end of 
the conflict in Syria and the turn out of the “Arab Spring” will certainly influence the 
shape of Iraq’s future. 
 
Ancient History 
A moderate version of Islam could live peacefully alongside a democratic system. A 
moderate version is one that does not take an active part in every day politics, yet 
monitors the overall process and takes part in forming public opinion. 
 
Democracy, as I understand it, is a set of values that include human rights, women’s 
rights, minority rights, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience and religion, etc. 
Therefore, I do not distinguish Islamic democracy from western democracy. It’s 
indivisible.  
 
Islamist parties identify themselves with ancient historic events. They use the Quran 
as their reference in legislative, executive and judicial matters. They do not 
recognize any example outside this framework. Seculars identify themselves with 
438 
 
 
national symbols, and use international declarations, agreements and protocols as 
their references. 
 
Their (Islamists) symbolism is easily identified with the populace. They also have the 
advantage of Western and regional support. I am totally convinced that the Bush 
administration gave weight to Islamic parties in forming the Governing Council, and 
abided by the views of the Shia religious leadership (Marji3iya) in drafting the 
constitution. Even the timing of the first elections was obviously in favour of Islamic 
parties. 
 
Islamist parties have not been performing according to the ideals they have set 
themselves to. Far from it. They promised justice, but were not able to deliver. 
I think that the failures of Islamic parties are intrinsic. Iraq is a complicated state with 
a complicated social system. It is also a state rich with a variety of resources. 
Islamist parties did not set out to build a democratic state. 
 
I do not think that there is a need for religious parties in Islamic countries. They have 
caused sectarian conflicts in Iraq and failed to run the state. Islamic parties claim to 
speak on behalf of God, in accordance to their interpretation of the Quran. 
 
I do believe that democracy cannot exist under religious parties, or totalitarian 
parties, even if they were secular. Democracy, in my opinion, is a set of modern 
values that recognize the freedom of individuals and rights of groups (women, 
children, elderly, etc.). I do not believe that democracy can be identified as Islamic or 
western. 
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Islamist parties have impeded democracy on more than one level. First, they stick to 
Islamic doctrine on personal affairs, allowing children to marry at the age of 9 or less, 
discriminating between men and women in inheritance and allowing women to be 
beaten up by their spouses and siblings as a measure of discipline. A woman's 
testimony is not allowed in a court of law. I could go on for pages. On a different 
level, Islamist parties encourage sectarianism and permit religious discrimination 
against non-Muslims.  
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Interview 15 
Dr Fareed Ayar 
 
Dr Fareed Ayar was a member & Spokesman of Independent High Electoral 
Commission in Iraq (IHEC) (2004-2008). He is the General Secretary of the Union of 
Arab News Agencies. He is a veteran a journalist. He is German-educated and of 
Christian background. The interview was conducted face to face in his house in 
London in October 2014. It was recorded on a tape. 
 
Answers 
 
Democracy is not an ideal idea. It’s a good system for those who appreciate what 
democracy is all about. Therefore we need to specify the nature of the peoples or 
human groups where democracy is to be applied. 
 
I believe that democracy doesn’t benefit Iraq currently and we must find a new idea 
or a system other than democracy which the US has parachuted into Iraq. If we 
study the first elections held in Iraq to establish democracy firmly after a long 
totalitarian dictatorial regime, we would find that the application of democracy was 
not good or right in the sense that is prevalent now.  
 
Low Level Awareness 
During the first elections, which were held on 30 January 2005 and in which I was a 
member and spokesman of the Independent High Electoral Commission in Iraq 
(IHEC), 8 million voters participated in the elections … 4 million of them were Shia 
who went to the polls to elect representatives of the Shia without any real electoral 
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programs. Nor were there any guarantee from those they would elect that they would 
give freedom of speech afterwards. Two millions, who were Kurds, voted on an 
ethnic basis. Two other millions, who were Sunnis and Christians and others, also 
voted on the same basis. As such, those elections were not really conducted in the 
right way because the cultural (awareness) level of the Iraqi people was not up to the 
standard of realising the meaning of democracy.  
 
In a proper democracy, voting must be on the basis of the political projects and 
programmes presented by the candidates, parties or political groupings. The 
problem with voting on the basis of sect, religion or ethnicity is that it is based on 
compulsion not freedom. A Shia cleric can order a thousand Shia voters to vote for 
one candidate who is not known to them. This is voting not electing and there is a 
difference between the two.  This is the problem [that impedes democracy]. 
 
There was no democratic situation during the formation of the first government. 
Those who were elected were not afraid of the electorate withdrawing their support 
from them as they voted for them because they were Shia and as long as they 
remain Shia, they will vote for them again. This is the problem and we must find 
another formula or system to apply the so called democracy in Iraq.  Current 
democracy in Iraq has not taken root, on the contrary, it is fragile because it is based 
on ethnic, religious and sectarian bigotry.   
 
There is another thing and it’s how to make the electorate qualified to elect [the right 
people]. There are illiterate people who go to vote, and beside them stand educated 
people who are graduate of renowned universities. There is a huge difference 
between the two. How can they be equal?  
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I don’t see any problem regarding the lack of equality, I believe it is an important 
matter and I wrote about it in one of my books. The problem is that even applying 
democracy in the right way, there must be some conditions or terms imposed on the 
electorate. We must not treat this as a matter of discrimination in accordance with 
article 19 of the UN charter and one must have also completed the intermediate level 
of education [the stage below the secondary school level] to have the right to vote. 
We do not want elections to be done wrongly because of religious influences and 
outdated customs. Religious, ethnic and regional fanaticism flies in the face of 
democracy and impedes its application. 
 
I believe secular parties serve democracy more than religious parties which do not 
believe in democracy to begin with and regard it as a ‘despicable satanic act’ as I 
read in some articles for prominent Islamic writers. They [Islamists] practice 
deception in order to get to power as happened during the reign of Egyptian 
President Muhammed Mursi. Therefore, secular parties are more receptive to 
democracy and are subject to many of its terms. However, secular parties in third 
world countries (which are called developing [countries] out of politeness, although 
they are in fact backward) are also too negligent. Take the [Iraqi] Communist Party 
which was able to organize a demonstration of one million people in Al-Rashid Street 
back in 1959. Now it is unable to get one or two candidates to parliament. 
 
Tunisian Islamists accepted democracy reluctantly and if it was left up to Rachid El 
Ghannouchi [the leader of the Ennahdha Party] to implement what’s in his mind, he 
would have been among the most extreme of those applying religion and bigotry in 
power but his party was forced to accept democracy. This is why you see the 
Islamist government formed after the fall of Zeinul-Abideen Bin Ali in Tunisia 
accepting democracy gradually. Otherwise, it would have become one of the most 
extreme religious parties in the Arab World [if they had their way]. 
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Electoral system 
We [at IHEC] at first had banned the use of religious symbols [in electoral 
campaigns] but religious parties managed to manipulate this [ban] in a very strange 
way. They were printing many publications bearing the pictures of religious leaders, 
Sheikhs and Sayyids, and when we would hold them to account, they would deny 
having done so and attribute it to their supporters, and this was always an excuse in 
their hands.      
 
In my opinion, parties should not be established on religious bases in any country. 
Banning the establishment of parties on religious bases does not breach the 
principles of democracy. If we allow them [religious parties] to work, then the voter 
would be under the influence of the clergy and this restricts his freedom. In fact, his 
freedom would be non-existent because of his connection to religion.   
 
We have tried to ban the use of religious symbols [in elections] but we were not able 
to do so because there was a feeling of freedom [euphoria] among all people, and 
the religious parties among them, at the time, so we couldn’t really stop them. But we 
did mention that it is not permitted to use religious symbols, mosques, Husseiniyahs 
and places of worship. 
 
Religious discourse encourages the making of false claims, hypocrisy, and 
opportunism. Many people became MPS and officials [as a result of using religious 
discourse] while they were Marxists in the past. They did this for political and 
material reasons. The road to power is now through opportunism and the use of 
religion.  
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This double (deceitful) fanatic religious, sectarian discourse, has created the bigotry 
and backwardness in all dimensions of life that is currently happening in Iraq. This is 
their message and they have no other guiding or civilized message.  The electorate 
voted on the basis of their sect, region and ethnicity and the use of religious and 
sectarian discourse led people to vote in this way. 
 
This discourse has brought unqualified persons to parliament, government and 
leadership in the country. This is the reason why the country has reached this 
decadent stage at the moment on all levels. Now unusual measures are needed in 
order to improve the country’s situation which is at the bottom of the list of failed 
states and these past years are what put him in this situation.  
 
No Achievements 
There are no achievements whatsoever during the last ten years in my opinion. The 
change of MPs in this manner, whereby in each parliament there are 325 or 275 
[MPs who would get pensions later] is not beneficial for the country. The number of 
retirees will be huge, and half of the Iraqi budget will be spent on the salaries of 
retired people. This is a very serious matter. Spending is overly focussed on non-
productive things which are not in the interest of the country and its infrastructure. I 
wish the previous MPs kept their seats so that we can cut expenditures. 
 
Change comes after difficult gestation in our countries unlike in the west where 
change comes about smoothly. Yes, changing persons through elections might help 
democracy take root, but these things do not reform [rebuild] the country in my 
opinion. What’s more important than these matters is to focus on educating the 
people and raising their scientific and knowledge capabilities. Da3ish (ISIS) won’t be 
fought by dropping bombs alone, but through education and the spread of 
awareness and knowledge. There must be cultural solutions. I went to Canada to 
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monitor elections. In fact, I was learning not monitoring. [In Canada] they teach 
elections in the primary school classes. The do the same in Austria. I was impressed 
by this and we must do the same in Iraq. 
 
Freedom of the media 
Yes, the press is free and there has been freedom since the abolition of media 
censorship in 2003. TV channels are proliferating like mushrooms and this 
proliferation doesn’t lead to progress or to guiding the people towards their basic 
issues because these [channels] are [for the most part] religious and they broadcast 
material that soils the reputation of the Iraqi people. The media expanded a lot and 
those who work in the media are far above 10,000 journalists now. I do not see this 
as a healthy state of affairs. There must be some conditions for people to become 
journalists. It is okay for the number to grow if they were professional, qualified and 
believers in the honour of the profession. It is necessary that there are professional 
organizations to train journalists in order to enable them to convey information to the 
electorate and citizens so that they can vote in the right way. 
 
Rentier state 
Rentier state makes people dependent on the state because all resources are in the 
hands of the government and citizens become dependent on the person who has the 
money and that is the Prime Minister. He distributes the money as he sees fit and 
this is one of the biggest obstacles to democracy which impede it from progressing 
or taking root in Iraq. It is important that a private sector exists so that taxpayers and 
people in general can hold government officials to account. There is no real 
economy in Iraq now as agriculture has gone and so has industry. Only oil is left. 
 
The Ruthless Just Ruler  
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All these forms of democracy, such as elections and parliaments, are of no benefit to 
third world countries presently because peoples are in need of just rule associated 
with ruthlessness. There is a need for ruthlessness. I have seen from my experience 
that ruthlessness yields benefits for the people in third world countries and that 
democracy does not lead to any result. There must be a strong leader [in charge] like 
the one in Egypt right now.    
 
Legitimacy 
That legitimacy comes through the ballot boxes alone is an incomplete statement. 
The ‘brain boxes’ are the ones which bring legitimacy. The ruler must be constrained 
by a law and constitution. I am talking about the ‘just despot’. I believe that we must 
give the army a role, but the problem now is that there is no [professional] army that 
believes in the known military values. Our current army is in a regrettable state. What 
is happening is that our army defends and doesn’t attack. It should have attacked 
Da3ish (ISIL) in order to defeat it. The reasons for the weakness of the army lie in 
the current democracy, or let’s say the defect[s] in the current democratic system.   
 
Prospects 
I do not know what will happen [in the future] and I am really pessimistic. Iraq must 
not remain a field for experiments. I am pessimistic for the foreseeable future. I am 
pessimistic. The fearsome thing is the break-up of Iraq. The problem is that there is a 
trend in the world towards unity yet we [in Iraq] are tending towards division.  I 
believe in the unity of Iraq. I do not want to go out of Baghdad but [find myself] 
unable to go to Basra, that I love, [without going through border checks]. I reject 
division even if it comes through democracy in which my belief has been shaken. I 
advise Iraqis to put the interest of the nation before their personal interests. We must 
work in the interest of the country.  
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It’s within the right of every individual to work for his personal interest but not through 
stealing the wealth of the people. There is no problem in working for the personal 
interest that accords with the national interest. But officials and employees must not 
get rich at the expense of public funds. The law must be applied on all [without 
discrimination]. Forgers must not be allowed to continue to work for the state. 
Sending high ranking officers into retirement is not good enough. Those negligent 
[among them] must be held to account. Iraq used to work in this way. In my opinion, 
the real democratic system was only during the reign of [Brigadier General] Abdul 
Kareem Qassim. The country was more beautiful, cleaner and better and the people 
were comfortable. 
 
The biggest problem in Iraq now is corruption. Appointing relatives is a big problem 
and the law used not to allow this. Some Americans who came to Iraq were corrupt 
enough. There was corruption in many of the contracts that they brought to us 
including contracts for the IHEC.    
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Interview 16 
Dr Akeel Abbas 
 
Dr Akeel Abbas is an academic, writer and journalist, he was a USAID advisor in Iraq 
(2011-2013). He is currently an associate professor teaching journalism and English 
literature at the American University of Iraq based in Suliamaniyya. He is an Iraqi 
American who is well-versed in US-Iraqi politics and cultures. He is originally from 
Kadhimia in Baghdad and of Shia background. The interview was done by email and 
answers were received in English on 25th October 2014. 
 
Answers 
There are indeed several cultural and religious impediments to the establishment of 
a fully democratic system in Iraq. On the religious side, in general clergymen, clerical 
institutions, and Islamic parties look suspiciously at democracy, considering it a 
Western invention that has no basis in Islamic teachings. Even those pro-democracy 
enlightened clergymen and Islamists cannot cite from Islamic teachings any real 
evidence in support of democracy beyond the reference to the shura principle which 
merely involves consultation among the elite about state decisions and policies (little 
to do with democracy as people's real participation in selecting their representatives 
and rulers). On the cultural side, Iraq has little knowledge or practice of individualism 
and genuine respect for pluralism, both of which are fundamental pillars of any 
effective democracy 
 
Voting the Clergyman's Conscience 
 A religious fatwa, real or imagined, undermines the very notion of elections as one is 
voting his/her own conscience. It becomes rather voting the clergyman's conscience 
by thousands or millions of his followers. It also stops individual voters from 
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developing the necessary skills to examine the electoral platforms of the different 
candidates. Through this process of examining and comparing different platforms 
and making a personal voting decision based on it, people become enlightened and 
educated voters who can think independently, not merely followers who vote based 
on voting decisions made by their religious leaders. 
 
With the exception of regional affiliations, yes tribal and sectarian affiliation or bias 
do impede democratisation because they feed into collective, hierarchal thinking, 
instead of individualistic thinking that is usually the basis of any genuine democratic 
process. Tribal and sectarian affiliations are structurally anti-democratic, while 
regional affiliations are not. 
 
In general, yes a secular party is better placed to be fairer and more democratic than 
a religious one. A religious party, particularly in Iraq, is tied to pre-modern loyalty and 
understanding of human affairs, instead of the modern interests of the voting public. 
A genuinely secular party has the potential to appeal to the interests of Iraqis, 
regardless of ethnicity and faith, whereas religious parties inherently appeal to the 
interests of particular groups. 
 
An electoral system that includes only secular parties is definitely better for the 
country. Without secular parties that transcend sects and ethnicities, Iraq will 
continue to be prey to sectarian and ethnic strife. Sect-based parties, by their nature, 
are not pluralistic and have in mind the interests of their sect followers. 
 
Religious clothing and rhetoric bring electoral benefits in Iraq. Because religion is the 
dominant way of thinking in Iraq currently, many voters attach special value to 
politicians' acts, displaying signs of religious loyalty or affiliation. 
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Political Religiosity 
I think part of the problem lies in the fact that religious rhetoric helps politicians get 
more votes and this encourages the non-religious to pretend to be religious in order 
to get more votes, even though they are not religious in actual life. Common voting 
appeals and patterns are religious in nature, something that leaves non-religious 
parties at a clear disadvantage. These parties sometimes find themselves "forced" to 
adopt religious gestures and rhetoric which, in turn, gives the entire political and 
electoral process a religious character that is not genuine or truly representative. 
 
This double standard that politicians practice will only promote a false spirit of 
political religiosity that will deepen sectarian identities and undermine Iraq's national 
identify. Religion in Iraq is essentially sectarian, hence divisive instead of uniting!  
 
It is very clear that that people in Iraq have actually voted in the last three elections 
according to their religious and sectarian affiliation. The composition of the 
parliament reflects the ethno-sectarian composition of the country. If people do not 
vote based on sect/ethnicity, you might have many Shiites electing a Sunni and vice 
versa, which means that the composition of the parliament will not necessarily reflect 
the actual ethno-sectarian composition of the nation 
 
Using religious and sectarian slogans have definitely helped bring unqualified 
officials who may have hidden their inabilities behind their religious rhetoric. It is very 
clear from the abysmally poor performance of the state machinery, particularly in its 
upper echelons and decision-making bodies. A large portion of the general public 
tends to evaluate public officials based on their religious ethics, not on professional 
competence. 
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Democratization in Iraq over the last ten years has partially failed. The value of 
elections as a periodical mechanism to renew or rescind the trust in the sitting 
government has been somewhat deeply established in Iraq over the past 11 years. 
This is despite the fact that the entire election process is unfairly skewed in the 
interest of religious parties. 
 
Undemocratic Culture    
The main reasons for the failure of democratisation in Iraq are as follows in my 
opinion: 
A- A dominant, mainstream culture that is essentially undemocratic in its basic 
values and system of meaning. 
B- Dominance of religious parties that reduce democracy to the mere act of election. 
C- The weakness of civil society organizations and secular parties. 
D-Sectarian strife that made people resort more to their sectarian identities seeking 
protection in sect-based militias that are more trusted and effective than the state 
itself! 
E-The initial US failure in keeping the peace and restoring basic services. This gave 
a strong and lasting impression that democracy does not work, giving rise again to 
the familiar anti-democratic desire/theme of the strong man as the saviour. 
 
Empowerment of People 
The positive signs for democracy that I have noticed in Iraq over the last 11 years 
are as follows: 
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A- Generally people have become used to the diversity of opinions, an important 
step towards creating a democratic culture in the long run. 
B- Voting has created a sense of empowerment among people through which they 
can punish underperforming politicians. This means that there would not be a return 
to sham, 99.99% kinds of "elections."  
 
The challenges are primarily cultural in the sense a non-democratic culture will have 
to democratize to allow the emergence of a genuine democratic experience. This 
means reforms in the areas of education, law and state performance. This is a 
generational project that would probably 20-30 years to materialize, if everything 
runs relatively well. The challenge is huge, but success is possible. I think time is on 
the side of democracy in Iraq, but it will be a painfully slow process. 
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Interview 17 
Dr Kamal Field 
Dr Kamal Field is an academic specialising in economics. He held several senior 
positions in the Iraqi government post 2003 among which were the deputy minister of 
Finance (2004-6), advisor to the Trade Minister’s and then PM advisor for economic 
affairs. He is currently the Director of the Iraqi Institute for Economic Reforms in 
Baghdad. He is of Shia background. His father was Welsh (Fredric Field) who had 
worked in the Iraq oil industry and he settled in Iraq, marrying an Iraqi lady. He lived 
in Basra till he died in 1970s. The interview was conducted via email and answers 
were received in Arabic on 5th November 2014 and they were translated into English 
by the author. 
 
Answers 
One of the cultural and religious impediments to the establishment of a fully 
democratic system in Iraq is the absence of the norms of coexistence when having 
different opinions or beliefs. There is an absence of belief in the value of equality in 
rights and duties.    
   
Yes, people’s views are influenced by the views of clergymen or tribesmen because 
the options available to the citizens are few. The general cultural and educational 
standard does not currently accord with the democratic option and the influence of 
religious leaderships and others will remain strong until a breakthrough occurs in the 
level of education and general knowledge of the people. The democratic system in 
Iraq is at the beginners stages. It didn't come as a result of mass desire, it’s actually 
like a plant that was growing in a hostile environment. 
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Tribal, sectarian or regional affiliation or bias do not necessarily impede 
democratisation unless the values of the tribe are contradictory to the values of 
democracy or good governance... 
Secular is not Fairer  
A secular party is not necessarily better or fairer. The best party will be the one 
which believes in the principles of good governance.    
Wearing religious cloths does indeed have an influence on simple people but not in 
the long run.    
 
Religious rhetoric does help politicians get more votes, and this very fact encourages 
the non-religious to jump on the religious bandwagon in order to get more votes, and 
this is a common phenomenon in other countries and not peculiar to Iraq.   
In a state like Iraq, the personality of the political leader plays a role in creating the 
character of the political system. In advanced countries (which have a stable political 
system), the leaders have a limited role in exploiting the leadership position.  
   
People in Iraq have actually voted in the last three elections according to their 
religious and sectarian affiliation because they do not trust the alternative or do not 
know any alternative. Using religious and sectarian slogans have helped bring 
unqualified officials to power who may have hidden their inabilities behind their 
religious rhetoric. 
  
Democratizations in Iraq over the last ten years have not failed. It’s growing but it 
suffers from teenage concerns, but it will fail if the teenage period has lasted long. 
Democracy fails if we do not follow the principles of good governance which can be 
summarized in the values of efficiency, law and order, transparency etc... 
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The positive signs for democracy that we have seen are the peaceful transfer of 
power and the personal and press freedoms, but we have not seen the good 
governance. According to international experience, democracy requires the strict 
application of law and this application of law is proportionately linked to the 
educational and cultural state of society. I reckon it may take another 15 years 
before democracy can take root in Iraq. 
 
 
Interview 18 
Dr Abdul-Khaliq Hussein  
 
Dr Abdul-Khaliq Hussein is prominent writer and opposition figure to the Saddam 
Hussein’s regime. He is a retired medical doctor from Basra, southern Iraq. He is the 
author of several books on recent Iraqi political history, politics and sectarianism. He 
is secular but backs the Islamist-led government and political process. He is of Shia 
background and lives in England. The interview was done by email and answers 
were received in English on 6th November 2014 . 
 
Answers 
 
Bedouin Values 
Firstly, democracy cannot flourish overnight, particularly in a country that has no 
history of democracy prior to 2003; even during the era of the monarchy, there was 
pseudo-democracy. Secondly, it is a fact that after a long despotic regime like 
Saddam’s, chaos will inevitably follow the collapse of the regime. 
456 
 
 
 
With regards to the cultural and religious impediment, I strongly believe that there 
are cultural and religious obstacles against democracy, but the situation is not 
hopeless. Iraqi culture is a mixture of modernity and Bedouin [values], in addition to 
the sectarian and racial conflicts. These issues are not unique to the Iraqi people. 
Almost all the great European democracies have faced such problems; the Thirty 
Years’ War [1618-1648] in Europe between the Catholics and the Protestants which 
ended with the Westphalia Treaty in 1648. Nearly 20% of the European populations 
were annihilated. Also the sectarian wars in Britain, but in the end, tolerance 
prevailed.  
 
Eventually, the Iraqi people will learn how to live together in peace, and come to 
cherish a democratic regime. Every new regime has its problems, but democracy 
has history on its side. 
  
Yes, a religious fatwa, be it real or false, in favour or against, any party or individual 
candidate, impedes the democratic process. I believe religion and politics should not 
be mixed. Again, I come back to Europe which could not get rid of their political 
problems until they had separated religion from politics. But, to be fair, Iraqi religious 
leaders have not issued any fatwa in favour of any religious or political group. But if a 
politician tries to give a false impression that his party is favoured by a grand 
religious leader, he will fail and his attempt will be counterproductive. Having said 
that, and in circumstances like Iraq’s, where religion is deeply rooted, and has a 
great effect on people, I believe it is an advantage, if a religious leader can 
encourage people to cast their votes without bias to any political party. So far, this 
has been the case since 2004. 
  
Yes tribal, sectarian or regional affiliation or bias impedes democratisation, but 
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again, these problems cannot be overcome overnight. The previous regime had 
revived tribalism and the old Bedouin culture, destroying the very fabric of the 
society, in such a way that it is almost impossible to be ruled except by the iron fist of 
the Ba’ath regime. A turn to modernity takes great patience, sensitivity and 
rationality. Tribal, sectarian affiliation and regional bias cannot be denied or ignored 
or discarded overnight.  
 
Secular is Fairer  
Of course a secular party is better placed to be fairer and more democratic than a 
religious one, but what about if the majority of the people are allegiant to the religious 
parties? Democracy means to use ballots instead of bullets to choose the 
government. What about if the religious party wins?  Are we going to revoke the 
democracy and the results of the ballot boxes and install an unelected secular 
government? Isn’t that dictatorship? The solution is that people must be re-educated 
about democracy. It was the 19th
 
Century British politician, Robert Lowe, who said: 
“we must educate our masters”, i.e. to educate people who elect their rulers. 
 
-In theory, secular parties are better for the country than religious parties, but taking 
the current Iraqi situation into consideration, it is almost impossible.  
To be realistic, sectarian divisions are entrenched among the people, and it will take 
time - probably a generation - to change this attitude, particularly when the Sunnis 
find themselves no longer dominant in the newly founded democratic regime, and 
the Shia find themselves threatened by the Sunni extremists, like ISIS and al-Qaeda, 
therefore, merely preaching to people to abandon their loyalty to the religious parties 
and switch to the secular ones won’t work. The Shia fight for their existence, while 
the Sunnis fight to return to their golden era when they were the main rulers and 
decision makers.  
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Even if a constitution is amended to ban religious parties, the religious politicians can 
establish their religious parties with secular names; for example the followers of 
Muqtada As-Sadr are calling themselves Al-Ahrar (The Liberal party). Also in Turkey 
and many other countries there are religious parties with secular names like [(Justice 
and Development Party (Adalet ve kalkinma Partisi or AK in Turkish)]. So how can 
we stop them in a democratic regime which guarantees freedom for all, and they can 
claim that their parties are not religious but secular like Ennahdha party in Tunis, and 
Justice and Development in Turkey?  
 
- I don’t think wearing religious cloths help politicians get more votes; the leaders of 
the Da'awa party (al-Maliki party) didn’t wear religious clothes, and won the majority 
of the Shiite votes. While Muqtada al-Sadr is wearing religious clothes and his party 
lost seats from the previous elections.1218 Also, Sayyid Ayad Jamal-Eddin, who is a 
diehard secular who wears religious clothes, lost in both general elections of 2010 
and 2014. 
 
If the non-religious pretend to be religious in order to get more votes this will backfire 
on them, exposing their hypocrisy. The end result will be the opposite of what they 
hope for. But, the predominance of religious parties, particularly in the Shiite sect, 
encourages the secular individual politicians to join the religious blocs as happened 
in the previous elections. 
 
1- Resorting to double-standards has negative effects on politicians in particular, 
and 
2- on democracy in general. Many big names have lost in the last general election 
3- because of these infamous double-standard attitudes. As Abraham Lincoln said: 
                                                            
1218
 The statements in red are factually inaccurate. Many IDP members wore religious cloth, while members of 
Muqtada’s party didn’t actually wear religious cloth nor have they lost many parliamentary seats.     
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4- "You can fool all the people some of the time, and some of the people all the 
time, 
5- but you cannot fool all the people all the time." The effect due to these double 
6- standards on people will, of course, leave them disappointed and the next time 
they 
7- will not vote for them. Democracy has its own auto-correction tool, people learn 
from 
8- their own mistakes. 
9-  
The majority of people in Iraq voted according to their religious and sectarian 
affiliation, except the secular minority who voted for the secular candidates. But even 
those secular voters voted for their secular candidates from their own sect. I think 
only a very small minority voted for a candidate from an opposite sect or religion.  
Using religious and sectarian slogans has helped bring unqualified officials who may 
have hidden their inabilities behind their religious rhetoric, but again, time is the best 
healer. Such unqualified officials will be exposed.  
 
Democratization has not failed 
Democratization in Iraq has not failed. Not at all. Democracy has won and is growing 
steadily albeit with difficulties which are expected. Saddam’s regime has gone 
forever. There is a permanent democratic constitution, albeit with few defects. Four 
free and fair general elections and five local and regional elections were held 
successfully with amazing punctuality. The problem is not a failed democracy, but 
poor preparation. However, people learn from their mistakes. The other problem is 
that, as democracy is new in Iraq, the loser cannot accept defeat; therefore he/she 
accuses the winner who becomes prime minister, as a dictator or even worse than 
Saddam… etc. This is how democracy started in the West; eventually democracy 
and acceptance of the results of elections have become an integral part of their 
cultures. Iraqi people are not different.  
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In my view there is no failure, but there are difficulties which are inevitable with any 
new democracy as I alluded to above. Democracy has never been born fully 
developed anywhere in the world. Those who expected that Iraq would become 
Sweden or Britain immediately after Saddam’s downfall were mistaken. However, 
the difficulties which faced Iraqi democracy are as follow: 
 
a- Iraqi democracy was born at the time when Sunni Islamic terrorism was at its 
highest. This terrorism is supported by religious leaders of the Wahhabi sect, 
exploited by the remnants of the Ba’ath to restore their lost regime. 
 
b- The sectarian conflict, which is not new, was exacerbated after the fall of 
Saddam’s regime because the Sunnis, who were dominant in ruling Iraq for a long 
time, suddenly lost their power and found themselves on equal footing with the rest 
of Iraqi sects and ethnic groups. Therefore they found themselves at a disadvantage 
because of democracy and that is why they even collaborated with the terrorists like 
al-Qaeda and ISIS. 
 
c- The Kurdish ethnicity had suffered heavily during the previous regimes since the 
foundation of the modern Iraqi state in 1921. Therefore they are suspicious of any 
regime in Baghdad even the one that is elected democratically and they have their 
fair share in it. They would like to fulfil their dream in establishing their own national 
state. That is why they are always in conflict with the federal government, and this 
poses a threat to democracy. 
 
d- A few old-fashioned regional governments do not want Iraqi democracy to 
succeed, because they fear that Iraqi democracy will inspire their own peoples, and 
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that is why they support sectarianism and terrorism in Iraq. 
 
e- Iran factor: Iraq shares with Iran a very long history and a 1600-kilometre border. 
The Sunni sect is against Iran for a sectarian reason, and the Western allies (the US 
and the EU) are in conflict with Iran over her nuclear programme. They want the Iraqi 
government to stand against Iran. Iraq cannot change history and geography, i.e. 
Iraq is condemned to live with Iran in peace and cooperation rather than 
confrontation. On the other hand Iraq needs cooperation with, and help from, the US 
and the EU. Therefore, Iraq is stuck between these two sides. That is why any Iraqi 
prime minster is like a tight rope walker without a balancing pole.  
 
Positive Signs 
There are a lot of positive signs for democracy in Iraq. But, there are people who 
only see a half empty glass, and others deny the achievements, and a third group 
fabricates a lot of lies and blame the democratically elected government for the 
heinous crimes committed by the terrorists, to defame democracy. Below I list very 
briefly a number of positive signs:  
1- Saddam’s regime has gone forever,  
2- People are free to criticise the government including top officials without any fear 
of persecution, 
3- There are more than 600 political entities, over 7000 Non-governmental 
organizations (NGO), 1000s of national and local newspapers, scores of radios and 
satellite TV stations, the majority of them are independent1219, 
4- Several free and fair general and local elections were held successfully. There is a 
very active parliament and an inclusive government, for the first time; the Aizidis, 
Shebeks, Mandaens and other ethnic and religious minorities are represented in 
                                                            
1219
 Statements in red are inaccurate 
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parliament.  
4- Free access to the internet, email, etc.; there are more than 26 million mobile 
phones, which means only children under the age of 5 have no mobile phones. All 
these were forbidden during Saddam’s regime. 
5- Reconstruction of Iraq, all time high oil export, services including nearly 24-hour 
electricity supply?1220  have remarkably improved.  
6- All universities, schools, hospitals, health centres and many others are fully 
functioning, 
7- People are free to travel anywhere they like… etc., and many others.  
 
If there are negative aspects like imposing hijab or certain Islamic dresses, these are 
imposed by some Islamist vigilantes without the approval of the government. These 
vigilantes exist even in some places in Western democracies like Great Britain. In 
London, some Islamists vigilantes proclaimed certain neighbourhoods in greater 
London as Sharia zone, and selling alcohol is forbidden!   
  
There are a lot of challenges for democracy in Iraq, these are: 
Terrorism, corruption, sectarianism, nepotism, Kurdish issue, unemployment, 
population explosion, relations with the Arab world, Turkey, Iran, USA, EU and the 
rest of the world. 
 
As about the prospect for democracy, in the medium and long term, the future is 
bright, though with difficulty in the near term. Now the Sunni Arabs, after they have 
tested the ISIS rule, have come to understand that they have to accept the new 
                                                            
1220
 This is certainly inaccurate as power supply in Iraq is at best 12 hours per day during summer time which is 
needed most due to high temperature in June, July and August.. 
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democratic regime. As you rightly alluded to in question 5 that “the pluralistic nature 
of Iraqi society”, this is another positive factor for democracy, i.e. Iraq ought to be 
ruled by a democratic regime because of the pluralistic nature of Iraqi society. “unity 
in diversity”. 
 
We must be fair and realistic regarding the time frame for a true democracy to take 
root in Iraq. Democracy took 400 years to take root in Europe, and because of the 
globalisation and high-tech information revolution, in my view, it will probably take 40 
years for democracy to take root in Iraq and the rest of the Arab world. 
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Interview 19 
Mr Adnan Al-Janabi 
  
Mr Adnan Al-Janabi is an MP for Babylon for the Patriotic List (led by Dr Ayad 
Allawi). He is a former minister of state (2004-5), graduate of LSE in Economics, 
tribal sheikh of the Janabiyyeen tribe (Members of this tribe follow both Sunni and 
Shia faiths). He is an expert on oil. He is of Sunni background. The interview was 
done via email and answers were received in English on 28th November 2014. 
 
Answers 
Iraq has never been fully democratic. It has been ruled by dictators of varying 
degrees of despotism since 1958. Since 2003 occupation, the state was dismantled 
with disastrous consequences, leaving Iraq as a sectarian failed state. 
Culturally, Iraq is a tribal society with “Bedouin” mentality which has no respect for 
representative governance. 
 
Since democracy depends largely on the free will of individuals to vote for their 
preferred party, a religious fatwa, be it real or false, in favour or against, any party or 
individual candidate, impedes the democratic process 
Tribal, sectarian or regional affiliation or bias also impedes democratisation in Iraq 
Yes, a secular party is better placed to be fairer and more democratic than a religious 
one. Religious or sectarian parties should be banned. 
 
Wearing religious cloths or using religious rhetoric helps politicians get more votes in 
a religious society such as the Iraqi one. This makes the non-religious pretend to be 
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religious in order to get more votes, even though they are not religious in actual life 
because religious rhetoric helps politicians get more votes  
The double standard practiced by politicians leads to what Iraq is now: a failed state 
on the verge of civil war. 
 
Yes, people in Iraq have actually voted in the last three elections according to their 
religious and sectarian affiliation 
Yes, using religious and sectarian slogans have helped bring unqualified officials 
who have hidden their inabilities behind their religious rhetoric 
YES, Democratization in Iraq has failed over the last ten years 
Impediments to democracy include the fact that Iraq is a rentier state, also the 
dismantling of the state by occupation 2003, sectarianism and tribalism. 
No, I have not seen any positive signs for democracy in Iraq over the last 11 years 
It is difficult to get over the problem of the rentier state, although it is possible to 
move gradually out of sectarianism and tribalism. 
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 Interview 20 
Basim Jameel Anton 
 
Mr Basim Jameel Anton is the Vice Chairman of the Board of the Iraqi Businessmen 
Union, He is a prominent economist and commentator on economic and political 
affairs. He is of Christian background. The interview was done via email and 
answers were received in Arabic on 16th November 2014 and translated into English 
by the author.  
 
Answers 
Cultural and religious impediments to establishing a democratic system in Iraq are 
corruption, domination, exclusion, ignorance and deriving strength from religion to 
stop the spread of democracy. Religious fatwa can affect elections and impede 
democracy in Iraq especially since a large percentage of Iraqis go to the ballot box 
influenced by emotions not reason. Tribal, sectarian and regional loyalties do impede 
democracy and the most obvious evidence is that many educated people didn't even 
get 10% of the votes of tribes and tribesmen. 
  
Secular parties are mostly fairer and more democratic because they usually have a 
high percentage of educated and cultured people among their membership. Certainly 
an electoral system that allows only secular parties to be active in politics is better for 
the country than a system which permits religious parties which might appeal to 
religious sentiment or provoke sectarian loyalties, to work, provided that each 
political party presents its economic programme and to pledge to its supporters to 
implement it after the election. 
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Wearing religious cloths or using religious rhetoric helps politicians to get more 
votes. It is preferable that legislation is passed to ban these parties from standing in 
elections in order to prevent the exploitation of the emotions of simple people and 
the manipulation of religions for electoral purposes.       
 
Religious discourse helps politicians get more votes and this fact alone might 
encourage the non-religious to pretend to be religious in order to get more votes 
even though they are not religious in reality. The most obvious evidence of this is 
that many secular politicians have joined religious lists in order to win elections. This 
double-dealing is hypocrisy, opportunism and reneging on the promises made to the 
electorate.  
 
Sectarian Loyalties 
Most voters in the last three or four elections voted on the basis of their religious and 
sectarian loyalties, and as a result, society, parliament and government ministries 
were divided on this basis.    
The use of religious and sectarian slogans has helped to bring unqualified and 
inefficient officials who might have hidden their lack of professionalism behind the 
religious rhetoric. The proof of this is the failure of the previous parliament to produce 
economic laws. 
 
Iraq's dependence on oil revenues mainly has weakened democratic transformation 
because it has led to the stoppage of other productive sectors, especially industry, 
which are considered the magnet for attracting businesses to productive factories 
which act to create cultures and facilitated the exchange of information and interests. 
As such, workers are selected on the basis of economic interests and, this way, a 
part of democracy would be achieved. 
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The efforts of democratic transition in Iraq have not completely failed over the last 
ten years because the democratic culture has spread, even though in a distorted 
way sometimes. 
 
The main reasons for the failure of the democratic transition are: 
 1- The weakness of the democratic culture (awareness) 
2- The dominance of the religious portfolio (on Iraqi politics) and the (undue) power 
of the religious parties. 
3- The weakness of politicians and rulers at the initial stages 
4- The sectarian division of the Governing Council 
5- The dominance of personal interests of politicians and rulers  
6-Financial and administrative corruption 
 
Yes, positive signs pointing to the development of democracy in Iraq have started to 
appear over the past eleven years but they are below our level of ambition.  
 As for the future, I expect big blocs to squeeze out the smaller blocs and (social) 
components in Iraq. I also expect the marginalization of Iraqi and democratic talents. 
The challenges facing democracy are the brittleness of the constitution and its 
vagueness which renders it subject to different interpretations. The democratic 
march doesn't end at a certain end. Democracy continues to believe in developing 
itself and achieving better results. 
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Interview 21 
Ms Shirouq Al-Abayachi 
  
Ms Shirouq Al-Abayachi is MP for Baghdad for the Civic Democratic Trend List. She 
has been an activist in human rights and women rights.  She is from Baghdad and of 
mixed sectarian background. The interview was done via email and the answers 
were received on 1st December 2014 in Arabic and translated by the author. 
 
Answers 
There are many cultural and religious impediments which have been accumulating 
over the long decades of modern Iraqi history without any serious remedies by any 
social, political or cultural institution. The most important of these impediments is the 
patriarchal fatherly, tribal male mentality which has been enforced through 
increasingly failed governmental policies since the beginning of the 1990s. 
  
Also, the collapse of the middle class and the disappearance of its civilised values 
which were a nurturing environment for the cultural and sectarian diversity. What 
helped enforce this culture was the spread of illiteracy and ignorance due to the 
collapse of the educational institution and the spread of poverty and dire need for 
basics among Iraqis due to wars and dictatorships and later sectarian conflicts. This 
has been accompanied by the political manipulation of religion and sectarianism in a 
way that enhanced warlords and militarism instead of civility and openness. 
  
Certainly a religious fatwa in favour of one candidate or against another candidate 
impedes democracy, even if it was imagined and not true. This is what we have 
noticed through our practical experience during the elections which were held in Iraq. 
The religious emotions of people were exploited for the benefit of parties and 
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sometimes individuals who worked in the interest of their personal, party or sectarian 
interests without the real enforcement of democratic practices and without serving 
the interests of the people who elected them. Despite this they were elected once 
again.   
 
 Yes, tribal, sectarian and regional loyalties do impede democracy and these sub-
identities have contributed to the loss of the Iraqi national identity. They have also 
contributed to enforcing submission to the clerics and the clergy in general and to 
tribal and regional personalities, while real democracy depends on the spirit of 
citizenship and the horizontal extension of responsibilities according to competence 
and talents and based on the complete equality between citizens without any 
consideration of their religious, sectarian and regional backgrounds. 
 
Separation of Religion and State     
A secular party is certainly more just than the religious one because secular parties 
do believe in the principle of citizenship and the separation of religion and state in a 
way to guarantee the non-exploitation of religious emotions for sectarian and ethnic 
purposes  
 The pluralistic nature of Iraqi society requires a secular political system that is based 
on the separation of religion and state that guarantees the application of the 
principles of equality and justice between all citizens regardless of their sub-identities 
and at the same time respecting pluralism and differences without allowing its 
exploitation for the sake of passing deceptive policies in the name of religion or 
doctrine. 
  
Yes, wearing religious cloths and using religious discourse help politicians get more 
votes especially in rural societies where illiteracy, poverty and ignorance are 
prevalent. 
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In the post 2003 Iraq, we have seen a lot of practices of religious pretence in order to 
get to high positions or get additional votes especially through agitating sectarian 
emotions among the Sunni and Shia. The higher the tone of sectarianism the higher 
the electoral popularity. 
 
This political and religious hypocrisy has led to complete failure in building state 
institutions on the basis of the right criteria of propriety and competence, yet it 
entrenched ignorance and retarded concepts in Iraqi society.   
  
 The electorate in Iraq did vote in the last three or four elections on the basis of 
religious and sectarian loyalties especially in the elections of 2005, less in the 
elections of 2010, but this trend came back in force in the 2014 elections. 
 The use of sectarian and religious slogans has helped to bring about incompetent 
and unqualified officials and this is prevalent in most Iraqi governmental institutions.  
 
Iraq's dependence on oil imports as its basic income has weakened, to a large 
extent, the democratic transition. People's reliance on the rentier state feeds into 
their economic dependence on it, something that translates, in turn, into more power 
for Islamic parties which have used the oil resources to greatly consolidate and 
extend  their influence and power using all means available to them. 
  
 The efforts of democratic transition over the last ten years have clearly failed and 
the reasons are as follows: 
1- The American decision to establish democracy in Iraq and the whole area was not 
serious. 
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2-The declaration of Iraq as the first front to fight terrorism in order to protect 
America. This has helped spread of the phenomenon of militarism and weapons and 
led to the weakness of the law and state control and spread of militias and armed 
groups outside the control of the state.   
3-Turning Iraq into a theatre for regional and international conflicts 
4- The failure of building the Iraqi state according to a specific identity  
5- The control of the state by Islamic parties who govern on the basis of sectarianism 
6- The disappearance of the middle class and the advent of a class of warlords, 
militarism and corruption. 
7- The spread of illiteracy, ignorance and poverty in a big way among Iraqis. 
8- The spread of corruption 
 
The Americans could have simply supported civil democratic forces instead of 
supporting Islamic and tribal forces. They could have protected Iraqi borders instead 
of opening Iraq as a basic front for fighting terrorism, inviting all terrorists of the world 
to Iraq in order to fight them. 
 
They shouldn’t have put Iraq under occupation, instead of that they should have 
formed a national transitional government that introduces a transitional programme 
for three years at least based on the removal of the effects of the Saddam totalitarian 
regime and preparing the way for real democratic elections under full international 
supervision.  
 
Social Rapture  
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They should have achieved the project of Iraqi reconstruction without corruption and 
disputes between the State Department and the Pentagon.  They should have 
respected the dignity of the Iraqi people before anything else. 
 
I have noticed some positive signs on the development of democracy in Iraq during 
the last eleven years but they are weak and infirm. I can summarised them in the 
following: 
1-Press freedom in spite of the many excessive practices with some media 
organisations and the absence of laws to protect the freedom of expression and the 
right to get information. 
2- The existence of some civil society experiment which spread awareness and 
contributes to enforcing some democratic concepts. 
3- The existence of peaceful protests demanding reforms such as the ones that took 
place in 2011 
 
In the light of rapture in the social fabric of Iraqi society which is based on sectarian 
and ethnic basis, and the absence of the force of law and security, as well as the 
absence of real developmental programmes and the absence of a vision for social 
and institutional reforms, all these have weakened, in a big way, the prospects of an 
entrenched democratic experiments over the next ten years. 
474 
 
 
Interview 22 
Dr Wahda Al-Jumaili 
Dr Wahda Al-Jumaili is currently an advisor to the Speaker of the Iraqi parliament. 
She was an MP for Baghdad when she was interviewed for this study. She is an 
expert on legal affairs with a PhD in law. She is of Sunni background and was part of 
a religious Sunni list led by the Iraqi Islamic Party member and former deputy Prime 
Minister and Finance Minister, Rafi’a Al-Essawi. The interview was done via email 
and answers were received in Arabic on 12th December 2014 and translated by the 
author. 
 
Answers 
The culture of society and politicians promotes a central system, a ruling party and 
despotism, also discrimination and classification of people on the basis of ‘this is a 
Shia first class’ and this is a Sunni of the degree (Article 4-terrorism)1221… (Sectarian 
discrimination). We have had many experiments in the last ten years in which 
religious fatwas, artificial and real, have contributed to changing the direction of 
elections, but the religious authority has lately distanced itself from this subject. 
 
Tribalism No Impediment 
I wouldn’t call tribalism an impediment, but the nature of Iraqi people is tribal, and 
when the state is weak, the citizen resorts to any other refuge that can protect him 
which is the tribe, region or sect. We have not yet seen any secular parties which 
have a plan to establish a democratic state that can include everyone, except Dr 
Ayad Allawi perhaps, but he dreams of the premiership only and the evidence is that 
all the examples he has presented have failed. 
                                                            
1221
 ‘Article 4-terrorism’ his is the name given to a law in the Iraqi criminal system according to which all those 
accused of terrorism are prosecuted.   
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We certainly aspire to building a civil state that believes in human beings before 
loyalty to religion or sect, but this is premature in a country like Iraq, where religious 
parties have climbed to power on the back of religious feelings of Iraqis. But we have 
a hope that civic parties that believe in humanity before anything else will develop.  
 
I believe that wearing religious cloths or using religious discourse has helped 
politicians get more votes since the beginning of the democratic transition which was 
in the election of 2005 and 2010, but the rate of benefit from such discourse is 
decreasing after the exposure of the falsehood of those who claim to be religious. 
We have many cases where people have claimed to be religious in order to get 
votes but they were exposed and they were not re-elected. A hypocrite cannot be 
serious and he will fail sooner or later and the electorate will find out all their hidden 
cards. 
 
Voting has certainly been conducted on the basis of sectarian loyalty first, then 
religious loyalty second. The use of religious and sectarian slogans has brought 
incapable officials to a certain extent, but we started seeing the development of the 
culture of responsibility which made some people consider before choosing (which 
party or candidate to vote for). 
 
I believe there is no relation between the democratic process and economic policy, 
despite failure of the latter due to successive governments’ failure to adopt clear 
economic policies.  
 
It is not possible in a country such as Iraq that democratic transition process can be 
completed within ten years… We need a longer period than this. In the last elections, 
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we saw a qualitative improvement in the process of democratic transition and this is 
due to the awareness and knowledge of society which is the source of authority.  
 
It is difficult for the transition into democracy to be quick in a developing country such 
as Iraq which is multiracial, multi-sectarian. In spite of this, the British say that what 
Iraqis have achieved in ten years in the transition to democracy could not have been 
done by Britain in 50 years. 
 
The Kurdish Challenge 
There is some positive development regarding democratization in Iraq, but only 
slightly, and all this largely depends on the awareness of society and its 
responsibility towards the country because it is the source of authority.  
The challenges to democracy in Iraq are as follows: 
1-The security challenge is serious and it has affected democratic transition in a big 
way. 
2- The belief in conspiracy theory and distrusting partners by some politicians.  
3-The weakness of political leaders and the influence of foreign diktats on them.  
4-The failure to attract talents and elites to the centres of decision-making, to replace 
the residue that Islamist parties, from both sides, have brought (into the political 
process). 
5- The ambition of the Kurds and their attempts to impose their will on central 
government and their exploitation of the gap between Sunnis and Shia.  
6-The discord, division and weakness of social peace and favouring sub-identities 
over national identity and this is all due to the failing of politicians who are decision 
makers. 
 Maybe in 2022 we will have an established and stable government.  
477 
 
 
Interview 23 
Dr Ibrahim Al-Haidari 
 
Dr Al-Haidari is a distinguished Iraqi sociologist and an accomplished author. His 
books on sociology have been widely read in the Arab world, most famous among 
which are: ‘Tragedy Karbala’ and ‘The Patriarchal System’ among others. The 
interview was conducted via email and answers were received on 28th May 2016   
 
Answers 
1-What are the social reasons for the faltering of democracy in Iraq and what are the 
ways to remedy them in your opinion? 
Democracy is a culture, values, criteria and civic conduct more than institutions, 
systems, concepts and procedural mechanisms. It consists of ways of thinking, 
working and behaviour based on freedom, the independence of the individual and 
respect for human rights, as well as on good citizenship that regulates the ways of 
communication, understanding, tolerance and sound rational dialogue. It requires the 
recognition of the different other and aims at gathering, unifying and merging the 
components of society (the nation) in a single national unity.  
 
Democracy, as a social system, is based on the principle of equality with no 
discrimination based on gender, race, religion, language, colour, or social origin. It 
stipulates the principle of accountability and justice in the distribution of rights and 
duties which requires the existence of a state that enjoys reverence which enables it 
to impose the authority of the law on members of society, equally and without 
discrimination.   
Democracy requires a democratic culture that brings about a rupture with the past 
and the heritage which is based on (accepting) reported traditions as opposed to 
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reason. Pastist culture is a parental, patriarchal, auditory, oral, non-written culture 
that stands against democracy at the level of praxis because it is neither liberal nor 
informed. That’s why we see most of the electorates vote on the basis of their 
religious, sectarian, tribal, partisan affiliations as well as private interests. Moreover, 
the use of democratic mechanisms to hold elections in an atmosphere where 
individuals do not enjoy complete social/political awareness, nor enjoys [sic.] self-
independence, aborts the democratic process and facilitates the ascendance of non-
democrats to power. Their aim is not to change and modernize society, but to get to 
power and gain wealth, power and influence. This is partially due to the weakness of 
the state and the spirit of citizenship, the split identity and the non-development of 
real and effective democratic forces in society. This strengthens the tribal, sectarian 
and regional spirit and consolidates it at the expense of the homeland, citizenship 
and democracy.   
The truth and the reality is that not practising democracy in a transparent way is not 
due to the political system alone, nor to its mechanisms, nor to the foreign other 
alone, but its roots extend to the despotic totalitarian systems, the masculine 
patriarchal tendency, the traditional undemocratic culture as well as the absence of 
rupture between religion and the state. 
 
Awareness of democratic culture today might not go beyond some urban educated 
segments of what has remained of the middle class which has already shrunk. It 
does not extend to groups and segments of the wider masses, especially those of 
tribal/peasantry origins, which still do not believe in democracy, or its practices, and 
still live in a masked Bedouin [culture] and whose loyalty is to the tribe, sect and 
region, not to the homeland and the state. Democracy is not just ideas, sayings and 
slogans whose praises we sing. It’s a way of life, thinking, work and behaviour as 
well as a practice of freedom, pluralism and human rights according to the 
individual’s intellectual persuasions. 
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Democracy cannot grow in a country where there are no democrats and democratic 
culture!  
The truth is we still have not learnt democratic ethics and are not trained to practice it on 
sound bases and in a way that contributes to our progress. When an opportunity to 
exercise freedom arises, we quickly exploit this margin of freedom and democracy so that 
it turns into chaos. The individual only knows the negative side of freedom and that is the 
excessive audacity in speaking and acting, the taking of the right[s] by force without any 
regards for the state and the law and without respecting the [rights of the] different other. 
On the contrary, the other is insulted and exploited, and acts that reflect shallowness of 
culture and ethics are performed. 
 
First, we must learn about freedom, the individual’s independence and a real democratic 
culture, then we can practice them as values and behaviour in daily social life starting 
from the family, through civil society establishments which are independent of the state, 
till we reach the top of the pyramid of power. This is the only way to rid ourselves of 
backwardness, despotism, violence and terrorism. If democracy is a culture, then it must 
grow automatically and spontaneously and from within. 
 
2- Do you think that the Iraqis’ distrust of the US, the sponsor of the democratic project in 
Iraq, is one of the reasons of the faltering of democracy in Iraq? Do you think that the US 
has not done enough to consolidate democracy in Iraq? 
 
Iraqis’ trust in America’s policy in Iraq has been shaken. It claimed that it had brought 
with it a democratic project to turn Iraq into a democratic country that will be a beacon of 
‘democratic’ radiation in the Middle East region. Yet, America has tried to implement its 
democratic project through the theory of ‘creative chaos’ which constituted a mistake 
committed by occupation forces in relation to the structure of the political system which 
has come as a result of an a priori judgment that Iraqi society, which is pluralistic 
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ethnically, religiously, doctrinally and tribally, is inherently divided and the problem of 
governance in it cannot be solved without a government based on (sectarian) power-
sharing, and specifically from the three main social components, i.e., Shias, Sunnis and 
Kurds, who should divide power among themselves.  This is the same as Biden’s project 
which was met with wide acceptance in the U.S. Senate without consulting the Iraqi 
people. The aim of the project was the division of Iraq and breaking its geography and 
society into three weak ethnic and sectarian (Shias, Sunnis, Kurds) entities (regions). 
The practical implementation of the “theory of creative chaos” in Iraq happened during 
the rule of (Paul) Bremer (the US civil administrator), and this was based on dismantling 
the state and its institutions and, at the same time, keeping the liberals, the independent 
and the technocrats away from governance and not recognizing their role in 
reconstructing Iraq. This is a deliberate mistake to empty Iraq from the Iraqi intelligentsia 
which shouldered the burden of modernity and social progress. 
 
Such irresponsible conducts have helped deepen chaos and produced a political and 
administrative vacuum which resulted in fragile security and the spread of violence, 
terrorism and social fragmentation, which was a result of the nature of the American 
policy and the grave mistakes it had committed as well as its failure in restoring balance 
to Iraqi society and providing an atmosphere conducive for a margin of real freedom and 
democracy. The primary task in this regard should have been the formation of an 
effective national government from opposition parties, independents and academics, 
from inside and outside [the country], not on the basis of sectarian power-sharing, but on 
the basis of the right person in the right place. 
 
But realities on the ground proved otherwise. Chaos became “uncreative” and it spread 
to all the countries of the Middle East, especially Arab states. It dismantled and destroyed 
all that was there and didn’t rebuild what it has destroyed. It has produced dangerous 
political, social, economical and cultural phenomena. These were in fact the natural by-
products of this uncreative chaos.  If this chaos has produced the so-called Arab Spring, 
then this (blood-stained) spring has soon turned into a stormy autumn that has not only 
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shaken the thrones of the dictators that ruled most Arab countries, but also shook most 
social classes and hierarchies and heralded the creation of sectarian conflicts, paving the 
way for the forces of political Islam, as happened in Egypt with the ascendance of the 
Muslim Brothers to power, and propped it up to ascend to power on the shoulders of the 
real Arab Spring revolutionaries. Soon, the chaos spread from Iraq to Tunisia, Libya, 
Syria, Egypt, Yemen and the rest of the Arab states. No one knows yet of its dire 
consequences. 
 
In fact, we can say that the creative chaos brought by the occupation was one of the 
most important factors which impeded, and even disabled, the national, democratic, 
pluralistic project which Iraqis were hoping to build, and whose state the US claimed it 
came to help Iraq rebuild. 
 
3- Do you see any religious impediments to democracy? Do you think that political Islam 
is an impediment to democracy? 
 
Religion in itself is not an impediment to democracy, but the non-separation between 
religion and the state and the politicization of religion are. Religion is essentially a faith-
based creed that is linked to metaphysics, the forbidden and the sacred. It cannot be 
subjected to intellectual interpretations or to individual opinions. Either you believe and 
obey or you don’t believe and refuse. Yet, democracy believes in freedom of opinion and 
leaves to the individual the choice to believe in a creed or not to believe. Political Islam, 
like other religions, doesn’t separate religion from politics because it believes that 
“governance is the prerogative of God.” Therefore, it becomes, in this case, an 
impediment to democracy. One has to distinguish between the true religion and the 
different interpretations of it and the way human beings understand religion and exploit it 
for personal interests. 
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Historically, democracy has not found a place in our heritage or the traditions of our 
society except in a very few and rare instances. If there were groups that held or adopted 
these ideas, they were not able to achieve what they had promised. Also, awareness of 
democratic culture today might not go beyond some educated urban groups of the 
remnants of the middle class which has shrunk, especially from the liberals. Groups of 
the wider Islamic masses, especially those of tribal/rural/Bedouin origins, which still don’t 
believe in democracy nor in its practice, still live in a “masked Bedouin culture” where 
their loyalty is to the tribe, sect and region, not to the state or the homeland. 
 
We talk about democracy, transparency, freedom of expression and belief, and human 
rights, and about tolerance, dialogue, mutual understanding and recognition of the other. 
But we do not really realise what we talk about, and if we realise it, we do not recognise 
it, and if we recognise it, we only practice it by paying lip service to it, and if we practice it 
we exploit it for our personal interests. 
 
It is noticeable that some of us demands democracy, and pretends to cling to its 
concepts and practice, but he doesn’t practice it in reality with members of his family and 
peers and at work and in his social, economic, and political relations. Democracy is not 
just ideas, sayings and slogans whose praises we sing. It is a way of life, culture, 
thinking, action, behavior, as well as the practice of freedom, pluralism and respect for 
human rights according to the individual’s intellectual persuasions. 
 
4- Do you think that sectarianism is one of the impediments to democracy to Iraq? If it is, 
how can sectarianism be tackled from the standpoint of sociology?  
 
Sect is a social-religious component that is based on a certain pattern of religious or 
sectarian praxis, which acquires a social aspect over time. If sectarianism had a social 
function and role, these are a function and a role that precede the establishment of 
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modern state. That is so because the sect has a fanatical tendency that makes the 
individual present his total or partial loyalty to sectarian values, beliefs and perceptions, 
rather than other [values, beliefs and perceptions]. Sect is a traditional group that always 
maintains its belonging, loyalty, values and conventions, avoiding the fusion into the 
national identity. Belonging and loyalty to a sect always conflict with loyalty to the national 
identity and constitutes an impediment to practicing democracy which believes in 
pluralism, difference and respect for the other. The national identity is originally linked to 
the idea of citizenship, as a legal principle, as much as it is linked to political affiliation 
and democratic choice. 
 
Sectarianism impedes achieving democracy because it divides the national identity and 
breaks it up, while democracy unifies sub-identities in one national identity because it is 
based on the concept of citizenship and respect of the other. Remedying sectarianism 
can only happen with the abolishment of social, economic and cultural discrimination and 
differentiation, alleviating economic and political disparity, and respecting sub-identities, 
treating them on an equal basis and not repressing them. This cannot happen unless a 
democratic system, which protects and guarantees the rights of all identities and 
subsumes them in a single national identity, is implemented. In democratic societies, 
people transcend the bounds of their sub-identities and sub-loyalties in favour of a 
national identity that gathers all people in a national unity that becomes a starting point 
for peaceful coexistence among different social components and achieving social 
integration. 
  
5- Do you think that a secular system that separates religion from politics is more 
amenable to a democratic system? 
 
The origin of the idea of separation of religion and state is the separation of the church 
from the state. This separation was in fact born during the period of renaissance, 
enlightenment and modernity in Europe which saw the separation between the temporal 
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and the spiritual, i.e., the separation between temporal and religious lives, since every 
one of them has its own space. The conflict with the church produced a movement 
toward liberation and emancipation from its authority and clerical ideas which 
occasioned, for the first time in history, a separation between politics and religion or what 
is called in Europe as the concept of “secularism.”  Secularism is derived from the word 
science or world. It is a liberal concept that refers to separating religion from the state, 
and civil society from political society, i.e. the state must not exercise any religious 
authority, and the church, the mosque and the temple must not exercise any political 
power, as well. 
 
Accordingly, we have two types of states: one secular, the other religious. The modern 
secular state is the one that is prevalent in the world today. It does not interfere in 
religious affairs, nor does it allow clerics to interfere in political affairs. It only applies 
made-made law. The religious state vests authority and power in the hands of God. In 
other words, governance is the prerogative of God alone, and this is the basic nucleus 
upon which the Islamist project is based, i.e., the state that applies Sharia law, rather 
than the man-made law which is devised by human reason, on earth. The separation of 
state and religion also means not subjecting political and economic activities to the 
monopoly of any religious authority that is independent of society.  
 
Authority here means, first, the monopoly of a distinct group, which claims to own the 
absolute truth, of state affairs and its social, economic and political activities. Separation 
of religion and state doesn’t mean separation of religion form society. Secondly, the 
separation of religion and the state does not mean the separation of religion from society. 
The separation of religion and the state means that legislation must stem from the 
independence of the legislature which is based on the constitution. The constitution is a 
man-made legislation that organizes the secular state that is based on citizenship. This 
means that all [citizens] are equal before the law irrespective of religion, sect, colour, 
gender, origin or ethnicity. All people are citizens who are equal before the law in terms 
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of rights and duties. That’s why we can say that the secular system is more amenable to 
democracy because it is a synonym of it [democracy].  
 
6- What is the reason for the non-spreading of democracy in Islamic countries? Are there 
religious or social reasons?  
 
The fact that the Arabs remain the least to enjoy freedom and democracy is not only due 
to the failure of the process of transition to democracy, but also to the confluence of 
backward social, economic, religious, cultural and political structures that have worked to 
remove or exclude social forces that are aware of the crisis, and [resulted in its] lack of 
organization of available opportunities as well as lack of a real and motivating catalyst. 
Also, the weakness, even shrinking and fragmentation of the middle class, which 
shoulders the burdens of modernization, social progress and democracy, has contributed 
to the development of a civilizational reversal that has returned the Islamic states several 
centuries back. 
 
 7- What are the prospects for democracy in Iraq in your opinion after this experience that 
has been there for 13 years?  
 
The fall of the previous regime, even if it was by occupation forces, has thrown a stone in 
static. It created a movement and movement is the basis of change. Democracy is a 
continuous and practical process. It is an infant experience that is still crawling but it is 
manifested in the following: 
 
-the seeds of a civil society-democratic (civil society organizations) under a weak state 
and amidst partisan, tribal, sectarian, and regional conflicts and violent political infighting. 
-the open society following the fall [of the regime] has contributed to the spread of mass 
communications and media – newspapers, magazines, mobiles, satellite channels – 
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although in a random, unorganised and undisciplined way. 
-the appearance of many parties and civil society organizations, most of which are 
ineffective, fossilized, and lack expertise, freedom and independence, in addition to the 
allocation of 25% of seats in parliament and provincial councils to women, which is a 
positive move. 
-the entry of various communications and social media, especially the internet, into 
houses, cafes and universities will open numerous windows for modernity and widen the 
culture of democracy in the future.   
 
I say, the seeds of democracy in Iraq are bound to grow even if at a very slow pace. It 
cannot stand and become sound in a few years, because it is a culture, values and 
behaviour which we must learn, nurture, support and then practice correctly. 
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Interview 24 
Kamran Qaradaghi 
 
Mr Qaradaghi is a veteran Kurdish journalist, writer and former chief of staff of the 
Iraq presidency in the period 2006-2010 during the term of President Jalal Talabani. 
Prior to this role, he was editor-in-chief of Radio Free Iraq in Prague. Currently, he 
writes for London-based Al-Hayat Arabic newspaper. This was an email interview 
received on 29th July, 2016. Answers were received in Arabic and translated by the 
researcher. 
 
Answers 
1-Do you think the democratic experiment in Iraq has been successful so far? If it 
hasn’t been successful, fully or partially, what are the impediments in your opinion? 
 
KQ: If we regard the holding of relatively free parliamentary elections, and the 
transfer of power based on the results of the elections, as a criterion for democracy, 
then the answer must be positive.  But, aside from this, it must be said that 
democracy in Iraq has not been successful. It has failed to establish real 
constitutional and legal institutions that are required for institutionalizing the 
democratic system. All the present institutions, including the judiciary, have been 
politicized and their independence has been compromised and, as such, they have 
ended up being subjected to the will of the government. Also, the ruling political 
establishment is unable to differentiate between the two concepts of government and 
state. This is in addition to the failure to establish the required institutions which has 
made things worse due to the absence of democratic culture in the first place. Worst 
of all is the sectarian polarization which has deepened the principle of belonging to 
the community, whether ethnic or sectarian, before belonging to the state.  
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2- Do you think Kurdish political parties have contributed to the success of the 
democratic experiment or was their role impeding? Do you also think that the 
Kurdish leadership truly believes that it will benefit from a successful democratic 
experiment in Iraq (which will supposedly keep it a unitary state)? Or it believes it will 
be harmed by this success? 
 
KQ: In the early stages of the change after 2003, the Kurdish parties presented 
themselves as having democratic experience since 1991 in Kurdistan that the new 
Iraq could benefit from. But they soon withdrew unto themselves with the 
deterioration of the security and political situations, and the subsequent 
intensification of sectarianism and power-sharing as well as administrative and 
financial corruption right to the end of the known list of negatives and the political 
and economic crises that ensued and that still exist between Baghdad and the 
Kurdish Regional Government, and, in turn, the internal crises within Kurdistan itself.  
Personally, I believe that had the democratic experiment in Iraq succeeded 
according to the correct criteria of the democratic concept, its success would not 
have been harmful to the Kurds or their national aspirations. On the contrary, it 
would have helped the Kurdish nationalist parties to achieve their national 
independent state. Under a sound democratic system, presumably, the centre would 
not insist on Iraq remaining a single centralized state, but would rather be open to 
negotiations on a peaceful, friendly separation for Kurdistan, should its [Kurdistan’s] 
nationalist parties call for it. 
 
3- Do you think that the Kurds really feel they that belong to the current Iraqi state or 
their belonging is largely nationalist and they strive to establish their own state? In 
this regard, have they ever felt they belonged to this state since its creation in 1921? 
How were their feelings, as a non-Arab ethnicity, when the Iraqi state adopted a pan-
Arab ideology during the republican era? 
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KQ: I believe that one of consequences of the historical circumstances that had led 
to the establishment of the Iraqi state in the 1920s as a result of the fall of the 
Ottoman Empire was that the Kurds’ feeling of belonging to this state remained 
weak. This was enhanced by the failure of the Kurdish statehood project in the 
framework of the Treaty of Sèvres in 1921 (10 August 1920) which was abrogated by 
the Treaty of Lausanne signed two years later. As far as Iraq is concerned, the 
armed confrontations between the centre and Kurdistan have not abated, with short 
intermittent periods of negotiations which led to temporary understanding about 
limited autonomous rule for the region, until we reached the Anfal operations, ethnic 
cleansing, the use of chemical weapons and mass graves during the seventies and 
eighties of the last century.  These events have deepened the Kurdish feeling of not 
belonging to the Iraqi state, especially after the declaration of republican Iraq as an 
integral part of the Arab nation. It’s well known that this phrase has been removed 
from the Iraqi constitution because of the insistence of the Kurds on rejecting it. 
 
4- Is there a circumstance under which the Kurds would feel a sense of belonging to 
the current Iraqi state? Do you expect that the declaration of a Kurdish state is a 
foregone conclusion and it’s just a matter of time?         
   
KQ: Briefly, I believe that the Kurds in [Kurdistan] Region have made a resolution in 
this regard. The principle of independence and national state has become 
entrenched in their soul. The difficult question that remains is how and when 
circumstances would allow the achievement of this aim. 
 
5- How do the Kurds feel about their division among four countries? Do ordinary 
Kurds feel they are one coherent nationality? Or are there real differences between 
the Kurds in Iraq, Turkey, Iran and Syria? 
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KQ: Kurds in all parts of Kurdistan have one feeling towards belonging to their 
nationality and regarding Kurdistan as their homeland. But there are differences, 
although [these differences are] not essential but can resemble shades of one 
colour. This stems from the geographical nature of Kurdistan, its division and 
cohabitation for centuries with different peoples. This has left effects on the patterns 
of behaviour and thinking. There are other similar effects that caused by the 
differences of dialects, especially the two main dialects: Kermanji and Surani. Some 
Kurds in Iraq share the same dialect with Kurds in Turkey and Syria, while some 
others share another dialect with Kurds in Iran. 
 
Interviews on single issues 
 
Interview 25 
Dia Ash-Shakarchi 
Mr Shakarchi is an author on Islamic theology and former cleric. He was a leading 
member of the Islamic Da’awa Party until 2006. He was a member of the Iraqi 
National Assembly (2005-6) and member of the ‘Constitution-drafting Parliamentary 
Committee’.  The interview was on ‘the rationale behind Islamists’ rejection of 
democracy’. It was done via email. His answers were received in Arabic on 15th 
March 2016 and it was translated by author. 
 
Answers 
 
Question: What are the reasons behind Islamists’ non-acceptance of 
democracy? 
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There are several reasons for the non-acceptance of Islamists to democracy and 
their rejection to include it in their literature in the stage before they had to accept it 
superficially, as is the case with the forces of Iraqi political Islam prior to 2003, or, in 
other words, before the stage of them benefitting from democracy, in order to pump 
as many as they can of the theocratic content in the civic state. The reasons are as 
follows: 
 
1- Ideological reason: this comes from the mentality of monotheism. 
Democracy means the rule of the people and this contradicts their belief 
of ‘the rule of God’ which is one of the necessities of monotheism according 
to verse 44 of chapter 5 (Sourat Alma’ida): (Those who do not rule according 
to God’s revelations are the infidels) according to one of the interpretations of 
the verse, although the context of the verse indicates that what is meant by 
‘rule’ is not ‘government’ but the judiciary and trials. In addition, they draw 
upon the Prophet’s experiment, as well as Ali’s, and others such as Moses, 
David and Solomon. 
2- Social or ethical reason, according to their religious understanding of ethics. 
One of the necessities of the democratic system is for the state to guarantee 
general and private freedoms and respect of the privacy of the individual and 
non-interference of the state in individual freedoms which do not touch on the 
public interest or order. That’s why some of the Islamists who later became 
prominent politicians after 2003, insisted that I focus on the political side of 
democracy in the statement of the ‘Iraqi Democratic Islamic Forum’ in 2002. 
Their aim was to rule out the social aspects of democracy which they fear 
its ‘corruptive consequences’ according to their religious understanding 
of corruption. 
3- Political reason: This is because of their fear of the competition of other 
non-Islamic political forces which may oust them from power through free 
elections, and also fear of the principle of the (peaceful) transfer of power, or 
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(the possibility that) they (secular forces) do not allow them to monopolize 
power. Pluralism in the framework of an Islamic state will confine 
competition to the parties of political Islam, excluding secular or ‘civil’ 
forces as they have come to be known as, in line with the principle of 
‘dissimulation’ which is not justified in my opinion. 
When Islamists were compelled to accept democracy in Iraq for example, they 
have tried to include criteria by stipulating that laws and the practising of rights 
and freedoms must not be incompatible with what they called ’the general morals’ 
(of the population) so that they can, when they can, interpret ‘general morals’ 
according to their religious understanding, and what they have included in the 
infamous article two of the Iraqi constitution that ‘It is not permitted to enact any 
law that is incompatible with the constant rulings of Islam’. They rejected to 
include the phrase ‘on which there is consensus’ as was the case in the TAL 
(Transitional Administrative Law).   
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Interview 26 
Miss Maysoon Aldamluji 
This interview is on the Article 2 of the constitution. It was done by email and 
answer was received in Arabic on 2nd July 2016 and translated by the author. 
 
Question: 
Do you think that Article 2 (clauses A, B & C) of the constitution was balanced in the 
sense that no law can be enacted by parliament in line with Clause A that 
contravenes the principles of democracy, as stipulated in Clause B, or is it actually 
more useful for Islamists to introduce Sharia laws with no actual deterrence from 
Clause B since there is a text to refer to regarding Islam while there is no agreed 
upon text to refer to regarding the principles of democracy? Please find Article 2 with 
its 2 sections and 3 clauses below as well as the link for the Iraqi constitution: 
Article 2: First: Islam is the official religion of the State and is a foundation source of 
legislation: A. No law may be enacted that contradicts the established provisions of 
Islam B. No law may be enacted that contradicts the principles of democracy. C. No 
law may be enacted that contradicts the rights and basic freedoms stipulated in this 
Constitution. Second: This Constitution guarantees the Islamic identity of the majority 
of the Iraqi people and guarantees the full religious rights to freedom of religious 
belief and practice of all individuals such as Christians, Yazidis, and Mandean 
Sabeans.  
 
http://www.iraqinationality.gov.iq/attach/iraqi_constitution.pdf 
 
Answer 
On a number of occasions Islamist parties attempted to impose Islamic rulings, 
like banning the sale of alcohol or replacing the Personal Status Law with Islamic 
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jurisdiction (Sharia). Every time they did this, they used clause (A) of article 2 of 
the constitution as reference. Clause (B) was not a deterrent, as there is no text 
to refer to. However, it was public resistance that stopped those attempts, backed 
by the Marji3iya in Najaf.  
 
Interview 27 
Dr Kadom Shubber 
Dr Shubber is the Founder and ex-Editor-in-Chief of the International Journal of 
Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance & Management. The interview was done via 
email. The answer was received in English on 5th May 2016. (A detailed bio of Dr 
Shubber is available within his first interview which is available in this appendix) 
The interview is on the exclusion of the Ba’ath Party from the political process. 
 
Question: 
In retrospect, do you think it was fair or democratic to ban the Ba'ath Party from 
participation in the political process? Do you think democracy would have been 
served better with the inclusion of the Ba'ath Party and the political process would 
have been more successful than now? Also, briefly, if you think the political process 
has failed, even partially, what are the reasons for the failure in your opinion? 
Answer: 
•         In principle, no political party should be barred from the democratic process, 
as such barring will drive them underground and may enhance their status in the 
eyes of the public. Political ideas and arguments should be fought and invalidated 
only via rational and opposing ideas and arguments. 
•         Anyone with a criminal record (past or current) must be made to answer for 
their actions under a fair, open and transparent legal system. 
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•         It must be made illegal for any political party (or any other organization for that 
matter) to employ violence as a means for carrying out their activities. This should be 
enshrined in the law of the land and made enforceable in practice. 
•         In the case of Iraq, a Commission for Truth & Re-conciliation is appropriate, 
whereby those who committed certain misdemeanours (writing malicious reports, 
intimidating others etc.) could repent. If those adversely affected would forgive them 
and the authorities see only a limited damage done which can be excused, the 
culprits might be set free. Finally, I attach here a research paper which I recently 
prepared, and which has now been published on the Baghdad-based Al-Bayan 
Centre's website.  
 
Interview 28 
Dr Kamal Field 
 
 Dr Filed is an academic and former deputy minister of finance in Iraq.  
The interview was done via email and it’s on the exclusion of the Ba’ath Party from 
the political process. The answer was received in English on 4th May 2016. A 
detailed bio of Dr Field is available within his first interview which is available in this 
appendix 
 
Answer 
Immediately After 2003, there is justification to exclude the Baath Party (the mass of 
the party used directly and indirectly to repress the nation and in particular those who 
belong to other political parties. This should have been reviewed after establishing 
the new political process in Iraq to give opportunities to all those who have not 
committed any crimes to engage in normal life. Ideally 2010, practically 2014. 
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Interview 29 
Sami Al-Askari 
 Mr Al-Askari was an MP until 2014. He was also an executive at the 
Deba’athification Commission in 2004/5 and deputy Governing Council member in 
2003-4. This interview is about the exclusion of the Ba’ath Party from the political 
process. The answer was received in Arabic on 4th May 2016 and was translated by 
the author. (A detailed bio of Mr Al-Askari is available within his first interview which 
is available in this appendix). 
 
Answer 
The Ba’ath Party believes in the theory of the ‘leading party.’ It believes it has a 
mission in the nation that no one else can achieve. This in their opinion gives them 
the right to lead society. From a practical standpoint, the Ba’ath practiced, 
throughout the periods during which it ruled in Iraq and Syria, absolute dictatorship in 
which it maintained control as well as the monopolization of political action, the 
media and the leadership of the state’s institutions. Even during the periods when 
political circumstances forced it to allow some parties to participate in politics, this 
participation was nominal and it compelled those parties to acknowledge the ‘leading 
role’ of the Ba’ath Party. The justification given in Iraq was that the Ba’ath Party was 
the one that led the revolution (military coup) and this gave it the right to lead the 
country. The other thing is that, throughout all the experiences of the Ba’ath Party, 
plotting was the approach it employed to get to power. This approach has become a 
characteristic of the Ba’ath that it practiced against others and between the party’s 
factions. Therefore, allowing the Ba’ath, as a party, to participate in the democratic 
process poses a threat to it. Besides, the Ba’ath in Iraq bears [the responsibility for] 
all the catastrophes and wars that had destroyed Iraq as a people and a state. The 
experience of Germany in its dealing with Nazism, criminalizing it and depriving it of 
participating in the democratic process is an example that should be followed. No 
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one casts doubt on the credibility of the democratic experience in Germany and 
depriving the Nazis from political participation. It never constituted a defect in 
democracy in that country.  
 
Interview 30 
Miss Maysoon Aldamluji 
 
The interview was on the exclusion of the Ba’ath Party from the political process. It 
was done via email and the answer was received on 8th of May 2016 in Arabic and 
translated by the author. (Interviewee’s detailed bio is available in her earlier 
interview in this appendix) 
  
Answer 
I believe that participation in elections should be on equal footing. I am not talking 
about the individuals who have abused their powers but about the party (the Ba’ath) 
that has manipulated all the state’s possibilities for its interests. Would there have 
been a real competition between the Ba’ath Party and other parties? Frankly, I don’t 
think so. According to this criterion, individual Ba’ath Party members who have not 
committed crimes, should have been allowed to stand in the elections, but not the 
party as an institution that had monopolized political life in Iraq and manipulated all 
government and nongovernment institutions for its interests, among which were 
syndicates, unions, media organizations and the religious establishment. I write this, 
yet I find a degree of utopia in my opinion, since external interferences made the 
elections unequal, in addition to the absence of important laws such as parties law 
which was not passed until a few months ago, and the subjugation of the Electoral 
Commission to the (political) sharing as well the absence of a clear law for elections. 
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This was enough justification for excluding the Ba’ath Party in the first and second 
elections. But today, we need to review matters. Crimes have diversified and they 
are no longer exclusive to the Baath Party. Ending Deba’athification will bring some 
stability to the country. Criminals, be they Ba’athists or non-Ba’athists, are certainly 
not included in this. 
 
 
 
Interview 31 
Dr Ibrahim Al-Haidari 
 
This interview was done via email and the answer was received on 6/6/2016 in 
Arabic and translated by the author. It’s about the exclusion of the Ba’ath Party from 
the political process. (Interviewee’s detailed bio is available in another interview in 
this appendix) 
 
Answer 
In spite of the fact that banning the Ba’ath Party left the new regime with so many 
enemies, but it was necessary, because all what has been happening in the past till 
today, is due to the heavy legacy of Ba’ath Party and its ideology. But this type of 
banning needs an alternative social and political philosophy and a real national 
democratic project, not sectarian power-sharing.  The German experience of 
Denazification was right and successful because Germany established a 
constitutional system that is based on respect for the law and supports the 
reconstruction of what was destroyed in the war. Germany is an industrially 
advanced country and has a legacy of good civilization. It has serious people who 
respect the law, work and time and this is the secret of their progress.    
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Interview 32 
Samir Sumaidaie 
This interview is on the exclusion of the Ba’ath Party from the political process. It 
was done by email and the answer was received in English on 6/6/2016. A detailed 
bio is available within Mr Sumaidaie’s  first interview in this appendix. 
 
Answer 
1. Is it democratic to bar any political party which advocates the destruction of 
democracy as an ideology? Such parties exist in the form of Nazi or other totalitarian 
parties. They declare that if they come to power, they would change the "rules of the 
game" and would therefore bring an end to democracy as a system of government. 
2. Is the Baath party such a party? 
______________________________ 
Addressing the first question, it is, in my opinion, justified to ban such a party, for the 
sake of preserving democracy itself. It can of course be argued that if they are open 
about their purpose, and people elect them, well that is the people's choice, and 
therefore their coming to power would be "democratic". This is a weak argument. For 
democracy is desirable specifically because it permits change through a process 
proscribed by a set of agreed rules. any change according to such rules and under 
the auspices of established democratic institutions (the Constitution, the legal 
framework,  
 
Parliament, independent electoral commission, etc) any such change is reversible 
and allows society in general to adjust the system of government and the process 
policy making, gradually to the dynamic changes in society. In another word, it is self 
correcting. If this process is hijacked and made irreversible, this would prevent the 
system of government from adjusting to the changing needs. It would lose the 
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essential "self correcting" capacity which could and would lead to serious disasters in 
decision making. (e.g. Hitler's war, or Saddam's decision to enter Kuwait). It is 
imperative, therefore, from a utilitarian standpoint, to ban any party which avows the 
foreclosure of the process of dynamic adjustment of the process of government and 
therefore imperils society.  
In making this judgment, the basis should be declared: The highest value is not the 
value of absolute unfettered freedom, but rather the highest long-term good for the 
largest number of people. 
 
Now we come to the Baath Party. Is it such a party? I would say yes. That is 
because, by their words and deeds, they declare themselves as having the absolute 
right to lead. It is the "leading party" (دئاقلا بزحلا) Its legitimacy is based not on 
elections but on "revolutionary legitimacy" (ةيروثلا ةيعرشلا), and it is not accountable to 
any institution. There are no checks and balances. There is no "self correcting" 
mechanisms. Decisions therefore can be (and were) catastrophic. This was their 
track record both in Iraq and in Syria. In both cases they were used as vehicles by 
ruthless absolute dictators. 
 
If the Ba’athists come (as they did) after they were removed from power and say, 
well, we now believe in democracy and we have undertaken a process of self-
criticism, should we believe them and include them in the democratic process? Again 
no! Because such a party which has become suddenly democratic is a totally 
different animal. It cannot be the Baath party. The Baath party cannot strip off its 
entire ideology, history and crimes like a bathing robe and suddenly emerge clean 
and free from its past. 
 
Having addressed the question with respect to the Baath party (in my opinion), I 
think the argument in point (1) above applies to Islamist parties. They should be 
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barred from the democratic process because they aim to use democracy to reach 
power and then utilize it to destroy democracy. Their ideal model is (one man one 
vote one time), or as close to it as they can get! I hope I have answered your 
question. Where is this all leading to? 
 
 
 
 Interview 33 
Hashem Ganem 
 
 Mr Ganem is a British-educated Iraqi American engineer and activist. He served in 
the Iraqi armed forces during the Saddam regime and has been working with US 
institutions in connection with Iraq. The interview was done over several emails. The 
answers were received on 4th May-26th June 2016 in English. 
 
Answer 
The political dynamics would have been enhanced if the Baath party was invited to 
contest the first post 2003 elections.  All of the ills of Iraq would have been levelled at 
its doorstep during the electioneering, and rightly so. The party would have not won 
any seats in the parliament, and if they did, it would've been a miserly number of 
seats.  Don't forget then no one wanted to be associated with them; they would not 
have cadre to field for the elections.I think allowing the Ba’ath Party to partake in the 
first elections post 2003, would have shown maturity and inclusiveness, which would 
have been a stunning political manoeuvre, and a serious step towards:  
 
a) reconciliation - primarily with their audience/constituency (in & outside of Iraq) 
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b) thwarting their nefarious  intentions and activities. 
They, then, may or may not have accepted the offer of an open hand (by their 
victims) to be part of rebuilding Iraq.  Either way they would have been be exposed 
to the Iraqi people and to the rest of the Arab world (which was, and still is, a 
constituent of theirs). 
The consequences of such rejection are clear (need no second guessing) 
If the accepted, then they would've had to play by the same rules as the rest.  
 
Personally, I think it would have been inconceivable for them to join the political fray 
and would had made the same ludicrous demands of return to power, reinstate 
Saddam, the US to compensate for the war damage and called for Jihad.  Then all 
consequential violence would have been identified so clearly as theirs. 
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Interview 34 
Dr Hussein Al-Hindawi 
Dr Hindawi is an author, journalist and poet and was the president of the first 
electoral commission. Currently, he is an advisor to the President of the Republic of 
Iraq. The interview was done via email on the exclusion of the Ba’ath Party from the 
political process and whether that was an impediment to democracy. The answer 
was received on 26th June, 2016, in Arabic and translated by the author. A detailed 
bio is available within his first interview which is available in this appendix. 
 
Answer 
I would like to stress right from the beginning the necessity to draw a distinction 
between the past and the future in expressing my view in this case. That’s to say the 
separation between the two concepts of dissolution-Deba’athification which was 
stated in the first resolution of the US civil administrator, Paul Bremer, (whose 
implementation was riddled with mistakes, violations, arbitrary decisions, and 
sometimes self-interested exploitation whether by the Deba’athification Commission, 
especially under the late Ahmed Alchalabi and the late Ali Allami or sectarian groups 
and corrupt officials amidst collusive silence form the high judiciary), and the concept 
of banning the Ba’ath Party (and consequently dissolving it), which is now tabled in 
parliament as a separate bill to be voted on by parliament as a separate [legislation] 
from the Accountability and Justice Law. I believe that Deba’athification was a 
political project, not a law, and herein lies the problem. In other words, the aim 
should have been to ban the Ba’ath Party since 2004 as a Fascist party opposed to 
democracy. The implementation of the law should have not led to the criminalization 
of all Ba’athists, both low- and high-ranking, but to remove its past domination of the 
country and state institutions (Can it be denied that it did not exist before the 
American invasion?). The law should have also sent all those Ba’athists who have 
actually committed criminal acts to face justice, but only according to law and on the 
basis of judicial procedures alone.    
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This way, the law would have been transformed into a tool to impose just 
punishment on real criminals and utilized as a general conduct to ‘educate’ society in 
addition to sparing the innocents and those who made mistakes or even the 
opportunists among Ba’athists from any retaliatory acts or from depriving them of 
their citizenship rights. In fact they should have been made beneficial to state 
departments and institutions. It goes without saying that any law in this regard should 
not have been contrary to Article 7 of the Iraqi constitution which aims to stop the 
propagation of the Ba’ath Party ideology but not punishing any Ba’athist who was not 
a criminal. 
In other words, I personally am until now for the idea of dissolving the Ba’ath Party 
because it is in my opinion: 
1- A racist part (the ideology of immortal message) 
2- A party that believes in coup d’etat (in its declared programme; in fact even 
(President) Abdulnassir stipulated to Michael Aflak (the founder of the Ba’ath Party) 
that the Ba’ath Party be dissolved in Syria as a condition for the declaration of unity 
between Egypt and Syria) 
3- It is a fascist party (the massacres of the Qasr Annihaya (the Palace of the End 
prison), the Anfal campaigns, chemical weapons, the massacres of the 1991 intifada, 
the mass graves…). There are international legal positions that vindicate this 
position. 
I have a long study published in 1977 in Aswat Magazine and I still have original 
copies of it, in which I presented these three concepts in a new and expanded way, 
before (the publication) of the Republic of Fear by Kanan Makiya, and I am surprised 
that he didn’t refer to it in it. My conclusion is literally as follows: ‘The Ba’athist 
ideology in the final analysis holds the traits and characteristics of a Fascist ideology 
in a country that is industrially backward and where development is weak. It derived 
most of its basic elements from previous Fascist ideologies and it tries to follow in its 
footsteps.’      
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Interestingly, there are those who confirm that Barzan Ibrahim Alhassan, Saddam 
Hussein’s half brother, had asked the latter (Saddam) to dissolve the Ba’ath Party 
after the invasion of Kuwait because (he believed) it became harmful to Iraq and its 
people. 
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Interview 35 
Dr Akeel Abbas 
 
Dr Abbas is an academic, journalist and writer. This interview is on the exclusion of 
the Ba’ath Party from the political process. It was done via email and the answer was 
received on 1st of July 2016 in English. (Interviewee’s detailed bio is available within 
his earlier interview in this appendix) 
 
Answer 
 
The policy of excluding the Baath party from participating in the democratic process 
in Iraq is wrong-headed and counter-productive. First, the Baath Party (BP) has 
some following among Iraqis who, if BP is barred from politics, will go unrepresented, 
potentially turning into a disgruntled and angry segment of society. This sends BP to 
the world of the underground with potential resort to violence, instead of making it go 
away as the Deba’athification policy makers envisaged.   
 
All of this has the effect of upsetting the democratic process in Iraq as the past 12 
years have shown. No political party which disavows violence and pledges to abide 
by existing laws should be barred from entering politics. The BP should be given the 
choice of disavowing violence, allowing the judicial system to prosecute its members 
accused of political crimes in fair trials, and, consequently, allowed to enter politics. If 
it refuses to disavow violence, respect the law, and obstruct legal prosecution of its 
accused members, then it should not be allowed to enter politics. 
509 
 
 
Interview 36 
Dr Kanan Makiya 
 
Dr Makiya is a prominent author (his two most famous books are ‘The Republic of 
Fear’ & ‘Cruelty and Silence’). He is an academic and was one of the leading figures 
in the Iraqi opposition to Saddam Hussein. The interview was done via email on 
exclusion of the Ba’ath Party from the political process. The answer was received on 
1st July 2016 in English. A detailed bio is available within his first interview which is 
available in this appendix. 
 
Answer 
I think the issue of fairness or democracy does not enter into the question what to do 
with the Ba'ath party immediately after the fall of Saddam. It is a question of what 
was the wisest thing for a democratically inclined Iraqi leadership (which as you 
know I do not think we had) to do after the fall. I believe it was by far wiser NOT to 
have banned the Ba'ath party after 2003 because of how many people had been 
members of it and because of the suspicion that would naturally fall upon anyone 
who had been a member thus encouraging the politics of "settling of accounts," 
which turned out to be one of our biggest problems after the fall of the regime 
because all the new leaders engaged in it on a very wide scale.  
 
The principle failure of the political process is that the new leadership--which had 
never "earned" its right to be leaders by overthrowing the outgoing regime--treated 
the state as a "ghanima" (booty) and the outgoing regime (and more generally Sunni 
Iraqis) as "enemies" to be done away with; no one of any weight or importance was 
thinking of Iraq as a complex country that was desperately in need of a future. They 
were all small men, of no vision. 
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Interview 37 
Dr Akeel Abbas 
Dr Abbas is an associate professor at the American University of Iraq, writer and 
journalist. The interview is on Article 2 of the Iraqi constitution and whether it 
impeded democracy. It was done by email on and the answer received on 2nd of July 
2016 in English.  A more detailed bio is available within his first interview in this 
appendix. 
 
Answer 
This article is self-contradictory because it tries to reconcile irreconcilable 
contradictions. Democracy and religion belong to diametrically opposed orders of 
reality. The former is based on debate and questioning that leads to following the 
opinion of the majority, while protecting the rights of the minority whereas latter is 
based on holy texts that accept no debate or questioning and pay no attention to the 
opinions of the majority or minority.  
 
This article causes conflict instead of establishing balance. It also gives a 
disproportionate role to the clergy as the interpreters of religious texts, whereas there 
are no codified, binding democratic ideas or texts that can be resorted to.   
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Interview 38 
Adnan As-Sa’egh 
Mr As-Sa’egh is a prominent poet, journalist and writer. Some of his poetry has been 
translated into other languages. He was the president of the Iraqi Youth Literary 
Union in the early 1990s. The interview was done by email and the answer was 
received on 17th July 2016 in Arabic and translated by the author. The interview is on 
culture and censorship in the 1990s in Iraq. 
 
Answer 
Has the fist of the wounded wolf gone quiet? Perhaps yes, perhaps no. How was 
that? 
In the first scene that was seen before our eyes, you can see the iron fist was not as 
it was, in its organization, firmness and censorship, on many aspects of people’s 
lives, politically, culturally, economically, and in civil society. 
  Yes, the iron fist of the popular army and the (regular) army was a little less firm 
due to the consequences of the intifada of 1991 and the engagement of the authority 
(the wolf) in dressing up its deep wounds, and also due to the blockade (sanctions) 
on Iraq and the banning of flights and other things. You could see some of the 
newspapers such as Babil and Az-Zawraa, which were run by Saddam’s son, Uday, 
and other (newspapers and magazines) began to be bold enough to criticise senior 
officials in the state and its affairs. In the past, it was not allowed to criticise a 
minister or even a general director sometimes, but these newspapers and the 
tongues of the people were not at liberty, even through a simple insinuation, to get 
near the pyramid of power or those close to him, and here I mean Saddam Hussein, 
his family and the apparatuses that belonged to them such as the Republican 
Palace, the Republican Guards, Fida’eyyi Saddam (Saddam’s Sacrificers) and 
others.    
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This is the second scene which is closer to the nature of the wolf- the authority itself. 
You find that that iron fist had become wilder, more violent and murderous and (more 
wolfish). Fidaeyyi Saddam militias became prominent and it’s the most murderous of 
all that has happened in Iraq. They treated citizens with contempt. 
After the intifada has shaken the ruler’s chair, with a strength seen for the first time, it 
almost toppled it, the ‘Leader Necessity’ as Saddam used to be called, became more 
clinging to the chair and more weary and watchful for the most minor of sounds. This 
was reflected on his conduct in his confrontation with his opponents. The closest to 
him were his two sons-in-law, Hussein Kamil and his brother, and many of their 
guards after the incident of their escape with their families (the daughters of the 
‘Leader Necessity’) to Jordan and their announcing their opposition then their return 
to him in regret after a mediation of King Hussein. The King’s mediation didn’t matter 
nor the presence of the two daughters of ‘Leader Necessity’ and his grandchildren, 
who were excluded and then killed all those who returned. This was what happened 
to his two sons-in-law, imagine what could happen to intellectuals and people of 
thought. 
This famous incident is the undeniable verdict regarding turning the whole scene to 
the other side. If you examine it in details, it will reveal to you a story that is beyond 
imagination, even that of the magical realities found in the novels of Gabriel Garcia, 
Marquis and Asturias, especially his novel (Mr President) which used to be circulated 
in secret in Iraq. 
 I would like to report on the murder of Dr Raji At-Tikriti where reality and fiction have 
mixed as it was circulated in whisper among fearful people, until it reached us while 
we were sitting at café ‘Al-Assima’ in Amman at the end of 1993 and it was reported 
to us by our friend, the academic and play artist, Dr Akeel Mehdi.  Dr Raji was lured 
by the Iraqi ambassador to Jordan, who was a relative of his, to go back to Iraq 
quickly after he gave a lecture at the Shoman lecture theatre, where he indirectly 
criticised the ‘‘Leader Necessity’’. Yes, it was indirect criticism. When he arrived in 
Baghdad, the old man was put in ditch and hungry wild dogs were unleashed on him 
to eat his flesh before the eyes of his family and children. When the actor Akeel 
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Mahdi reported this catastrophe in his theatrical way and his distinguished voice, I 
couldn’t sleep the night after, until I wrote a poem entitled ‘what happened to the 
doctor’ which has been included in my poetry book (Under Strange Sky) which was 
published in n1994. This poem brought upon me a lot of problems after it spread in 
Baghdad when I was living with my family in Jordan.    
This incident was not unique. Many bitter incidents happened before and after it, 
among which was the murder of the journalist Dhurgham Hashim because of a 
(critical) article that he wrote. 
This is the testimony that I have written in my book (The Intellectual and 
Assassination)  
My friend the journalist and writer, Dhurgham Hashim, was the editing secretary of 
the magazine (Hurras Al-Watan- The Guards of the Motherland) at the end of the 
eighties). I have worked with him as well as with the creative artist Ali Al Mandilawi 
and Salam Ash-Shammaa and others during my compulsory military service as 
journalists soldiers) The President of the Arab and Iraqi literary unions, Hameed 
Saeed, was not able, nor were other literary writers, to stop the anger of the 
authorities brought upon our poor friend Dhurgham who thought the (declared) 
openness after the end of the Iran-Iraq war was true, so he wrote an article in 
response to an article by Abdul Jabbar Muhsin, who was the President’s media 
secretary at the time, using the famous song ‘life is spring and the weather was fine, 
lock all other subjects for me’.1222 (Instead), they ‘locked all his life for him! When one 
of our brave female journalists (Narmeen Al Mufti) wanted to organise a peaceful 
demonstration in front of the Journalists Syndicate before his execution calling for his 
release, someone came to her and threatened her that (if she continued with her 
planned demonstration) she will be arrested and then shown on TV as accused of 
prostitution. 
                                                            
1222
 This is a cheerful song by the loved Egyptian singer and actress, Suad Husni. It has become a symbol of 
happiness and prosperity in life and people evoke it all the time because of its rhyming verses, optimistic 
outlook and meaningful phrases. It can be found on this link: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ScZ3HGYPc_A  
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 Prominent writer and intellectual, Azeez As-Sayyid Jassim, says ‘Hajjaj1223 was able 
to sustain his strong rule for over 20 years despite the wide mass rage (against it)’… 
Jassim concludes that the length of justice on earth is very short in comparison to 
the length of long-term oppression. The authority is (always) quick in its tendency 
towards isolation from the masses because it aggregates around itself using what it 
possesses of wealth and means of power, tasks and business. The authority 
becomes increasingly isolated when it becomes despotic and class-oriented. This 
excerpt is from Jassim’s book; ‘Ali Sultat Al-Haq’ or ‘Ali’, the Authority of Justice’, 
Darul Adab, Beirut, 19881, first edition.    
 I got the book from the author himself during those years after it was banned in Iraq. 
The book was the hidden or (perhaps) direct reason for his arrest in 1991, torture, 
then compulsion to disclaim his book publically through writing an introduction to a 
new book that carried the same title in which he changed many lines and ideas, 
together with authoring three other books about the other ‘Rightly Guided-guided 
caliphs- Alkhulafa Ar-Rashidoon)’ who are Abu Bakir As-Siddeeq, Omar Bin Al 
Khattab, Othman Bin Affan and lastly on the (fifth Caliph), Saddam Hussein, (who 
was called) the ‘Giant of the Two Rivers’. He was requested to write the other books 
while he was in prison and they were printed in a record speed in the printers of the 
Public Cultural Affairs Publishing House in Baghdad. I remember that during my 
frequency of the ‘Dar Library’ (I worked as editor in the ‘At-Taleeaa Al-Adabiayya’ or 
(Literary Elite) magazine then ‘Nadi Al-Kitab’, both of which belonged to the same 
publishing house) I saw books and (big) volumes carried to his prison in a special 
car. I also know later through a female employee in the library, with whom I had a 
good relation, that these books were being taken to him there in line with an order 
form the presidency of the Republican Palace, so that he could author those books. 
 
                                                            
1223
 A ruler of Iraq during the Umayyad dynasty rule during the first and second Islamic century. Hjjaj was 
infamous for his ruthlessness and harsh treatment of the opponents of the Umayyad Empire. 
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I used to visit his brother Dr Muhsin Al Musawi, who was my manager at the 
publishing house, and I used to hear from him some short stories in a quiet trembling 
and fearful voice on the news of Azeez, while the sound of the radio was turned up. 
He told me later (while we were in Amman after we left Iraq for the last time), that he 
feared the presence of hidden recorders that might have been planted in his office. 
After the books were completed and released to the markets, Azeez As-Sayyid 
Jassim was released from prison. He was pale, receding and sucked-faced, but only 
to die after a short period of time as a result of what was said to be thallium poison 
that used to be secretly slipped into his drink as. That’s how he was liquidated 
physically as well as intellectually through the distortion (of his views) through 
(inserting the title) ‘Giant of the Two Rivers’ (for Saddam) and other things.  
 
 In Beirut in 1996, while I was living in it before my immigration to Sweden, my two 
friends, Fatima Al Muhsin and Zuhair Al-Jazaeri, asked me to write a testimony for 
the magazine (Aswat) on what happened to my generation during the eighties and 
nineties, which I called ‘The Other Exile’. 
At that time I received a letter from the novelist Muhsin Ar-Ramli who used to live in 
Spain, in which he told me, in a big agony, about his brother, the novelist Hassan 
Mutleg, the writer of the novel ‘Dabada’ who was hanged on 18/7/1990 and his 
family were not allowed to hold a mourning ceremony for him.   
 
Ar-Ramli said ‘my brother lives with me at all moments and places. He is tree of 
sorrow that is getting bigger within me until it destroys me. I feel (the burden of) 
responsibility that I live and work for two people not one. He is a live within me, in 
fact he has more life than me. He was a cultured man, a real human being, a brave, 
truthful person and a rare legend. His departure was the biggest catastrophe befallen 
me and the biggest loss to Iraqi culture. I send you with this letter the information I 
have about him and some other information that you will find at the back of one of 
the copies with the letter but remember always to avoid what can be harmful to his 
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family and daughters inside Iraq. The last line of the Ar-Ramli letter can summarise 
to you the whole scene with all its fear. That’s huge fear of the mere prospects of this 
letter falling in the hands of the wounded wolf. 
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Interview 39 
Dr Fareed Ayar 
 
Dr Ayar is the former member of the Independent High Electoral Commission 2004-
2008. The interview was on the exclusion of the Ba’ath Party from political 
participation and whether this has impeded democratization. It was done via email 
and the answer was received on 17th July 2016 in Arabic and it was translated by the 
author.  A detailed bio is available in his earlier interview in this appendix. 
Answer 
 
I do not believe it is fair to exclude the BP from participation in the political process. 
The infamous Deba’athification law was issued by an American order and from Paul 
Bremer who didn’t know Iraq, its components, problems, and the status of its mosaic 
society. There are many examples in countries where the regime changed but the 
previous ruling parties, even the dictatorial ones, were allowed to participate in the 
political process. There is a shining example in South Africa, and how Nelson 
Mandela chose the proportional representation system in order to enable the parties 
representing the white minority, which used to rule according to a pure dictatorial 
ideology, to participate in the new system [of government]. It is regrettable that there 
is no Iraqi Mandela who thinks in a prudent, intelligent way and who has a futuristic 
view in this regard. 
 
The sub-question ‘what are the justifications for banning any political party (with the 
exception of those who committed crimes) from electoral competition’ I answer 
saying that ‘there are no justifications for banning any political party as all [parties] 
have the right to participate in the electoral contest. In Iraq, in spite of the fact that 
the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) has not openly mentioned the banning of 
any political party from the electoral contest and there are no justifications in this 
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connection, but the Deba’athification law has turned the equation upside down and 
created many pretexts to exclude Ba’athists until certain ranks from practising the 
electoral right. Not only that, but it had also stopped the pensions of many retired 
Ba’athists. This was one of the reasons and justifications for the emergence of so-
called terrorist groups. I say here that in Russia, before the fall of the communist 
system, there were 4 million officially registered members of the [Communist] Party. 
Were they banned from practicing their electoral rights? Were their livelihoods 
stopped after the fall of the regime? No, they are practising all their rights and 
receive their salaries like all the others. That’s why no hostile organizations opposed 
to the new regime emerged.  Regarding the question of whether the banning was 
democratic or undemocratic, I answer that it is an undemocratic measure par 
excellence. This is a proof that the authority that was established after 2003, most of 
whose members came from secret party organizations where conspiracies and 
intrigues are wide-spread, cannot digest the presence of an organized party such as 
the BP to share with it the destiny that it wants to devise for the ‘new’ Iraq. Events 
have proven that most of the procedures taken in Iraq on the level of political power, 
did not respect democratic concepts and approaches.     
 
In answer to the final question: if all political parties and entities had participated in a 
natural way in the political and electoral process since the first elections which took 
place on 30th of Jan 2005, Iraq would have been a lot better by now and most of the 
possibilities would have been made available to sort out most of the problems, which 
have led and are leading to terrorism, killing, destruction and sectarian conflict which 
our country is witnessing most regrettably. I reiterate that numerous states had 
embraced dictatorial systems and they had gone through regime change but did not 
experience what has happened in Iraq because the problem is not in the type of 
regime but in the depth of the mentality that is running or implementing it. May God 
bestow His mercy on Nelson Mandela! How great he was.  
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Interview 40 
Dr Kadom Shubber  
   
The interview is On Article 2 of the constitution. It was done via email and answer 
was received in English on 18th August 2016. A detailed bio is available in his 
earlier interview in this appendix.  
Answer 
 
As Article 2 stands, it provides the minimum required for the protection of 
democracy and Islamic values/principles. The Constitution should have gone into 
more details in expounding the basic liberties that must be guaranteed, or an 
enactment should have been made by parliament to fulfil this. 
  
As regarding abidance by the basic principles of Islam, the problem here is that 
various scholars or schools of thought might put different interpretations on 
Quranic verses and traditions of the Prophet (e.g. those referring to gambling, 
liquor, marriage, divorce, trade, interest-taking etc).  
 
The Constitution should have made provisions for a competent board or a 
recognized authority who could adjudicate in cases of disputes over 
interpretations. Alternatively, a law should have been enacted to deal with this 
matter. 
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Interviews on Shia-Iran relations 
Questions 
1-Do you think the majority of Sunnis in the Arab world generally discriminate against 
the Shia Arabs? 
2- Are the Iraqi Shia justified in turning to Iran for support? Or for feeling that they 
need Iran to support them in a hostile environment? 
3- If Kurdistan chooses independence, and the Iraqi Sunni Arabs follow their route in 
an independent or autonomous region, do you think what remains of Iraq will be 
more than ever under the influence of Iran?  
 
Interview 41 
 Dr Akeel Abbas 
Email interview on Shia-Iran relation. Answer received 20 Aug 2016 in English 
(Interviewee’s bio is available in his earlier interview in this appendix) 
 
1- No, I think the discrimination exists only in Arab societies where Wahhabism 
dominates as a religious ideology and a way of life. The majority of Arab societies 
are not Wahabi. 
2-No, there is no justification to turn towards Iran. Shia Islamist parties promote this 
faulty notion. Iraqi Shia should rely on a strong and fair modern state in Iraq, a state 
they should play a major role in building and upholding. 
3-An Iraq without Sunnis and Kurds would most likely be subject to Iranian influence 
and dictates. Religious and ethnic diversity in Iraq help the country develop more 
balanced foreign policy and relations. 
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The whole issue is the assertion of religious identity. Whenever religious identity is 
asserted, discrimination is likely to emerge. In the 1960s and 1970s, Iraqi Shias did 
not speak about discrimination against them by other Arabs. But the assertion of 
identity, Wahabi, fundamentalist or Shia leads to the emergence of discrimination. 
Historically speaking Iran did not protect Iraqi Shias from discrimination. There is no 
evidence of this since the establishment of the Iraqi state. The whole narrative is 
false. 
   
Interview 42 
Dr Kadom Shubber 
 
Email interview on the alleged discrimination against the Shia in the Arab world 
and also Shia-Iran relations. The answers were received on 20th  Aug 2016 in 
English. (Interviewee’s bio is available in another interview in this appendix).  
 
1-Do you think the majority of Sunnis in the Arab world generally discriminate against 
the Shia Arabs? 
 I THINK THEY DO UNFORTUNATELY. THIS IS HARMFUL TO THEM AS WELL 
TO IRAQI SHIAS.  THIS DISCRIMINATION IS PARTICULARLY OBVIOUS IN THE 
GULF STATES, THOUGH LESS PRONOUNCED IN THE CASE OF THE ARAB 
NORTH AFRICAN COUNTRIES. 
 2- Are the Iraqi Shia justified in turning to Iran for support? or for feeling that they 
need Iran to support them in a hostile environment? 
 IN ESSENCE, THE ANSWER IS YES. HOWEVER, IRAQI SHIAS SHOULD 
ATTEMPT TO ORGANIZE THEMSELVES AND MANAGE THEIR AFFIARS MORE 
EFFICIENTLY AND PROFESSIONALLY, WHILE ALSO ACCEPTING ASSISTANCE 
523 
 
 
FROM WHATEVER SOURCE IN THE WORLD. IN OTHER WORDS, THEY 
SHOULD NOT RELY ON IRAN TOO MUCH. 
4- If Kurdistan chooses independence, and the Iraqi Sunni Arabs follow their 
route in an independent or autonomous region, do you think what remains of 
Iraq will be more than ever under the influence of Iran? 
 
 NO, IRAQI SHIAS HAVE THEIR OWN CULTURE AND VALUES, AND THEY ARE 
UNLIKELY TO BE SUBMERGED INTO IRAN OR AGREE TO DOMINANCE BY 
TEHRAN. AGAIN, THEY MUST STAND ON THEIR OWN FEET AND MANAGE 
THEIR AFFAIRS MORE EFFECTIVELY, WHILE COOPERATING WITH OTHER 
NATIONS WHEREVER POSSIBLE, SEEKING TO SERVE NATIONAL INTERESTS. 
  
 
 
Interview 43 
Maysoon Aldamluji 
Email interview on the alleged discrimination against the Shia in the Arab world 
and also on Shia-Iran relations. The answer was received on 20th Aug 2016 in 
English. 
 
Answers 
Question 1-Do you think the majority of Sunnis in the Arab world generally 
discriminate against the Shia Arabs? 
I think that the majority of Sunnis were not concerned with the sectarian conflict 
before the invasion of Iraq. The rise of political Shiasm in Iraq, followed by the 
Syrian Arab Spring, caused hostility and discrimination towards Shia Arabs. A 
good example is Hassan Nasrullah of Hizbullah. He was idolized by the majority 
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of Sunnis in the Arab world and viewed as an icon of resistance against Israel. 
Since he openly sided with Bashar Al-Asad of Syria, who transformed from 
secularism into a Shia leader backed by Iran, Nasrullah no longer commands a 
popularity that he enjoyed before. 
 
Question 2- Are the Iraqi Shia justified in turning to Iran for support? Or for 
feeling that they need Iran to support them in a hostile environment? 
The majority of Iraqi Shia are proud Arabs who refuse to be subordinated by 
Iranians or anyone else. However, the indifference of some Arab countries to 
their cause, compared with the ease in relations with the Iranian leadership has 
pushed Shia leaders towards Iran. Propaganda through media and religious 
networks has also helped to solidify the Shia need for Iran. Shia population was 
lead to feel under threat from ISIS and other Sunni extremist, backed by Sunni 
Arab governments. 
 
3- If Kurdistan chooses independence, and the Iraqi Sunni Arabs follow their 
route in an independent or autonomous region, do you think what remains of Iraq 
will be more than ever under the influence of Iran?  
Iraq will always be tough to swallow. Recent protests in southern provinces, with 
Shia majority, has openly demonstrated hostility towards Iranian interference in 
Iraq. 
 
Interview 44 
Dr Khalil Osman 
Dr Osman was a BBC journalist before he joined UN as a senior political analyst. He 
was sent to Sudan, Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan and now Somalia. He is the author of 
‘Sectarianism in Iraq: The Making of State and Nation Since 1920’. He holds a PhD 
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from the University of Exeter. The interview is about sectarianism in Iraq. It was done 
via email and the answers were received in English. 
   
There are insights on the relationship between democratization and sectarianism 
scattered throughout my book, especially in the sections which deal with de-
Ba’athification, electoral politics and consociationalism. I hope you were able to pick 
some of these up. But since my book focuses on the relationship between 
sectarianism and state- and nation-building in Iraq, then I will try here to list some 
insights that touch specifically on the relationship between democratization and 
sectarianism. 
There is a two-way relationship between democratization and sectarianism in Iraq. In 
other words, each has had an influence on the other. For one thing, by redrawing the 
balance of power between ethnic and sectarian groups making up the Iraqi people, 
democratization intensified the process of the hardening of ethnic and sectarian 
identities in post-2003 Iraq, which had been swelling beneath the surface under 
Ba’ath Party dictatorship, and accelerated the fragmentation of Iraqi society. As 
such, instead of facilitating the management of social and political conflict in society, 
democratization undermined the prospects of coexistence among various 
communities and fomented inter-communal conflict. 
 
On the other hand, it is hard to see how democratization could have thrived under 
such conditions of extreme social conflict, themselves fueled at least partly by 
democratization, and where large segments of communities find it difficult to live with 
each other in the same state. By promoting consociational power-sharing, 
sectarianism awakened communal fears of marginalization and whipped up 
communal appetites for larger shares of the power pie. Ethno-sectarian 
consociationalism in Iraq bred a style of policymaking and decision-making whereby 
decisions are made not based on a plurality articulating cross-communal interests 
and demands, as one would expect in a normal functioning democracy, but rather 
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between sectarian leaders and parties. As the quest for political power turned into an 
inter-communal zero-sum game, sectarianism helped create a climate conducive for 
the implementation of blanket or root-and-branch de-Ba’athification, thus making it 
possible for the use of this lustration and vetting system into an exclusionary 
mechanism directed primarily, but not exclusively, against the Sunni Arabs. But as 
effective democracy requires equality of opportunity in the political system and for 
self-realization, political inequality nurtured by sectarianism undermined democracy. 
Sectarian strife in Iraq, which unfolded against the backdrop of escalating 
insurgency, indirectly contributed to the strengthening of authoritarian governance. 
Democratic governance in Iraq was undermined when elected governments found 
themselves increasingly called upon to resort to military means to deal with the 
mounting insurgency and terrorist attacks. Militarization had a psychological impact. 
It nurtured the autocratic tendencies of elected governments and senior elected 
officials, especially in a system where significant powers are concentrated in the 
office of the Prime Minister, who is also the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. 
This authoritarian drift on the part of the executive branch of government was 
compounded by the privatization of violence as a result of protracted communal 
tensions and strife. The rise of non-state armed groups, most of which claim to 
provide physical protection to certain communities and to defend their interests, 
weakened the state and its capacity to promote democratization. It also undermined 
democracy as a mechanism to manage social conflict and share power by peaceful 
means and unhampered by threats and intimidation. With the rise of non-state armed 
groups, bullets took precedence over ballots. 
 
Sectarianism has also had a detrimental effect on the prospects of nurturing a 
democratic culture in Iraq. Sectarianism in Iraq gave rise to a view of political power 
as a communal right or entitlement rather than a national trust or patrimony. In such 
an atmosphere, the state becomes booty to be plundered by sectarian bosses and 
their cronies rather than an institutional machinery of governance and service 
delivery. The hardening of sectarian identification promoted non-democratic 
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expressions and discourses where one’s sectarian group is seen as worthy of a 
larger share of political power and of playing a more central role in determining state 
policy and the public interest, while the sectarian ‘Other’ is seen as less deserving of 
political power, whose vision of the public interest is inferior and who should be 
relegated to a lesser role in determining state policy. This has been having a serious 
adverse effect on policymaking. With the lack of strong democratic cultural 
underpinnings and values, legislation on weighty issues and policies can only be 
possible after going through a lengthy process of pulling and hauling among political 
blocs claiming to represent ethnic and sectarian political interests. The outcome has 
been not only gridlock, but also disappointing. Even when the parliament legislates 
laws presumably intended to promote democracy, such as the media law and the 
political parties law, the final drafts that it passes have so many loopholes and 
ambiguities that one ends up wondering how they can truly further democratization in 
Iraq. 
 
Second part of the interview received 7/10/2016 regarding a question about Ayad 
Allawi’s assertion that there is no sectarianism if there are many Islamic parties. 
 
There is an important point here: Islamist parties, and even non-Islamist parties very 
frequently, usually resort to two discourses or a double-discourse. In public, and in 
their media discourse, they usually resort to declaring their commitment to cross-
sectarian, all-encompassing national principles, and claim to be free of sectarian 
inclinations, but in the discourse which they use with their grassroots they resort to 
the tactics of outbidding the other political parties, especially those whose political 
ideology and makeup are inspired and derived from a certain sectarian affiliation, 
and the very same sectarian affiliation to which it itself belongs. In doing so, they 
seek to present themselves as being the most devoted to and capable of 
safeguarding the interests of the sect. From the perspective of open discourse, it is 
true that we see some development in the discourse of these parties. They have 
shunned some of the crude sectarian idioms and methods which they used to use 
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before and adopted a more open discourse. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq, 
the Independent Tribal National Gathering, the Turkmen Justice Party, and other 
Shi’ite and Sunni parties and trends provide live examples of what I am saying. But 
in the discourse which they use with their masses, grassroots and components in the 
course of their attempt to win support in elections, these parties and political entities 
have usually resorted to a sectarian inflammatory discourse which arouses sectarian 
sentiments, and even instincts. Ultimately, this prompts me to say that what you 
relate to me of what has been uttered by Ayad Allawi is an opinion that is at odds 
with realities on the ground. During the time which I spent in the midst developments 
unfolding on the ground in Iraq, many field officials of these parties, who are in direct 
contact with their parties’ grassroots, used to state to me during private meetings 
things that are at odds with the national, all-encompassing discourse of their parties. 
Similarly, I dealt with the issue of de-Ba’athification in my book and explained, citing 
evidence, how competition between Shi’ite Islamist parties prompted them to outbid 
each other at a number of waystations in the development of the de-Ba’athification 
process. Consequently, this has delayed, and sometimes prevented, the enactment 
of laws that could have diluted the intensity of using de-Ba’athification as an 
exclusionary tool. 
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45 
Mr Samir Sumaidaie 
 The interview was conducted via email and answers were given in English and 
received on 30th August 2016. It’s about the alleged discrimination aganst Shia in the 
Arab world and also on Shia-Iran relation. A detailed bio is available within the 
interviewee’s first interview in this appendix. 
 .   
 
Questions 
1-Do you think the majority of Sunnis in the Arab world generally discriminate against 
the Shia Arabs? 
2- Are the Iraqi Shia justified in turning to Iran for support? or for feeling that they 
need Iran to support them in a hostile environment? 
3- If Kurdistan chooses independence, and the Iraqi Sunni Arabs follow their route in 
an independent or autonomous region, do you think what remains of Iraq will be 
more than ever under the influence of Iran?  
 
Answers 
I think this question is not easy to answer, by me at least: 
First, what exactly do you mean by "discriminate", and in what realm? 
- In employment? 
- In marriage? 
- In social interactions? 
- In the application of the law (in courts, by police, provision of government services). 
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- Politically? 
- By simply holding a negative opinion of Shiaa's theological beliefs? 
- By doing business with them? 
- Do Sunnis discriminate all the time or only in certain circumstances (i.e. depending 
on the context)? 
- To the extent discrimination exists, how varied is it (i.e. what is the spectrum across 
countries and social strata)? 
 
You see, as you drill down you will find that a "yes" or "no" answer would be so 
inadequate as to be almost meaningless.  
 
Having said all that, a considerable amount of research through polling and other 
objective methods is needed to clarify the picture and come up with credible 
answers. Anything I say is necessarily subjective, anecdotal and of limited relevance. 
 
I would have said that the majority of Sunnis in the Arab world (mainly Egypt and 
Morocco who have the larger populations) until recently did not know much about the 
Shiaa. Some have a very vague notion of what they are, and some may have been 
even unaware of their existence, until the advent of Iran and the sectarian low level 
war in Iraq and Syria. The situation is very different in Lebanon, which is at the other 
end of the spectrum, because its system of government is based on sectarian 
identity. Gulf countries are in a category of their own. But, even there Oman and 
Yemen (which are more populous) stand apart. Yes, there is some discrimination 
in Saudi Arabia, and the Emirates, and Bahrain. But is it driven by theological 
factors or by political and security factors? Probably the latter. 
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2- Are the Iraqi Shia justified in turning to Iran for support? or for feeling that they 
need Iran to support them in a hostile environment? 
 
I would have asked the question differently:  
 Are the Iraqi Shia WISE in turning to Iran for support?  
 
Forgetting about Sunna and Shiaa, a theocracy (no matter what religion or sect it 
adopts) is an idiosyncrasy in the 21st century. It is a backward step. The Shiaa in 
Iraq, themselves, would be better served to think not in sectarian terms but in the 
more modern sense of being citizens in a country that needs to solve its problems 
and catch up with the world. The moment they start to think in sectarian terms (as 
most of them have already done, encouraged by the Islamists and Iran) they become 
hostages to the logic of sectarian politics which automatically leads to (ةصصاحملا) 
which leads to its twin siblings, namely, corruption and terrorism. And the same logic 
propels them towards reliance on Iran and to confrontation with other Arab societies. 
That, tragically, is what actually happened and that is why we (Shiaa and Sunni) are 
all in the mess we are in. There is no way to get out of it unless sectarian politics is 
abandoned. 
  
3- If Kurdistan chooses independence, and the Iraqi Sunni Arabs follow their route in 
an independent or autonomous region, do you think what remains of Iraq will be 
more than ever under the influence of Iran?  
The logic which I described in the previous reply, makes Iranian domination a given. 
It is the inevitable result of sectarian politics in Iraq. The choice will be between: 
 
A. Iran dominating the whole of Iraq (by keeping a strong grip on Shiaa politics, 
suppressing the Sunnis, and if possible the Kurds.  
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Or 
B. Letting the Kurds and Sunnis go their own way and just keeping the rump Shiaa 
area and Baghdad (after "cleansing" the belt around Baghdad and areas in Diyala 
Province), under their de facto control. 
 
Faced by such a choice, they, of course much prefer "A", because it is a bigger 
territory and, crucially, it affords them to have contiguous territory with access to 
Syria and South Lebanon. This clearly is their preferred choice and is what we 
actually observe in Iranian declared and implicit foreign policy objectives. 
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Interview 46 
Kamran Qaradaghi 
 
Mr Qaradaghi is a veteran Kurdish journalist and writer and of Sunni background. 
The interview was done by email and the answer was received in English on 3rd 
September 2016-09-03. A detailed bio is available within his first interview in this 
aapendix. 
 
Answers 
  
1-Yes I believe this to be the case. The minority Shia in the Arab countries are for 
centuries fearful of oppression and marginalizing by majority Sunni Arabs.  
 
2- Collective security is a major concern of Shia Arabs and for that reason they turn 
to Iran, which is the major powerful state in the region, for protection. The belief 
by Shia Arabs that Iran is the best guarantee for their protection against Sunni Arabs 
have been strengthen and became a reality since the emergence of the Islamic 
Republic. Some turn to Iran because of sectarian ideological reasons (Wilayat Al-
Faqih, etc), others purely for protection. 
 
3- Yes no doubt about that. if that scenario happens the Shia Arabs will feel even 
more vulnerable and an Iraq without Kurds and Sunnis will automatically fall 
completely under the influence of Iran.   
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Interview 47 
Mr Habib Al-Shammery 
 
Mr Al-Shammery is a senior member of the Islamic Da’awa Party (IDP) and former 
senior Iraqi government official. He worked in two ministries, Education and Youth 
and Sport. He is British-educated and has full understanding of both Islamic and 
western cultures. 
Question: Do all members of Da’awa Party have to be religious? And no one can 
join the Da’awa Party if he/she is not religious? Answer received via email on 26th 
September 2016 in English. 
Answer 
 
To be religious is not just observing the rules of the religion such as the prayers. This 
is not a true representation of what a true Muslim is. A true Muslim should have 
respect for all people and their faiths, have humility, have sincere kindness and love 
for their fellow man, not be judgmental, cruel, harsh or evil  and to communicate both 
physically and by their actions peace and unity. They should convey all of these 
actions in their daily lives both privately and publicly. We are after all only human and 
Allah does not judge us, so who are we to think that we can judge others and create 
so many problems and distrust within our families and society. 
Islam is fundamentally considered to be a belief in being a good person and to 
portray all of the above attributes in being a kind, non judgmental and honest 
individual and contribute to their society. 
In response to your question 
You (have) got to be religious, yes (to be a member of the Da’awa Party).  
The interviewee was pressed on the issue with another question and the following 
response was received in Arabic and translated by the author. 
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I have mentioned in another letter that a person must be religious before he is 
accepted in the Da’awa Party. Does this answer your question? 
Glossary 
Anfal Booty 
Athan call to prayer  
Fiqh almaqasid   The jurisprudence of the aims  
Ghanima    booty 
Hawzah    A Shia religious seminary 
Hijra     Migration of the Prophet from Makkah to Madeenah 
Jubba  Religious cloth/Islamic garb 
Sayyid A Shia religious title reserved for those who are 
descendants of the Prophet.  
Salafi Religious trend that advocate the emulation of the 
first generation of Muslims 
Shura Consultation 
Sultan Ruler 
Sulta Power 
 Takfeer  Ex-communication of others   
Taqiyya Dissimulation (the Shia principle of not revealing 
your true opinion if you fear persecution).   
Taqleed   Emulation: Shia principle of following the teaching of 
a senior religious scholar 
Umma  Nation  
Wifaq  Accord  
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 Wilayatul Faqeeh  Rule of the Islamic Jurisprudent (The political system 
currently prevailing in Iran). 
Wilayatul umma ala nafsiha The mandate of the nation on its destiny 
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Appendix 2 
Quotes from public figures published or broadcast in the media  
1 
Sheikh Jaafar Al-Ibrahimi  
 Well-known Iraqi preacher said in a sermon held in Samawa (undated) broadcast by the 
Anwar TV Channel. Youtube link, Al-Anwar TV, undated. Accessed on 4
th
 May 2016. 
 ‘Our problem as a country is not ISIS, not Al Qaeda, not the Kurds or the other components. 
The problem is the so called United Iraqi Alliance (UIA). This is the reality, leave politics 
and media talk aside.  If you review these people in your mind now, they were ‘no bodies’ 
(not known). Has any one of you known them before the establishment of the 169 or so called 
‘The Candle’? No one knew them. I didn’t know them.   
But I came to Samawa, Khidhir, Warkaa, Majid and other places in order to promote the list 
of 169 on behalf of the ‘marji’aya’ (religious authority) and the ‘fudhala’ (senior clerics). I, 
and other clerics, representing the religious establishment, have introduced those people 
(members of 169 list) to the people (of Iraq). We have got them into power.  Before the 
establishment of list 169, no one has heard of them. Najaf has helped them gain power, but 
when they got into power, they did not respect Najaf. They didn’t listen to Najaf’s directions. 
In fact they now fight Najaf and do not miss an opportunity to marginalize Najaf and its role 
and weaken its voice, just like the Abbasids.’ 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eDSDc_L8ZF8  
Also on published on Facebook: 
https://www.facebook.com/588012504550567/videos/1176866175665194/ 
2 
Ayad Jamaluddeen  
MP between 2006-2010. On Ba’ath Party participation in the political process. Interview 
with Shatha Aljuboori published at Alsharq Alawsat newspaper on 14/12/2009. Last accessed 
on 4th May 2016 
Ayad Jamaluddeen called for dialogue with the Baath Party and allowing those Ba’athists 
‘whose hands have not been stained by the blood of the Iraqi people’ to participate in the 
political process. Jamaluddeen called for ‘forcing the Iraqi government to conduct a dialogue 
with the Ba’athists in order to save the blood of Iraqis’. ‘It’s a conflict over power between 
two groups. The one in power now who got there via American tanks and another one that 
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lost power through American tanks’ he told Ashark Alawsat newspaper.  He said both refuse 
to reconcile and the victims are the Iraqi people. 
http://archive.aawsat.com/details.asp?issueno=10992&article=548458#.VyldDagrK1s  
 
Appendix 3 
Use of religious symbols 
                                            Prayer book with the photo of PM Ibrahim Al-
Jaafari distributed during the election campaign 
of Dec 2005  
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Appendix 4 
                                           Ayad Allawi’s distorted poster distributed by 
rival Islamist parties during the elections of 2005. 
The poster likens Allawi to the Ba’ath Party and 
Saddam Hussein, even though he opposed both 
since the early seventies. 
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Appendix 5 
UIA Poster with the photo of Ayatullah Sistani  
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Appendix 6 
UIA Election Poster with the photo of Ayatullah Sistani and the list’s 
election number of (555), distributed during the second election of 
15th Dec 2005 
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Appendix 7 
UIA Election Poster with the photo of Ayatullah Sistani with their 
list number (169), distributed during the elections of 30th Jan 2005 
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Appendix 8 
PM Al-Maliki’s poster promoting him as the ‘Muktar of the Time’, likening himself to the 
ancient Shia hero (Al-Mukhtar) who fought the Sunnis and killed their leaders 
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Appendix 9 
SIIC leaders, Abdul-Azeez Al-Hakeem, Adil Abdul Mahdi and Hadi Al-Amiri promoting 
themselves during the Ashoora Shia religious occasion. SIIC is part of UIA Islamic Shia list 
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Appendix 10 
Presidential order to appoint the president’s daughter, Jwan Masum, as advisor to her 
father, President Fuad Masum 
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Appendix 11 
Poster distributed across Iraq during elections showing the photo of Ayatullah’s Kadhim 
Haeri’s fatwa declaring it’s religiously unlawful to elect secular candidates  
  
 
 
